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TRUMP, AMERICA AND EASTERN EUROPE

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editorial discussion

Trump, America and Eastern Europe

R Kowal | Malicki | Micgiel | Pełczyńska-Nałęcz | Riabchuk

Warsaw
East
European
Review

V. Public Sphere in Post-Soviet space

Foreword

What challenges does East Central Europe face today? Now fully sovereign, the countries of the region seek new partnerships globally, address new and old problems locally, and engage their neighbours to tackle issues of common interest.

This, the eighth edition of the Warsaw East European Review (WEER) is the consequence of the 2017 Warsaw East European Conference, entitled "East Central Europe vis-a-vis Global Challenges". Some ninety scholars met and presented their views over four days of meetings in Warsaw in July 2017. The editors invited those with particularly timely remarks to submit their essays for publication, and have included a discussion of the WEER editorial board.

The volume begins with a discussion of a group of experts concerning "President Trump's America and Eastern Europe" and remarks during the conference by two former U.S. ambassadors touching on the same topic. Additional texts were delivered during panels examining: EU policy toward the Black Sea region; security, borders and regional conflict in East Central Europe; hybrid aggression and cyber security; regional security; Germany's new partners: bilateral security relations of Europe's reluctant leader; Central and Eastern Europe on the new Silk Road; the Caucasus; transformation in East and Central Europe; Russia and its neighbours; restoring Ukraine; European Union policy toward East Central Europe; challenges for the security policy of the Eastern European countries; East Central European foreign policy towards Russia; propaganda; what's new in Polish-Ukrainian relations; Israel/Middle East and Central and Eastern Europe/Poland; transformation of political systems and historical memory; Belarus between East and West; natural resources as a policy tool; and religion, identity and politics. Partner institutions cosponsored some of the sessions including: the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland; George C. Marshall Center; the embassy of the Republic of Georgia; the Center for Asian Affairs of the University of Łódź; the Israel Council on Foreign Relations; the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum; and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The organizers wish to express their gratitude to them and to the scholars who participated in the conference and in this volume.

Paweł Kowal, John S. Micgiel

I

Trump, America and Eastern Europe

Trump, America and Eastern Europe

An editorial discussion of the Warsaw East European Review

with: *Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, Jan Malicki, John S. Micgiel and Mykola Riabchuk*
led by: *Paweł Kowal*

Paweł Kowal[1]: Thank you for coming to our annual meeting. A certain paradox is that when President Trump became president of the United States, today's undersecretary of state for our part of Europe participated in the formulation of a letter on behalf of people from Central Europe, the point of which was to express concern that President Trump will change the current policy in our region, in other words, most experts expected the worst. The letter appeared more or less a year ago in *The New York Times,* and today Wess Mitchell, our colleague, is an important person in the administration. I think that this is a benchmark of how things with Donald Trump in matters of Central and Eastern Europe have gone so far, certainly differently than pessimists expected – we will get to this point in the discussion. Meanwhile, I would like to refer to the roots. I want us to think about how it happened that America has been so strongly present in our part of the world since the 1980s and 1990s. This was decided by politics, by events in the world in the 1970s, but sometimes there is also the role of the individual. I think that you cannot talk about it seriously in Poland without being reminded of one person, and that is Zbigniew Brzezinski, and I would

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like to start with this. What was the contribution of Zbigniew Brzezinski? I would like to ask for personal assessments on Zbigniew Brzezinski's contribution to the fact that America has become so involved in our region since the 1970s. After Carter's presidency, the first programs for supporting independent publications in Ukraine appeared.

Jan Malicki[2]: In Ukraine? In Poland!

Paweł Kowal: In Poland too, but also in Ukraine.

John S. Micgiel[3]: It started much earlier. In the mid-1950s there were programs for sending books to various institutions in this part of Europe, as well as supporting the opposition through financial subsidies for publications published in the second circulation. Not long ago Adrian Karatnycky, on the eve of the appointment of Mateusz Morawiecki as prime minister, mentioned that he sent money from the United States to his father in Wroclaw for Fighting Solidarity. These were not large sums, but allowed them to do things that they would not otherwise be able to do.

Paweł Kowal: Professor, I think it's worth reminding ourselves. Let's say why Brzezinski's role was exceptional to the extent that one could say that if it were not for Brzezinski, American policy would be different. I think the point is that we didn't say it well to each other.

John S. Micgiel: Brzezinski was already present, so to speak, at the center of decision-making in the United States when the changes started in Poland in the 1970s. Early in the 1960s, he advised Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and in 1977 he became an adviser to Jimmy Carter and then had a huge impact on US foreign policy. President Reagan also suggested to Brzezinski that he could continue his work as a National Security Advisor, but Brzezinski refused. Despite this refusal, in later years he cooperated with committees and advisory bodies of Reagan and also Presidents, George Bush senior, and Barack Obama.

Paweł Kowal: He was ideologically prepared to fight the system, he was one of the creators of the definition of totalitarianism, he had legal, business and political experience in administration. I think you have to place him as an extremely versatile person who suddenly finds himself in a unique place.

John S. Micgiel: In 1956, he published a book with Carl J. Friedrich under the title 'Totalitarian Dictatorship and Authoritarian Control', which was received with great interest by American academia. Harvard University did not sufficiently appreciate Brzezinski and his work, and Columbia University in New York benefited, offering him a position as lecturer in 1959. He had a great career in New York, and at that time he also worked as an adviser to two Democratic administrations in Washington. He made contact with business

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[2] **Jan Malicki** – Director of the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw. A member of the first underground editorial board of the underground journal Obóz (1981), then later its editor-in-chief (1982), he was founder and head of the underground Institute of Eastern Europe (1983–1985); founder and chief editor of the quarterly Przegląd Wschodni (since 1991); co-founder (1990), and later, director of the Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw; author of the Eastern Studies program, coordinator of government and university scholarship programs for the East and permanent deputy chairman of the "Consortium of Ukrainian Universities and the University of Warsaw". Chairman of the "Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum" inaugurated in January 2017, in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

[3] **John Stanley Micgiel –** Former lecturer on international affairs at Columbia University, former director of the Institute of East Central Europe and deputy director of the Harriman Institute. Former president and executive director of the Kościuszko Foundation in New York. Recurring visiting professor of the University of Warsaw's Centre for East European Studies and the Estonian Diplomatic School. His area of academic interest encompasses contemporary history and current policy of the countries of East Central Europe.

people, including David Rockefeller, who began to support him. At the time when Jimmy Carter was running his presidential campaign, Brzezinski reportedly approached him and suggested that he would be willing to act as his international advisor. When Carter won the election, Professor Brzezinski was appointed as National Security Adviser, and soon became one of the most influential figures in the Carter administration.

Paweł Kowal: How does the role of Brzezinski look from the point of view of Ukrainian political science?

Mykola Riabchuk[4]: Brzezinski is not so well known. He is seen rather as a symbolic figure, but without details of his texts or specific activities. He is known rather because he was demonized by Russian and Moscow propaganda, and because of that he was some kind of "demon", the incarnation of American evil, a major anti-Soviet. And in Ukraine, the attitude towards him depended mainly on whether you were anti-Soviet or on the contrary whether you were on the Russian side. That is why he was either judged as Moscow suggested or, to the contrary, he was worshipped, but it was mainly because he was anti-Soviet, it was not about the details. In the last decade some of his works began to be translated, for example the Great Chessboard was released in Ukrainian.

Paweł Kowal: Being in Ukraine, I have many times heard some reflections that someone has read or heard about the Great Chessboard.

Mykola Riabchuk: It appeared in a small edition with some delay.

Paweł Kowal: He aptly pointed out that the cause of instability in the region would be the Crimea issue when nobody before said anything about it.

Mykola Riabchuk: This issue was always talked about a bit. It simply was not taken seriously. Besides, Sergei Averincev once recounted the reflections of his mother, who in 1954, as Khrushchev handed over Crimea to Ukraine, said that *when Ukraine would want to separate, it would be a problem*. Also, it was not quite unknown and unpredictable. And even more so after the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.

Paweł Kowal: For the soviets Brzezinski was a demon, for us more a demiurge. This means that Brzezinski shaped US policy in various ways at key moments for security such as the campaign for NATO, this shaped opinions in Poland and the region in subsequent administrations, up to Clinton and Bush. I would like to come back to this moment.

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz[5]: This moment was inscribed in a coherent continuation of a certain vision of the region, a vision of the Soviet Union, a vision of the region's significance for security relations between the United States and the Soviet Union presented by Brzezinski in the United States consistently for decades. It began with a coherent

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[4] **Mykola Riabchuk -**Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Political and Nationalities' Studies in Kyiv, co-founder and co-editor of the *Krytyka* monthly (1997), president of the Ukrainian PEN Center.

[5] **Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz** – Sociologist and political scientist, specializing in Polish foreign policy and East European issues. From 2012 to 2014, undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from 2014 to 2016, ambassador of Poland to the Russian Federation and from 2016 Director of the Open Europe Programme at the Batory Foundation. In 1999–2012, she worked at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), among others, as head of the Russian department and deputy director. In 2011, she was in Brussels as the OSW permanent representative at the French Institute of International Relations. In 2009–2010, she became a member of the Steering Committee of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, and from 2008–2012, member of the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters. A participant in many Polish and international research projects, as well as the author of dozens of publications dedicated to transformation in Russia and East European countries, Polish Eastern policy and Polish-Russian relations. A guest Lecturer at Warsaw University's Centre for East European Studies.

narrative that you could not only focus on the arms race, that human rights are very important in these countries and that it is not just the United States versus the Soviet Union, but a Soviet Empire that goes beyond the Soviet Union and it is crucial for how these relations will be managed. Most importantly it was the introduction of our countries into the American field of vision, as it is known that Americans usually see small countries on other continents through a fog. It was something completely new and that is why at the time of Solidarity, the same argument was raised. And when it came to arguing for the enlargement of NATO, it was not embedded in a void. It was clear to the American elites that these countries came from somewhere and that it was part of the whole show that Central and Eastern Europe was a key region to the security of the United States. The key reason is that it acts as the brake to Russian imperial ambitions and that if these imperial ambitions are not constrained then they would pose a threat not only to the regional environment, but as a global threat. This work has previously been carried out for decades, and this narrative, afterwards, and the argumentation regarding the Crimea was its continuation. Brzezinski began to argue in the same way that if Ukraine is truly sovereign and free from Russia, then Russia will never be so dangerous and that it is a very important factor. For us, this is super-obvious, and in the United States it is still in many circles debatable. People ask why a small country somewhere at the end of the world is important for American security. It really took years of work to instill this logic in there and it worked well upon our entry into NATO, and later was verified by the annexation of Crimea and it in turn formed the United States' strong stance that it should engage in the conflict, not directly militarily but politically to counteract Russian aggression.

Paweł Kowal: To Jan Malicki, when did you first hear about Brzezinski?

Jan Malicki: From Radio Free Europe of course, like everyone here. I'm reminded that when I created the Eastern Summer School 27 years ago, and the first students from Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and Bulgaria came here and lectures were held by such people as Wandycz, Morawski, Davies, the participants did not believe that they would ever see them because they had only heard about them on Radio Svoboda, they could only read about them in the papers as being the worst demons. For me, Brzezinski was a mythical figure you heard about on Free Europe, then I saw him in Warsaw during Carter's famous visit and of course the crowds gathered to see the participants of the presidential entourage. I saw him somewhere on Miodowa Street, near the entrance to the Primate's residence in Poland, as Carter met with Gierek and with Cardinal Wyszynski. We then joked that Brzezinski had met with Interrex on behalf of the American Empire. If anyone remembers the powerful figure of Cardinal Wyszyński, his style, his behavior, his approach to his responsibility for the country, the nation and when it's combined with historical knowledge, it can be assumed, as he thought, that during the occupation he took responsibility for the fate of the nation.

Paweł Kowal: And in the 1980s, how did you perceive the role of Brzezinski? He was then formally outside the administration. Did the people in opposition in Poland realize that he was still playing a political role because it was not clear that Brzezinski had such an important role with Reagan, actually it is not clear to many until today. From what Professor Micgiel has said, that Brzezinski had access to the Reagan administration, the fact that he was working on his behalf has only been known for literally 3–4 years, from recently discovered documents, so it was not so clear.

Jan Malicki: For me it is also new, fascinating information that he had access to secret under Reagan, none of us knew that. This always requires the personal decision of the president, but he was positive about Reagan and his surroundings. Of course, we were aware of the role of Brzezinski mainly for two reasons. First of all in connection with the so-called Carnival of Solidarity when a lot began to be known, about the role of Brzezinski and his contact with John Paul II. This combination is not accidental. We look at it from the position of Poland at that time: debased, conquered, occupied, and suddenly a Pole becomes an advisor to the leader of a major world power and same time a second Pole is at the head of the Vatican, the global church.

Paweł Kowal: Today we know that they had contact, we have their correspondence …

Jan Malicki: There was a funny anecdote in the memoirs of Brzezinski when the author recalls the first telephone conversation with John Paul II. It was very soon after the election because Brzezinski naturally immediately recognized that this was a key issue for world politics. Then they made a call from Washington DC, from Brzezinski's office to Rome, at some point Brzezinski's secretary said that she had got through to the Pope, and Brzezinski took the telephone. It turned out that he had to go through three more secretaries – each of them nuns – and these secretaries began speaking in Italian, but when it turned out that it was Brzezinski, everyone spoke Polish. Finally he reached the last secretary and Pope. They talked for a long time, and agreed that they had to meet quickly, and then Brzezinski said: "Your Holiness, because there will be matters that will require immediate contact, I would like to ask if it would be possible to get a private telephone number to Your Holiness?" And here Brzezinski writes that there was silence and suddenly he heard somewhere in the background: "Stas, do I have a private number?"

Brzeziński and others

Paweł Kowal: Let us summarize why America is interested in our region?

Mykola Riabchuk: First, a small digression. It was the promotion of Brzezinski and the Pope from Moscow's point of view that was part of the "American conspiracy", it was obvious to them that it was a conspiracy that America had deliberately promoted the Pope, promoted Brzezinski and Solidarity, and that fueled paranoia.

Paweł Kowal: Especially since it was clear that at some point, or at least for those in the know, the voices of the German cardinals had actually prevailed. I would like us to do a short ranking, without commenting on the characters, who, in your opinion, shaped the United States approach to our part of Europe, I mainly think about characters somehow related to our part of the world. I am asking you for your rankings of the people who you think have influenced or shaped the political and intellectual atmosphere, so that future American administrations would be involved in our part of the world.

John S. Micgiel: There were influential politicians of Polish origin, for example, a Congressman from Detroit, Michigan, John J. Dingell junior who was the longest-serving representative in Congress, serving for 59 years. Or Congressman Dan Rostenkowski from Chicago, who served for 36 years and played a critical role during Reagan's administration in formulating a new US tax policy. There was Senator Edmund Muskie, a very prominent politician who was a Democratic candidate for the post of vice president in 1972, and later

served as Secretary of State in the administration of President Carter. And of course, scholars, especially in the field of research dealing with Central and Eastern Europe, Tsarist Russia or the USSR, among whom political emigres from this region of Europe dominated, such as the late professors Adam Ulam, Piotr Wandycz, Anna Cienciała, and probably the first person whom I should mention, Oskar Halecki. Halecki was a real titan in this group, who worked not only on Polish matters, but also the idea of East Central Europe, which he introduced into the narrative of geopolitics and historiography.

Paweł Kowal: And in January 1966 he was thankful for Cardinal Wyszyński's absence from Rome for making all the front pages of the newspapers in the world after giving a lecture for Paul VI. Mykola, your ranking? Maybe characters more connected with Ukraine, who influenced the formation of American policy regarding our region.

Mykola Riabchuk: Ukraine has never really been on the American mind map, except for Brzezinski and maybe Reagan, who had the courage to say that the Soviet Union was an evil empire – a stand which today's American leaders lack. This is probably the only president who was appreciated in Ukraine and Brzezinski, who is also associated partly with Reagan, with his tough policy and, thanks to his Russian "advertisement", is very respected.

Paweł Kowal: It seems to me that the Ukrainian lobby in America is not so weak, and when it comes to the form of the organization, it can often be even stronger than the Polish ...

Mykola Riabchuk: Of course, there is a lobby in Washington, especially active today and I would say effective, but it has never really been at a very high level ...

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: Let's not forget about Jeziorański.

Paweł Kowal: Soros? He is demonized today, yet his influence and readiness to spend money to raise awareness of the situation in Central Europe is enormous.

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: Soros's role was not such that he made Americans aware of the situation in the region, but in reality he was changing the situation, it is a little bit different. As far as Jeziorański goes he was saying you should accept these countries, mainly Poland, but it was known that if Poland was accepted then the rest would also join to NATO. He emphasized the situation, raised the issue of security. For Soros, he has not so much appealed to the Americans as he is more involved than that, changing not only institutions, but also the social mentality ...

John S. Micgiel: Soros can be referred to as an enabler, or activator.

Paweł Kowal: Katarzyna, in your ranking would Jan Nowak-Jeziorański be first?

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: First Brzezinski, but Jeziorański is very high.

John S. Micgiel: It should be mentioned that Nowak-Jeziorański introduced Brzezinski to people from the Polish opposition, among others such as Adam Michnik.

Jan Malicki: It seems to me that it is important to remind ourselves about how Brzeziński publicly appeared in Poland for the last time after receiving the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański prize in Wroclaw in 2014. At some point, he got annoyed with the questions the journalist was asking him and began to talk about what it was like in the 70s before Solidarity. He was saying that at some point in Washington they realized that the development of communism was a matter of urgent danger, it was decided to work in different, complementary ways, and to literally support the national movements in Central Europe. And when it comes to the ranking, since I am the last to speak and I have calmly thought about it, I would say – in one group I would put people of intellectual influence between the years 1900–2000,

for example Paderewski, Kucharzewski, Halecki, and Miłosz would be in this group, but it is only an all-Polish group of intellectuals, apart from Paderewski of course ...

Paweł Kowal: It seems to me that in America universities play a greater role than in Poland.

Jan Malicki: Jan Kucharzewski, who is so valued by us, also appeared there and was even quoted in the documents of the American State Department...

Paweł Kowal: And Bączkowski? If someone's book is a textbook at the Military Academy, then it has no impact? It does have an impact.

Jan Malicki: I put them together in one group because it's like saying that the study of Eastern Europe has an impact on Poland's foreign policy.

Paweł Kowal: It doesn't?

Jan Malicki: My influence equals zero in the literal sense. We only influence the students who come here, who are somehow shaped. If they then go to the administration or foreign service, it can be said that in this sense we have influenced them.

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: Well, if we over-adjust the criteria, we'll almost finish with just one name here ...

Jan Malicki: Brzezinski is obvious to everyone, but of course there is Richard Pipes. At first, it was the case that Polish or Jewish political émigrés from Europe were familiar with our part of the world. Brzezinski, Pipes, and here I would add Senator J. William Fulbright. He was criticized for how scholarships established by him were being awarded, but the idea was to get people, including the communist elite, into another world. I would put Fulbright in fourth place, and in the fifth, Charles Jackson who was the head of the National Committee for a Free Europe He, as chairman raised money for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I met him, an extremely influential person who stood quietly in the background. My ranking would include these five people.

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: Is there room for Jeziorański?

Jan Malicki: Jeziorański is in the group of intellectuals, these are the behind-the-scenes activists in my opinion.

Mykola Riabchuk: Apart from Roman Szporluk, of course, I would also add Lev Dobrianski. He was involved in Ukrainian affairs, but his daughter Paula was especially important because she worked in the American government. As for Szporluk, he did not admit to his Ukrainianness for a long time, his main works were on Pokrowski, Masaryk, Marx and Friedrich List. He was publishing in the Ukrainian journal *Suczasnosti* under a pseudonym. At that time, the Ukrainian subject matter in the western academic world looked quite suspicious – as the domain of nationalists, a kind of obsession. The Ukrainian theme simply did not exist in America, unlike the Polish theme. There was no Ukraine, there was no scientific topic. Exactly, all the most prominent Ukrainian scholars in the West built their careers and scientific reputations on non-Ukrainian subjects – from Czyżewski, Lucki, Pricak, Ihor Shevchenko, and up to Hryhorij (George) Grabowicz. A country that did not exist on the geographical map could not exist on the mental map.

America and the region after 1991

Paweł Kowal: By 1989, we have America delighted because at least some of the Soviet Empire was destroyed, and later in 1991 the Soviet Union itself. There was a discussion in which it was not at all obvious that America would want to engage in Central Europe. There were ideas to isolate again and to recognize that a certain stage in history is over. In a sense, it was only the war in Kuwait that started some thinking that it was not. There was talk about a Paxamericana, and deep American political and economic involvement in our part of the world. From the point of view of Poland, this meant a unique opportunity to be under an umbrella of protection against Russian imperialism and the consequences of the breakup of the Soviet states. The umbrella allowed us to develop quite quickly for the first time in over 200 years and at the same time guaranteed a certain stability of relations with Germany thanks to the fact that America also strongly supported European integration. So we have a period of uncertainty after 1989 – what will America do with its victory? We have the end of 1991/1992 when it was decided that America wants to be a world hegemon and wants to be a guarantor of security in Central Europe. My thesis is that it was also influenced by personal arrangements, and business interests, an American way of thinking. I would like to ask you about your interpretations of these phenomena. Why did America, despite the fact that it didn't have to get involved anymore now that the Soviet Union was broken and that certain goals were achieved, become so strongly involved in our part of Europe 25 years ago?

John S. Micgiel: I believe that among other things, it is because Brzezinski had a student named Madeleine Albright, and it was she in the Clinton administration who continued Brzezinski's thinking regarding American policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland. Prof. Albright was an extremely energetic person who had a strong influence on the president of the United States and who, despite other advisers, was able to convince Clinton to accept her ideas. Here I am referring to Strobe Talbott, who as undersecretary at the State Department focused on the Russian Federation, and in 1996 was worried mainly about the elections that were to take place then in Russia. The sharp clashes between Talbott and Albright occurred at a time when NATO enlargement was being discussed and that Poland should join the Pact, among others. Talbott believed that because of the elections in Russia, it was not the best time to expand NATO. It was then that the Idea of the Partnership for Peace was born, a controversial project that Walesa called a necktie for a coffin. There were other quotes of this kind, that reflected a feeling of frustration not only of Poles, but also of other nations in this part of Europe, who believed that the Americans were again talking above their heads with the Russians, and making decisions for them but without them. Mr. Talbott won this battle but Secretary Albright loyally introduced the Partnership for Peace project. But there were times when she raised her voice to Clinton and forced him to agree to her proposals.

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: I wonder if we do not look at it too historically. At one point it was known that what the Americans were involved in was a guarantee of security for our region, but in the early 1990s there was also a very strong component of thinking that the Americans were essentially involved in expanding the western boundaries, which perhaps Russia would become a part of, or at least would be a pleasant partner. It was a completely different perspective, an opportunity to change Russia or at least to favor

pro-Western change and build "the western world from Vancouver to Vladivostok". It really functioned as something realistic at the time. And we know that after all, the Americans had a romantic period until the mid-1990s, a belief in the durability of democratic change in the world. Some took even longer to understand the world in which they live. That's why investing in our region was played so cautiously on both sides, so as not to put off Russia, it was an element in actually building a unified, unipolar western world in which Russia was not supposed to be an adversary. Russia was supposed to be if not a part of it, then something friendly on the periphery. Today we see it was completely unrealistic thinking on many levels.

Paweł Kowal: These were the times when *Foreign Affairs* published articles about buying half of Siberia from Russia ...

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: Well, just a completely unrealistic conviction that after several hundred years of such history, country could be transformed by some institutions in a few years. I think that for all of us this is a great historical lesson, but politics concerning our region were also built on this based illusions. And to imagine that there might be some confrontation was really very limited, as proved by the famous Budapest Memorandum, because if the United States imagined that they would ever have to comply with it, they never would have agreed to the memorandum. The fact that something like this was ever signed only shows how unlikely the parties considered an armed Russian aggression against Ukraine. I think it is important to remember a different perspective today: at that time, America, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, invested in the transformation of Russia. To a large extent, that has been stolen, eaten and wasted.

Mykola Riabchuk: I would just like to point out that Ukraine has never been a part of Central and Eastern Europe in the American consciousness, it was part of the Eurasian space, therefore it was also always looked at through the lens of Moscow. And today Ukraine is still in the Eurasian department at the State Department. These departments have been reshaped and Ukraine is not in the one that deals with Europe, but it is still Eurasia from the perspective of the American official machine. And that is why this memorandum was signed. I said that in the case of Central Europe, of course, Talbott was counterbalanced by Albright, and in the case of Ukraine, Talbott was not balanced by Albright but dominated. Talbott's position was important, obviously pro-Russian and pro-Moscow. Maybe now they are just starting to realize that this was something else.

Paweł Kowal: Do you think that the assessment of the American approach to Ukraine was affected by the impression made by G.H.W. Bush's speech in Kiev in early August 1991?

Mykola Riabchuk: This speech is very well remembered in Ukraine. However, it was not just a speech about Ukraine, it was his declaration that they were afraid of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Bush warned against *suicidal nationalism*, but it was a message not only for Ukraine, but for all the republics to support Gorbachev, not to "play for sovereignty."

Ukraine from the American perspective

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: I would put forward the thesis that the Americans only noticed Ukraine as something truly separate at the time of the annexation of Crimea, or even a moment after the conflict began.

Paweł Kowal: What is the perception of the role of America at the beginning of Ukraine's independence, or is the Ukrainian perception that the Americans helped?

Mykola Riabchuk: Bush's contribution was embarrassing and probably until today no one has forgotten about it, and even during his visit to Kiev after his presidency, he was asked about it. He tried to justify himself saying that he meant something else, he was a little ashamed of this statement. I do not think that America played such a big role …

Paweł Kowal: This is an interesting difference, because for example from the Polish point of view the role of America in regaining independence is large and it is clear to everyone that American support was very important in 1988, 1989 and after 1991.

Mykola Riabchuk: In the case of Ukraine, this was not the case, the position that we must stay in the Soviet Union, in my opinion, was clearly perceived as such by Ukraine. Our independence happened in my opinion because Ukraine was already a member of the UN; if it had not been a member of the United Nations, I am sure that for a few years at least America would not recognize independence, and not only America, but everyone else, because America decides. It is fortunate that Stalin incorporated the country into the UN and that it could no longer be ignored if it was already a UN member.

Jan Malicki: The key was Belavezha. Belavezha made it impossible not to recognize it. Four months after Bush's visit in Kiev, it was Belavezha. I made many hours of recordings with those who signed the Belavezha Accords. Kiebicz and Fokin claimed that they were deceived and did not know what they were signing, and if they were to do it again, they would absolutely not sign it. It was otherwise with Burbulis, Krawczuk and Szuszkiewicz, with whom I talked for many hours. They say that they were not deceived, they knew what they were signing and if it happened again they would sign again. They also mention that at some point they rang to notify Gorbachev, and he said: "*I am president, how could you not talk to me, and apart from that what is the world going to say, what is Bush going to say?"* To which Yeltsin replied: *"We have already talked with Bush …"*

Paweł Kowal: But I asked about perceptions, and here the key is not a historical survey but how Ukrainians see the role of America in the region just after 1991.

Mykola Riabchuk: Most saw it as the stupidity of America, which was pressuring hard because it did not quite understand why it was wrong not only to give away nuclear weapons, but to give them to Russia! That was the most controversial. If only America took the weapons for itself, but to give it to Russia? The 1994 memorandum from the beginning was criticized in Ukraine, it was always seen as a paper that was worth nothing, that Kravchuk lost because he did not receive any real guarantee for the rockets he gave away.

John S. Micgiel: Just a note to this conversation, do you know how Bush's statement in Kiev is known in the US?

Paweł Kowal: Yes, they call it the Chicken Kiev speech. He spoke on the basis of what was then being discussed in America, only it was received in a completely different way in the Ukrainian context. In America at that time there was a widespread opinion that nationalism is a threat to this part of the region. In fact, Pope Jaon Paul II said the same thing in 1991 in Poland. At that time, the West was dominated by the conviction that our region was susceptible to nationalism and that nationalism would lead to a fuss in Central Europe and no one wants to pay for it anymore. Bush's statement, of course, must be read in this context. In the context of the very awakened Ukrainian aspirations of the collapsing Soviet Union a few days later, it looks embarrassing.

Mykola Riabchuk: Especially that Kravchuk was a nationalist like I am an Islamist. The perception of America in Ukraine began to improve more or less during the Clinton period. Clinton's visit to Kiev was very well received in the country, he made a great speech at the Mikhailovsky Square next to the Saint Sophia Cathedral. Only then came the war in Yugoslavia, the atmosphere got worse and Moscow used it for powerful anti-American propaganda and approval ratings for the US and for NATO dropped.

The case of annexation of Crimea

Paweł Kowal: I think that the next point of our conversation should be what Katarzyna raised, namely the issue of a clear breakthrough, which was the annexation of Crimea and the entry of the Russians into Donbass. Russia's entry into Georgia did not cause a reevaluation in Western thinking. It happened around 2014, it was also the end of Obama's term and the question is, do you interpret these events as some closure of the era, which began with the American policy towards the region in the early 1990s? Are they bookends? Is Trump doing something new already?

John S. Micgiel: Maybe we'll start with President Obama, who during his first four-year term was not interested in US foreign policy, and was focused instead on American internal politics. This is not atypical, because President Clinton only became interested in foreign policy during his second term also. It was during his second term that President Obama exhibited a liberal vision of the international order. As Andrzej Dąbrowski the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) rightly pointed out recently, the announced change in US foreign policy resulted not so much from the consistent views presented by Trump, but from his electoral rhetoric and from his personal dislike of Obama's policies. The introduction of changes in international politics is difficult for President Trump to put into practice and they have only occurred in those areas where it has been easy to implement. Despite his harsh criticism of European NATO members for insufficient defense spending, and despite the suggestion that American attachment to NATO may be conditional, Trump has upheld Obama's decision to increase the US presence in Europe, including the transfer of a heavy armored brigade to NATO's eastern flank and a proposed increase in the European Empowerment Initiative budget (ERI) in 2018.

We were all here when President Trump arrived in Warsaw in July 2017, we and it seemed to me that there would be a greater popular response in Poland, that there would be the same crowds as were the case when Presidents Clinton, Bush Senior and Bush Junior came here.

Jan Malicki: That it would look like the nation wants him …

Paweł Kowal: Were there not many people there?

John S. Micgiel: There were fewer people than, for example, when Paderewski's body was transported in June 1992 from Washington to St. John's Cathedral in Warsaw.

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: A lot of people came by bus like an organized trip.

John S. Micgiel: And in Polish newspapers, the issue of visa-free travel keeps recurring. Just as Obama said he would sort it out, Trump promised that he would do it in the first weeks of his presidency, but nothing has happened so far.

Paweł Kowal: Let's recall the discussion we had about what would happen if Trump became president. That America would withdraw, America would make a deal with Russia, all terrible things. Meanwhile, Washington maintains a military presence in Central Europe, supports Ukraine militarily and politically ...

Mykola Riabchuk: He even promises weapons unlike Obama ...

Paweł Kowal: So, something different has happened than we expected ...

Jan Malicki: I dare to say here that these assessments were not completely without sense based on the analysis of Trump's views and statements. I'm afraid that the merit is not on Trump's side but we owe it to Putin.

Paweł Kowal: And to Ambassador Kislyak ...

Jan Malicki: This meant that even if the plan was to appease relations with Moscow, damaged after Crimea, it was no longer possible.

Paweł Kowal: Do you think that the experts did not err, but that the circumstances changed?

Jan Malicki: Experts based their analysis on images, profiles, statements and views, and in this sense partly they and we were right, each of us was afraid. We simply owe this to Moscow's actions and I will add a small parabola that this is the same situation as in the late 1990s. The romantic American policy of the 1990s, which terrified us, wanted to have a partner in Moscow. Western money was consciously spent there, just to keep it going, only it had no effect. As a result, Poland and then then the entire region had to be admitted to NATO. I am remind of the attitude of Richard Pipes who understood this region, and when he came here for the first time to the Eastern Summer School he was attacked because it was fresh after his statement that Poland should not be admitted to NATO. He finally spoke to me in private: "Sir, tell me what is going on, why are they all attacking me, and even shouting at me?" I replied: "Professor, the point is that during communism, we were afraid that you would be conspiring with Moscow, and our dream is to anchor Poland in NATO because without it we will be in danger. In short, this question is why did you say that?" He responded: "Why? Because I think it is dangerous for America, it's not about my Polish origin, it is dangerous for America because if NATO comes here, Russia will react so that America will have to respond not only with an army, but perhaps with war." In short, he spoke as an official of the American state, and where he came from did not matter. In fact, this is how it works in America, if you are an official there, the question of roots does not matter.

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: I would like to take a moment to go back to the issue of the war in Georgia. Why did Georgia not impress the Americans? First of all because who knows where Georgia is? It is far away and actually not in Europe, but also the whole situation of this war was such that it really was very difficult to explain that the Russians actually attacked. It was manipulated in such a way that it looked like it was actually a Georgian provocation that might undermine a heated status quo, and the Russians simply said no to the provocation. Hence, it was the ambiguity around this whole situation and the geographical distance. It made it possible for the French to move the agenda on quite quickly. With Ukraine it was different because Ukrainian Crimea was seized overnight.

Mykola Riabchuk: But they tried to play the same hand...

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: They tried, but it was no longer possible to sell such a version to anyone. Obama did not show any interest in Ukraine until 2014, because he considered Russia harmless like a toothless, collapsing empire, which is a bit like how

the Russians sometimes look at the European Union. Until the decision on sanctions they looked at it this that way for sure, and then they were surprised. So was Obama, because this toothless failing state has been preserved effectively, militarily, aggressively – like an empire. But why were the Americans dragged in? Because the Russians set the axis of this struggle as a Russian-American conflict. After all, Moscow did not say: "We will handle our affairs with the Ukrainians," just something like: "We are fighting with the United States in the Crimea and Ukraine." There are many people in high positions near Putin who believe in such a distorted picture of the world. In this situation, the United States could no longer stay out of the conflict and the key person was Joe Biden. The vice-president took Ukraine to the higher political leadership in the United States as his own issue, he traveled, spoke, argued, acted. It did not happen again with Trump and it cannot be repeated. There is a huge difference, rarely noticed, between Obama's – actually Biden's --policy towards Ukraine, and that of Trump today. Obama thought about Ukraine with regard to the EU, he saw the security component and the issue of systemic transformation. Trump does not think much about Ukraine at all, but let's say the Trump administration thinks only in terms of security, without giving much importance to systemic transformation. This is also of great importance in my opinion for Ukrainian politics, because it encourages Porosh-enko to do what he does because he thinks that he will always sell the Americans on "we fight with Russia" and that the transformation component is irrelevant. That is because the Russians properly dealt with the lack of transaction elements in relations with Ukraine, because they bound Trump's hands in relations with each other. There is a new element in American politics, however, a professional diplomat named Kurt Volker, who was ap-pointed as the Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations, the representative for the Ukrainian conflict in Donbas. He is a real diplomat and very important because Europe has a conversation partner who is respected because Europe does not like, and cannot talk to Trump about Ukraine. But he is much lower in the political hierarchy than Joe Biden was, and in this context, a strategic vision or a political idea is important. Volker is a combina-tion of the effect of connected hands with good diplomacy. When asked, however about where Ukraine is in the perception of D. Trump, Volker replied that it was above all an obstacle in talking about Russia. That's how it is perceived, as an obstacle that should be somehow be overcome and it is not easy.

Volker, Mitchell, Tillerson

John S. Micgiel: Wess Mitchell is a bit higher in the administration...

Paweł Kowal: I think also Rex Tillerson, but he is far from Ukraine. Mykola, what's your vision of what happened last year?

Mykola Riabchuk: America discovered the existence of Ukraine. It was a very important change because the war explained a lot of things in this sense. As for Trump, there were great fears, even the Ukrainian authorities spoke very openly about this, which was not wise in the diplomatic sense. What is happening now is better than expected. I agree that America is not looking at the aspect of reforms in Kiev, but at the same time, it is important that it does not suggest a reduction of sanctions due to Russia's better behavior there. America is firmly saying that sanctions will last as long as specific issues are unresolved.

In Ukraine, there is a feeling that America's position is stricter than the EU. The European Union is shaky and we do not know what tomorrow will bring, while America has declared its willingness not to give way for as long as these Ukrainian issues are unresolved, and this will not happen in the near future. I understand why, because for America there is no temptation to trade with Russia as in the case of Europe, because Europe is very sensitive in this respect and surrenders to gas and oil temptations. For America it is less important and it can afford sanctions. In any case, I would say that in Ukraine, today's America is in a sense more appreciated as an ally, as a harder ally who may be less involved, but nobody worries that it may withdraw tomorrow. In Europe, there is a lack of stability in Ukraine's perception: if Merkel or Macron loses then that's it, while continuing American support will more or less exist. Especially when America has suggested, unlike the previous administration, the possibility of selling defensive weapons that Obama strongly opposed and did not even want to discuss. Now, especially when it comes to American generals, they favor this.

Paweł Kowal: What is America's interest in Ukraine?

Mykola Riabchuk: Geopolitical, because I think America has begun to understand that Russia is a serious threat. Trump has not said yet that this is an evil empire, although it is so, but it is coming to this. At least they say openly that Russia is the biggest threat.

Jan Malicki: I promised not to speak, because I talk a lot, but in my opinion we are at a moment, which Zbigniew Brzezinski talked about in the mid-1970s, when America came to the conclusion that Russia was no longer an opponent but a very serious threat to America. In my opinion, the new American policy espouses that same view.

Paweł Kowal: These are, however, two different views because your and Mykoła Riabczuk's view is that there is a new American approach. I was curious about the statement of Katarzyna, which showed that it was a certain inertia that led to such a state in American policy, which we even relatively liked, but it was not political intent, it just happened. It would be enough for Ambassador Kislyak to be somewhat more restrained in his contacts

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: However, I have the impression that we overestimate the importance of Russia and Ukraine for the United States because Russia is on the front pages of newspapers. But it is not Russia that is on the front pages of newspapers, it's political corruption in the United States that is on the front pages of newspapers. That's what's really antagonizing Americans, that the Russians have helped to reveal their state of affairs, it obviously causes such reactions as revenge on the Russians, but it does not mean that someone thinks today that Russia is the main empire of evil, like it was in Soviet Union times, a second pitch black pole in a bipolar world. No, now this second pole is China. Russians is a fading force that through its actions has revealed the weakness of the American elite and this now primarily occupies the United States. In Russia, it is interpreted as Russia dealing with the US, and we are buying a little of this Russian interpretation, but it is not really Russia that occupies Americans as much as their own political corruption, that Kislyak realized after talking with some of them that you can easily turn these people from patriots and statesmen into shallow businessmen ...

Jan Malicki: "Jurgieltnicy", that's how it was called in Poland in the 18th century.

John S. Micgiel: In the US today, Russia is seen as having intervened in the last presidential election, and the investigation into this matter will continue. This certainly interferes with President Trump's focus on the problems of US foreign policy, in the Middle East, East Asia, and most of all North Korea, which has not only nuclear weapons, but rockets

that transport these bombs even to the USA. It seems that the United States has lost the moment when it could prevent such a situation, and now there are two options. One is war with North Korea, which no one wants, and the second option is to persuade China and other members of the UN Security Council to take up this situation. It is impossible to overlook this matter in the US, among other reasons because of President Trump's constant tweets.

Paweł Kowal: Are we threatened with political isolationism in the US?

John S. Micgiel: No, because Americans do not support isolationism. In mid–2017, that is after six months of President Trump's administration, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted a survey on what Americans think about the policy "America First". On the question of whether they support the active role of the United States in international affairs, 63% of those polled responded positively, not distinguishing themselves thus, from many previous, long-term opinion polls. It is evident that an increasing percentage of Americans do not support the main assumptions of the president's policy and this is seen during recent gubernatorial and state legislative elections. I might add that in November 2018, Americans will choose all 435 Congressmen and 33 out of 100 Senators. Republicans who currently have numerical advantages in Congress and the Senate are afraid that because of Trump's internal and foreign policy, they may lose this advantage.

Will the US forget about Central Europe?

Paweł Kowal: The last question is about your predictions about how you think US engagement will look like in our part of Europe in a few years. Will the Americans stay here, or will they get bored, discouraged by this part of Europe? Will the issue of Central Europe remain such a high priority in American politics?

John S. Micgiel: Well, let me ask whether Central and Eastern Europe is a priority in any way for Trump's administration? Or is it seen above all as a region that can be beneficial to American economic interests? If so, much will depend on the activity of the countries of the region themselves. As for the security of NATO's eastern flank and military assistance for Ukraine, there are people inside the administration, especially James Mattis, head of the Department of Defense, who see the situation more clearly than the president, but not everyone shares his vision. Mr. Rex Tillerson, head of the State Department, removes competent people from work, while others decamp and look for employment somewhere else because Tillerson thinks too many people work in his department. People who have worked in the State Department all their professional lives and who are interested in this region and Europe are retiring from government service. Who will stay? Who will know what's going on here and why America should defend this area. Will common values be enough if the political idea of President Trump's "America First" provides a surprise?

Mykola Riabchuk: I think Russia will not let America forget about this region. I do not know if I enjoy it or not, but in any case I do not foresee the withdrawal of America, because as long as Russia has a very specific policy, quite aggressive, America has no choice but to react.

Jan Malicki: The United States will have to be in the region for several years, for several reasons. First of all, the American army is already here and there will be more of it in the

whole region and in Poland. Secondly, in full agreement with Mykola Riabchuk, I suppose that Donald Trump may not win the next election, but there is a high probability that the next Russian presidential election will be won by Vladimir Putin ... Therefore, he will pursue his policy, America will not be able to just leave the region. During a meeting in Reykjavik between Reagan and Gorbachev, there was a moment during the discussion when Gorbachev interrupted Reagan in mid- sentence, then Reagan said to him: "Mr. President, let me finish!" So, I hope that the next president of the United States will he not give up an active policy in our region, but will help to clean up this part of the world.

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: It's hard to say what will happen in the next few years, but one can see what is happening now. The Americans are withdrawing from everywhere. The Americans withdrew partly from the Middle East for very different reasons, and in different ways, sometimes unintentionally, but that is a fact. They have weakened their position in South-East Asia on the basis of a free trade agreement and the Americans are evidently withdrawing from Europe. What's more, they simply fight with Europe for now, they do not argue, but they fight about fundamental truths: climate, Iran, Israel. These are the absolute foundations for THE EU which now perceives America as a threat, a troublemaker, a provocateur, as an unstable and unpredictable force destroying fragile yet peaceful solutions ...

Jan Malicki: It is temporary ...

Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz: That's why I do not say what will happen in a few years because there are too many factors. If the Russian-Ukrainian conflict becomes open warfare, which I hope will never happen, it will certainly be different. If Russia's implosion survives, it will also be different. You cannot predict all these factors, but for now that is how things stand. And then there is the illusion that our region can maintain real American attention because there are US soldiers stationed here. Well, there are American soldiers scattered all over the world, they are everywhere and there are not many of them, but it does mean something. We behave a bit in Poland as if we had the only American foreign contingent globally but it is one of several dozen. The issue is can American attention be maintained in the region if America leaves or is pushed out of Europe because it is being politically challenged by an increasingly disappointed Germany and France? Now even the United Kingdom has more and more bones to pick with the current administration. There would be a chance to keep American attention in the region if we as Poland and Central Europe were anchored very much in Brussels and somehow opted for this American presence. But our region seems to be acting more and more as if it were outside the European Union. In this situation, the notion that we as EU members will maintain American attention while being opposed to the EU is a total mirage.

Paweł Kowal: Thank you very much.

II

US Foreign Policy in East and Central Europe

WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2017 OPENING SPEECH

AMB. METTHEW BRYZA

Shaking the Foundation:
the *Trump* Administration *and NATO's East*

This is a very powerful place for me to be, here at the University of Warsaw, I am totally Polish by background, 100 percent. I was looking in front of my hotel today, at the monument to the victims of Soviet repression and the deportations, it is very powerful. I looked at all the towns that victims came from, and I thought about my grandmother's region – Sambor, She was only from a small village, but you know, it made me think that had she, like so many other Poles, not taken a very difficult decision at that time I probably would not exist, would not be here speaking before you, and the changes that this country has gone through, would have never have happened.

Fundamentally, my talk, is going to end up being optimistic, but it's going to start pessimistic, because the title is, *U.S. relations with NATO's East under Trump: Shaking the foundation*. But before that I just want to build on some other things that were said already and thank all the excellencies who are here, the ambassadors, the other members of the diplomatic and academic communities. Professor Micgiel referred to my new life outside of diplomacy. I have a joint venture with a Finnish company, Lamor Corporation, which is the world's largest oil spill response company. I am on their global board – a fantastic environmental technologies company, and it's really fun to be involved in entrepreneurial endeavor, even if it's scary, because, well, all my meager savings are on the line and I have to succeed. So, it's very nice to be back here and have a chance to think and stretch my mind in the way I did in my previous career, to be here with you in a place that my grandparents may have never been able to enter. So it's a very powerful moment for me, thank you. And also to be an opening speaker, together with Secretary of State Szczerski and with my favorite boss of all time, Ambassador Daniel Fried closing the conference. Dan taught me so much about this part of the world, which I'll get to in a moment, enabled me and my dear friend Kurt Volker, who is now the new special representative for Ukraine, to make it, to move through the State Department system, when there were all sorts of bureaucratic obstacles, If you go back and google us, you will see we were attacked by *The Washington Post*, when we were brought to the State Department from the White House in 2005. There is a position in the State Department called DAS – Deputy Assistant Secretary. That's the

first level at which things get serious, where you actually can have an impact on policy. And, we were called the baby DASes, because we were brought over at younger age than normal, thanks to Secretary Rice and Ambassador Fried, and Dan suffered because of that, inside the bureaucracy, a lot of people disliked him because he enabled Ambassador Volker and me, and then another ambassador, Mark Pekala, a Polish American guy as well who became ambassador to Latvia. I remember, Mark at that time was 50, and he said: "Boy, only in the State Department and in Washington could a 50-year-old guy be criticized for being a baby". So, it's great to be outside Washington, it really is. I live in Istanbul now, by the way.

My speech will be built on much of the powerful insights of Professor and Secretary of State Szczerski, and I'm so tempted just to react and embrace what you said. You really reminded me of the context for many other things I want to say. So you should all know a little bit more about my background, I'm much closer to the Republican side of Washington than the Democratic side. But, I am not a member of any party. I was, yes, nominated by President Obama to go to Azerbaijan, but I was always closer to the Republicans and to President Bush and Secretary Rice, so when I'm tough on President Trump in a moment, you'll know, it's not some sort of an ideological response, but it comes from discomfort with what I fear on the President's part, is a lack of what Professor Szczerski was just talking about: that geopolitics have returned to this region, and really should never have left. And the President's chief advisors, whether Secretary Tillerson or National Security Advisor McMasters or, best of all, Secretary of Defense Mattis, I think they understand this, but I think, the President does not. I don't think he has a geopolitical vision. His speech here – I'll get into little more details – said the right things, but in a strange way, in some cases, not as clearly, I would argue, as he should have said. And I think, that's because he doesn't feel it. We all in this room feel it, we feel what Professor Szczerski was saying, we feel that geopolitics was here, that the world changed in 2008, when Russia invaded and occupied Georgia, we know it. By the way I was in middle of that and during the question-and-answer session I will be happy to talk a lot about that. But I don't think President Trump feels it. So, let's start a bit pessimistic, but let's think positive just a little bit longer. If you look at where Poland was in 1989, it's in a miraculous place now. You walk around the city, and it's got so many gleaming skyscrapers, restaurants from all over the world, Poles walking down the streets are indistinguishable in appearance from people of any other European nation. Poland has really returned to Europe, thank God – geopolitically, economically, culturally, and socially. Of course, Poland is in the heart of Europe, but people forgot about that for a while. We've had some crises recently that maybe worry us – of course and obviously, Russia's invasion and occupation of Ukraine, but that also woke us up. I was running a think-tank in Tallinn for three years, a Ministry of Defense think tank called the International Centre for Defense and Security. When I arrived there in 2012, then-President Toomas Hendrik Ilves said: "Please make your primary mission to reawaken Washington to the reality that the geopolitical work in the Baltic region – extended and including Poland of course – isn't over". In Washington, it feels too much as though people think: once the Baltic states and Poland entered NATO and the European Union – the hard work was over. And these countries came to be seen as successful, quaint, beautiful places, where there weren't any big geopolitical problems to be concerned with anymore. So, in my first day, the first paper that I reviewed for our Centre, was entitled: *How do we get NATO's attention?*

At the core of the proposal – I'm sad to say what I'm about to say about myself – was that we ought to ask NATO to pre-station equipment, not so much people, but military equipment, on the territory of NATO's East. And I vetoed it, because I said: "If we say that, people in Washington, Brussels and other European capitals are going to think –you Estonians, are hysterically anti-Russian". That was a strange mood in 2012, even for me, somebody who totally believes in the never-ending significance of geopolitics. But I was reacting to what I would hear all the time in Washington, reacting to my experience in 2008, and in the leadup to 2008, as President Putin was preparing to invade Georgia. Those preparations went on for years, and when I would ring the alarm bell I would often be told that I should focus more on managing President Saakashvili, having him quiet down, and not encourage him to be more aggressive. And it drove me crazy. I got that not only from some of my bosses, but also from my fellow mediators – German, French and British, and at one point my British counterpart looked at me when I was making the point that the EU and the U.S. need to do more to deter Russian creeping aggression in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He pulled me aside at the dinner and said: "Matt, have you lost your mind? Have you lost your mind? You are just going to embolden President Saakashvili if the Europeans are pushing back in the same direction Saakashvili is asking", and I said: "No, dear friend, I'm not, I haven't lost my mind. There will come a time, when we will lose our ability to shape the events on the ground in Georgia. It's coming, and President Putin is provoking it, whether it be through intelligence operations, that resulted in assassinations, or giving Russian passports to Abkhaz and South Ossetians, or enabling smuggling through the Roki tunnel joining Russia and Georgia that undermine Georgian reforms, or launching a missile attack on a day Secretary Rice and Ambassador Fried were in Georgia, a missile attack in South Ossetia that blew up a Georgian air defense radar…" These provocations were coming, but it was an inconvenient truth for many in Washington and in Europe that Russia could possibly really be moving in this direction of aggression towards Georgia, so my assignment was constantly to get Saakashvili to calm down and let us move on with another business at that time which was recognizing Kosovo as an independent state. At one point, it was no longer possible to calm down Saakashvili, Russian troops poured into Georgia, Saakashvili ended up getting blamed by the international narrative for having launched the war. I'll go to my grave thinking it was absolutely wrong based on the intelligence I was reading, it was a provocation by Russia. Had Saakashvili been wiser, perhaps, he would not have intervened, or he would not have ordered a counterattack on Tskhinvali, which, in hindsight, would have been a wiser approach, but he reacted. And now he goes down into history as being imperious and, uncontrollable and, well, the narrative was, that somehow Russia had been provoked into attacking. But now, as Professor Szczerski said, maybe we see things in a different light, maybe we realize that was the first moment, as you said, of the world changing and the return of classical geopolitics to our extended region. The funny thing is, at that time, none other than then-President of France Nicolas Sarkozy made the same point, but he didn't really understand, I think, what he was saying. If you go back and read *The Washington Post* – I think, it was August 18 of 2008, you can google it, he had an op-ed in which he said – essentially, to paraphrase – "Okay, this is terrible what happened, but really Russia is not going to leave Georgia, so let's move on". I'll get to that phrase "move on" in a second, in the context of Secretary Tillerson – we have to move on. But if Russia moves against Ukraine – this is in 2008 – "if Russia moves against Ukraine,

then there must be serious consequences". And, okay, Russia did move against Ukraine, but everyone remembers the initial responses on our part were very soft and slow. I remember Secretary of State Kerry, in the beginning said: "Yes, this is a problematic situation, but Ukraine has not become" – how did he put it? – "an object of East-West competition between the U.S. and its NATO allies and Russia". Of course, it had, and it was obvious to everyone, right? We know what the Russian move was about – it was about freezing Ukraine in place and not letting Ukraine get on the train – as you were talking about, Professor Szczerski – as the rest of the region moves towards the West. I even talked to BBC anchor Nik Gowing at the Brussels forum and I called him on this, at that time he said – this is in February of 2014 – "Russian troops appeared to have crossed the border into Eastern Ukraine, they are having a military exercise there, that must all be some sort of a misunderstanding, it couldn't be that Russian troops moved into Ukraine by design". He said that live, on TV. So, one or two months later, I saw him in Brussels, and I asked him: "Do you realize you said that, Nick?" He said: "Did I? Did I actually say that?" I said: "Yes, you did". He said: "Oh, well, you know, just like you, I was reacting to events just as they were happening". But that was his instinct, right, that was the West's instinct, even until February 2014, when the little green men were invading Ukraine, still some of our opinion-makers simply couldn't believe that Russia would do this.

So, that gets us to today, and a good sign – we finally woke up after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and occupation. The Warsaw summit of NATO was a great moment, we finally have overcome our self-imposed limitation of not deploying NATO troops and U.S. troops to this part of the world, which is a huge strategic development. We have now a consensus on sanctions. Although not as tough as they should be, both U.S. and EU sanctions could be much tougher, still the conventional wisdom is that Putin's Russia has stepped beyond the constricts of civilized behavior of the international legal system that we all committed ourselves to after World War II. That part is good. But the foundation of East-West relations, or the foundations of our postwar environment, I think, is under threat now – across Europe and also in President Trump's vision.

So, what is that foundation? The Foundation, of course, is article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – collective defense. Another foundation is the Bretton Woods institutions – the World Bank, the IMF to promote economic reform, modernization, and economic growth. NATO enlargement has also been one of the geopolitical tools, clearly, that helped to cement the borders of the post-World War II era in a way that protects the freedom of the people of this region, but also protects their right to decide their own historical destiny. Fundamentally, to me, that's what this is all about. From whatever country you hail, you should have the right to determine the geopolitical orientation and the civilizational location of your country, of your society, no one should dictate that to you. In the late 1980s, and early 1990s, these institutions, and these ideas really drove U.S. policy. Ambassador Fried, I hope, will talk about it when he's here. He was the one of the innovators, one of the first people, also with Chris Hill who at that time was a staffer in Congress who said: "We need to use the World bank, the IMF – not yet NATO – to provide support for the new Polish government, after 1989, to make clear that if Poland undertakes the thoroughgoing revolutionary reforms of Leszek Balcerowicz at that time, and then-President Wałęsa, then the West will be there, we will be there with our financial support, our security support, our political support, because it is in our own fundamental national security interests

that these countries – former captive nations – are independent, are free to choose their own destiny and thank goodness they choose to be together with us, because that's their fundamental identity in the first place, and we are stronger with them together with us. We are not weaker, we're stronger".

So now, finally, to President Trump's speech in Warsaw and the Trump administration. The Three Seas conference a few days ago in Warsaw was a great event. I spent 14 of my 23 years in the U.S. foreign service promoting these very ideas, promoting diversification of energy supplies for our European allies, especially natural gas, away from an overdependence on Russia. That's exactly what the Three Seas conference is about. We face, or we have a historic opportunity to rewrite the geo-economic map today. This is thanks largely to technology, a lot of it developed in the United States, but not only, technology that allows natural gas to be turned into liquid form and sent anywhere in the world on ships. It is thanks to revolutionary technology in the United States that allows for the extraction of massive amounts of natural gas, in new and unconventional ways through horizontal drilling and fracturing of the rock underneath the surface. It is also thanks to the geopolitical vision of Poland, and of Lithuania, in contracting for their own liquid natural gas import terminals. We know that there is a longstanding proposal also to have a liquid natural gas import terminal also in Croatia on Krk, and now with the Three Seas initiative there is a vision that we've worked on a lot at the Atlantic Council as well, where I'm also a senior fellow – to link up all these markets of liquid natural gas terminals and make sure no single monopolist like Gazprom, nor any other aspiring monopolist has the ability to manipulate the price of natural gas to keep the price high or to apply political pressure on the countries of the region. We all know, and there is no need to go into it now, that Gazprom has a long history of using natural gas pricing and cutoffs as geopolitical pressure. So, it's great that this Three Seas conference happened. It's amazing that President Trump spoke at it, I mean in my 14 years working on these issues it was impossible to arrange for the U.S. President to show up at an event on this topic. The issue of pipeline interconnections, liquid natural gas, pricing, monopolistic pricing – that is so down in the weeds, that a U.S. President never took the time to do it. These energy security issues are too down in the weeds, too technical for a President. But President Trump came, he gave a speech, he highlighted the geopolitical significance of U.S. natural gas now being able to come to Poland, and hopefully to Ukraine, Lithuania, and throughout the whole region. Great. But the way he did it sort of grated on me, it suggested he doesn't feel it, going back to my earlier remarks. He made a joke out of it, you know, he said: "We're going to talk about a liquid natural gas terminal at Krk island, Croatia". He turned to somebody and said "Have you ever heard of that one? Yeah, it's a great project" kind of dismissively. That was painful to me, to be honest. And he said: "Oh, there is also the Greek-Bulgarian interconnector – great project". Clearly, he really doesn't know what these things are. He has heard about it, his brilliant staff have written this into his speech, again, it would have been a dream for me to hear such words by previous U.S. Presidents, but I fear he doesn't yet feel it. I hope he'll get there, but I don't think he yet feels it. I loved what I heard in his main speech when I first heard it, and clearly, he was scripted, he stayed to the script, he read a speech with geopolitical vision, said some great things, and talked about article 5, right? He said – "The United States shows its commitment to article 5, not only through words, but through actions". I think he means the deployment of U.S. troops to Poland – fantastic. But he didn't say:

"I unequivocally stand by article 5, I reiterate that the United States would never, never swerve from its commitment to the collective security of all of our NATO allies". After the debacle at NATO headquarters if you recall in May 2017, in front of the monument to article 5, which consists of the twisted steel from the Twin Towers (the World Trade Centre in New York), which is the first and only time article 5 has ever been invoked, to defend The United States. He didn't mention article 5, instead he criticized our European allies, unlike Poland, for not spending 2 percent of their own budget on defense. So, this would have been a great opportunity to make clear, once and for all: "We totally stand behind article 5, and we were never not going to". But he waffled a little bit, at least it seemed to me. Maybe I'm too sensitive, I don't know, but I think he hedged a little bit on that. It was fantastic that he mentioned Poland's enduring fight for freedom, even when it was wiped from the face of the world, and then he talked about the civilization of the West. Great, but then he sowed of a little bit of doubt again into the whole concept, when he said: "But it's not clear, the West has internal strength to protect itself, to fight, to be free". And then he took a swipe at the European Union and European unity, with that strange final passage, probably written by Steve Bannon, I guess, his ultra-right advisor, that said: "one of our great enemies is bureaucracy, and centralization of authority..." Yes, I know he took a swipe at the size of the US government, but you know, it also struck me as also criticizing the European Union's unity. And if there is one thing that is the foundation of the geopolitical realties that we hope to create forever in this part of the world, it is that Europe has to stand together, just as you were saying, Mr. Secretary of State, and not let anyone fall from the train. But he seemed to be also calling into question whether or not that value of European unity is worth pursuing, even when saying: "We need to be strong and we need to fight for our freedom". He criticized Russia for its occupation of Ukraine, thank goodness, and for Russia's relations with hostile states – the governments of Syria and Iran – but then at the press conference, when he was not scripted, when asked about the Russian meddling in U.S. elections, right, and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee, emails and other things, which all 17 U.S. intelligence agencies say happened, and they say they agree that it was Vladimir Putin himself who ordered this and directed it, President Trump said: "Yes, the Russians were involved, but maybe some others were as well". Where does he get that? His own intelligence agency says it was Vladimir Putin himself who directed this, nothing about any other country. And if you go back and read, there was an amazing story in *The Washington Post* a couple of weeks ago about the Obama administration's failure to do anything before the election, when it was found out by the then-administration that this hacking was happening, and President Putin was directing it, one former senior Obama administration official is quoted as saying: "This is maybe our biggest failure, that we failed to bring up this information to the world before the election happened". President Trump is saying: "Well, okay, the Russians were involved, but maybe others were. So maybe this thing that the Obama administration says is our biggest failure – maybe, it's not that big of a problem, maybe we should move on". So, what's he doing, why are there these contradictions between what his staff says and what he says? I think what he was doing was trying to protect his flank against criticism in Washington about the ties of his team and his family to Russian security services, on the one hand, because that is a huge scandal in Washington, as we know. He wanted to look tough, but he also wanted not to go too far and upset the man he is about to meet for the first time, President Putin. By the way, there

was an extraordinary story in *The New York Times* yesterday, saying that Donald Trump junior after Donald Trump senior became the Republican nominee – met with a representative of, a lawyer of some Russian state-owned company interests trying to get derogatory information about Hillary Clinton to use against her in the election campaign, which echoes with what then-candidate Trump said when he encouraged Russian security services to steal information about the Clinton campaign and publish it on WikiLeaks. It's mind-boggling that a U.S. presidential candidate advocated espionage against the former Secretary of State and former Senator who was running against him for President. So, for these reasons I feel that all the foundation I've been describing of our geopolitical vision is truly shaken at this point. And we constantly see President Trump making a statement, and then his senior staff walking it back saying: "That's not what he really meant". I think that President Trump, like President Obama, distrusts foreign policy elites. To be fair, after President Obama violated his own red line in Syria on the use of chemical weapons, he said and says to this day: "I'm proud I did that, I'm proud I violated my own threats because had I acted upon them, I would have simply been kowtowing to the foreign policy elites in Washington rather than using my own instincts". So obviously, President Obama pulled us away from the geopolitical vision, vacated Europe in many ways, and then basically, had to come running back after Russia invaded Ukraine. Again, I am happy to talk about the Obama administration as well, but because all the Trump stuff is so fresh, so I'm going to focus on that now.

So then, President Trumps gets to the G20 meeting, and what was done and shown is absolutely remarkable, the handshake with President Putin. Everybody must recall all the crazy handshakes that President Trump has given to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Ab, when he's pulling his arm after which Abe looks like his hand is in pain, and then there was the titanic standoff between Emmanuel Macron and President Trump, where Macron really squeezed Trump's hand and kind of got the best of him. If you watch some of the video footage with Vice President Pence, he pulls him on stage, all to show who's boss. When Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada came to the White House, he put his arm on President Trump, so President Trump had no leverage. Trudeau is a boxer, in really great shape and he was pulling President Trump. The handshake means something to President Trump. Go back, and you can watch it on the *Financial Times* website. What did President Trump do? Well, first – nothing. President Putin did nothing, he waited, Putin waited. What was he waiting for? He waited for Trump to go first, because the symbol of President Trump reaching out his hand was the moment Russia got out of the penalty box. Russia's got all these sanctions on it, it wants them to be lifted, it's seen as a pariah by all the rest of us, especially by the United States under Obama, I mean Obama and Putin hated each other, so Putin was waiting for Trump to reach out. Trump did it. Not only that, he only clasped his hand for a moment, and he even put his left hand on Putin's hand as though trying to ingratiate himself, to show extra respect – nothing I've ever seen him do to anyone, not even his own Vice President whose arm he was pulling to show who's boss. I think this is a lot about his psychology – he has come to office, absolutely convinced that he is the only person who can create a breakthrough in U.S.-Russian relations. He's not the first U.S. President to do that, George W. Bush, my beloved boss, we all know, looked at President Putin and got a sense of his soul, right, we all know that story. Obama had his Russia reset policy, and Bill Clinton had the spirit of Bill and Boris, if you remember "from Vancouver to

Vladivostok", we were going to reshape the world and have a strategic partnership. Every new American President romanticizes Russia, and thinks he, eventually she, is going to be the one that creates the breakthrough and everyone is disappointed in the end, because Russia remains Russia, Russia will pursue its national interests. Its national interests largely do not overlap with ours, except in wanting prosperity and not wanting to eliminate each other with nuclear weapons, otherwise our world views are pretty diametrically opposed, and President Trump will learn this eventually too, but it hasn't happened yet. So, how did Secretary Tillerson describe the meeting between Trump and Putin? He said: "Well, several times President Trump raised the issue of the election interference by Russia". He didn't say – "President Trump confronted", didn't say "criticized", he said – "raised". Foreign Minister Lavrov came out and said: "President Trump accepted President Putin's explanation". Which is that Russia didn't do it. That's suspicious. So, you could say – okay, maybe Secretary Tillerson is just not a diplomat, he's head of the world's biggest oil company, maybe he just was not careful. But then he chose to say: "The good news is – the two Presidents did not agree to re-litigate the past". They agree to disagree, in other words. If Rex Tillerson was still the CEO of Exxon, and, let's say, Shell owed Exxon a billion dollars, would he have a meeting with the CEO of Shell and say: "Okay, we can forget about the billion dollars you owe us, don't worry about it, we're not going to re-litigate the past, you cheated us, but let's move on". Of course, not. Why is that not okay for a huge company, but it's okay for the United States? To let Russia out of this penalty zone? For what? Simply for the purpose of building – whatever it means – a more constructive U.S.-Russia relationship? First of all, that relationship is not an end in itself. It's a tool to do other things. And secondly, it's never going to be a constructive relationship if it appears that the U.S. leader can be so manipulated by his Russian counterpart. So, for all those reasons, I'm pessimistic about this current moment. Yes, geopolitics are now the defining factor in this part of the world, and always should have been. Yes, there have been some great developments. People like me will no longer say: "We can't write a report that says NATO ought to preposition material in the Baltic region, in Poland" We actually have troops on the ground now. Fantastic! We've woken up. We must make sure, of course, that those Warsaw Summit commitments are maintained, and we know – with your boss, Professor Szczerski [President Andrzej Duda] – President Trump was not clear on how committed the U.S. is to keeping our troops here on the ground, and that's a very worrisome development.

Ultimately though, my very last remarks are ultimately optimistic, because President Trump lacks geopolitical vision, lacks historical insight or, really even, frankly – I don't mean to be disrespectful, but – curiosity about history. Everything is about the deal. One and one, the individuals, the people – that's why he had nobody in a room which is what Putin wanted, besides Rex Tillerson and the interpreter when they met. And so, what's inevitably going to happen is he will start up with a grand bargain, where something happens in Ukraine mostly cut over the heads of the Ukrainians. But thank goodness with Ambassador Volker there, I know he's no fool and will fight against that, but probably though there will be an agreement which I know that the Trump administration, from my own contacts within, has been cooking up, hoping for, for a longtime, whereby President Putin gets what he needs. He gets an excuse to exit Donbass, because that's a failed operation, the uprising that he expected never happened, Russian troops are dying, it's an economic albatross around the neck of Russia. But he can't just leave, he can't just pull out Russian

troops, because that would really hurt him domestically, politically. So, okay, he says: "We've reentered the geopolitical stage, we're at the center of it with President Trump". Putin will say "We'll pull out of Donbass, we're never leaving Crimea", That will be the deal I think. Donbass – if the Ukrainian government offers autonomy – will have a sort of a frozen political conflict, troops gone, heavy weapons pulled back on the Russian side, Crimea still what it is – anschlussed by Russia. And then the other area where there will be cooperation is in Syria. And we've already seen in Southeastern Syria there is a modest cease-fire that seems to be holding – that's great, may it work, however it also provides U.S. blessing for Russian troops to base deeper in the Middle East, and that has never happened before. But leave that aside, maybe it will bring peace. Eventually that cooperation in Syria will collapse. Russia has no history of successfully establishing peace and rebuilding economies and complex cultures. It used brutality in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, to build the Soviet Union, but it doesn't have the finesse to rebuild something on the scale of Syria. And so, Trump is going to be disappointed with President Putin. President Putin will inevitably overplay Russia's hand, and finally at that point my last remark – if the EU and NATO have maintained their cohesion, remain strong, maintain the geopolitical vision of President Duda and Secretary of State Szczerski, then we have a chance to take these positive developments and push away the lack of clarity, the dalliance with Putin and the security services on the part of team Trump, and finally wake up – just as Obama woke up, just as President Bush woke up and realized he that he hadn't see Putin's soul, and then maybe we can rebuild. So, the key to all this is that you all are doing exactly what you've said, Mr. Secretary of State – taking the strategic reins in your own hands, pursuing initiatives like the Three Seas, changing the geopolitical facts on the ground so that when the U.S. does finally wake up – we know which way to move. Thank you very much!

WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2017 CLOSING SPEECH

Amb. Daniel Fried

Defending the Free World

One week ago President Trump spoke at Plac Krasińskich and gave the best foreign policy address of his presidency. He spoke of a community of nations, an alliance of countries united by values, among those values the rule of law, freedom of expression, freedom of speech. He spoke of a strong alliance of free nations. He spoke a strong Europe. He then mentioned that Russia is acting in Ukraine and other ways, as a destabilizing factor in the world. And therefore reaffirmed America's Article 5 commitment to Poland and to all the other NATO members. As I said, I think this was the best foreign policy speech of President Trump's new presidency. He reaffirmed in essence America's commitment to the free world. The free world is sometimes termed the liberal world order but I really don't like the phrase "the liberal world order," because there are many people who don't describe themselves as liberals, who belong in it, not outside it. I prefer "the free world". And in re-committing the United States to the free world, President Trump was following a centuries-old tradition in the West. In Europe, the notion of a just international order, rooted in transnational values, is at least as old as Erasmus. Emmanuel Kant elaborated the theory of perpetual peace between states committed to the rule of law and republican values. As my country, as America, emerged as a world power at the end of the 19th century, we developed our own American Grand Strategy, our version of the free world. We thought of ourselves as distinct from the European empires and spheres of influence of the time. In contrast, America sought an open, rules-based world, more just and simultaneously more profitable for ourselves and for others, because we Americans recognize that our interests, our prosperity and our security are tied to the prosperity and security of other nations. We believe that the advanced democracies of the world should set the global agenda along the lines of this vision. An objective, ambitious, but also generous vision, because we understand America's national interests in broad, not narrow terms. In his memoirs, *Kurier z Warszawy*, Jan Nowak-Jeziorański writes of astonishment at American humanitarian assistance to Poland in 1920 and wondered what sort of nation helped others and asked nothing for itself. But America understood that as we helped others, we in fact advanced our own interests, because America could not do good business with poor countries. We

wanted to make the world a better place so we could all get rich. That was our American ambition and confidence. My nation developed the outlines of this grand strategy starting in 1900, but my country failed to apply it in the 1930s when Europe needed us most.

Our failure was costly, nowhere more so than in Poland. But after 1945, recognizing our failure, we set out with what was left of Europe to build the free world. We contained Stalin's Soviet Union and rebuilt Western Europe. We established great institutions, NATO and what became the European Union, to make the new peace lasting. The achievements of the free world inspired the dissidents in Soviet-occupied Europe, including KOR and Solidarność here in Poland. And the people of Central Europe and Poland took down the iron curtain in 1989. In the early 1990s., as America contemplated our options, wise Poles from right and left made the case that the principles of the free world applied to all of Europe. Poles asked us rhetorically, whether freedom was limited to Europe west of the line that Stalin drew to which there was and is only one honorable answer. Thus inspired, NATO and Europe grew to embrace a hundred million Europeans, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The free world worked and Europe has enjoyed the longest period of peace, prosperity and democratic governments in its history. And the one element that I would have added to Donald Trump's speech if I had been asked, was to recognize all that Poland has accomplished in the generations since 1989. I'm not a Pole, but it is possible to argue that that was the best generation in Poland's history since King Stefan Batory. That may be right. But if this achievement was so profound, what has gone so wrong? What accounts for current doubts and skepticism? What accounts for Brexit and the rise of national populism in Europe and in some parts of America? I would say this by way of explanation or attempt of interpretation: first, economic stresses, even in successful Poland. The West in general has suffered through years of economic distortion, slow growth, high unemployment in much of Europe, and in America levels of income inequality not seen in almost 100 years. Add to this pressure, the challenge of national identity in the face of high immigration, Latino in the United States, Middle East-North African in Europe, Eastern European in some parts of the UK. And immigration traditionally generates nativist reactions in both Europe and America. I say this without approval, but there it is. The United States and the EU seem to have fallen short in response. American political institutions often seem paralyzed by partisanship and many Europeans seem alienated from the EU's institutions, a sort of democratic deficit on both sides of the Atlantic. In this period of unease, Russia has resumed its role as corrosive political spoiler, malign by intention, using propaganda, corrupt funding and other active measures updated for the cyber age. Moscow's aim seems to be the same as in Soviet times: to weaken the West's institutions and discredit Western values, shield Moscow's despotic system from liberal influence, and ease Russia's domination of its neighbors, Ukraine first of all. The free world order is being challenged by another vision: a new nationalism, which rejects in principle the objectives of an open, rules-based world led by the world's great democracies. Some of the new nationalists seem to regard values as an indulgence, and prefer power politics and spheres of influence. They call on the power of the nationalist idea, and that idea does have a dark power. No need to tell Poles about the consequences of such a vision if it were to succeed. In place of the free world order we would have great powers dominating their neighbors, unchallenged, arguing and fighting over the respective spheres of influence, and crushing rebellions from within. I cannot understand why anyone would advocate a return in fact to pre-1914 Europe or 1930s Asia,

throwing away lessons it took millions of lives to learn. What then must we do, we who defend and seek to advance the free world? First, immediate business: turn back Russian aggression, defend Ukraine and help Ukraine defend itself, maintain sanctions, intensify pressure on Moscow to settle and not prolong the conflict. And at the same time, push the Ukrainians to advance their own reforms, and resist Russian infiltration and leverage. We need to deal with Russian propaganda, cyber aggression, energy leverage and all manner of hybrid threats. Engage Russia and the Russians. The Trump administration may seek, as did the Bush and Obama administrations, to develop a positive agenda with Russia. This can be useful if we do not expect too much and if we avoid paying the Russians extra for cooperation. And we should reach out not just to the Russian government. We must not forget those Russians who have a better vision for their country. Dealing with Russia may be the easy part. We must also advance a transatlantic growth in jobs agenda. The free world order needs to deliver economically for its people and for the world. Closing economies is a loser's game. But open trade needs to be matched by pro-growth investment and other pro-growth policies. We must also challenge the new nationalism with a new patriotism. The nation and the nation state will remain fundamental. Americans will not give it up. Poles and others in Central Europe who have just regained their sovereignty, I suspect, will defend it. So will many in Western Europe. But the nation state and the good of the nation state is not an ultimate end, and the interests of the nation state are not the highest. In the Western tradition, tyrannical and aggressive rulers loose legitimacy and governments gain it, as they act in accordance with universal principles. Nations and governments are answerable to those principles. Thus, we embrace the France of "liberté-égalité-fraternité" and we find compelling the slogan of Polish patriots: "For our freedom and yours" ["Za waszą i naszą wolność"]. The West needs to make room for patriotism bound to higher principles. That is the West and that is the Western tradition. We may also need to find what is open to the nation, understanding it along cultural and linguistic, not only ethnic, tribal terms. My country, America, is founded on the principle that all men are created equal. And as Lincoln said: "Immigrants to America become Americans as they accept this principle". This open, American definition of nationality may have something to teach. British identity, as being a British person, is in principle cultural and trans-national. So is the French civic definition of nationality. This is not easy, as America's painful history shows. But the free world must challenge this century's new nationalism which is in many ways just a cheap remake of a 20th century original, with a better patriotism. A strong, confident Europe, based on the nation state, properly conceived, tied to Europeans, may yet emerge. In the end, we, who believe in the free world must believe in ourselves and our values, as Poles believed in themselves and their values in the darkest days of martial law. Among those values, our interests are best-served as our values advance. These values include the rule of law at home and rules-based law, human rights and democracy, and the prosperity they can generate. A strong state, with strong institutions, both independent and rooted in law, remains fundamental. Free nations' interests advance or decline together. The nation state, even the free world, are not ends in themselves, but earn legitimacy as they serve these higher purposes. And finally, the world's great democracies, must lead together to these ends, for if we do not lead, the world will be led by the world's great autocracies who are waiting like a demon crouching at the door. We must rule over them. Let us rediscover our faith in these ideas, the best of the West, and act to preserve, defend and extend our legacy.

WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2017

Round Table I – Regional Security

Remarks by: Graeme Herd (GCMC, United Kingdom)

I am delighted to be in Warsaw on this panel. In 1994 when I graduated with a PhD, and held my first academic post, the first international conference I went to was in Wrocław, and obviously I had to travel through Warsaw. So, it's really nice to be back in Poland and have the opportunity to present in the capital when older and wiser. Today, I am going to try and look at how we understand the rationality, the logic of Russia's foreign policy, particularly the destabilization efforts against neighbours and come to a conclusion has to how sustainable and long-term this approach will be. Will it gradually diminish or is it set to stay as it is or even increase?

To try and understand Russia's foreign policy, we need to look into the domestic economic, political, and social system created by a system-forming figure that is President Vladimir Putin. The two key data points here really are two strategic vulnerabilities that Russia has to deal with. The first is the hydrocarbon dependence, 50% of GDP and 70% of exports, and 98% of corporate tax. The vulnerability is that Russia is dependent on hydrocarbon revenues but cannot affect the price of oil globally (which sets the price of gas). Oil can be priced at $110pb or at $25pb and the shift can take place over a matter of months. The second vulnerability is the popularity of the president. When Putin has de-modernized Russia, de-institutionalized and de-globalized Russia it means that if his popularity decreases then you have an existential crisis within the federation. The destabilizing question is: "If not Putin, then whom?" There are no contingency plans, no succession mechanism to replace the leader. So, essentially we are looking at Russia's foreign policy operating in a context where the economy is in the toilet as reflected in a 0.2% average GDP growth since 2009; 2012 – 0% growth and since 2012 when Kudrin resigned from the government. Normally, the popularity of a president – as was the case in the first 8 years of Putin's presidency from 2000 to 2008 – tracks the economy, or maybe lags a little bit behind. As economic performance increases and revenues distributed to the population, so the popularity of the president. So, this is very abnormal politics.

However, within the context of these two strategic vulnerabilities and Russia's inability or unwillingness to address them, destabilization as a mainstay and organizing principle

of Russian foreign policy makes a lot of sense in terms of rational choice theory. It's a for-eign policy for a weak economy, a foreign policy for a high popularity of the president and it's a foreign policy which is cheap and gives a very good return on investment. In other words, it's a foreign policy that works. To understand really, strategically what Russia is doing it is interesting to look at von Clausewitz and his book "On War". Carl von Clausewitz as we know was an officer in Russian and Prussian military service, and he introduced the concept of a *schwerpunkt* or *center of gravity,* and if you think of the *center of gravity* of Rus-sia *in lieu* of an economy and political system that functions, the *center of gravity* in Russia is the belief of the people in the necessity of a strong leader who can patrol the frontier, guard the besieged fortress against external enemies, the good *Tsar* who holds the line, while the bad *boyars*, the government, muck up the economy. So, destabilization must be able to defend and advance the notion of a strong leader. Secondly, if you look at the cent-er of gravity of attack or offence, we're looking at Russia destabilizing market democratic systems and states and their center of gravity, which again is intangible, it's not a build-ing or a monument, it's a belief in the integrity of, for example, the democratic election system, of solidarity, of democratic values, transparency, accountability etc. So, when we look at Russia's use of conventional and sub-conventional tools, conventional tools being the presidency, the presidential administration, state controlled economy and companies, state controlled civil society, the diplomatic core, the intelligence services, the media etc., when we look at Russia's foreign policy we see all of these actors having a role and func-tion in attacking the center of gravity of the West, the political West, defending Russia's center of gravity, and we see the intelligence services acting as a linchpin to sub-conven-tional actors that Russia can use, support to and from anti *status quo* parties for example in Europe. Weaponizing history and identity, the use of frozen conflicts, weaponizing mi-grants and refugees, their use of transnational organized criminal groups, corruption – the Kremlin's Playbook. The CSIS study captures some of this very well in five states in the region. And also the use of strategic proxy forces such as *Ultras* or *Kadyrovtsy*, or private military corporations like the Maran Group, RBS Group in Libya, Wagner Group in Syria or the Balkan Cossack Army that ran the coup last year in Montenegro, or the so-called Baltic Civil Army in the Baltic States. There are many examples you can look at of these particular sub-conventional strategic proxy forces, and essentially you have a foreign policy in which the destabilization elements are deniable, one that 'washes its face' so to speak, it pays for itself as criminalized proxy forces can profit through its implementation.

The evidence for the utility of this foreign policy is apparent in state discourse. If you listen to Sergey Lavrov or President Putin or some of the propagandists in the Senate and the State Duma, you see two basic narratives or discourses. One leads this idea of center of gravity – defense and the other, the center of gravity – attack. For example, in terms of center of gravity defense, you often hear the expression "things may be bad in Russia, but they're worse in the West", "go to Berlin and you will be raped", as the Lisa case propagan-da tried to demonstrate. This is one part of the discourse. The idea that Russia is a great power; to sacrifice is to be a great power. We need to sacrifice more to rise from our knees, they fear us for your greatness, they are scared of and therefore try and harm us because we are great. This is the internal rhetoric, we are a besieged fortress, we are under threat, it is your patriotic duty to have a patriotic military mobilization. In this context, Putin is por-trayed as a contemporary Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, Suvurov, Zhukov or Stalin.

And in foreign policy terms or external center of gravity attacks, Lavrov often says there can be no European security without Russia. In other words, if you don't give us Yalta-Potsdam II or Helsinki III, that is, a grand bargain, in which our sphere of privileged interest is recognized, we will take one through destabilization that forces non-alignment and creates our buffer zone. In addition, as power is relative, if Russia is unable or unwilling to effect structural economic reform and strengthen itself, then it can, as an equalizer, weaken the West. This is a form of parity equality. Also, more recently you have the notion of the Moscow consensus, neo-modernism in Russian thinking. In other words, it is not just the critique of the west but they are now advancing an alternative market democratic paradigm – governance paradigm.

How long can this go on? How long does the logic of destabilization continue? There are really three alternative futures that we can analyze. The first alternative argues that Russia is now, or about to be in a process of a strategic pivot – a proverbial 'kiss and make-up' with the West, a Trump-Putin summit that allows for peaceful coexistence and selective détente with the West is in the offing. Russia needs to do this to get the capital and technology from the West, for example to exploit the arctic. I think there are number of reasons why this is not likely to happen. Firstly, the role of anti-Americanism is the core glue that binds leadership to elite and society, in lieu of real politics or economy. It is critical to the center of gravity defense in Russia. If you are a besieged fortress you need a "dignified enemy" and Merkel does not compare to Trump. Anti-Americanism is hardwired, I think, into the DNA of a Putinite system. Secondly, at least amongst Trump's national security elite, there is no sense that a misunderstanding and misconception is at the root of confrontational relations with Russia. There is a high degree of realism and an understanding that Russian interlocutors lie and cannot be trusted, and we will see how long the ceasefire in southern Syria lasts. We'll see also how long Putin resists the urge to try and drive a wedge between Trump's national security elite's so called "deep state" and Trump himself. I do not think they can. Russia's leaking of the Kislyak-Lavrov pictures from the White House, for example, was self-sabotage as far as I can see, but underscores Russia's need to have tactical victories even at the expense of having strategic better relations. You also have LNG exports and predictions that he US will be no.1 global exporter of LNG by 2020, having become hemispheric energy interdependence, to being energy independent. President Trump also talked about an arms race. President Putin has taken Russia back to 1986, when an arms race and energy competition highlighted the lack of internal modernization, but Putin does not have *Perestroika* or an alternative plan B which would be structural economic reform, which in his view would lead to the collapse of the system, or if it was successful, essentially result in regime or leadership change. Neither outcome would be countenanced, hence the status quo prevails.

The second alternative scenario is big bang revolution in 2017. The system is overloaded as it was in 1917, the system is militarizing, resources are diminishing, there is a Chekistocracy, with *Chekists* or *Siloviki* fighting each other, cannibalizing each other, manual control is not working as it used to work. This is a thesis put to work by Nikolay Petrov at the Higher School of Economics and I think there are a number of reasons why this is not going to happen. Society is acclimatizing; the elite have no other option but Putin; there is no consensus or mechanism to get a consensus around an alternative to Putin; the middle class have a lot to lose, and 200,000 of them emigrate each year and this acts as a safety

valve. The system is much more adaptable than this thesis would suggest, there is still money in the system.

It leaves us with the last alternative scenario option which I think is the most likely, a kind of a long good-bye scenario where you have stability plateaus and mini-crises, you have *zastoy* – stagnation, gradual degradation. I think Russia has actually crossed the critical threshold where it is locked into this trajectory. And if you look at some of the characteristics of that particular system think of a Democratic People's Republic of Korea – DPRK type outcome. This is a state in which organized crime is used and mainstreamed into the foreign policy to break sanctions. This is a state in which nuclear signaling occurs, and Putin is under pressure to demonstrate the political utility of these expensive weapon systems. It is a military first approach, guns ahead of butter, bread takes a second role to battleships. It is Juche in the North Korean understanding, that self-sufficiency, and this is something nationalists are talking about. It is essentially a G0 world order, it is a spoiler role in international affairs to act as an equalizer, and in this situation I think the risks of miscalculation, misperception and conflict escalation ladders increase. And Russia still has force multipliers it can use, the speed of decision making for example; the geographical proximity it has to regional hotspots; military tactical ability and ability to exploit weaknesses that are there in states around Russia; the return on investment – as economy that shrinks the return on investment increases; the strength of the belief in the center of gravity that state controlled television has been able to maintain and the political will of a leader who knows that essentially he has no other option. And lastly, there is western acquiescence, western weakness in policy responses.

For these reasons, the third alternative is the default evolutionary pathway and one that is much harder to manage than the other two, as it eventually slides into scenario 2 unless scenario 1 is obtainable. The core question is: how can the West reduce risk and mitigate miscalculation in its relations with Russia, while still upholding western core interests and not acquiesce in the abandonment of its core values?

WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 2017

Round Table I – Regional Security

Remarks by: Matthew Rhodes (GCMC, United States)

I will try to talk about a little bit about what NATO in particular as a core part of this community has been doing to respond. A starting point is to recognize that this conference is taking place at almost exactly the one year anniversary of NATO's summit here in Warsaw. I had an opportunity to participate during this summit at the parallel Warsaw Summit Experts Forum that was organized by NATO together with the Polish Institute of International Affairs here in Warsaw. While the adults were meeting in the Warsaw National Stadium about 300 other professors and experts such as myself were meeting in a circus tent across the parking lot. Sometimes this felt a little bit silly but it was very interesting to hear firsthand from many of the people attending the main summit and one of the opening speakers there was President Duda. One thing that stuck with me was his remark that for him this summit was the second most important thing that had happened for Poland since the end of the Cold War and the only thing that topped it was Poland's entry to NATO itself, so for him this was really a big deal. What I will try to do in my time is to talk a little bit about why the Warsaw Summit was so important for President Duda and other leaders of the alliance, and try to reflect on where we are a year after that summit and what remains to be done for NATO to respond to the Russian threat especially of hybrid warfare.

For the Warsaw Summit itself the headline outcome is something that may have been familiar to many of you in this room – this initiative known as "Enhanced Forward Presence". This was the initiative to finally have on a rotational basis four NATO battalion-sized battle groups stationed here in Poland under U.S. leadership, in Lithuania under Germany, in Latvia under Canada and in Estonia under British leadership. An additional 12 NATO countries are contributing to the forces in those various countries this year or next. These are now all in place. Having this presence on the ground was as an important reassurance for the countries involved, but also goes beyond a simple symbolic reassurance to a more robust defense and deterrence of Russian hybrid and conventional style warfare. It complemented a range of other military initiatives both at Warsaw and previously, decisions to increase the number of NATO-led exercises in the region, the establishment of multinational brigade headquarters here in Poland and Romania, and an American bilateral

initiative called "the European Reassurance Initiative" which next year should spend about $4,8 billion not only funding all these exercises but putting in place more prepositioned equipment and helping to pay for the upgrade of various military infrastructure such as airfields or seaports among the eastern members of the NATO alliance. So you get this kind of alphabet soup of different NATO initiatives on deterrence and defense. For balance, NATO also wanted to have a dialogue with Russia to complement these moves and that was symbolized especially by the resumption of talks in Brussels under the framework of the so-called "NATO-Russia Council". Those talks have not taken place for about two years from the spring of 2014 to the spring of last year, they have now resumed and according to some NATO diplomats I have talked to, these talks are valuable for at least two separate reasons. The first is that they are a channel of communication, which is important for expressing concerns and hopefully avoiding misunderstandings with Russia that could escalate to a higher level of conflict. However, the second benefit that is that in an alliance of 28, now 29 members with different priorities and viewpoints, nothing is more powerful for generating unity than listening to the Russian ambassador for a couple of hours. This is also perhaps a benefit of the dialogue. A third pillar of the NATO approach that has gotten a little bit less attention but was another of the main outcomes of the Warsaw Summit was an initiative around the idea of resilience, the idea that NATO members should be able to do more to cope with an unpredictable range of security threats, certainly including the kind of low-level hybrid warfare practiced by Russia. This was featured in a couple of different respects in Warsaw, within the main Summit declaration one of the articles identified resilience as a key enabler for collective defense. There was a separate document on enhancing allied resilience, and then resilience was a prominent theme in a document on strengthening strategic partnership with the European Union. So the idea of being able to have a robust ability to respond to a whole range of crises, to be able to use the military and other security resources of governments for civil defense, and also to be able to cope with hybrid warfare through stronger strategic communication are all elements of this increased focus on resilience. So, this is the summary of what NATO has been doing. Looking forward there are a couple of questions I think that remain. The first, natural one is, is that enough? As we begin to prepare to pay attention to the next Russia exercise such as *Zapad* 17 with a hundred thousand forces, are a few battalions in the Baltic states and Poland, or a few additional exercises enough to respond to a full scale Russian threat? The pessimist would say maybe not, they would look to various studies such as one by the RAND Corporation that estimated you need not four or five thousand troops on the ground but perhaps something closer to seven brigades – 30–35 thousand troops to really meaningfully be able to cope with a potential Russia attack. The optimist on the other hand would say that it is not so much the total numbers, but the symbolism and political meaning of this presence. They will recall that during the Cold War, the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer was once asked how many American troops you need in West Germany to feel safe from a Soviet invasion and his famous answer was one, and if Soviets know that if this person dies, you face a reaction from the entire United States. So perhaps this kind of dynamic applies here, but to the extent it does, it requires also the ability to quickly return and reinforce these NATO forces on the ground which means more money and also logistical improvements and legislative permissions to move them where they need to be.

A second ongoing question for NATO about this response is how to balance the response to the Russian threat on the so-called Eastern Flank with other security challenges for the alliance. NATO likes to talk about itself as being a 360-degree kind of organization, and in particular right now I can think of at least two other kinds of challenges that are significant. One is a challenge that is sometimes referred to as the Southern Flank, the challenges related to the overflow of migration or terrorism from the Middle East and Africa in recent years, which has been identified by several of the Mediterranean members of the Alliance as their top priority and which even the U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson hinted was perhaps most important for the U.S. as well, when it comes to terrorism. Over the longer term perhaps a challenge will be how you deal with the near eastern threat of Russia with the mix of challenges and opportunity of a rising Far East represented by China, India and the broader Asia-Pacific region. This was a question during the Obama administration – the issue of the pivot, but I think going forward it will also remain a question for the U.S. and for other European members of NATO. How do we balance these commitments to each other, with our efforts to deal with the events in the Asia-Pacific?

Last but not least the third kind of issue going forward for NATO's response is the question of whether the other kinds of differences among the members of the alliance will somehow undermine the unity and solidarity of the response vis-à-vis Russia and hybrid warfare. To name just a few that you can pluck from the headlines – the ongoing drama of Brexit, the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union, debates within the EU on building a kind of multi-speed framework for the future, which pits sometimes France and Germany on the one hand with East Central European members on the other, and also the ongoing question of different views of the Russia threat. Again, there has been I think a basic agreement on a set of robust measures both in terms of the military response and economic sanctions but this may not last into the future and this is one of the issues that is being watched very carefully also involving U.S.-Russian relations. The alliance has already identified a couple of the next steps in the next two to three years to cope with these remaining unresolved issues. NATO is talking about having another Summit in the summer of 2018 probably in Brussels, and leading up to it the next buzzword that will be the focus of the alliance apparently will be the idea of coherence, how do you bring all these different initiatives vis-à-vis Russia but also vis-à-vis other challenges together into a kind of integrated fashion so they do not compete with each other, and perhaps when this can be achieved in 2018 going forward in 2019 or 2020, there would be an effort to revise the existing Strategic Concept document of the alliance which dates from 2010 – which a very different period in European security -- but they will try to use this updating process as an opportunity to debate and come to a real consensus among the allies on where the relative priorities lie. I will also be watching what NATO does over the next two years very carefully, and hope that these next summits will be equally important to Poland as the one in Warsaw last year.

III

Hybrid war, Information War and Regional Conflicts in Post-Soviet Space

Kakhaber Kalichava[1]

Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Georgia

Between Kosovan and Georgian Breakaway Regions' Conflicts.
Historical Analysis of the Differential Aspects of These Conflicts in the Post-Soviet Period

Abstract: *The end of the Soviet era gave birth to various conflicts throughout the world. Each of these conflicts has its own peculiarities, but also shares certain similarities. The interpretation of each conflict in the post-Soviet space – as well as throughout the history of mankind – has always been dependent on the particular political viewpoints and vectors of various belligerent, or non-belligerent, parties. The case of Kosovo and that of the Georgian breakaway regions, also have their similarities and differences, also rooted in the political interests of each belligerent party. These conflicts, as well as most post-Soviet era conflicts, are characterised by third party involvement derived from the Cold War period, when the world was divided into the two political camps of East and West.*

Key words: *Kosovo, Georgia.*

Introduction

On February 17, 2008, the independence of Kosovo was recognized by the UN, however without the approval of the Security Council. This fact came as an apple of discord between Russia and the West. Russia, the historical *defender* of the Balkan Christendom (highlight by the author) perceived Kosovan independence as a factor undermining Russian influence on the Balkans, assuming that igniting the Georgian conflict regions could have been the appropriate answer for Kosovo to the west. As American diplomat and political analyst Ronald Deitrich Asmus mentioned in his book, only four days after

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the declaration of Kosovan independence, Mikhail Saakashvili and Vladimir Putin met in Moscow: "Their discussion centered on Kosovo's recent declaration of independence and what it meant for Georgia. According to the Georgian record of the meeting, Putin said to Saakashvili: There is an urgent need to react to what has happened in Europe on Kosovo. We are currently thinking how to deal with this problem. You shall remember that we are under huge pressure from the republics of the Northern Caucasus, and we have to answer for their solidarity for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. You know we have to answer the West in Kosovo, and we are very sorry but you are going to be part of that answer."[2] Six months later the war broke out in Georgia. Besides this, Putin had also mentioned that a "Pandora's Box" had been opened by the West: "What can we say to the Caucasian Nations? Why is it possible for Kosovo to acquire independence but it is not possible here?"[3]

Thus, guided by its imperial policy towards the post-Soviet space, disguised by the non-existent concept of "similarity" between Kosovo and Georgian breakaway regions' conflict cases, the Kremlin acted as the defender of Serbian territorial integrity and sovereignty, simultaneously undermining the same holy principles of the Georgian state. Since there is always a Russian way to look at a situation,[4] Moscow flexibly used the case of Kosovo in order to increase its influence in its neighborhood.

Kosovo: From political and military turmoil of the 1990s to Independence

At the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century the Balkan region was engulfed in political and military crisis caused by the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation. The first military confrontation to take place on the territory of Yugoslavia was the Ten Day War in Slovenia in June-July 1991 between the Slovenian territorial defense and the Yugoslav people's army. In January 1992 the Independence of Croatia and Slovenia was internationally recognized. This led directly to the escalation of conflict in Bosnia Herzegovina. Serbia was striving to create a Greater Serbia. Simultaneously, Serbia maintained a tight control over the Kosovo region where elections were held by Kosovar Albanians on May 24, 1992. Ibrahim Rugova the head of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) became the president of Kosovo.

Although the Serbian government did not recognize these elections, Albanians were diligently striving to organize their state in Kosovo. By that time the LDK had an estimated 700,000 members and established offices in several major European cities, notably in Zurich, Stuttgart and Brussels, projecting itself as a national movement rather than a party.[5] Ibrahim Rugova practically became the president of Kosovo's shadow government.

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[2] Ronald Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World. Georgia, Russia and the future of the West* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 105–106.

[3] "V. Putin: Why can Kosovo acquire independence and Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot? (V. Putin: Pochemu Kosovo mozhno poluchit nezavisimost, a Abkhazii I Osetii Nelzya?)," August 29, 2008, http://www.nedelia.lt/world/4996-v.putin-pochemu-kosovo-mozhno-poluchit.html

[4] Peter Pomerantsev, "Yes, Russia Matters: Putin's Guerilla Strategy," *World Affairs* 177, Issue 3 (September-October 2014): 16.

[5] Miranda Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 250.

In order to improve the economic situation of all Albanians, including diasporas from different parts of the world, people were asked to pay 3 percent of their income tax and companies a 10 percent profit tax into the coffers of this shadow government.[6] Thus the main goal of Rugova's government was somehow to prevent violent rebellion and internationalize the Kosovo issue – from diplomatic mediation to UN trusteeship.[7] It was a really difficult task UNDER circumstances when the Serbian military presence was large not only in the Kosovo region but in Bosnia Herzegovina and also Croatia, where the Serbian army had engaged in wars throughout the 1990s. These factors led Rugova to the decision that it was better to do nothing and survive than to act and be massacred.[8] Besides that, it is worth mentioning that the Albanian population had been rising in the Kosovo region. In 1971 their number increased to 916,167, or 73.7 % of the whole population.[9] This fact appeared to be a major source of Serbian grievance.

In these circumstances Serbia was perceived as an aggressor and instigator of the political and military turmoil in the Balkans by the USA. However, generally the western world by that time continued to view Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia and not as a potential nation-state seeking independence like Croatia and Slovenia. U.S. President George H.W. Bush in his letter to Milosevic in December 1992, called the "Christmas Warning", stated that: "in the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the United States will be prepared to employ military force against the Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia proper."[10] In November 1992 an article appeared in *The New York Times* with the title "Operation Balkan Storm: Here's a Plan" outlining a strategic plan of a U.S. military and political intervention in the Balkans to permit the Bosnians to defend themselves from Serbian aggression.[11]

Russia was also a power with its own political interests in the Balkan region during the 1990s. However, as opposed to the U.S., Russia was in a deep political crisis caused by the dissolution of the USSR. Thus the Kremlin was not as effective in the process of political interference in Balkan affairs during the early 1990s.

Pursuing a peaceful policy Rugova's government had high expectations to put put the Kosovo issue on the agenda of the Dayton Conference of November 1995, which formally ended the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. However, unfortunately for Kosovar Albanians the conference was mainly focused on ending the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. Talking about the reasons for not mentioning Kosovo affairs at the Dayton negotiations, Richard Caplan highlights the absence of war in Kosovo at that time as one of the main probable reasons for this issue not to be raised as an urgent case.[12] The Dayton accords came as a vivid illustration of the ineffectiveness of Rugova's peaceful policy. Simultaneously, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), created by Kosovar Albanians during the 1990s, with its radical attitude towards the unification of Kosovo and Albania, was becoming more and more popular and finally took the lead in 1997–1998, conducting guerilla attacks against the Yugoslav armed

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[6] Tim Judah, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 73.

[7] Peter Ronayne, "Genocide in Kosovo," *Human Rights Review* 5, Issue 4, (Jul-Sep 2004): 60.

[8] Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian. A History of Kosovo,* 264.

[9] Judah, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know,* 55.

[10] Quoted from: Ronayne, Genocide in Kosovo, 60.

[11] George Kenney, and Michael J. Dugan, "Operation Balkan Storm: Here's a Plan," *New York Times*, November 29, 1992, See.: http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/29/opinion/operation-balkan-storm-here-s-a-plan.html

[12] Richard Caplan, "International Diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo," *International affairs* 74, no. 4 (October 1998): 751.

forces. The Serbian response to KLA actions was harsh. In March 1998 nearly 70 Albanians (mostly women and children) were massacred by Serbian military and police forces in Drenica, turning nearly all Kosovar Albanians into KLA condoners.[13] By July the Kosovo Liberation Army controlled more than 30 percent of the province's territory.[14] It was the actual beginning of military clashes in Kosovo.

On March 31, 1998, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1160 condemning both the Albanian and Serbian sides for the use of excessive force and stressing the necessity of a peaceful political solution to this conflict.[15] Despite this, the situation in Kosovo became totally uncontrollable. Despite the next Resolution (1199) adopted by the UN Security Council on September 23, 1998 (demanding a ceasefire), and due to the actions of Serbian security forces over 230,000 Albanians were displaced.[16] This Resolution was defied by the Serbian military forces, who shelled one village, killing a reported 18 women, children and elderly people on September 26.

U.S. diplomacy was trying to play its role in the negotiation process between the conflicting sides. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated: "We have made it clear to Milosevic and Kosovars that we do not support independence for Kosovo, that we want Serbia out of Kosovo, not Kosovo out of Serbia."[17] But Kosovar Albanians were striving for nothing but independence, thus military clashes continued. On October 13, NATO entered the fray warning Belgrade that it would commence air strikes if Serb security forces were not withdrawn from Kosovo within 96 hours.[18] Only after being threatened with bombing did Milosevic agree to sign an agreement with U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke to cease fire in Kosovo. On October 24, 1998, Resolution 1203 was adopted by the UN Security Council, according to which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was to establish a verification mission in Kosovo, and calling on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to comply with resolutions 1160 and 1199. Additionally, NATO air verification missions over Kosovo were to complement the OSCE verification mission.[19] Yugoslav troop strength was reduced from 18,000 to 12,500 men and special police were limited to 6,500. But the KLA quickly took the positions left by the Serbian forces thus showing minimal willingness of compromise to achieve peace. By the beginning of November 1998 Serbia sent its troops into Kosovo again. [20] Thus despite the diplomatic efforts to achieve a ceasefire, the situation at the end of 1998 in the Kosovo region was far from peaceful.

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[13] Julie A. Mertus, "Operation Allied Force: handmaiden of Independent Kosovo," *International affairs* 85, no. 3 (May,2009): 469.

[14] Michael MccGwire, "Why did we bomb Belgrade?" *International affairs* 76, no. 1 (January, 2000): 4.

[15] "Resolution 1160 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting, on 31 March 1998," http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980331a.htm.

[16] "Resolution 1199 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting on 23 September 1998," http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u980923a.htm.

[17] James Ker-Lindsay, "From Autonomy to independence: the evolution of international thinking on Kosovo, 1998–2005," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 11, no 2 (June 2009): 145.

[18] Mertus, Operation Allied Force, 469.

[19] "Resolution 1203 (1998). Adopted by the Security Council at its 3937th meeting, on 24 October 1998," http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u981024a.htm.

[20] Benedikt C. Harzl, "Conflicting Perceptions: Russia, the West and Kosovo," *Review of Central and East European Law* 33, Issue 4 (October 2008): 501.

On January 8–10, 1999, KLA forces killed four Serbian policemen near the town of Shtime. Serbian forces responded by killing over 45 Albanians including a 12 year-old boy in the village of Racak. After that, Milosevic ordered the village to be closed to international investigators.[21] An extremely interesting point of view is given about the Racak massacre in a book by Russian expert E. Guskova, in which she claims that this massacre was fabricated by the OSCE control mission in Racak and the bodies of the victims were brought to Racak from elsewhere, in order to blame the Serbian army for conducting these atrocities.[22] Guskova's allegations represent a vivid illustration of the Russian position in the Kosovo conflict, which will be broadly discussed below.

After the January events diplomats decided to make one more deal in a chateau southeast of Paris, in the town of Rambouillet. The delegations of Kosovar Albanians and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were to negotiate peace-making in the Kosovo region with the mediation of the NATO Contact Group. The conference was held from February 6-23.[23] The agreement was to have a limited duration of three years. Some Serbian and Yugoslav forces could stay in Kosovo, especially on the borders. Kosovo itself would have become an autonomous part of Serbia where its security was to be guaranteed by a NATO-led force and the KLA would be disarmed.[24] Unfortunately these points only deepened the discord between the two sides. Consequently, by the end of the conference both sides rejected the main points of agreement. Kosovar Albanians still demanded independence, asking for a two-week consultation period. As for the Serbs, Milosevic not only rejected the points proposed at Rambouillet but even increased Yugoslav troop concentrations on the border with Kosovo and in Kosovo itself. These forces had already been engaged in significant offensive operations during the Paris follow-on talks and now increased their activities even further.[25]

When the two sides returned to Paris on March 15, the Kosovar Albanians announced their readiness to sign the agreement. The Serbs however came back with an almost entirely new proposal. They had crossed out practically every proposal regarding Kosovo's future administrative affairs.[26] Nevertheless, a totally different point of view is given in the works of Russian authors (Guskova, Manachinski) who claim that until the last day of negotiations the Serbian side had not seen nearly 69% of the agreement's text and especially the parts which envisaged the entrance of NATO forces in the region. Thus, according to the Russian rhetoric, this step was the embodiment of a Yugoslav occupation policy by NATO forces.[27]

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[21] Mertus, Operation Allied Force, 62.

[22] Elena Guskova, *The history of the Yugoslav Crisis (1990–2000) (Istoriya Iugoslavskogo krizisa (1990–2000)* (Moscow: "Algoritm" Publishing House, 2001), 669–670.

[23] In order to highlight the level of discord between Albanian and Serbian sides, it is interesting to mention that even the space of two adjoining dining rooms has been strictly divided between the conflict sides and the staff of Contact Group was alternating informally between both rooms at mealtime. Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo," *International Affairs* 75, no 2 (April 1999): 227–228.

[24] "Rambouillet Accords. Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo," http://peacema ker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/990123_RambouilletAccord.pdf.

[25] Weller, The Rambouillet Conference, 236.

[26] Judah, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know,* 86.

[27] Elena Guskova, *The history of the Yugoslav Crisis,* 671 / Manachinnskii A. Ia, Denisov D.O, *Kosovo and Metokhia: Between autonomy and separatism. History and Modernity (Manachinnskii A. Ia., Denisov D.O. Kosovo I Metokhia: Mezhdu avtonomiey I separatizmom. Istoria I Sovremennost)* (Moscow: Pushkino, 2014), 316.

One more attempt to resume negotiations with Slobodan Milosevic took place on March 22, 1999, when Richard Holbrooke once more tried to persuade the Serbian leader to accept the Rambouillet accords. Again no progress was made. Holbrooke then returned to Brussels where NATO, upon having received a briefing on his discussions, authorized the launching of military operations against the FRY,[28] which started on March 24. The Kremlin's attitude towards these operations was perfectly shaped in Russian Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov's "U-turn over the Atlantic." During his flight to Washington on March 24 for diplomatic talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) about a loan to Russia amounting to 4.8 billion dollars, he was informed of the beginning of the NATO military operation. Primakov instructed his pilots immediately to turn around and return to Moscow: "We will not peddle our political principles" said Primakov later in Moscow. However, according to Regina Heller (University of Hamburg), the most obvious sign that Primakov's move was primarily a symbolic one is the fact that the canceled meeting between Primakov and IMF director Michel Camdessus was rescheduled in Moscow for the next day.[29]

The NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia lasted for 78 days from March 24 until June 10, 1999. This operation symbolically coincided with the 50th anniversary of the organization itself. The most important issue, which always arises towards this military operation, is that it was not approved by a UN mandate. According to the words of the U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe: "NATO does not need a UN mandate. It is always desirable to have one but we believe that Article 51 of the UN Charter provides for individual and collective self-defense that provides very broad authority for countries to act even where there is not a specific Security Council resolution authorizing that action."[30] According to Article 51 of the UN charter itself: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security..."[31] Thus according to Article 51 of the UN Charter it is difficult to find any justification for the words of Walter Slocombe, as Kosovo was not in 1999, and is not nowadays, a member of the United Nations and the principles of this article cannot be applied to it. On the other hand, questions should definitely be raised about the lack of other effective options for achieving stability in Kosovo after the adoption of three Security Council Resolutions, initiating cease fire agreements and peace conferences in order to somehow settle the conflict.

The Russian political position in this conflict was basically defined by its reduced influence on world policy throughout the 1990s, after the dissolution of the former superpower. It became hard for Russia to realize that Western Europe or the USA could somehow have their political interests in the Balkan region's stability, especially against Serbia, a traditional Russian ally in the Balkans. The position of the Kremlin was expressed by Primakov to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1998: "Russia has been present in the Balkans for more than 200 years. It is a mystery to us that America now wants to dictate their

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[28] Weller, The Rambouillet Conference, 236.

[29] Regina Heller, "Russia's quest for respect in the international conflict management in Kosovo," *Communist and Post-Communist studies* 47, (2014): 338–339.

[30] Bill Hayton, "Today Kosovo, tomorrow the world," *New Statesman,* (2 April. 1999): 11.

[31] "Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice," https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf.

recommendations to this region and to solve problems on their own initiative there without even consulting with us."[32]Thus, the main reason for not obtaining a UN mandate for NATO military operations lies in the position of Russia (a member of the UN Security Council), which would have never approved NATO military dominance over a region of its interests, not because it really cared about the peace-building process and Serbian sovereignty, but rather because it would not facilitate western dominance in the Balkans. The absence of Russian willingness to peacefully resolve the conflict in the Balkans by the Western powers, leaving the Kremlin itself without benefits, was the main reason for the confrontation between Russia and the West at the end of the 1990s.

By May 1999, Russia was particularly concerned about the prospect of NATO-led operations in Kosovo. Milosevic himself by that time was still adamantly opposed to negotiations with the Western powers. In these circumstances Russian politician Viktor Chernomyrdin together with U.S. officials took part in one more diplomatic effort to end the Kosovo crisis. The Russian diplomatic intervention culminated on May 6 with an agreement by the G8 Foreign Ministers meeting at Petersberg in Bonn which returned the Kosovo question to the Security Council and affirmed that there would be a political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet Accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and other countries of the region.[33] The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1239 on May 14 highlighting the necessity to implement the peace principles outlined in the Petersberg statement adopted by the foreign ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.[34] On June 1, 1999, the FRY officially informed Germany that it had accepted the G8 peace principles peace and demanded an immediate end to NATO bombing. The EU's newly appointed Kosovo envoy, Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, travelled to Belgrade with Russian envoy Chernomyrdin to deliver the terms of the settlement, which were accepted by Milosevic.[35]

Finally on June 10, 1999, NATO bombing of Yugoslavia came to an end with the adoption of Resolution 1244 by the UN Security Council,[36] according to which the reconstruction of the devastated Kosovo region was entrusted to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The United Nations was charged with administrative tasks; UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) was made responsible for the reallocation of all displaced persons; the OSCE was to take care of the process of democratization in the region, emphasizing the protection of human rights; and the European Union was charged with the economic recovery of the region.[37]

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[32] Harzl, Conflicting Perceptions, 495.

[33] James Hughes, "Russia and the Secession of Kosovo: Power, Norms and the failure of Multilateralism," *Europe-Asia Studies* 65, no. 5 (July 2013): 1003.

[34] "Resolution 1239 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4003rd meeting on May 14 1999," http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990514a.htm.

[35] Hughes, Russia and the Secession of Kosovo, 1004.

[36] "Resolution 1244 (1999). Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on June 10, 1999," http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm.

[37] Meszaros Edina Lilla, "United Nations Interventionism: Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo," *Eurolimes* 18, (Autumn 2014): 136.

The Kosovo Stabilization Force or KFOR was designated by NATO to provide security in the Kosovo region under the Rambouillet agreement. The first KFOR contingents arrived in Kosovo on June 12, totaling 50,000 troops by 2001. Initially these forces were divided into five sectors, with the Supreme Command established in Prishtina. French and Italian contingents were located in the north and northwest of the region, the British in the centre, Germans in the southwest, and American contingents were located in the southeastern sector of Kosovo.[38]

Russia, however, also planned to send a peacekeeping force to Kosovo but refused to allow it to fall under NATO command demanding a Russian-controlled sector in Kosovo. With that demand Russia sent a battalion of paratroopers from Bosnia to Prishtina Airport on June 11 thus preempting the expected arrival of KFOR forces. It was a moment when NATO and Russia were on the verge of war. Supreme General Allied Commander of Europe of NATO Wesley Clark ordered a blockade of the runways at Prishtina to prevent the Russians from receiving additional reinforcements. However, Mike Jackson, the British Commander on the ground refused the command saying: "I am not going to start a third world war for you." Three days after the seizure of the airport, Russia signed an agreement that integrated it into the Kosovo peacekeeping force but without assigning it a separate sector.[39]

On June 2003 at the Thessaloniki summit the fourth representative of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Michael Steiner inaugurated a plan for further development of the region called: "Standards before status". This plan covered a lot of issues including the establishment of democratic institutions and the rule of law to the development of a market economy and dialogue with the authorities in Belgrade. The main goal of this plan was to demonstrate that Kosovo's institutions were capable of providing protection for all of its ethnic communities.[40] However, in mid-March 2004 tragedy unfolded. On March 16, Kosovo Serb residents of the village Caglavica (near Prishtina) blocked the main highway to Skopje in order to protest a drive-by shooting which had wounded a local resident the previous day. The same evening in the northern village of Cabra three Kosovar Albanian boys were found drowned in the river Ibar. Public Television broadcasted the claim that the boys had tried to escape from Serbs.[41] These events ignited riots throughout Kosovo, which had a tremendous impact. By March 19 it was estimated that almost 51,000 people had taken part in at least 33 separate incidents across the province. As a result 19 people had been killed, 8 Serbs and 11 Albanians, and over a thousand injured. Nearly 550 homes had been burned, along with 27 monasteries and churches. These events left nearly 4,100 people displaced.[42]

After the March Crisis it became obvious that discord between the Serb and Albanian societies in Kosovo was not being reduced but rather, on the contrary, it was getting more tragic. In these circumstances the need to solve the Kosovo political status issue was put on the agenda. The international powers supervising implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 – the Contact Group of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the United States – came to the conclusion that waiting for Kosovo to fulfill the

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[38] Edina Lilla, United Nations Interventionism, 137.

[39] Harzl, Conflicting Perceptions, 505.

[40] Branislav Radeljic, "Official Discrepancies: Kosovo Independence and Western European Rhetoric," *Perspective on European Politics and Society* 15, no. 4 (2014): 434.

[41] Franklin de Vrieze, "Kosovo after March 2004 Crisis," *Helsinki Monitor* 15, Issue 3 (July 2004): 148.

[42] Ker-Lindsay From Autonomy to independence, 150.

"Standards before status" would not work. Despite UNMIK efforts to stabilize and democratize Kosovo, its efforts can be generally summarized as far from successful. According to estimates nearly half of Kosovar Albanians expressed their intention to emigrate because of the poor economic condition and unemployment during the early 2000s.[43]

In November 2005 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari, to lead the process of arriving at a status agreement.

On February 2, 2007, the "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement" (Ahtisaari Plan) was prepared. Although Ahtisaari avoided the word independence in the text of the plan it was obvious that this document paved the way for Kosovo independence. According to the plan Kosovo would become a multi-ethnic society, which would govern itself democratically (Art. 1; 1.1),[44] Albanian and Serbian were to be defined as the official languages of Kosovo (Art. 1; 1.6),[45] Kosovo would have authority over law enforcement, security, justice, public safety, intelligence, civil emergency response and border control on its territory (Art. 9; 9.1),[46] in regards to protecting the rights of the Serbian population, it was stated that the educational curricula in Kosovo schools would be taught in the Serbian language, and schools would be allowed to use books developed by the ministry of Education of the Republic of Serbia upon notification to the Kosovo Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (Art. 7; 7.1).[47] The Serbian University of Mitrovica would be allowed to function in the north and the municipality of Mitrovica itself was to be divided into northern and southern parts. The Ahtisaari team provided for a "Joint Board" of the two municipalities to carry out functional cooperation in the areas of their own competencies as agreed by the municipalities (Art. 13, Annex 3).[48] In order to implement all the changes towards the democratization of Kosovo, Ahtisaari's team left a 120-day transition period of settlement (Art. 14).[49] This plan was presented to the Security Council on March 26, 2007, where Russia successfully blocked it.[50]

One year after the adoption of the Ahtisaari plan, on February 17, 2008, Kosovo's independence was declared in Prishtina, where the Kosovo Declaration of Independence was signed by Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and President Fatmir Sejdiu.[51] This fact did not come as a surprise in the context of world politics after all the above-mentioned events preceding it. By June 2008 Kosovo independence was recognized by 42 states of the 192 members of the United Nations.[52, 53] It was declared *sui generis* – a unique case – that had no parallels elsewhere.

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[43] Artjoms Ivlevs, and Roswitha M. King, "Kosovo – Winning its Independence but losing its people? Recent evidence on emigration intentions and preparedness to Migrate," *International Migration* 53, no 5 (2012): 88.

[44] "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, February 2, 2007," http://www.kuvendikosoves. org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Judah, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know,* 114.

[51] "The Declaration of Kosovo Independence. February 17, 2008, Full Text," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe /7249677.stm.

[52] Ker-Lindsay From Autonomy to independence, 141.

[53] Five EU member states Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece refused to recognize Kosovo Independence.

According to the Montevideo Convention (1933) on the Rights and Duties of States, the state as a person of International law should possess the following qualifications **a.** a permanent population, **b.** a defined territory, **c.** government and **d.** capacity to enter into relations with other states.[54] This document helps to provide a basic – but not binding – framework as to whether a territory or entity should be recognized as a state or not. Besides this document, entities claiming statehood usually emphasize the right of self-determination. This principle is recognized by the Charter of the United Nations and has since been elucidated in international treaties and agreements – such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the Anti-Colonial Declaration (1960), the Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) and the Helsinki Final act (1975).[55] Hence, there is no *Lex Specialis* (particular laws governing a specific subject – K.K) according to which states should be created throughout the world.

According to the Constitution adopted on June 15, 2008, Kosovo was declared an independent, sovereign, democratic, unique and indivisible state (Art. 1; 1.1),[56] the official languages of the Republic were Albanian and Serbian (Art. 5; 5.1),[57] and the assembly of Kosovo was to comprise 120 deputies, of which 10 seats were intended for Serbian representatives (Art. 64; 64.1; 64.2).[58] Besides that, through article 96 (96.3), the Serb community of northern Kosovo was allowed to be represented by one minister in the Kosovo government.[59]

Despite these concessions towards the Serbian community, the northern part of Kosovo inhabited by Serbs refused to be the part of the new state.[60] Officially Belgrade itself was alarmed by this decision. Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic was particularly active in travelling around the world trying to prevent Kosovo from gaining wider acceptance and legitimacy. Despite United States opposition, the Serbian government managed to secure the necessary resolution (A/RES/63/3) on October 8, 2008, by 77 votes to 6 according to which, the following question was forwarded to the International Court of Justice: Is the Unilateral declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law? The very next day a request for an advisory opinion was submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by the UN Secretary General. As a result, submissions were received from 36 member states.[61]

On July 22, 2010, the International Court of Justice prepared an Advisory Opinion. This document highlighted the non-existence of a general rule prohibiting unilateral declarations of independence[62]" and applying the lotus principle of international law according to which what is not prohibited is allowed, referred to by UNSCR 1244 as to the *Lex specialis*

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[54] "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, Article 1," https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf

[55] Quoted from: James Ker-Lindsay, "Analysis of current events. Not such a *sui generis* case after all: assessing the ICJ opinion on Kosovo." Nationalities Papers 39, no. 1 (January 2011): 2.

[56] "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo," http://www.kushtetutakosoves.info/repository/docs/Constitution.of.the.Republic.of.Kosovo.pdf

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] David I. Efevwerhan, "Kosovo's Chances of UN Membership," *Goettingen Journal of International Law* 4, Issue 1(2012): 110.

[61] Ker-Lindsay From Autonomy to independence, 4.

[62] *Accordance with International Law of the unilateral declaration of independence in Respect of Kosovo. Advisory Opinion of 22 July, 2010,* http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf

applicable to the situation. Finally, stressing the conformity of the Declaration of Independence with the *Lex Specialis* (UNSCR 1244) ICJ concluded that a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo was conducted according to International Law.[63] However, the advisory opinion of the ICJ could not achieve peaceful negotiations between the Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo.

On April 19, 2013, a 15-point agreement on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia was signed. This document was thought to be a landmark agreement between Serbian and Albanian people and was basically focused on the Serbian accommodation issue in the northern part of Kosovo. According to this agreement, Serbs from northern Kosovo were allowed to establish four communities of municipalities, which would have one regional, Serbian police commander. Serbs were also allowed to have a Court of Appeal where the majority of judges would be Serbian.[64] This agreement as well as all the other measures taken to stabilize the situation in the region between the Serb and Albanian people could not achieve its main goal, as during the last Serbian presidential elections of April 2, 2017, the question of participation of the north Kosovo Serbian communities in the Serbian elections was raised again. Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic who was running for President said that he could visit the northern Kosovo Serbian communities even without the approval of the Prishtina authorities. However, he did not want to cause trouble for Serbs in Kosovo.[65]

In January 2017 tensions were raised between Kosovo and Serbia. Now the point of discord was a Russian-made Serbian train decorated with large images of Serbian Orthodox icons from Kosovo monasteries and the slogan: "Kosovo is Serbia" painted on it. The train was to travel from Belgrade to Mitrovica. Kosovo prevented the train from crossing the border between the two countries, with allegations it was prepared to blow up the tracks. Finally, the train was stopped by Serbs themselves near the southern Serbian city of Raska. Aleksandar Vucic accused Kosovo of overreacting saying that Serbs were only sending a train and not a tank to Kosovo.[66]

Post-Soviet conflict developments in the Georgian breakaway regions

Abkhazia

Turmoil of the 1990s

By the beginning of the 1990s, the newly declared (April 9, 1991) Second Georgian Republic was engulfed in deep political and military turmoil. Despite all the difficulties

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Adem Beha, "Disputes over the 15 –point agreement on normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia," *Nationalities Papers* 43, no. 1 (2015): 103.

[65] "No Decision if Kosovo Serbs will Vote in Serbian Elections," March 21, 2017, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/no-decision-if-kosovo-serbs-will-vote-in-serbian-elections-03-20-2017#sthash.VEWPR5XD.dpuf.

[66] "Serbian train sparks escalation in tensions with Kosovo," January 14, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38625872.

caused by the dissolution of the USSR, the Georgian government was trying to maintain control over the political situation in the country and in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.

On July 9, 1991, the law of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic on Changes and Amendments of the Constitution (Organic Law) of the Abkhaz ASSR was issued.[67] This law was basically aimed at reducing the Georgian presence in the Abkhaz Supreme Council, which consisted of 65 deputies. It then created a new principle of ethnic division – 28+26+11 – according to which the number of Abkhazian deputies was 28, Georgian deputies were represented by 26 members, and other nationalities were allowed to have 11 members in the Abkhaz Supreme Council. Thus 93,000 Abkhazians who had been 17% of the region's total population were to be represented by 28 deputies in the Supreme Council, whereas nearly 240,000 Georgians, 46% of the region's total population, were represented by 26 deputies.[68] Despite this misbalance, the Georgian government accepted the law in order to avoid further escalation of the conflict in Abkhazia. However, this compromise appeared not to be enough for separatists.

Together with these difficulties, the Georgian government had to deal with domestic opposition. The discord grew deeper and by January 1992 President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted from the country and state power moved to the hands of the Military Council headed by Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba Ioseliani. This council is believed to have been funded and backed by the Kremlin, at least the turmoil in Georgia must have been very beneficial for Moscow. As the discord grew deeper, several criminal bands were being organized on Georgian territory, mostly divided between the supporters of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the newly established Military Council. These bands, together with the formations of Abkhazian separatists had been successfully disorganizing Georgian state unity, which should have played a crucial part in consolidation of Georgian opposition against the main threat from the Kremlin. Moscow, for its part, has been trying to deepen this crisis in Georgia supplying the separatist band formations with weapons from the Russian military bases on Georgian territory (Gudauta, Akhaltsikhe). Although the Georgian government issued a law on September 15, 1991, granting occupational force status to all the military formations of the USSR army on Georgian territory,[69] these bases actively functioned for more than a decade after that.

Thus, in the period when the Georgian state was in need of political and military unity in order to fight against the interests of the enemy, Tbilisi appeared to be divided in almost every aspect of political life. This fact was most beneficial for the Kremlin and separatists in the two breakaway regions and they successfully used it against Georgian statehood.

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[67] Tamaz Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia (1989–2006). Collection of Political-Legal Acts* (Tbilisi: GCI LTD Publishing House, 2003–2005), 66–67.

[68] Levan Alexidze, *Has the Kosovo case diminished the adherence of the international community of states to the inviolability of territorial integrity of the UN member states, including Georgia? (Daaknina tu ara `kosovos precedentma` sakhelmtsipota saerTaSoriso Tanamegobrobis erTguleba gaeros tsevr sakhelmtsipota, saqarTvelos CaTvliT, teritoriuli mTlianobis Khelsheukheblobisadmi?)* International Law and Georgia (from antiquity to present) Selected Papers Published in 1957–2012, Vol I, History, Concepts, Discourse. (Tbilisi: Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, 2012), 692. (Georgian text)

[69] Shota Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts (Konfliqtebis anatomia)* (Tbilisi: "Forma" Publishing house, 2011), 97.

After acquiring governmental power, the Military Council restored the 1921 Constitution of Georgia. On March 10 former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union (1985–1991) Eduard Shevardnadze was invited from Moscow by the Military Council to become Chairman of the State Council of Georgia.

On March 31, 1992, according to the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Abkhazia, the formation of a regiment of the Abkhazian army was declared.[70] On July 23 a decree issued by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia,[71] headed by Vladislav Ardzinba since 1990, abolished the Abkhazian Constitution of 1978 and instead declared the restoration of the Constitution of 1925, which had never come into legal force.[72] With this step, separatists once more attempted to get rid of Georgian jurisdiction. Needless to say this act did not have any legal power. "**We will at any cost compel Georgians to shoot us**!"[73] (emphasis by the author) – these are the famous words of Vladislav Ardzinba, which precisely described the separatist attitude towards every aspect of its relationship with Georgia.

In an attempt to stop all the raids and robberies organized by criminal bands, the State Council of Georgia issued a decree on August 10, 1992, on the introduction of a state of emergency for railway transport.[74] In order to restore state control over the railway lines the Georgian government decided to move parts of the National Guard with Tengiz Kitovani as a commander and the paramilitary organization of Mkhedrioni headed by Jaba Ioseliani to the Abkhazian territory. The entrance of these forces into Abkhazia on August 14, 1992, marked the beginning of the Abkhazian war, which lasted till September 30, 1993.

While talking about the military forces of separatists it is important to mention the mercenary fighters from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples – a loose coalition of ethnic, tribal and regional groups from the Caucasus Mountains. Combatants consisted of ethnic Abkhazians from Turkey, Syria and other places of Abkhaz diaspora. In addition to these fighters a significant number of ethnic Russians, who did not reside in Georgia or Abkhazia prior to the outbreak of the armed conflict, were seen fighting on the Abkhaz side.[75] The Pskov division with its special function, the № 345 airborne troops, the № 643 anti-aircraft missile regiment based at the Bombori (Gudauta district of Abkhazia) air base, the № 529 aviation regiment of the air forces, the Black Sea Navy, the battalions throughout Abkhazia, and the subdivisions of the special services. In addition, according to data given by M. Demianov, special services adviser of Ardzinba, at the beginning of the war the №643 Russian anti-aircraft missile regiment gave the separatists 984 rifles, 267 guns, 18 machine guns, 500 hand grenades, 600 signal missiles, more than half a million bullets, military trucks, military engineering equipment, etc.[76]

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[70] Essays from the History of Georgia. Abkhazia from ancient times till the present days, ed. Jemal Gamakharia, TamazBeradze, Teimuraz Gvantseladze, 466. Tbilisi: Institute of History and Ethnology of Iv. Javakhishvili, 2011.

[71] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia (1989–2006). Collection of Political-Legal Acts,* 112–113.

[72] As it is widely known, this Constitution was not even published and never came into force. Thus, it never had any legal power. See.: Essays from the History of Georgia, 427.

[73] Gocha Gvaramia, "How was the war starting in Abkhazia. (Kak nachinalas voina v Abkhazii)", http://www.aps ny.ge/analytics/1187113045.php.

[74] Essays from the History of Georgia, 469.

[75] "International Society to bring a Verdict on the Tragedy of Abkhazia/Georgia," ed. JemalGamakharia, 58–59. Tbilisi: 2015.

[76] Essays from the History of Georgia, 471–472.

Russian army forces took part in several bold military operations. On February 20, 1993, the Russian Defense Ministry sent a SU-25 fighter-bomber to bomb Sukhumi in retaliation. Defense Minister Pavel Grachev admitted that the Russian attack had been carried out in revenge for Georgian shelling of areas close to Eshera. This attack was witnessed by American journalist Thomas Goltz, who noted that the raid consisted of at least one SU–25 plane dropping a 500-pound bomb on Sukhumi.[77] The Russian Navy participated in a landing operation at Tamish on July 2, 1993, where Russian–Abkhazian paratroopers consisting of 300 persons armed with one tank, one armored vehicle, and one grad missile annihilated Georgian positions.[78, 79]

Considering all the evidence showing the Russian presence in the war it is ridiculous to mention the work of American film director and producer Dodge Billingsley who denied the importance of the Russians in military operations during the war which, according to Billingsley, was lost by Georgia mostly because of the ill-discipline of its army.[80] The Georgian army may really have been ill-disciplined but not mentioning the role of the Russian military in the Abkhazian conflict can be explained either by a lack of knowledge of the war itself or a lack of objectivity by the author, in both cases we are clearly dealing with a mere falsifications of facts.

Alongside military domination, the Kremlin also carried out effective diplomacy during the war in Abkhazia. On September 3, 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze and Boris Yeltsin met in Moscow where they signed an agreement according to which the territorial integrity of Georgia was to be secured and all armed formations participating in the conflict would firmly observe a ceasefire from 12:00am, September 5, 1992. (Art.1). Article 9 of the agreement envisaged the troops of the Russian Federation being temporarily deployed on the territory of Georgia, including in Abkhazia, where they were obliged to firmly observe neutrality and not to participate in internal conflicts.[81] This agreement did not prevent the capture of the city of Gagra in the beginning of October by Abkhazian, Russian and Caucasian Confederate forces. Terrible atrocities took place after conquering Gagra by Abkhaz separatists. Torture, decapitation, immolation, mutilation, eye-gouging, playing football with severed heads, murder by car, rape and execution-style killing was documented by various reports on crimes against the Georgian population in Abkhazia.[82]

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[77] "International Society to bring a Verdict on the Tragedy of Abkhazia/Georgia," ed. Jemal Gamakharia, 60–61. Tbilisi: 2015.

[78] Essays from the History of Georgia, 476.

[79] As for the Tamish landing operation, besides all the given material from different scholarly works I have personal memories of my father, who was a participant of that tragic war together with his brother (my uncle). On July 2, 1993 when the landing operation was launched in Tamish my father was in the local hospital supporting his brother who had suffered a heart attack. Witnessing the endless numbers of Georgian soldiers taken to this hospital with severe injuries with their legs and hands torn off my father asked one of the soldiers about the situation of their positions, the soldier replied in total shock saying he could not understand why they (Russian–Abkhaz landing operation soldiers) were not falling when he was shooting them. This fact vividly highlights the level of – Russian provided – armor protection and the preparation of the forces annihilating Georgian positions in that landing operation.

[80] Dodge Billingsley. "Military aspects of the war: the turning point." In *"The Abkhazians. A handbook,"* ed. George Hewitt, 147–156. Curzon Press, 1999.

[81] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 123–124.

[82] International Society to bring a Verdict, 63–64.

The next agreement about a ceasefire and peaceful regulation of the conflict was signed on May 14, 1993, in Moscow. But like the previous agreement it was only focused on weakening the attention and vigil of the Georgian side leading to a continuation of military operations against Georgia during June and July.[83]

On July 27, 1993, the third and last ceasefire agreement was signed between the Georgian, Russian and Abkhazian sides. For the first time, at Russia's insistence Abkhazia became a party to the agreement, according to which both the Georgian and Abkhazian parties should be disarmed and all the defense infrastructure of Sukhumi should be dismantled.[84] The Georgian side fulfilled the points of this agreement whereas the Russian-Abkhazian formations were not been disarmed. Moreover, they increased their military presence in the region and got ready for a final offensive, which took place on September 16 and ended with the fall of Sukhumi on September 27, 1993. Three days later, the occupants and separatists reached the river Inguri and took control of almost the whole territory of Abkhazia.

According to the 1989 census 93,267 Abkhaz lived in Abkhazia, whereas the Georgian population comprised 239,872 people.[85] After the war nearly 10,000 people were killed and up to 240,000 Georgians were left displaced.[86]

Moscow finally achieved its goal on October 8, 1993, when Georgia became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. On May 14, 1994, an agreement was signed between the Georgian and Abkhazian sides about a ceasefire and Separation of Forces. According to this agreement the Georgian army should withdraw beyond the frontiers of Abkhazia (Art. 2; 2.4) and the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States would be deployed in a Security Zone to monitor compliance with this Agreement (Art. 2; 2.2).[87]

On November 26, 1994 Abkhazia adopted a Constitution, according to which the Republic of Abkhazia was defined as a sovereign democratic state (Art. 1)[88] with its own symbols: national flag, national emblem and a national anthem (Art. 10).[89] The Abkhaz language acquired the status of the state language together with Russian, which is also used in state institutions (Art. 6).[90] Vladislav Ardzinba became the de facto president of Abkhazia.

According to the new Georgian Constitution adopted on August 24, 1995, the territory of the state of Georgia was determined as of December 21, 1991, hence spreading its jurisdiction over Abkhazia and also the Tkshinvali region (Art. 1; 1.1).[91] Thus the Constitution of Abkhazia was inconsistent with the Georgian Constitution, and declared contrary to the efforts to promote a peaceful political settlement through negotiations between the conflicting parties in Georgia by the CSCE Budapest Document adopted on December 6, 1994,

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[83] Essays from the History of Georgia, 475.

[84] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 137–138.

[85] Essays from the History of Georgia, 490.

[86] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 100.

[87] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 158–159.

[88] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 173–174.

[89] Ibid.

[90] Ibid.

[91] "The Constitution of Georgia, Adopted on August 24, 1995," http://www.parliament.ge/files/68_1944_951190_CONSTIT_27_12.06.pdf.

where the facts of ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population were also highlighted;[92] as well as by the OSCE Lisbon document of December 3, 1996.[93]

On December 1, 1994, under the auspices of the UN, the first dialogue between the Georgian and Abkhazian sides was opened in Geneva. Both sides took responsibility for a peaceful return of displaced persons to Abkhazia. The second round of these talks took place on January 11–13, and according to its decisions, initially refugees should have been peacefully returned to the Gali region from February 10, 1994. Unfortunately this agreement was also breached by separatists – by organizing disturbances, burning down the houses of the Georgian population and even killing Georgian people, and they again halted the process of the newly begun negotiations.[94]

The OSCE resolutions did not impede separatists from conducting a referendum in order to determine the attitude of citizens to the Constitution of 1994 on October 3, 1999. On the day of the referendum 219,534 citizens in the territory of Abkhazia were eligible to vote, and the 97.7% of them who voted approved the Constitution. The results of this referendum itself were approved by the Act of National Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia adopted by the Deputies of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Abkhazia on October 12, 1999.[95]

These acts, conducted by separatists, were once again denounced by a declaration of the OSCE at its Istanbul summit of November 17-18, 1999 reaffirming strong support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia.[96]

The Tskhinvali Region[97]

According to the 1989 census, the total population of the former South Ossetian Autonomous District was 98,400. Ossetians represented 66.2%, Georgians 29.44% and other nationalities 4% of the overall regional population. The number of Ossetian inhabitants throughout Georgia in that period was about 164,000 (3% of Georgia's total population) of which only 39.7% percent, i.e. 65, 200 Ossetians resided in the former Autonomous District territory.[98]

The Tskhinvali Region was engulfed in military clashes from spring 1991 until summer 1992. Due to the political mess in Georgian politics, military units participating in hostilities lacked organization and supplies, therefore they were obliged to obtain them by themselves. This process was usually accompanied by desertions, and the worst forms of

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[92] "CSCE Budapest Document," December 6, 1994, 18–19, https://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true.

[93] "Lisbon Document," December 3, 1996, 8, http://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true.

[94] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 100–101.

[95] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 310.

[96] "Istanbul Document," November 17-18, 1999, 49, http://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true

[97] Although this conflict region is widely called "South Ossetia" in English and not only English language literature, I find it important to use the official Georgian name "Tskhinvali Region" while referring to this conflict region, because, as it is already widely known in Georgian and foreign historical scholarly, the name "South Ossetia" was the name of the Autonomus Region in the Georgian Soviet Socialistic Republic (SSR), invented by the USSR on April 20, 1922. Such spatial formation had never existed on Georgian territory before. That is why I consider it important to use the name: "Tskhinvali Region" in this article according to the correct Georgian political terminology.

[98] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 133.

looting of the local, peaceful population. These circumstances created fertile ground for the Kremlin to intervene and play the role of conciliator between Georgians and Ossetians. In April 1992 units of the USSR army left the Tskhinvali region leaving all their weaponry to Ossetian separatists. [99]

On May 29, 1992, the independence of South Ossetia was declared by the Supreme Council of South Ossetia.[100] On June 10 a meeting between Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia E. Shevardnadze, and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the North Ossetian SSR A. Galazov, took place in the village of Kazbegi (Georgia). According to the protocol of this meeting the Parties agreed to an immediate ceasefire in the Georgain-Ossetian conflict zone (Art. 1),[101] to set up, until June 12, a joint quadripartite group of observers that would include representatives of all parties involved in the conflict (Art. 2),[102] and to work out a series of measures aimed at the return of refugees to their homes before the onset of the winter chill (Art. 6),[103] and also deemed it appropriate for the Russian Federation to participate in the negotiation process aimed at settling the conflict (Art. 9).[104]

In two weeks the Russian Federation committed itself to settle the conflict between the Georgian and Ossetian people according to Article 9 of the Kazbegi meeting protocol, and on June 24, 1992, Yeltsin and Shevardnadze signed an agreement in Sochi (Dagomys). With this agreement the Russian and Georgian parties took responsibility to undertake all necessary measures to terminate hostilities and undertake a comprehensive ceasefire by June 28, 1992 (Art. 1; 1.1).[105] In order to secure demilitarization of the conflict region, and to rule out the possibility of involvement of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the conflict, the Russian Federation agreed to withdraw the Tskhinvali-district deployed 37th Engineer-Sapper Regiment and helicopter regiments within 20 days from the moment of the ceasefire and separation of opposing parties (Art. 2),[106] in order to exercise control over the implementation of the ceasefire, withdrawal of the armed formations, and disbanding of forces of self-defense. To maintain a security regime in the region, a mixed Control Commission composed of representatives of opposing parties was to be set up and would carry out its functions in close cooperation with a joint group of military observers created in accordance with the agreements reached in Kazbegi (Art. 3; 3.1).[107] As can easily be observed by these two agreements signed in Kazbegi and Sochi it is quite uncertain which parts should form the aforesaid quadripartite group. According to the Sochi agreement this group should have been formed by the "opposing parties" – which by any logic were the Georgians and Ossetians, in this case, however, it is vague to talk about which four sides should compose the quadripartite group. It was already more than obvious that both Kazbegi and Sochi agreements represented Russian attempts to dominate the conflict between the Georgian and Ossetian peoples on Georgian soil.

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[99] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 148.

[100] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 100.

[101] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 102.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 103.

[107] Ibid.

The vagueness was dispersed by the protocol of the meeting of representatives of the parties on the Implementation of the Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict held in Vladikavkaz. According to this document the Mixed Control Commission would compose the following officials: S.K. Shoigu, G.V. Filatov, S.V. Khetagurov, S.N. Suanova, O.D. Teziev, P.G. Gazaev, T.K. Kitovani, P. Giorgadze, N. Lomouri, E. Sabanadze, and G. Tushurashvili (Art.1).[108] Thus, if according to the Sochi agreement Georgia and Russia appeared to be the negotiating parties, the Vladikavkaz meeting protocol clearly approved the composition of the Mixed Control Commission of Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian parties. The number of forces of this commission was defined by the decision of the first session of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) of October 31, 1992, according to which, for the purpose of ensuring command of the joint force to establish peace and support law and order, the following military commanders were to be appointed as staff: Lieutenant General Gennady Filatov (Russia), Lieutenant General Panteleimon Giorgadze (Georgia) and Major General Stanislav Suanov (North Os-setia) (Art.1).[109] According to article 2 of the decision: "The joint forces should comprise 1,500 persons and 900 persons in reserve: 500 persons from the Republic of Georgia and 300 persons in reserve; 500 persons from the Russian Federation (parachute landing regiments and 300 persons in reserve; 500 from the Ossetian side and 300 reserve".[110] These documents finally unveiled the main goal of the Kremlin's politics in the Tskhinvali region – to legalize its military presence on Georgian soil disguised by the JCC commission's peacekeeping nature.

On March 1, 1993, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the OSCE mission and the parties of the conflict. This document defined the area of the OSCE competencies in the peacemaking process in the Tskhinvali region.[111] This step was immediately contradicted by a decree issued by the Supreme Council of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialistic Republic (SSR) on Recognition of the Republic of South Ossetia on March 6.[112] Instead of denouncing the unilateral declaration of independence of the separatist region on Georgian territory, and thus to really facilitate the Kremlin alleged peacekeeping responsibilities, a decree was issued on March 22, 1993, by the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation which put this decree on the agenda.[113] Thus, the real goal of the Kremlin in the process of escalating conflict in Georgia became more vivid.

On November 2, 1993, the Constitution of the South Ossetian Republic was adopted. According to Article 23 of this document North and South Ossetia would have an administrative border and it should not impede the ethnic, socio-economic and cultural unity of the Ossetian people.[114]

Prompting the escalation of the conflict in the Tskhinvali region on the one hand did not present an obstacle for the Kremlin's policy in Georgia, which went on to sign an agreement on the Further Development of the Process of Peaceful Settlement of the

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[108] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 104.
[109] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 105.
[110] Quoted from: Ibid.
[111] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 150.
[112] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 131.
[113] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 132.
[114] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 150.

Georgian-Ossetian Conflict and the Joint Controlling Commission (JCC) on October 31, 1994, in Moscow. After an ironic exclamation in the preamble of the document, that: "in the course of two years after the conclusion of the Sochi agreement, no substantial achievements in terms of promotion of political dialogues have been achieved,"[115] it was decided that the JCC would be transformed into a permanent mechanism, called upon to participate in a planned and coordinated manner in the process of solving different aspects of the conflict settlement.[116] This agreement was signed by all four parties of the JCC.

The next meeting on the Comprehensive Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict was conducted on October 30, 1995, in Vladikavkaz between Georgia, South Ossetia, the Russian Federation, and North Ossetia with participation by the OSCE. According to the meeting's protocol, the parties agreed to start a negotiation process immediately. The expert groups of the parties were assigned the task to elaborate and put forward their proposals on the following issues: measures and guarantees of security; restoration and strengthening of mutual trust between the parties of the conflict; economic recovery and reestablishment of normal business links; and the status of South Ossetia.[117]

On November 9, 1996, one more document violating Georgian territorial sovereignty and integrity was signed between the North and South Ossetian governments. According to the agreement, the sides decided to encourage the process of integration in the social-economic, scientific-technical, banking and customs spheres; and the forming of unified cultural, educational and informational space (Art. 1).[118] The sides committed themselves to elaborate and implement the measures on exploitation and maintenance of the Trans-Caucasus Motorway through the "Rocky Crossing" (Art. 12).[119] Thus, Georgian territory became the area of cultural integration between the North and South Ossetian people. What is more dramatic for Georgia, the exploitation of the "Rocky tunnel" constructed in 1984 as the connection point for the Ossetian people jeopardized Georgian state safety because of the uncontrollable smuggling of various goods from Russia and the North Caucasus to the central part of Georgia.

In November 1996 a Presidential election was held in the Tskhinvali region, and Ludvig Chibirov became its first president. On November 26 after the decree of the so-called Presidential Elections on Part of the Territory of the Tskhinvali Region, the Georgian parliament declared this event as illegitimate and null.[120]

Negotiations between Eduard Shevardnadze and Ludvig Chibirov started in 1996. During their three meetings (August 27, 1996, Vladikavkaz; November 14, 1997, Java and June 20, 1998, Borjomi) – various crucial political and socio-economic issues were negotiated and concluded by the "Agreement (Declaration) on Basic Principles of Political and Legal Relations between the Sides in the Georgian Ossetian Conflict" in Baden (Austria) on July 13, 2000.[121] Thus, by the end of the 1990s the negotiation process between Tbilisi and

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[115] Quoted from: Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 170.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 205.

[118] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 228.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 229.

[121] Hansjorg Eiff, "The OSCE Mission to Georgia and the Status of South Ossetia," *OSCE Yearbook* (2008): 41.

the separatist Ossetians reached its best point of productivity. By that time an estimated 12,496 people had been displaced from the Tskhinvali region and awaited return to their homes.[122]

The Road to the Five Days War of August 2008

The end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium was marked by significant difficulties in Georgian, as well as Russian, politics. Both of these countries were engulfed in deep socio-political crises. Being the only legal successor of the USSR, Russia alone agreed to honor all its foreign debts totaling $160 billion.[123] By the end of 1990s it became obvious that Boris Yeltsin could not lead Russia to economic and political stability. The Kremlin was in need of much more sober (considering Yeltsin's alcohol addiction, this word can be used both in an allegoric as well as in a literal context, highlight by the author) government with new approaches towards this deep crisis. In 1999, KGB officer Vladimir Putin became Prime Minister of Russia. According to an apt remark by Alec Rasizade (senior associate at the Historical Research Center in Washington): "Had the conditions in Russia been more stable than they were in 1998–1999, it is more probable that Putin would have lived out his days as no more than a retired KGB officer". The author mentions that the situation in Russia of that period can be precisely described by the Russian word *Bespredel* (unrestricted iniquity, pandemonium).[124]

Considering the situation in Russia it is not difficult to imagine the situation in the Georgian state in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. The country was experiencing a deep economic crisis, typical of the process of post-Soviet economic transition from the socialist to a free-market economic model, which was quite a painful process, mostly characterized by a high level of state corruption and mass unemployment. It was difficult to find any area of state life in which Georgia had any kind of satisfactory indicators. The occupied territories of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region remained the major issue on the Georgian foreign, as well as domestic, political agenda. It was under such circumstances that the country had to face the *Bespredel* Kremlin regime.

The last years of the 20th century in Russian-Georgian relations were marked by the escalation of conflicts in the breakaway regions of Georgia. This tendency became more sensible after Putin's accession to power in 1999. While talking about the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 it is important to stress that the events that led to this war did not begin one or two months or even years before the conflict itself; as the analysis below illustrates, it had been diligently prepared by the Kremlin since 1999.

The issue of removing Russian military bases from Georgian territory was raised at the OSCE Istanbul summit. The Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and Georgia stated that the Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani would be dismantled and

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[122] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 133.

[123] Alec Rasizade, "Putin's mission in the Russian Thermidor," *Communist and Post- communist studies* 41, Issue 1(March 2008): 9.

[124] Rasizade, Putin's mission, 4.

withdrawn by July 1, 2001.[125] Had Russia fulfilled this promise, it would have definitely reduced its military presence in Georgia, hence creating a fertile ground for peaceful regulation of both conflicts in Abkhazia as well as in the Tskhinvali region. But the Kremlin chose a policy of maintaining a permanent tension with Georgia. It was obvious that a peaceful solution to the conflicts in both regions was not in the Kremlin's interest.

On November 9, 2000, the Russian government informed Georgia of its intention to implement a visa regime for Georgian citizens wishing to enter Russia. Over Georgian objections Russia quit the CIS pact that had abolished visas within the Commonwealth and promptly began demanding visas from all Georgian citizens entering Russia.[126]

On April 8, 2001, the new Constitution of the South Ossetian Republic was adopted.[127] In December 2001, presidential elections were held in the occupied Tskhinvali region, resulting in Ludvig Chibirov being replaced by Russian-supported businessman and professional wrestler Eduard Kokoity. It became clear that the negotiation format of Shevardnadze and Chibirov concluded in Baden in July 2001 was not an appropriate scenario for Russian policy in the Tskhinvali region.[128]

The terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001, appeared to be an additional reason for Putin's Russia to act against Georgia. On the first anniversary of this tragic event Putin characterized Georgia as a country "presenting a terrorist threat" and announced his readiness to invoke Article 51 of the UN Charter in order to use military force against Georgia, which he had already done on August 6, 2002, by bombing the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. Six weeks later on November 22, Shevardnadze responded to Russia's ultimatum at the NATO summit in Prague, where he declared Georgia's intention to join NATO.[129] The mere analysis of the aforesaid fact leads one to the important conclusion that it was the Kremlin, not Tbilisi, which initiated restrictions on the immigration of Georgian citizens to Russia and after the beginning of the Second Chechen war in 1999 – which, as has been proved by the evidence was initiated and fabricated by the Kremlin itself[130]– with the slogan of *Fighting against terrorism* began to exert its new foreign policy approaches towards Georgia, accusing the country of being the source of terrorists and bombings in its territory. At the beginning of the 20th century the Kremlin most definitely did not desire the conflicts in the Georgian breakaway regions to be solved by peaceful measures.

In May 2002, Russia issued a new law on citizenship according to which the Kremlin invented a "simplified manner" of conferring citizenship to particular groups of people. These regulations are given in the 6th paragraph of Article 14 of the Law on Citizenship of the Russian Federation which states that Russian citizenship can be granted by a simplified manner to a group of people who: "b) have had USSR citizenship, and having resided or residing in the states that have formed the part of the USSR, have not become citizens

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[125] "Istanbul Document," November 17-18, 1999, 259, http://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true.

[126] Andrei Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war," In *The Guns of August 2008. Russia's war in Georgia*, ed. Svante E. Cornell & Frederick Starr, 51. London: M.E. Sharpe, 2009.

[127] "Constitution of the South Ossetian Republic," (KonstitutsyaRespublikiYuzhnayaOsetia), http://cominf.org/node/1166488810.

[128] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war," 52–53.

[129] Ibid.

[130] About the preparation of the Second Chechen war by the Russian Federal Service see.: Yuri Felshtinski, and Alexander Litvinenko, *Blowing Up Russia: Terror from within*, (New York: S.P.I. Books, 2002), 279.

of these states and as a result remain stateless persons."[131] This was the actual beginning of a Russian passport distribution policy in Georgian breakaway regions, which later on the eve of the war became a "legal pretext" for Moscow to intervene on Georgian territory in order to protect Russian citizens.[132]

According to former Putin economic advisor Andrei Illarionov, Russia in February 2003 supplied Ossetian separatists with heavy military equipment including twelve T-55 tanks. This process continued throughout 2004, when in May and June the Kremlin sent seventy-five additional T-72 battle tanks and huge stocks of weaponry and ammunition to the Tskhinvali region.[133] Besides that, instead of disbanding its military bases according to the above-mentioned OSCE Istanbul document, the Kremlin conversely began the construction of new military bases in the city of Java in the Tskhinvali region and the modernization of its military base in Ochamchire, Abkhazia. A third military base, according to the Russian journalist Yulia Latinina, was constructed in the Dagestan region of Botlikh, military forces of which had also participated in the war against Georgia in 2008.[134] All these measures were conducted by Russia during the 2003–2004 transitional period in Georgia, when a new political team headed by Mikheil Saakashvili came to power. If Shevardnadze expressed the desire to become a member of NATO, Saakashvili's team began the actual implementation process of all the necessary reforms in order to somehow get closer to European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. It goes without saying that this policy of Saakashvili was perceived as a threat by the Kremlin, which by escalating the conflicts in the breakaway regions tried to maintain control over Georgian foreign policy.

Despite a vivid pro-western foreign policy attitude, the new government of Georgia was trying to negotiate with Russia. The first official meeting of the newly elected President Mikheil Saakashvili with Putin took place on February 11, 2004. The Georgian side demonstrated a willingness to negotiate with Russia, but instead of real negotiations Tbilisi only received an increasing amount of Russian ammunition in the Tskhinvali region. On July 8, 2004, Georgian authorities captured nine trucks loaded with armaments and ammunition sent from Russia to the Tskhinvali region. The following day, fifty Georgian peacekeepers were disarmed and humiliatingly made to kneel in the center of Tskhinvali, while the scene was videotaped and broadcasted on all the main Russian television channels. The same night, the villages of Tamarasheni and Kurta, which were controlled by the Georgian administration, were shelled together with the Georgian checkpoints near the villages.[135] Despite this aggressive policy, the war between Georgia and Russia was averted in 2004 because of the Georgian government's patience and its policy of not responding to Russian aggression in the same manner.

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[131] "Federal Law no 62-FZ of May 31, 2002 on Russian Federation Citizenship," http://www.legislation line.org/documents/action/popup/id/4189.

[132] Kakhaber Kalichava, Some Aspects of Russian "Passport Policy" in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region, (RuseTis mier afxazeTsa da tskhinvalis regionSi gankhorcielebuli sapasporto politikis zogierTi samarTlebrivi aspeqti), *Historical Researches* XII, (Tbilisi 2013–2015): 217–233. Sokhumi State University, Georgian Historical Society by EkvtimeTakaishvili Abkhazian Organization, (Georgian text)

[133] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war," 50.

[134] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war," 56. / Yulia Latynina, "200 km of Tanks. About Russian-Georgian War" (200km tankov. O Rosiisko-Gruzinksoivoine), http://readli.net/chitat-online/?b=124895&pg=1.

[135] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war," 57.

On November 5, 2004, Prime Minister of Georgia Zurab Zhvania met Eduard Kokoity in Sochi in the presence of representatives of Russia and the OSCE. The statement of this meeting, which stressed the necessity of a ceasefire and the maintenance of peace in the Tskhinvali region, noted: "in future not to dislocate armed formations and posts in the zone of conflict, without the agreement of the JCC".[136] Thus, it should be highlighted once again that **the statement of Zurab Zhvania and Eduard Kokoity meeting in Sochi on November 5, 2004 clearly prohibited the movement of any kind of military formation or equipment, without the consent of the Joint Control Commission in the conflict region** (emphasis by the author).

Addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on January 26, 2005 Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili proposed a peace plan for settling the conflict in the Tskhinvali region. Unveiling the main features of this plan, Saakashvili mentioned: "Specifically, our plan envisions constitutional guarantees for the regions autonomous status, which include the right to freely and directly elect its local self-governments, including an executive branch and parliament. The Region's parliament will be a parliament with substance. That means that it will have control over issues such as culture and education, social policy, economic policy, public order, the organization of local governments, and environmental protection. At the same time, the people of the Tskhinvali region-South Ossetia must have a voice in the national structures of government and this plan establishes the constitutional guarantee to do that". This plan was immediately rejected by the Ossetian separatist authorities claiming that its intention was to remain independent from Georgia and calling the plan totally unacceptable and yet another propagandist move.[137] Georgian peace attempts were praised by the OSCE Ljubljana ministerial document of December 6, 2005, according to which the Georgian plan "supported by the sides, will serve as a basis for the peaceful settlement of the conflict".[138]

On May 30, 2005, Georgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Salome Zurabishvili and her Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov signed a joint communique on the timing and sequencing of the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia. According to this document Russia was to complete its military withdrawal from Georgia by the end of 2008. This was reaffirmed by another agreement on the Russian military base withdrawal from Georgia on March 31, 2006, in Sochi. According to Article 11 of the document, Russia was to cease supplying its military bases with military equipment.[139] Despite these agreements by May 2006 Moscow had begun the construction of a new military base in Elbachita, two kilometers northeast of Java.[140]

A new phase of escalation began on September 27, 2006, when Georgian Minister of Interior Vano Merabishvili announced the discovery of a spy network coordinated by officers of the Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (Rus. *Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye*

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[136] Diasamidze, *Status of Autonomous Regions,* 438.

[137] Jean–Christope Peuch, "Georgia: President Unveils South Ossetian Peace Plan In Strasbourg," Radio Free Europe, January 26, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/a/1057093.html.

[138] "OSCE Ministerial Council," 6 December 2005, 41, http://www.osce.org/mc/17490?download=true.

[139] Kakhaber Kalichava, *The Russo-Georgian War of 2008 in Georgian and English-language literature. (RuseTsakarTvelos 2008 tslis omi kartul da inglisurenovan literaturashi)* (Tbilisi: Ekvtime Takaishvili Georgian Historical Society, Abkhazian Organization "MERIDIANI" Publishers, 2016), 223. (Georgian text)

[140] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war," 59.

– GRU). As a result of the counterespionage operation, four Russian and eleven Georgian citizens were arrested. The Georgia Ministry of Interior released audio and video recordings of five Georgian citizens confessing to having cooperated with Russian military intelligence. In response the Kremlin demanded that the UN Security Council meet at once on this issue, the Russian embassy in Tbilisi stopped accepting visa applications from Georgian citizens, Russia recalled its ambassador in Tbilisi Vyacheslav Kovalenko, and the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations sent an airplane to Georgia to evacuate the families of Russian servicemen and diplomats. Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov called Georgia's actions state banditry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned Russian citizens not to visit Georgia. According to Illarionov, by October 4 the anti-Georgian campaign had turned into a full-scale witchhunt. The State Duma adopted sanctions against Georgia, while the Federal Migration Service created a special "Georgian Department". Georgians with multiple-entry visas who were already on Russian territory had their stays terminated.[141] As one can observe, the Russian reaction to the Georgian counterespionage operation was far from adequate. The Kremlin was used to treating Georgia as less than a state entity, incapable of responding to any of Russia's illegal actions on its territory. After this operation, the Kremlin once more expressed its attitude towards the Georgian state by the measures taken in response to the Georgian counterespionage operation as if – how could Georgia dare to detain Russian spies engaged in anti-Georgian activities on Georgian soil?!

By May 2007 the Georgian government initiated another step of conflict resolution in the Tskhinvali region by creating a Provisional Administration of South Ossetia – a rival entity on Georgian-controlled territories of the separatist region headed by former Defense Minister of South Ossetia Dmitry Sanakoyev. This step was viewed as controversial in Georgian political and scholarly society. According to Georgian historian Dazmir Jojua, the creation of the Provisional Administration established a new conflict order in the region.[142] This issue can be disputed in various ways, however one aspect is clear – the Georgian government did not violate any legal norm by creating an administrative entity on its own constitutional territory.

Surprisingly enough, the withdrawal of the Russian military bases from Georgian territory was carried out during the second half of 2007. Considering all the Russian measures aimed at escalating the conflict, the unexpected withdrawal from the military bases on Georgian territory was quite surprising. Yet at a Munich Conference speech of February 10, 2007, while criticizing NATO policy, Putin mentioned that Russia was keeping its promise to withdraw military bases from Georgia in an accelerated regime.[143] However, Andrei Illarionov mentions that these steps were taken by the Kremlin in order to avoid a situation in which Georgia could take Russian bases hostage in the case of a war against Georgia being launched. According to the author, "an action which Russian authorities had repeatedly described as requiring at least eleven years was executed in less than five months".[144]

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[141] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war," 62–63.

[142] Dazmir Jojua, *Russian military intervention in Georgia. The August war of 2008 and its consequences. (RuseTis samkhedro interventsia sakartveloshi da misi shedegebi)* (Tbilisi: Universali Publishers, 2010), 348. / 90. (Georgian text)

[143] "Putin Munich Speech," February 10, 2007, (Vystuplenie presidenta Rossii Vladimira Putina na Myunkhenskoi konferencii po voprosam politiki, bezopasnosti. 10 Fevralya 2007 goda)," http://izvestia.ru/news/321595.

[144] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war," 65–66.

From the beginning of 2008 the situation in the breakaway regions escalated. Considering the failure of all the peace proposals and plans suggested by Georgia to Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, Tbilisi had every reason to expect the military escalation of conflicts in Abkhazia as well as in the Tskhinvali region. Thus, the Georgian government decided to strengthen its military potential and to increase its military budget from $560 million to $875 million. In January 2008 a referendum was held in Georgia on the issue of becoming a member of NATO – 77% of the population expressed the desire to accede to NATO.[145] Needless to say, these steps were perceived as hostile acts by the Kremlin, especially given the fact that the NATO Bucharest summit of April 2-4, 2008, was approaching, where the issue of acquiring Membership Action Plans by Georgia and Ukraine was expected to be settled.

Russian dissatisfaction with Georgia's NATO aspirations becomes clearer if one looks at the dynamics of Russian gas prices for Georgia during 2005–2009: $60 – 2005, $110 – 2006, $235 – 2007, $280 – 2008, $350 – 2009.[146] These numbers vividly illustrate the role of gas as an energy resource in the Kremlin's foreign policy.

By the beginning of 2008 the Kremlin had already prepared a plan for actual war in Georgia. This plan, according to Vladimir Putin himself, had been prepared and approved by the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 and according to him the existence of this plan was not a secret.[147] The effectiveness of its execution depended on Russian-Georgian relations and the geopolitical circumstances around the Caucasus region. In this regards there were two significant world political events used as political gifts by Moscow, the first was the Declaration of Kosovo Independence on February 17, 2008 and the second was the decisions taken at the NATO Bucharest summit, April 2-4, 2008.

The Kosovo issue had been one of the major political issues for Russia throughout the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. In his famous Munich speech, although not mentioning the word "Kosovo", Putin openly hinted at his Balkan policy while stressing the necessity of using force only with UN (not NATO or EU) approval.[148] The acme of Putin's political insolence in this regards was expressed on February 21, 2008, at a meeting with Mikheil Saakashvili, when the Russian president made an open announcement about the Kremlin's political-military plans in Georgia: "As for the disputed territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in this regard we shall respond not to you – said Putin – but to the West – America and NATO, and in connection to Kosovo. You should not worry, it shouldn't bother you. What we do will not be directed against you but will be our response to them".[149] Putin's words could have been fulfilled by declaring the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which the Kremlin knew very well could not have been justified without blaming Georgia as being the aggressor, oppressing the Abkhaz and Ossetian people etc. This scenario was similar to the beginning of the 1990s, when Vladislav Ardzinba's main goal was to somehow compel Georgians to shoot. Now Putin was to compel Georgians to do the same.

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[145]   Jim Nichol, "Georgia (Republic) and NATO Enlargement Issues and Implications," In *Georgia and the Caucasus Region*, ed. Fran W. Haro, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2010), 127.

[146]   Jana Kobzova, Nicu Popescu, and Andrew Wilson, "Russia and EU's Competitive Neighborhood," In *The Great Power (mis) Management. The Russian-Georgian War and its Implications of Global Political Order*, ed. AlexanderAstrov, (Ashgate, 2011), 85.

[147]   "Putin about August of 2008: The plan existed and it is not a secret," (Putin obavguste 2008 goda: plan byl I eto ne secret) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u3ureBVwmIY.

[148]   Putin Munich Speech.

[149]   Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war,"67.

On March 4 the South Ossetian Parliament and three days later (March 7) the Abkhaz Parliament called on Russia, the CIS and the UN to recognize the independence of the breakaway regions.[150] In these circumstances on March 28, Saakashvili proposed a new peace plan for settling the conflict in Abkhazia. The key elements of the plan were the creation of a new post of vice-president of Georgia to be occupied by an Abkhazian, a veto over legislation relating to Abkhaz concerns and the creation of a free economic zone aimed at boosting growth in the region. "Unlimited autonomy, wide federalism and very serious representation in the central governmental bodies of Georgia – all will be guaranteed, with the support of international guarantors,"[151] Saakashvili mentioned. The next day the separatist Abkhaz government responded to Georgia that for Abkhazia to become a part of Georgia was out of the question.

The most important and decisive diplomatic hopes for Georgia were to be settled at the NATO Bucharest summit, where acquiring Membership Action Plans (MAPs) for Georgia and Ukraine was to be decided. Unfortunately, because of the position of the leading European countries – Germany, France, Italy – for which economic relations with Russia were major priorities, the issue of granting MAP to Georgia and Ukraine was turned down. In addition, the U.S. government appeared to have its own major interests towards Russia in regards to a transit agreement that allowed the USA to supply its military forces in Afghanistan via Russian territory. All these major political issues were successfully settled at the summit in exchange for not granting Georgia and Ukraine MAPs, which could have served as a lever to somehow narrow Russian imperial ambitions throughout Eastern Europe. One of the prominent politicians opposing the decision to reject MAP for Georgia and Ukraine was the 4th President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski (2005–2010) – who referred to the decision taken by the majority of members at the summit as being unfair to Georgia and Ukraine.[152]

In his speech at the summit Putin said: "As for the policy of expanding the alliance, we have been attentively watching your discussion yesterday. On the whole, of course, we are satisfied with your decisions, which took place…if the discussion on your expansion issues developed differently yesterday, today's transit agreement would not likely be signed…".[153] Thus, it can be said that the NATO Bucharest summit results were generally quite beneficial for Russian foreign policy and particularly for its policy in Georgia. The summit proved to be not the slightest obstacle for Russian policy in Georgia.

On April 16 Putin ordered the Russian government and Russian regional authorities to establish direct relations with the governments in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region.[154] The situation escalated in Abkhazia in April. According to material captured by Georgian drones, the Russian military presence was increasing at the military base of Ochamchire.

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[150] Ibid.

[151] Leigh Phillips, "Georgian government announces Abkhaz peace proposal," *Euobserver*, March 31, 2008, https://euobserver.com/foreign/25892.

[152] Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World. Georgia, Russia and the future of the West,* 133.

[153] "Text of Putin's speech at NATO Summit (Bucharest, April 2, 2008)," *Unian*, April 18, 2008, https://www.unian.info/world/111033-text-of-putins-speech-at-nato-summit-bucharest-april-2-2008.html.

[154] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war,"68, 70.

At the same time reconstruction of the railways in Abkhazia had been started by Russia. Georgia accused Russia of preparing for military intervention.[155]

In June a new peace proposal was prepared by Deputy Foreign Minister of Georgia Grigol Vashadze. This plan proposed the creation of a free economic zone in the Gali and Ochamchire districts of Abkhazia, also dialogue for a peaceful settlement of their political status and what's most important, exchanging the Russian peacekeeping mission for a Georgian-Abkhazian police force. German and American peace plans were initiated in June and July of 2008. According to the German plan, the return of Georgian refugees to Abkhazia were to proceed in peaceful circumstances, various rehabilitation works in Abkhazia would have been funded by the EU, and what is most important, the political status of Abkhazia was to be settled through dialogue. The American plan envisaged the same principles with the addition of one more important issue, namely of replacing Russian peacekeepers with international forces.[156] Despite the efforts of Georgian and international society to peacefully resolve the escalating conflict in Georgia, Russia showed little desire to be a real peacemaker in Georgia's breakaway regions. During the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Tbilisi on July 10, 2008, Russian MIGs violated Georgian airspace. What's most interesting, the Kremlin affirmed this action stating that it was a warning for "Cooling several hot heads in Tbilisi".[157]

On July 15, Russia launched large-scale military maneuvers in the north Caucasus – Kavkaz 2008 – with the participation of 8,000 servicemen from the army, interior forces, and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (Rus. *Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii* – FSB) including 700 armored units. The main goal of the exercise was to perform an "operation of peace enforcement" and participants were given a leaflet entitled: "Soldier! Know your probable enemy!" with a description of the details of Georgian military potential.[158] On the same day the Georgian army began its own military training called "Immediate Response"[159] in order get its army ready to protect state sovereignty in the case of the Kremlin's military intervention, which seemed highly likely to occur.

In the works of Andrei Illarionov and Yulia Latynina interesting numbers are given on Russian mobilized military forces. As became apparent on July 18, the airborne stormtrooper regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division took up positions at the "Roki" and "Mamisson" passes of the main Caucasian massif, while the Volgograd Infantry Division was deployed in Krasnodar Kray. On July 20, an infantry battalion with fourteen armored personnel carriers entered the lower part of the Kodori Gorge and three days later the 135th Infantry Regiment of the 19th Vladikavkaz Infantry Division replaced the Pskov paratroopers at the Roki pass. On July 25, a special medical detachment set up a field hospital named "Tarskoye" that could handle 300 wounded soldiers per day. Meanwhile the construction of the military base near Java was completed. On July 28, South Ossetian separatist forces

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[155] Latynina, "200 km."

[156] Kakhaber Kalichava, "The Road to the War" – January-August 2008. According to Data published in Newspaper "KvirisPalitra" (Part II – April-August 2008), (`gza omisaken` – 2008 tseli: aprilidan agvistomde)," *Proceedings of Young Historians* III, (Tbilisi: Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, 2016): 170–172.

[157] Kalichava, "The Road to the War", 167.

[158] Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war,"71.

[159] Kalichava, "The Road to the War", 168.

for the first time fired at the joint peace keeping forces and OSCE observers.[160] According to Yulia Latynina, the 135th and 693th Regiments of the Russian army were posted to the Java military base at the beginning of August.[161] At the same time, in order to conduct a successful information war against Georgia, Russia mobilized nearly 50 journalists in the Tskhinvali region, their work on the ground providing the basic source for Russian media to blame Georgian Nazis for killing pregnant women and children and deliberately flooding basements, which appeared to be shelters for Ossetians during the Georgian invasion.[162] All these Kremlin media allegations ring hollow as soon as one recalls the evacuation of the Ossetian population from the Tskhinvali region to North Ossetia at the beginning of August. So, by the time of the actual beginning of the Georgian military operation on August 7, 2008, more than 20,000 civilians had been evacuated.[163]

The shelling of Georgian villages in the Tskhinvali region started at the end of July. The main goal for the separatists and the Kremlin now was to somehow compel Georgians to start a military operation. However, Tbilisi was trying not to respond as long as it was possible. Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temur Iakobashvili conducted two visits to Tskhinvali on 5 and 7 August; Eduard Kokoity refused to meet him. The head of the Russian peacekeeping forces Marat Kulakhmetov told Iakobashvili that Kokoity was out of control and Russia could not prevent his actions.[164] Despite these circumstances Tbilisi did not officially respond to the provocative moves of the Kremlin backed by Ossetian separatists. Even by 23:00 of August 7, when Saakashvili was informed about the shelling of Tamarasheni from the direction of Tskhinvali and Java, he ordered the continuation of the ceasefire. According to Iakobashvili, in half an hour Saakashvili received a call which informed him of "150 pieces of armor" moving towards the Roki tunnel from the North Caucasus.[165] At the fateful moment at 23:35 on August 7, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was compelled to launch a military operation in order to protect state sovereignty.

As can be seen, Georgia launched its military operation only after exhausting all the peaceful methods in order to settle the conflict. By midnight of August 7, Saakashvili did not have any choice, as president he was responsible for state sovereignty, which had been violated by the separatists and by Russian actions. Hence, the answer to the question of Oksana Antonenko: "what prompted Saakashvili to transform the Russian-Georgian cold war into a hot one?"[166] can be answered as – Saakashvili tried to protect the sovereignty of the country threatened by the Russian military, which for its part was the only side that really bore a burden of turning a cold war into a hot one. In this regard, a more vague question is given in the work of Timothy William Waters (Indiana University) where the author mentions that: "Asking what Russian tanks were doing on the other side of the international frontier obscures the equally critical question of what Georgian tanks were doing on their own side and why it is their side?"[167] Waters questions the legal constitutional right

[160] Andrei Illarionov. p. 71–72.
[161] Latynina, "200 km."
[162] Ibid.
[163] Ibid. / Illarionov, "The Russian leadership's preparation for war,"73. /Asmus, "A little war that shook the world," 28; 34.
[164] Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World,* 34–36. / Latynina, "200 km."
[165] Latynina, "200 km."
[166] Oksana Antonenko, "A war with no winners," *Survival* 50, Issue 5 (October-November 2008): 24.
[167] Timothy William Waters, "Plucky Little Russia: Misreading the Georgian War through the Distorting lens of Aggression," *Stanford Journal of International Law* 49, Issue 1 (Winter 2013): 223.

of Georgia to the territory of the Tskhinvali region, which is affirmed by the Georgian state constitution. It is highly unlikely that the author can name any other document superior to the Georgian constitution that can prove the opposite.

The Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 lasted for five days from August 7 to 12. During this war the Russian army invaded not only the territory of the Tskhinvali region but also a second front in Abkhazia, and western Georgia. The Russian fleet was also involved in military operations. A lot has been said and written about the exact time of the beginning of the war on a political and scholarly level. Georgia presented its main evidence about the Russian military presence in the region in September 2008. This material is represented by an intercepted telephone conversation according to which a supervisor at the South Ossetian border guard headquarters asked a guard at the tunnel with the surname Gassiev at 3:52 a.m. August 7: "Listen, has the armor arrived or what?" – Gassiev replied: "The armor and people". Asked if they had gone through, he said: "Yes, 20 minutes ago; when I called you, they had already arrived".[168] According to this evidence a Russian presence had been observed on Georgian soil as early as the morning of August 7. According to Russian journalist Yulia Latynina, who definitely had broad access to Russian media material, two Russian regiments (135 and 693) had already been present at the Java military base several days before the actual beginning of the war. For an Independent International Fact-finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFCG) however, the fact of the Russian presence on Georgian territory before the actual start of the Georgian military operation "could not be verified"[169] and "the shootings that occurred before 7 August seemed to have been rather spontaneous actions where it was not clear who provoked whom".[170] Thus, according to the IIFFCG conclusion: "President Saakashvili's order on 7 August 2008 at 23:35 and the ensuing military attack on Tskhinvali turned a low-intensity military conflict into a full-scale armed conflict. Therefore this action justifiably serves as the starting point for the legal analysis of this conflict."[171] Considering all the aforesaid analysis, it becomes obvious that the conclusion of the European Union-established mission, headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, is in full compliance with the EU's too moderate policy towards Russia.

The EU's attitude towards the war in Georgia was mostly focused on the ending of the war rather than settling the conflict between Russia and Georgia. The vivid illustration of this fact is the Six-Point Plan conceived by then-EU head French President Nicolas Sarkozy on August 12. The following issues were envisaged by this plan:

1)   No recourse to use violence between protagonists.
2)   The cessation of hostilities.
3)   The granting of access to humanitarian aid.
4)   The return of Georgian armed forces to their usual quarters.

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[168] C.J. Chivers, "Georgia Offers Fresh Evidence on War's Start," New York Times, September 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/16/world/europe/16georgia.html.

[169] *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia*, Vol. II, 254, http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide/citation-guide-1.html.

[170] *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia*, 261.

[171] *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia*, 231.

5) Russian armed forces to withdraw to the positions held before hostilities began in South Ossetia. Russian peacekeepers to implement additional security measures until an international monitoring mechanism is in place.

6) The opening of international discussions on the modalities of security and stability of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.[172]

One ned not necessarily be an expert to anticipate that after allowing Russia to implement additional security measures, not a mitigation but only an escalation of the conflict could be expected. Russia, using this opportunity acted as it normally does, according to its political interests, and on August 26, 2008, unilaterally declared the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[173] Georgia for its part denounced yet another illegal act conducted by Russia and adopted the Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories, which defined the status of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region as being Georgian territory.[174]

On August 14, 2008, Georgia submitted an application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the Russian Federation in respect of a dispute concerning the "actions on, and around, the territory of Georgia" in breach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination of December 21, 1965. On December 1, 2009, the Russian Federation raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the court. Despite these objections the ICJ in its Summary of the judgment of April 1, 2011 found it completely unrealistic "that Georgia had not exhausted the possibilities of a negotiated settlement with Russia" – thus blaming Russia for breaching the norms of International Law.[175]

On January 27, 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the beginning of the investigation for crimes allegedly committed during the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 between July 1 and October 10.[176] This decision of the ICC raises hope to expect a much more objective conclusion about the events which took place in Georgia during 2008 than was given in the above-mentioned document of the IIFFCG (the "Tagliavini Commission"). The most important aspect of the ICC research is that it focuses not only on the five-day period of war but on the much longer period from the beginning of July till October 10, during which the long chain of Russian criminal activities is expected to be investigated. Head of the Russian investigation committee Aleksandr Bastrykin, in referring to the ICC investigation mentioned that the International Court of Justice has put everything "head over heels".[177] Thus, the Russian attitude towards the future results of the ICC investigation is known in advance.

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[172] "Six-point peace plan for the Georgia-Russia conflict," http://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/background-six-point-peace-plan-georgia-russia-conflict.

[173] "Russia Recognizes Abkhazia, South Ossetia," Radio Free Europe, August 26, 2008 http://www.rferl.org/a/Russia_Recognizes_Abkhazia_South_ Ossetia/1193932.html.

[174] "The Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories," http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/81268/88220/F1630879580/GEO81268.pdf.

[175] "Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia VS Russian Federation), Summary of Judgment of April 1, 2011, Annex to summary 2011/2. p. 3," http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=4d&case=140&code=GR&p3=4.

[176] "ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I authorises the Prosecutor to open an investigation into the situation in Georgia," January 27, 2016, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1183&ln=en.

[177] "Bastrykin: ICC turned Tskhinvali events of 2008 head over heels," (Bastrykin: MUS perevernul sobytya v Tskhinvale v 2008 s nog nagolovu), February 2, 2016, http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2715592&cid=7.

The August war of 2008 between Russia and Georgia came as one more tragic point in the history of modern Georgia as it paved the way for Russia to gain tighter control over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. Russia vetoed an extension of the international monitoring missions in the conflict regions – the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) functioning since August 1993[178] expired on June 16, 2009. The OSCE mission functioning since 1992 expired on January 1 2009.[179] The European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was established on September 15, 2008, by the European Union, which started its monitoring activities on October 1. However, Russia does not allow EUMM monitors to enter Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, thus the mission has its offices in three Georgian cities – Tbilisi, Gori and Zugdidi.[180]

Georgian villages of the Tskhinvali region – Kekhvi, Kurta, Achabeti, Tamarasheni, Eredvi, Vanati and Avnevi were totally burnt down by the Kremlin backed separatists. As Eduard Kokoity has mentioned in his interview these Georgian villages have been "completely demolished".[181]

After getting rid of the Georgian influence in the breakaway regions Russia actively began the implementation of its Russification policy there. What is most important – Abkhazian and Ossetian separatists themselves are triggering this process. By the so-called Constitutions of both breakaway regions the Russian language acquired the status of a state language.[182] Besides that, the Russian language is gaining influence in the schools of both separatist regions. From September 1, 2015, in eleven Georgian schools of the Gali district (Abkhazia) Russian language books have been introduced instead of hitherto used Georgian books.[183] Besides that, it is widely known that presidential candidates of Abkhazia are required to take a test in the Abkhazian language in order to be eligible to run.[184] This point only illustrates the dominance of Russian influence in Abkhazia.

As for the Tskhinvali region it should be mentioned that attempts to be united with North Ossetia and thus to become part of the Russian Federation have mostly been activated after the so- called presidential elections of April 9, 2017. Anatoli Bibilov became the de facto president of the state.[185] The next day the referendum on the renaming of the Republic as the Republic of Alania was conducted, in which 78% of the population approved

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[178] "United Nations Security Council Resolution 858 (1993), 24 August 1993," http://repository.un.org/bitstream / handle/11176/51858/S_RES_858%281993%29-EN.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.

[179] Tom Parfitt, "Security and human rights observers to close South Ossetia mission," December 22, 2008, Monday, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2008/dec/22/georgia-osce-mission-closes.

[180] "European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia," https://eumm.eu/data/image_db_innova/EUMM%20Facts heet%20ENG%202017%20APR.PDF.

[181] "Eduard Kokoity: We virtually demolished everything there," (Eduard Kokoity: My tam prakticheski vyrovnyali vse), August 15, 2008, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1011783.

[182] "Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia," April 8, 2001, Art 4, http://cominf.org/node/1166488810 / "Constitution of the Republic of Abkhazia," November 24, 1993. Art 6, http://www.apsnypress.info /apsny/ constitution/

[183] Zaza Tsuladze, "The new wave of Russification in the occupied Gali," (Rusifikaciis akhali talgha okupirebul galshi), August 4, 2015, http://www. amerikiskhma.com/a/gali-georgian-books/2900478.html.

[184] Iskra Kirova, *Public Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Russia, Georgia and the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia* (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2012), 21.

[185] "Data of the CEC of the elections and referendum at 62 lots," (Dannye CIK povyboram I referendum na 62 uchastkakh), April 10, 2017, http://sputnik-ossetia.ru/South_Ossetia/20170410/3987947.html.

this initiative.[186] Talking about the perspectives of becoming part of the Russian Federation, Bibilov openly declared that South Ossetia is virtually a part of Russia.[187]

People abducted on the charge of 'Illegally crossing the border' have become common in both breakaway regions of the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions. Needless to say, this process is actually adhered to by Russian border guards. Abducted people are usually released after their families pay a ransom for them. According to 2016 estimates, 134 people were abducted and detained in Tskhinvali and 193 in the Abkhazia region.[188]

Thus, using these criminal methods, the Kremlin maintains control over Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Considering all the given facts and figures it is not difficult to conclude that all Kremlin measures are focused on the total assimilation and russification of both breakaway regions. The most tragic phenomenon in both cases is that Abkhazian and Ossetian people, or at least their leadership, are eager to sacrifice all their national values to Russian imperialism, the very values, which according to the separatists themselves, have always been "threatened" and "violated" by the Georgians. This fact cannot be surprising considering all the ideological efforts carried out in both breakaway regions since the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the majority of the modern Abkhazian and Ossetian population may really perceive Russia as their savior from Georgian imperialism. The most astonishing aspect, however, is when high level academic personal such as prof. George Hewitt (University of London), hopefully familiar with the history of the Russian presence in Georgia and general Caucasian policy, in his academic speech raised the following question: "Can one point to any Russian military aggression against Georgia since the establishment of Soviet power by the Red Army in 1921? I think not. The pattern, then, is unarguable"[189] – the only really "unarguable pattern" that derives from this concept is that prof. Hewitt's views on the Georgian-Abkhazian, Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Russian relations completely coincide with the Russian political narrative, which is highly unlikely to serve as a real guarantee for the protection of Abkhazian and Ossetian national values.

Conclusion

Observations of the events that took place in the Balkans and the Caucasus from the period of 1980–90s up to now allow us to draw conclusions on the similar and different aspects of the Kosovan and Georgian breakaway region conflicts. In this regard, the first

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[186] "State Alania was told YES," (Gosudarstvu Alanyaskazali DA), April 10, 2017, http://sputnik-ossetia.ru/South_Ossetia/201704 10/3987727.html.

[187] "Anatoli Bibilov: We are the virtual part of Russia," (Anatoli Bibilov: Fakticheski my chastRossii), April 12, 2017, http://m.sputnik-ossetia.ru/radio/20170412/4003721.html.

[188] "During the year 2016 – 134 people have been abducted in Tskhinvali region and 193 in Abkhazia by the occupational forces," (2016 tsels, saokupatsio rezhimis mier tskhinvalis mimarTulebiT -134, afxazeTis mimarTulebiT ki 193 adamiani ikna dakavebuli), April 13, 2017, http://www.interpressnews.ge/ge/konfliqtebi/427691-2016-tsels-saokupacio-rezhimis-mier-ckhinvalis-mimarthulebith-134-afkhazethis-mimarthulebith-ki-193-adamiani-iqna-dakavebuli.html?ar=A.

[189] George Hewitt, "Some thoughts on Ronald Asmus' "Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West," Conference paper, St. Andrew's, April 16-17, 2010.

difference that becomes apparent is the role and the political attitude of Serbia towards the Yugoslav Federation, and of Georgia towards the Soviet Union. If Serbia throughout the 1980–90s was trying to prevent Yugoslavian dissolution trying to implement all the necessary measures to achieve this goal, Georgia was conversely fighting for freedom in order to get rid of the Soviet, and later, Russian imperial influence. Thus, if Serbian aspirations were aimed at creating a Greater Serbia of the period of the Nemanja Dynasty (14th century. Highlight by the author), Georgia was fighting to keep its sovereignty in the framework of the first Republic of 1918–1921 and maintain control over Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, which have always been inseparable parts of Georgia. If in the case of Serbia, the Kosovo region has historically been the nexus of conflict between the Serbian and Albanian peoples, Abkhazian and Ossetian separatism in Georgia came as a political price to pay for cooperation with Russia from the late 18th century.

Considering the international political situation created at the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century it becomes obvious that neither the Balkan nor Caucasian region could stay out of the great powers' political sight. Both the West and Russia have their geopolitical interests in these regions. Everything depends on political priorities, which largely define the dose of the great powers' involvement in these conflicts. In the case of the Balkans, according to Tim Judah's remark, the basic determinant factor of western involvement is the location of Kosovo, which is located not on the periphery but "bang in the middle" of Europe.[190] As for Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, the heir of the Soviet Empire, the Russian Federation, had its own political priorities here. Thus, engaged in these conflicts the West and Russia have been implementing their own measures to achieve peaceful outcomes to the conflicts. Nearly all of these measures highlight the different aspects between the Kosovo and Georgian breakaway regions' conflicts from the end of the Soviet era up to now.

In the case of Kosovo the West had been trying to initiate the peaceful end to the conflict between Serbs and Albanians before the NATO bombardment campaign of March-June 1999. During 1998, United Nation's Resolutions 1160, 1199 and 1203 were adopted calling upon both Serb and Albanian parties to find a peaceful resolution to the hostilities in Kosovo. Neither of the conflict parties accepted the proposals in these resolutions. The UN tried to negotiate with both parties at the Rambouillet Conference in February-March 1999 but also without any results. Finally, two days before the actual beginning of the NATO bombardment campaign on March 22, 1999, the last attempt at negotiations was held between Richard Holbrooke and Slobodan Milosevic, which also proved fruitless. Only after these negotiation attempts did NATO began the actual military air campaign against Serbia. Russia harshly opposed the Western attitude towards a military solution to the Kosovo problem, not because the Kremlin really cared about the likelihood of civilian casualties during the bombing campaign, but mostly because it could not itself maintain its own control in the Balkans, where Russia has been present for nearly two hundred years. Only by May 1999, when Moscow could clearly see the outcome of the NATO bombing campaign – threatening that Russia be left without any political dividend from the Kosovo crisis – did it appear to be the co-initiator of a peaceful resolution to the conflict

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[190] Judah, *Kosovo. What everyone needs to know,* 128.

in Kosovo, when Viktor Chernomyrdin played his role in the negotiation with Milosevic by the Petersberg agreement of the G8.

Russia was dissatisfied also by Resolution 1244 adopted by the UN Security council on June 10, 1999, according to which such high ranking international organizations as the UN, the OSCE and NATO were to be responsible for the security measures to be implemented in Kosovo. The main source of Russian grievances was the fact of its exclusion from the KFOR military mission comprised of NATO military personal. As can be observed, Russia fought against the UN in the battle over Kosovo pretending to be the only side demonstrating the will for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict. The notorious affair of capturing Prishtina Airport on June 11, 1999, was the most vivid illustration of real Russian interests in this conflict.

The whole irony of Russia's peaceful nature in the peaceful settlement of the Kosovo conflict becomes apparent as soon as one recalls Moscow's diplomatic measures applied to the Georgian breakaway regions several years earlier, where Russia played the role of instigator rather than conciliator of the conflict. Besides direct participation in the wars and hostilities in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, the Kremlin engaged itself in signing three deceitful agreements with the Georgians during the war in Abkhazia – September 3, 1992; May 14, 1993 and July 27, 1993. All these agreements were aimed at the disarmament of the Georgian military in order to achieve a military victory against Georgia and thus to maintain control over Abkhazia, where Russia affirmed its military presence by the Moscow agreement of May 14, 1994. The same tactic was used in the Tskhinvali region, where the Sochi agreement of June 24, 1992 served as the guarantee of Russian military dominance over Georgia. Russian military and diplomatic actions were denounced by the OSCE in documents adopted in Budapest (1994), Lisbon (1996) and Istanbul (1999).

Thus, the major difference between Russian engagement in the Abkhazian and the Tskhinvali region conflict in Georgia and the Western engagement in the conflict of Kosovo lies in the nature of the measures conducted by both sides in order to regulate the conflicts. Even the slightest glance at the above-mentioned documents vividly shows that Western engagement in Kosovo bore a much broader international character and was aimed at achieving stability in the Balkan region, whereas Russian measures conducted in the Georgian breakaway regions were mostly concentrated on maintaining its dominance over the Georgian state, to prevent the Georgian government from getting rid of Russian influence and violently compelling Tbilisi to become a member of CIS in 1993.

In addition, it is very important to mention that Kosovo during the 1980–90s did not experience the presence of a foreign military on its territory. Belgrade officially governed this province by the time Yugoslav Federation collapsed in 1991. In these circumstances up to 1998 we were witnessing hostilities in Kosovo between the two parties and after that, not only one particular state but the United Nations Organization appeared to be engaged in the process of conflict resolution in Kosovo.

In the Georgian case, we have the opposite situation where one power, namely the Kremlin, has been funding, organizing and prompting all anti-Georgian activities of the Abkhazian and Ossetian separatists. Four Russian military bases were located on Georgian territory from the end of the Soviet era, which have not been disbanded despite three official agreements on the issue (1999, 2005, 2006). To the contrary, Moscow engaged in the process of renovation a military base in Abkhazia during the early 2000s and even building

a new military base in the Java region. All these measures in Georgian breakaway regions, conversely to Kosovo, were carried out by one sole state, the Russian Federation, whereas international society continued to denounce these actions. In this regard, according to Mikheil Saakashvili's apt remark, Moscow depicted itself as a "piece-keeper", who in his opinion, is there "to keep the pieces of the old empire and not the actual peace".[191]

Simultaneously the Kremlin began the process of turning the Abkhazian and Ossetian population of the Georgian breakaway regions into Russian citizens according to its "Passport Policy" launched in 2002, thus creating the pretext for the invasion in Georgia, which took place in August 2008. The West never conferred U.S., French, Italian, German or British citizenship to Kosovar Albanians, in order to justify the NATO air campaign against Serbia.

It is also really difficult to ignore the differences between the nature of the documents implemented for Kosovo status settlement under UN mediation and the documents issued by the Moscow-backed Abkhazian and Ossetian separatists. Yet a "Comprehensive proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement" (Ahtisaari Plan) prepared in 2007 stressed the importance of the creation of a multi-ethnic society in the region. As for language, the Serbian and Albanian languages were to have the status of a state language. These points were also highlighted by the Kosovo Constitution adopted in June 2008 which even envisaged Serbian representation in the assembly of Kosovo. We have a totally different situation in the so-called Constitutions of Georgian breakaway regions. Neither the Abkhazian (1994) nor Ossetian (2001) Constitution even mentions the importance of integration with Georgia, the use of the Georgian language on the separatist territories is totally out of the question, whereas the Russian language in both regions constitutionally acquires the status of a state language together with the Abkhazian and Ossetian languages.

One of the most important differential aspects between the Kosovo and Georgian breakaway regions' conflicts is the issue of genocide. While talking about the war of 2008, one of the prominent Kremlin ideologists Aleksandr Dugin described Georgian military actions as the "premeditated genocide" of Ossetian people.[192] According to the IIFFCG (Tagliavini Mission) conclusion: "Russian claims about genocide committed by Georgians against ethnic Ossetians proved to be propaganda aimed at justification of Russia's illegal activities and encouragement of Ossetian proxy militants and other armed formations to commit brutalities against ethnic Georgians in revenge for the "genocide and mass killings".[193] The commission concludes that: "Allegations of genocide against Ossetians are not substantiated by evidence" rather on the contrary: "There is serious and concurring evidence to indicate that ethnic cleansing has been committed against ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia, through forced displacement and the destruction of property".[194] After the war nearly 100,000 people were left displaced from the Tskhinvali region most of whom were Georgians. The Abkhazian war has left nearly 240,000 Georgians displaced.[195]

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[191] Tracey German, "David and Goliath: Georgia and Russia's Coercive Diplomacy," *Defense Studies* 9, Issue 2 (June 2009): 228.

[192] Aleksandr Dugin, "After Tskhinvali. Interests and Values," *Russian Politics and Law* 47, no. 3 (May-June 2009): 66.

[193] *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia*, 187.

[194] *Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia*, 430.

[195] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 358.

In the case of Kosovo, genocide was conducted against the Albanian, not Serbian, people. According to the UN estimates nearly 850,000 Albanians were displaced from Kosovo by the beginning of 1999.[196]

Considering all the cultural, social and economic assimilation measures conducted by Russia in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region one more difference between the Kosovan and Georgian breakaway regions' conflict becomes apparent. The nature of Russian policy in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region is totally different from the nature of the Western presence in Kosovo, since no Western state has ever attempted to assimilate Kosovo or to incorporate this region. The worst thing that can happen to Kosovo is to become a part of Albania, of an independent country populated by ethnic Albanian people, whereas in Abkhazia as well as in the Tskhinvali region Russia is trying to implement a variety of policies from cultural to military and economic incorporation of these regions into the Russian Federation.

All these factors stress the different nature of the conflicts in Kosovo, Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. However, for some, not only Kremlin authors, these facts do not seem to be convincing enough to differentiate those conflicts from each other. For instance, Italian scholar Ezio Bonsignore thinks that: "The Russian intervention in the Georgia/South Ossetia conflict is the perfect mirror image of the NATO intervention in the Serbia/Kosovo conflict, and the Russian sanctimonious claims of their military action being but a "peace-enforcing" deployment to protect the South Ossetian population from Georgian violence are exactly as plausible and credible as NATO's attempt, back in 1999, to sell its ten-week bombing campaign against Serbia as an 'humanitarian intervention' on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians threatened by Milosevic's thugs".[197]All the analysis given in the text above is the illustration of the opposite, thus there is no further need to comment on Bonsignore's point of view, which shows an extremely close resemblance to the Russian political narrative.

While talking about the nature of Kosovo and Georgian breakaway regions' conflicts and discussing the different causes of these conflicts, we should also analyze the link between the Kosovo declaration of independence and the unilateral declaration of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence by Russia nearly six months later. On February 19, 2008 – two days after the declaration of independence by Kosovo – Pulitzer Prize-winning author and columnist of the *Washington Post* Anne Applebaum in her article about "The Consequences of Kosovo" mentioned: "Keep that lesson in mind over the next few months as others in Europe – and possibly elsewhere – attempt to use the Kosovo example as a precedent. After all, if the Albanians can be independent from Serbia, the Abkhazians and South Ossetians would like to be independent from Georgia …"[198] It is interesting to notice that the de-facto Abkhaz president Sergey Bagapsh commented on the declaration of Kosovo independence on February 18 – one day before Applebaum's prophetic article was to be published. According to Bagapsh: "if anyone thinks that Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria will stop after the recognition of Kosovo, they are making a big

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[196] Malashkhia, *The anatomy of conflicts,* 358.

[197] Ezio Bonsignore, "The Kosovo Payback," *Military Technology* 32, Issue 9 (2008): 4.

[198] Anne Applebaum, "The Consequences of Kosovo," *Washington Post*, February 19, 2008, 25.

mistake". He added, "Kosovo is a precedent".[199] Besides that, it could not have come as a surprise for any Western state that Russia and all the separatist regions under the Kremlin's control would have interpreted the independence of Kosovo according to their own political interests.

According to the former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Kosovo issue was deadlocked by 2008 and it was hard to find any other solution for this conflict except the granting of independence to Kosovo. Stressing the "unprecedented nature" of the conflict Rice mentions that: "It was not possible to go to the Security Council for a vote establishing an Independent Kosovo; The Russians would surely be joined by the Chinese in a veto … The only choice was to manage the problem in a way that prevented violence, convincing as many countries as possible to recognize Kosovo".[200]

Thus, if in the western perception the declaration of Kosovo's independence was directly interlinked with such high values as human rights protection[201] and refraining from violence, the Kremlin used this event in order to complete its political task and retain full control over the Georgian breakaway regions in order to maintain its political leverage on the internal, as well as the foreign, policy of Georgia. In any case, the declaration of Kosovo independence is directly interlinked with the unilateral declaration of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence by Russia. U.S. scholar Mikulas Fabry says that: "it is extremely unlikely that Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August of 2008 would have ever occurred without the prior US-led recognition of Kosovo in February of 2008".[202]According to Ronald Asmus: "In their handling of Kosovo, the United States and the European Union rarely connected the dots between what was happening in the Balkans and what might happen in the Southern Caucasus. We were too optimistic in our belief that we could compartmentalize the conflicts and handle each one separately and differently".[203]

Considering all these factors it is not difficult to conclude that settling the conflict in Kosovo was a major priority for the West, whereas the escalation of the Abkhazian and Tskhinvali region conflicts represented a major priority for the Kremlin. The clash of these priorities continued at the NATO Bucharest summit in April 2008, where the issue of acquiring MAP by Georgia and Ukraine was turned down. This process resulted in the Russian-Georgian war of 2008 and unilateral recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian Independence and continued by the Ukrainian Crisis from 2013 up to now. The wars in

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[199] Quoted from: Doug Bandow, "US Policy toward Kosovo: Sowing the Wind in the Balkans, Reaping the Whirlwind in the Caucasus," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 20, Issue 1 (Winter 2009): 17.

[200] Condoleezza Rice, *No Higher Honor. A Memoir of My Years in Washington* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), 426–427.

[201] Former Soviet dissident and Czech President (1993–2003) Vaclav Havel in his famous speech of 1999 about the situation in Kosovo and its future, stressed the changing nature of the modern state itself, which should be basically focused on protecting human rights, since: "Human rights are superior to the rights of states. Human freedoms represent a higher value than state sovereignty". Quoted from: "Kosovo and the End of Nation-State. Vaclav Havel speech to the Canadian Senate and the House of the Commons in Ottawa on April 29, 1999." Translated from Czech by Paul Wilson, *The New York Times,* http://www.manushi.in/docs/497.%2520Kosovo%2520and%2520the%2520End%2520of%2520the%2520Nation-State.pdf.

[202] Mikulas Fabry, "The contemporary practice of state recognition: Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and their aftermath," *Nationalities Papers* 40, Issue 5 (September 2012): 661–662.

[203] Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World. Georgia, Russia and the future of the West,* 88.

Georgia and Ukraine appear to be parts of one process of exercising 19th century Russian imperial ambitions throughout its neighborhood and thus jeopardizing European security.

The analysis of the interconnection between Kosovo and Georgian breakaway regions' conflicts allows us to draw one more important conclusion about the general failure of western policy in 2008. In this regard, the declaration of Kosovo independence and thus prevention of Russian influence in the Balkans, appears to be a job half done by the West in terms of achieving reliable stability and security in Eastern Europe. It was not only the independence of Kosovo, as a matter of fact, that had a boomerang effect for the West in Georgia and lately in Ukraine, but the combination of miscalculated steps taken by the US and the leading European states in Bucharest towards the MAP issue, followed by the implementation of the Six-Point Plan which merely ended, but did not settle the Russian-Georgian conflict – all of which did not hinder Russian plans in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Eventually, all these steps permitted Russia to act the way that it has in Ukraine since 2013. Finally, the chain of these events shows the ultimate failure of Western policy attempts to reduce the Russian presence in Eastern Europe.

Nowadays, despite the total international denouncement of Russian actions conducted in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, the Kremlin continues its policy of assimilation of these regions by the recognition of their independence. In this regards Russia is not supported even by the CIS member countries, only Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru appear to back Russian policy in the Georgian breakaway regions. By comparison, Kosovo by the year 2017 has been recognized by 115 UN member states. However, these numbers do not really matter to Russia which, with its foreign policy attitudes, remains the protector of the Abkhazian and Ossetian people from Georgia. Accusing the West of applying double standards towards major international issues,[204] the Kremlin continues to depict itself as the only island of truth in the modern world.

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[204] "Putin Munich Speech."

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Change of the Security Environment in the Transatlantic Region and its Impact on the Evolution of Foreign and Security Policy of the State

Abstract: The analysis report includes research of the main trends and their components of relevant change in the European security environment; considers political steps of the main international actors within the sphere of the security architecture of the region. The author describes the possibilities of enhancing a regional cooperation, an implementation of multilateral initiatives in the context of modern security challenges. The report reviews the effect of these changes on the defense policy of Ukraine, suggests and substantiates appropriate recommendations for Ukrainian public authorities on the need for more active involvement in the formation of the new sub-regional security system.

Introduction

The modern trends in the Euro-Atlantic security environment are dangerous both for the West and Ukraine. Understanding the gravity of the "Russian threat" was the result of consistent anti-Western aggressive rhetoric by Moscow, the demonstration of military campaigns in Ukraine and especially in Syria, all of which contributed to the development of a new policy of physical restraint of Russian expansionary aspirations by Western countries. NATO received a new impetus for existence, unprecedentedly increasing its eastern flank. However, Europe is actually far from unified on its political positions in the face of new threats, demonstrating the destructive tendencies connected with the dominance of populism and euroscepticism, which are typical for most states in the region. In this case special attention should be paid to the position of Eastern European countries, which are the closest neighbors of Ukraine and are considered traditionally as lobbyists

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of its interests. There is an urgent need for analysis of modern socio-political trends in this European region and their impact on the foreign and security policy of Ukraine.

Populism

Today's populism in Europe and the U.S. is a result of a concentration of politicians on the issues of destructive criticism and rejection of positive rhetoric. Populism is an ally of paternalistic societies, mainly the rich, and provokes creation and popularization of so-called "anti-movements". The rhetoric of the latter aims at the destruction of an existing world order, which is considered unfair but without a distinct alternative. Political embodiment of "anti-movements" can be seen in the Left parties and the Right-radical parties with chauvinist orientation that use national ideas and historical discourse as opposed to trends of globalization. Some of these political actors are institutionalized and even represented in parliaments of their countries ("Jobbik" in Hungary, "**Kukiz'15**" in Poland). The Kremlin actively supports them, including financially, and takes advantage of them, using emotional-valuable imbalance.

The latter is shown in today's society where the deconstructive prevails over the constructive; irrationalism prevails over rational behavior. Among EU residents aged 20 to 32 (the main electorate of populists) there is a popular accusation of enlightened bureaucrats in all problems in their lives. This trend undermines both education (because today a master's degree is not required for opening successful million-making businesses or start-ups) and for the bureaucracy that is the existing political system. Instead, there is increasing popularity of forms of revolutionary struggle against the system such as manifestations and demonstrations, including using force as evidenced by the increasing violence on the streets of European cities. Russia successfully uses these trends by means of "hybrid war" instruments, basing its position on a realistic concept, while Europeans continue to live in a utopian liberal world.

The catalyst for populism in Europe is the theme of migrants. The most negative perception is directed on migrants from the Middle East and Africa seeking asylum in Europe, mostly through not being able to assimilate and integrate into their host society, living in compact communities or ghettos, and practicing their own religion. The end point of the migrants' flows is the wealthy countries of Western Europe. But implementation of allocating national quotas by the EU for the relocation of refugees showed a negative perception of migrants in Central Europe, particularly in conservative societies such as Poland or Hungary. However, there is also a growth in negative attitudes toward migrants from Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, in European society. Ukrainian migrants have the highest level of integration, knowledge of language and cultural traditions of their host countries and the general attitude towards them is better than towards Syrians, but generally negative (although in Poland there is a state policy supporting Ukrainian migrants and encouraging their living in the country). The main reason for this is the excessive openness in liberal European society, which thus creates comfortable conditions for terrorists, and results in an extension of ethnic suspicion and hostility.

Waivering on Liberal Values

During the last decade Europe has shown a quite selective and free interpretation of the liberal values on which it is based. Thus, economic development is a constant of the market economy liberal model. However, in conditions where the world's minerals required for technological production are being reduced, their rising in price and complexity of mining has placed this trend under threat. For keeping and strengthening the resource base in the case of increasing competition from China, Western countries have begun to use the model of "development cooperation" ambiguously. On the one hand, the latter is intended to be an instrument of direct financial assistance to countries that are in trouble (African failed states), or in a transition period of building democratic institutions, social and economic reforms (the fight against corruption), achieving the rule of law, human rights and freedoms. But on the other hand, the purpose of direct assistance (non-investment) is to strengthen spheres of economic influence in the regions rich in natural resources. As center-peripheral connections that ensure a sustainable supply of raw materials to Europe are weakened today, Germany, which is the richest European economy, invests[2] a lot of funds in the third world within "development cooperation". The state does this primarily because of fear that the German economy, based on processing and production, will quickly lose its position without African and other resources. The German example of such "development cooperation" is successfully used by European countries, even those that only yesterday were subject to foreign assistance (Poland, Czechia, etc.).

The logic of exhausting resources dictates another liberal course, connected with an interest in ecology. The purpose of large-scale projects of renewable energy is the desire to avoid dependence on energy supplies, which are exhaustable and geographically located outside Europe. A complete end to reliance on fossil fuels is in long-term perspective. Today, along with the challenges of the diversification of energy carriers there is a problem with dependence of technological industries (jobs) on oil and gas imported from Russia. For stability European politicians are ready to negotiate with anyone, even those who undermine international order. There is a threat for Kyiv, connected with the weakening of support from European partners for a policy of sanctions against Moscow.

These practices significantly undermine the credibility of liberal values, indicating a waivering by the Western world from its own postulates. Such liberal tendencies as fighting for the rights of sexual minorities and gender politics are even more vulnerable to Russian counterpropaganda.

As to the first value Moscow uses traditional conservative orthodox rhetoric, which is opposed to the Western liberals. Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans practice their own traditions; their population largely perceives conservative family values. So the Kremlin and its agents that are hostile to the LGBT community increasingly win over the West with their political rhetoric in these geographical areas.

Another component of the struggle between liberals and realists is the gender issue. The fight in the West to achieve gender equality in politics has not justified itself, not only in the U.S. where Hillary Clinton lost to Donald Trump, but also in Eastern Europe, where

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[2] The budget of the Ministry of Economic Development of Germany provides about 8 billion Euros for such assistance, which goes primarily to African countries.

female candidates in Bulgaria and Moldova lost to male candidates in presidential elections. In both cases, women maintained a pro-European vector of development, whereas male socialists mainly agitated for a revival of relations with Russia[3].

Growth of Left Rhetoric Popularity

The dominance of left centrist parties in Eastern Europe has become more significant. In fact, the centrist-right-conservatives hold political leadership only in Hungary and Poland. Even in the Baltic countries, which traditionally are not supporters of left ideologies, the populists that use left rhetoric (the *Lithuanian Farmers* and *Greens Union*) won the elections. The growing popularity of left politicians can be explained by the following:

- Low level of social standards. In Central and Eastern Europe people actively compare their standards of living with prosperous EU countries which look much more attractive. In the absence of borders it causes a significant outflow of young people to the West and an ageing population in Eastern Europe. The analysis shows that pensioners in particular are the main electorate of the left populists;
- Nostalgia of the older generation, supported by Russia (within a "hybrid strategy"), of social standards in the former "socialist camp" states, that is free education and medicine. The Kremlin uses similar rhetoric in Ukraine;
- Attractiveness of the model of state price controls, state involvement in economic regulation as opposed to the market economy that threatens instability.

Left politicians have already been sworn into power in Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria. They have significant prospects in Germany, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Latvia. In conditions where the intrusion of Russian propaganda paints an image of Ukraine as a state of "right radicals" makes its prospects for strategic partnership with the above-mentioned states much more complicated.

Euroscepticism

An important trend in recent years has been the crisis of European identity, based on liberal values. That crisis strengthened skeptical political movements that criticize the foundations of the united Europe, and "undermine the national identity" of member states. The popularity of Euroscepticism is directly linked to the three previous trends – populism, waivering from liberal values (or their free interpretation) including the protection of human rights and the growing popularity of the left.

Euroscepticism has grown in Central and Eastern Europe on the topic of a "fully-fed" Western Europe that takes more than it gives. Old member states demand more from new members than the latter receive in preferences and direct assistance. First of all, this

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[3] The exception is France, where Russia wagers on the right radicals of Marine Le Pen. However, this exception is determined by different society polarization. Whereas in France a confrontation exists between the white population and colored immigrants, Christians and Muslims, in patriarchal societies of Central and Eastern Europe there is a fight between European liberals and conservatives-traditionalists.

concerns countries that are in the Eurozone. The Baltic States have all recently changed currency and now are amongst the poorest countries in the EU. Another category of troubled countries are those member states that have not fully overcome corruption, in particular, Bulgaria and Romania. The model of Europe as an economic paradise is no longer relevant and quickly loses attractiveness. Rich countries do not want to share and secure their interests through protectionism, giving preferences to domestic producers.

The influx of migrants from the Middle East to Europe has intensified contradictions within the EU, which existed because of the imbalance of economic policy. This in turn leads to the radicalization of society, the spread of terrorism and extremist threats in Europe. The result of these aforementioned events is the wish of some EU member states to implement more independent policy, which increases the popularity of Eurosceptic parties. Unwillingness to open borders for migrants is one of the main reasons for the June 23, 1916, referendum in the United Kingdom to exit the EU. Its positive results are extremely important for the international environment. They are changing the architecture of European relations and have an influence on world markets.

Growth of Social Consciousness

The aforementioned trend is inherent in Central and Eastern Europe that are most sensitive to political changes in Europe. The trend relates to the determination of citizens in various countries of the region to defend their position publicly. The phenomenon of "Maidan diplomacy" with different slogans spread in 2016 from Ukraine to Poland (freedom of speech), Hungary (anti-migrant demonstrations) and Romania (anti-corruption platform). People are ready to stand for justice, truth, to fight against corruption at mass rallies. But in fact this practice of population mobilization within a struggle against injustice is dangerous political technology that can be used for the purpose of manipulating people. Populists and Eurosceptics are the biggest beneficiaries of this growing social consciousness, speculating on European values. Russia, which seeks to undermine European unity from within, can use such a regional phenomenon.

Similar efforts are made by Moscow in the context of Polish-Ukrainian historical discourse on, for example, Volhynia. Polish politicians-chauvinists use the Volhynia tragedy in order to improve their ratings, speculating on the history of relations between the two nations, which should be studied by historians, not politicians. The conservative government of Poland has fallen into the trap of nationalists, as non-recognition of the justified struggle of Kresy patriotic movements threatens the loss of the electorate who are delusional about populists. Something similar happened in Ukraine in 2006–2007, when glorification of Bandera and Shukhevych was perceived as the reality, although in eastern Ukraine these historical figures were considered in a hostile and ambiguous way. However, as before in Ukraine and today in Poland, saying unpopular things like looking for historical compromise, means a willful loss in political rating. In fact, populist films about Volhynia, and the use of hostile rhetoric, has put up barriers for development of a good neighborhood, and violent actions or desecration of objects of historical memory, in terms of the Russian threat, weaken the credibility and possibility of a common response. Exasperating historical enmity, the use of irredentism and the support of ethnic minorities are the

deliberate policy of Russia in the context of not only Ukraine and Poland, but also Romania and Hungary (Székely Land), Ukraine and Hungary (Hungarians and Ruthenians in Transcarpathia), and Moldova (the Gagauz people).

Mitigation of Attitude towards Russia

Despite Russia's chosen way of aggressive confrontation with the West, whose ultimate goal is securing the status for Russia as global actor and recognizing Russian interests and "zones of influence", the state is considered as a threat mainly by military experts, and only sometimes, by politicians. The main motivation of these various attitudes is economic as Europe needs the big Russian market, which is closed due to sanctions. The logic of benefitting from trade with Russia often dominates under the instinct of self-preservation in European countries, insofar as Russia acts destructively not only in relation to Ukraine.

Moscow often encourages disintegration processes in Europe, provoking economic and political separatism of individual states in the EU or its regions. Russia is interested in a weak and unconsolidated West, where it can use the weaknesses of the EU for its own aggressive purposes. It concerns undermining the political system, reducing attractiveness, impairing the image of the international subjectivity of Europe in the world. For this purpose, Russia is ready to establish corrupt links with representatives of the European elite, to provide sponsorship to Eurosceptic movements and to its political satellites in different European countries. Corruption is an ally of Russia. The more corrupt the society, the more lobbyists of its interests it has inside the region.

Russia tries to use the destruction of unity in the EU for recognizing its own geopolitical ambitions, aimed at reviewing existing borders in Europe. Legitimization of the existing balance of power assumes intrusion of phobias into Europe, its intimidation through, for example, placing offensive nuclear forces in the Kaliningrad region and in occupied Crimea. This practice leads, among other things, to the reduction of European will and determination to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Weakening of Transatlantic Relations

The countries of the "new Europe" went the way of post-socialist transformations and democratization and consistently became part of the EU and NATO through the support of the United States. It highly likely determined their dependence on the positions of overseas partners on issues of foreign policy. The election rhetoric of the new U.S. President Donald Trump has left many questions unanswered, including the degree of involvement of Washington in European affairs in the context of Russian hybrid aggression. U.S. Vice President Mike Pence at the Munich Security Conference in February 2017 partially dispelled doubts about reducing the role of the United States in Europe, de facto adopting a peculiar doctrine of deterrence of Russia rather than prevention. Stated beliefs are held by the majority of European military experts and generals, but, indeed, not by politicians.

NATO as an unconditional guarantor of security in the region should go through a new powerful development in the near future. In this context, it is very important to implement decisions of the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit, in particular increasing the U.S. military presence on the continent and the permanent placement of multinational contingents in Northern and Eastern European states. By contrast, the southeast flank remains a zone of less attention, where Russia's increased support of the pro-Russian left in Bulgaria, Greece, the Balkans, and partly in Romania, is weakening transatlantic relations. Another factor, which can be used in the region by Moscow, is neo-Ottoman Turkey, with which Russia is developing strategic bilateral relationships.

Russia is ready to encourage the creation of tension in transatlantic relations with a view to minimizing the political influence of the U.S. in Europe. The latter, in the absence of the support and protection of the United States, can be the next easy victim of Russian imperial policy, which is trying to restore its spheres of influence in Central and Eastern Europe. For this purpose, Moscow tries to undermine the unity of NATO from within, as the greatest threat for effective approval of solutions in NATO is the principle of consensus.

In such conditions, Ukraine continues to be in a "grey zone" of security without the prospect of becoming a member of NATO in the near future. The country risks being an object for trade in conditions of "reset" relations between the U.S. and Russia.

Inertness of Security Architecture

Along with the prolonged ability of major international security institutions such as the UN Security Council, NATO, the OSCE, in providing support to the existing international order, the international environment has demonstrated a lack of initiatives, proposals, opinions concerning the stabilization of the European and global security situation. Traditional forms of conflict resolution through mediation of international organizations, third countries, international conferences (such as the Geneva format) and other crisis mechanisms are not operating in conditions of dual tactics with Russia as one of the major security actors. On the one hand, there is a simulation of desire to sit at the bargaining table and negotiate in a traditional way. On the other hand, Russia is secretly financing terrorist groups around the world, becoming the leader of anti-Western views. This coincides with the decline of the security situation in Europe (note the growth in the number and dimensions of terrorist attacks), which requires a maximum focus of countries in the region on internal security issues. The latter reduces the ability of European states to lobby actively the values, and resistance, to Russian influence. So there is a possibility of semi-compromise solutions in favor of pacification of the situation, such as the thesis about a lack of alternatives in the implementation process of the Minsk agreements. It potentially contributes to the creation of security "buffer zones" with non-blocked countries in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, which will be used by Russia for strengthening its sphere of influence. This is promoted by the following:
 – Frozen and active conflicts in the region;
 – Historical conflict potential of the region;
 – Complicated socio-economic situation;
 – Resource dependence on Russia;

- High levels of corruption;
- Incompleteness of the European integration processes;
- Russian destructive influence on local elites;
- Internal contradictions and social polarization on a ethnic-confessional or political background.
- In conditions of simultaneous influences of these trends, Ukraine is a focus of the international community. Future configuration of regional security depends on its proactive diplomacy.

Ukraine in Times of Changes

The course of European and Euro-Atlantic integration is not only uncontested in the context of Russian aggression, but a conscious civilized choice of Ukraine. Of course, in conditions of increasing crisis in the EU and the dominance of Eurosceptics and populists, EU enlargement is not now a priority for European states. However, Ukraine's way into Europe is through a wave of reforms which are important *per se*. The achievement of certain economic standards, transparent business rules, rule of law and reforms in the defense sector are significant for Ukraine.

In today's circumstances the support of the United States is on the first place, as it has a practical importance for our country. Kyiv continues to implement systemic reforms at a national level through financial support from, among others, the United States. However, the diplomatic support of Washington is a guarantee of international rejection of the Crimea annexation by the Russian Federation. The U.S. position and the level of its involvement in conflict resolution in Ukraine is a landmark for the Western neighbors of Ukraine in supporting its sovereignty in conditions of Russian aggression by particular actions (political solidarity, military trainings, joint patrolling of water space etc.).

In this case NATO, as a major military institution, and development of relationships with it, accords with the strategic vision of Ukraine. Achievement of NATO standards on a military level significantly increases the defense of the state in terms of Russian aggression. For Kyiv the decision of NATO to strengthen the eastern flank (the placement of additional regular forces in Poland and the Baltic countries) to counter the military preparations of Russia has a great strategic and symbolic importance, increasing the military presence of Alliance forces in the close proximity to Ukrainian territory. Entry into NATO is a long-term goal of Ukraine, while Kyiv realistically evaluates and realizes the practical contemporary perspectives of cooperation with Brussels in terms of the military escalation of Russia and the existence of its occupied territories.

Existing trends put forward new challenges for Ukrainian authorities. Today Ukraine needs to prepare for the reformatting or modification of the Normandy format in Donbas, extending it with new members, state-guarantors of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum – that is the U.S. and the UK, as well as a number of close neighbors and allies. Poland and Romania are countries that fully understand and share the security threats that exist in the region. Involvement of new negotiators could improve peacekeeping efforts; demonstrate unity and the principle position of the leading international actors, forcing Russia to behave more discreetly. These constructive

efforts will contribute to seeking a compromise that can pass from declarations to practical steps such as restoring peace and stability in the region.

Today the regime of sanctions applied by the international community against the Russian Federation, is unprecedented considering the number of participants and the dimensions of their actions. Economic and diplomatic sanctions of the international community should not be dependent on the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Instead, they should be maintained and strengthened until the completion of full restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which includes de-occupation of some territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and returning the Crimea to Ukraine.

The sanction regime will most likely continue, despite Russian efforts. In 2017, pro-Russian parties in Europe have had relatively low chances of winning the elections in their countries (except France). But even the presence of pro-Russian factions in the parliaments of Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, which try to remove sanctions against Moscow, may have a long-term negative effect for Kyiv. In particular, considering the changes in the security environment, it is necessary to prepare for the attempts of Moscow to legalize the annexation of the Crimea through its European agents of influence.

Conclusions

Today the vulnerability of Western democracies consists in the disjunction of basic liberal values and realpolitik. Valuable visions of the world, which is inherent for a post-bipolar era, are threatened by the return of aggressive realpolitik under pressure of threats and challenges, the number and scope of which are unprecedented. The younger generation of leaders of the Western world, educated in traditions of liberalism and humanism, cannot adequately react and respond to challenges. As a result, populists and nationalists, whose activities are not limited by a valuable understanding of the liberal world, are getting a chance to take power. The Kremlin relies on the latter in a long struggle between realists and liberal utopians.

Ostentatious inertness of the architecture of international security contributes to a further extenuation of attitudes of major international actors towards violations of international law in the case of Russia's annexation of the Crimea, its support of military operations in Donbas, and the Aleppo bombing in Syria. In these conditions the position of the new U.S. presidential administration, that still shows restraint and ambiguity, goes on in the foreground. The U.S. must take the burden of a deterrence policy against the aggressor in Europe.

The foreign policy of Ukraine must take into account modern transatlantic trends. However, since the changing of the world's balance of power and affirmation of Russia as a global geopolitical actor take place on Ukrainian land, Ukrainian diplomats must not only fix the security environment changes, but must actively participate in forming a new system of subregional security, relying on the unique experience of Ukraine. The neighbors of Ukraine, primarily Poland and Romania, should be reliable partners in this process. It is necessary to build with them a historical dialogue in view of contemporary common threats and challenges.

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Hybrid War Activities of Russian Intelligence Services Abroad: The Case of Ukraine

Abstract: The term 'hybrid warfare', which is widely understood as mix of conventional/ unconventional, regular/irregular, as well as information and cyber warfare, appeared at least as early as 2005 and was subsequently used to describe the strategy used by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War. Since then, the term "hybrid" has dominated much of the discussion about modern and future warfare, to the point where it has been adopted by senior military leaders and promoted as a basis for modern military strategies. But after Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 the term has gone beyond the discussion in small circles of experts and became a starting point for the formation of the new hybrid world order. And its main political agenda is Russian's attempt to bring under control as much independent countries as possible. Since Ukraine became the first (and we sincerely hope the last) hybrid victim in Europe, it is useful to analyze some hybrid war's tactics, that have been used against Ukraine by Russia to predict their usage in other countries, especially in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe region, where the Russian Intelligence services are especially active.

Key words: hybrid war, Intelligence Services, Ukraine, Russia.

The activities of Russian intelligence and special security forces against Ukraine clearly reflect the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation. According to the idea and plan of the hybrid war, the political objectives are achieved with minimal armed interaction with the enemy, by means of disruption of the latter's military and economic potential, information and psychological pressure, active support of internal opposition, guerilla warfare and sabotage methods[2]. The special forces of the Russian Federation were entrusted with

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[2] Gerasimov, 2016.

the task of planning, organizing and implementing measures for creating the necessary conditions (political, economic, ideological, etc.) in the country — the object of aggression, at the preliminary "pre-war" stage. Their role also remained prominent during the active phase of the hybrid war. For the aggressor-country, readiness to oppress the resistance was of vital importance. Consequently, they received intelligence information on the situation in the country clarifying the state of affairs in the national defense sphere and operational readiness of the law enforcement agencies — which is in itself a form of aggression. The moment Ukraine declared its independence, the Russian special forces confidently kept their presence on its territory, mostly due to the Soviet roots of the Ukrainian security agencies. Thus, there was no significant need to actively employ the classic methods of intelligence activities or sabotage works. All the necessary information was received almost openly, using "friendly contacts" in the government, Parliament, security agencies, and other state administrative bodies. The Russian intelligence services had enough sources of information and possessed enough knowledge of the current situation inthe security and defense spheres of Ukraine to exert influence in the process of state decision making.

But after the developments of the Orange Revolution and unsuccessful attempts to make use of the Russian special forces, the Kremlin authorities began to treat Ukraine as a hostile country. This meant intensifying covert intelligence work, forming undercover paramilitary groups consisting of people with criminal pasts, sport-patriotic youth clubs (with relevant ideological anti-Ukrainian brainwashing), and support of pro-Russian organizations and movements. Thus, the Russian intelligence services formed and carried out activities in south-eastern regions and in the Crimea with a network of anti-Ukrainian organizations, including various Orthodox groups focused on the ideas of the "Russian World", separatist political groups (Donetsk Republic), and criminalized paramilitary groups ("Cossacks", fight clubs, primarily in the Crimea, Oplot organizations, security agencies). In 2004, Russia first made its move in "Eastern Ukrainian" separatism. On November 26, 2004, the Luhansk Regional Council founded the "South-Eastern Republic". On November 28, 2004, in Severodonetsk, Luhansk region, a Congress of MPs of all 17 regions of Ukraine (predominantly eastern and southern) was held. It was attended by a representative delegation of the Russian Federation led byMayor of Moscow Y. Luzhkov. The participants of the Congress discussed the foundation of the "South-Eastern Federative Republic" with its capital in Kharkiv[3].

The leaders and members of these organizations later played an important role in implementing the plans of the Crimea annexation and during the turmoil in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine. In addition, the intelligence services of the Russian Federation focused on systematically infiltrating the security and defense agencies of Ukraine. Both serving and former military servicemen and employees of the law enforcement forces were engaged in the agents' network, and some even headed the illegal paramilitary troops of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. During the military and intelligence service operations seeking toannex Crimea to the territory of the Russian Federation, the regional command personnel and its units sabotaged their roles to defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine. A key factor in the anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian Federation in the Crimea was the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation.

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[3] To the second anniversary of the aggression of Russia against Ukraine, 2016, p. 15.

The Black Sea Fleet conducted counterintelligence operations against the military intelligence of the FSB (Federal Security Service). The fleet was used as a base for carrying out subversive operations, public outreach efforts and other anti-Ukrainian activities. The organization and launch of information campaigns to discredit Ukraine, both on an international level and within the country, became one of the priorities for the Russian Federation intelligence services.

After 2010, the Russian intelligence services focused their attention on cementing what they had achieved. First, Ukrainian foreign policy was refocused eastwards. This was achieved by activating the infiltrated people, loyal to the Russian Federation, in a number of Ukrainian governmental agencies. The purpose was to weaken and demoralize components of the security and defense sector, increase the presence of Russian capital within the economy of Ukraine, promote the advantages of joining integrated Russian structures in exchange for economic benefits, further development of pro-Russian movements, and coordination of pro-Russian civil organizations activities. Clearly, these directed subversive activities at the preparation stage of the hybrid war were successful, and contributed to the annexation of part of the Ukrainian territory in order to create a zone of instability in the east of Ukraine. The annexation of the Crimea was the result of a carefully planned and well-orchestrated special operation led personally by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, who actually admitted it in the Russian propagandist documentary film, "Crimea. The Path to the Motherland". Russian General Colonel A. Volkov appraised the actions in the Crimea with the following words: "...a brilliant concentration of forces, facilities, and special forces operated in Crimea with a disguised purpose and making use of a wide range of measures for disinformation of the enemy. Ukraine was unprepared"[4]. The time to conduct the operation was also well-chosen: it was a moment of greatest weakness in the state administration of Ukraine, demoralization of its agencies, and the strong influence of Russian propaganda on the local population. Using the earlier created opportunities, the Russian Federation intelligence services organized a number of mass rallies in Crimea and in some south-eastern regions of Ukraine; most participants of these rallies were brought from the Russian Federation, among them were special groups of well-trained provocateurs. Russian troops, with the assistance of the "Crimean self-defense forces", blocked and seized units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The "referendum" on the status of Crimea was held later. Another important activity became the implementation of moral and psychological pressure on military servicemen deployed on the peninsula and also on the employees of the law enforcement forces and members of their families. Total information dominance was asserted on the seized territory; Ukrainian broadcasting was blocked and circulation of Ukrainian print production was banned. After the annexation of the peninsula, the Russian intelligence services continued to destabilize the social and political situation in Ukraine, discredit Ukrainian authorities, create an image of Ukraine as a "failed state", and prepare for a military invasion (including an invasion under the guise of peacekeeping forces).

In 2014, there was an attempt at mass infiltration of Ukraine by individuals intent on conducting secret subversive operations, organizing mass turmoil and civil unrest, and paralyzing the work of the state authorie**s**, law enforcement bodies, etc. Thus, mass civil

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[4] Voloshyna, 2016.

unrest and riots were organized, including the seizure of regional administration buildings by the law enforcement bodies in the Donetsk, Luhansk and Kharkiv regions; the majority of the participants of these riots were citizens of the Russian Federation. There were also attempts to seize administrative buildings in Odessa, blocking the deployment of Ukrainian Armed Forces and the National Guard. As in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, there was also strong moral and psychological pressure put on the military servicemen and members of their families deployed in the Donbass. Currently, the activity of the Russian intelligence forces on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is focused on exposure and oppression of the occupation opponents, real and imaginary, and on the organization of provocations against Ukraine. A massive repressive campaign against Crimean Tatars was launched by former employees of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU). Informant recruitment by the Russian Federation intelligence services remains high. The most desired targets include: servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, employees of law enforcement bodies and the security services of Ukraine. It is evident that credible intelligence information regarding the Ukrainian security and defense systems remains crucial for Russian authorities. In addition, this activity also indicates attempts by the Russian Federation to create opportunities to conduct acts of sabotage coordinated with attempts to discredit the state authorities of Ukraine, and also to create possibilities to launch successful military operations. Moreover, the efforts of the intelligence services of the Russian Federation have also targeted Ukraine's military-industrial complex, which has intensified its activity since the launching of its anti-terrorist operation. The deployment of massive and powerful Russian military units near the Ukrainian border has also led to an additional launch and intensification of activity by the Russian Federation intelligence services, particularly in the frontier regions: the Kherson, Kharkiv, Chernigiv, Odesa, and Sumy regions.

Furthermore, the military intelligence service and units of the counterintelligence service of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) are acting more intensely and vigorously. It is worth mentioning that during the conflict in the Donbass, Russian intelligence services created special centers for sabotage-terrorist training in the region. "Graduates" of these centers were often found and detained by the Ukrainian law enforcement forces. It is also important to remember that illegal activities were carried out under the direct command of the "curators" of the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB), the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and the so-called "Ministry of State Security of the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic". The Russian intelligence forces not only coordinated and managed the operation of these illegal bodies, but also maintained control over them, carried out arrests, and, if necessary, eliminated "undesirable persons", etc. According to Ukrainian intelligence[5], another "type" of activity of the Russian intelligence services (predominantly FSB) was mobilization and recruitment of illegal paramilitary groups. People convicted of lesser crimes were threatened with sentences for more serious crimes, by means of planting fake evidence against them, such as charging them with possession of weapons, armaments, explosives, etc., in the Voronezh and Rostov regions, Krasnodar territory and in some areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Employees of the FSB blackmailed the

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[5] FSBRFprinuditelnomobilizirujetzhitelejORDLO – razvedka, 2016.

detainees with threats of holding them criminally accountable for their alleged deeds and forced them to sign conscription contracts. Another element of the hybrid war was use of the criminal world by the Russian intelligence services.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Interior documented intensified activity by the organizers and leaders of organized criminal groups who gained privileged status in the Russian Federation territory. It is very likely these individuals were under the influence of Russian intelligence services and were used to gather information and contribute to the crime situation in Ukraine[6].

The Russian intelligence services also made use of religious communities, an almost perfect environment for influencing large numbers of people, in the direct preparation and annexation of the Crimea, as well as for events in Eastern Ukraine. The religious factor was also utilized in the rest of Ukraine, and will continue to be used. However, sectarian tension and conflict are not normal in Ukraine, and before 2014, there were only a few isolated cases. These issues were resolved by law, and never resulted in violence. Sabotage activities of the Russian intelligence services were not limited to the occupied territories. There was a danger for citizens of Ukraine who had been visiting the Russian Federation where attempts to recruit their services were made using threats and blackmail. In addition, the activity of the Russian special security and intelligence services intensified with the beginning of the hybrid war beyond Ukraine as well, and the main directions included the following:

– discrediting Ukraine in the international arena (including attempts to create an image of Ukraine in the eyes of the international community as a sponsor of terrorism);
– attempts at influencing the decisions of international organizations (UN, OSCE, PACE, and others);
– launching public outreach campaigns, actions, and disinformation;
– reduction, or impossibility of granting Ukraine any international aid;
– speculations on the issues related to the right of the nation to self-identity;
– inciting anti-Ukrainian moods (including speculation on controversial historical issues);
– inspirations of the theme of the "Russian World", and the necessity to protect Russian-speaking citizens;
– sabotage and destructive activities in cyber-space;
– andsupporting activities of pro-Russian political forces and anti-Ukrainian non-governmental and civil organizations and movements in EU countries and worldwide.

These days, Russian intelligence services continue their work to discredit the policies of Ukraine, bodies of central and regional power, law enforcement organizations, and command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Attempts to influence decision making also continue, as well as support of organizations advocating separatism. With the appearance and development of volunteer movements in Ukraine, the Russian intelligence services received another area to focus on that needed discrediting. With the launch ofan intensive, anti-corruption campaign in Ukraine, non-governmental organizations fighting against corruption became of interest to the Russian intelligence services. Thus, these services hold a leading place in the implementation of the Kremlin's plans for Ukraine. The founding of the National Guard is the latest staff reshuffle in the ranks of the Russian

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[6] Troyan, 2016.

special services. Plans for a significant extension of FSB powers point to the fact that the Russian authorities, and their ability to resolve internal and external problems, will rely on the strong and well-controlled special and intelligence forces, forces that will continue to actively operate and act against Ukraine even after the conclusion of the hybrid war activity and cessation of direct armed confrontation in the anti-terrorist operation region.

But why should it be so important for other East European countries? Because Ukraine is not the only state which is in the "sphere of influence and interests" of Russia. Any other country or even group of countries could become the next victim of a Russian hybrid war. The main task is to avoid this scenario and benefit from the preparation of adequate answers to modern regional security risks, and researching the Ukrainian case could be helpful in achieving these goals.

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Hybrid Aggression: A Multi-Pronged Attack

Abstract: *The author tries to show and explain some key features of Russia's hybrid aggression in Europe as a multi-pronged attack. Among them are military challenges, refugee challenges, cultural, informational, gender challenges, the impact on the inner policy of European countries. The author also shows possible ways to answer these challenges and counter the aggression.*

Key words: *hybrid aggression, Europe, Russian aggression, sanctions*

In recent times it seems more likely to use the term 'hybrid aggression' instead of 'hybrid war' when referring to events in the Ukrainian East and in Crimea since 2014. This is not only because 'war' sounds more threatening. The term 'aggression' suits the situation better in as far as the term 'hybrid' means a combination of very different instruments, and conventional war is only one of them, and not the main one. Hybrid aggression means a wide range of very different and unexpected challenges. Among them are cyberattacks, informational warfare, a war of images and influence on the emotions.

It is obvious, that goals and instruments are changing, and have already changed, since this hybrid aggression in Europe started. Well, it is also a question as to when it has started.

Russia's goals in Europe during 2016–2017 were as follows:

- Dilution of sanctions – gas was not on the sanctions list, but even so the Russian economy is hardly able to withstand the sanctions' pressure for long;

- Regaining Gazprom`s position on the European gas market is another important aim;
- Weakening and threatening Europe. Shaking the belief in European unity aims to create space for the Kremlin's influence;
- Presenting the Kremlin as a reliable partner flatters Putin's ambitions and shows Russians that their state is still great;
- And creating a comfortable political space by supporting "Russian friends" in East Central Europe, France, Germany, etc. The Kremlin chooses very different politicians and political organizations as promoters of its own interests and narrative.

But the goal seems unchangeable – the Kremlin is trying to destroy the European Union, to push it into the backyard of international politics[2].

Key recent trends of Russian hybrid aggression

There are two parallel processes in the framework of Russian hybrid aggression – the search for new instruments and the decline of the familiar worldview. This decline makes Europeans so busy and deeply concerned about themselves, that they often do not notice that another peaceful thing suddenly can become an effective weapon.

The distance between decision-makers who are aware of the Russian threat, and people who are tired and afraid of globalization, is not going to become shorter. On the contrary, this leads to people's frustration and disappointment in the ruling political elites. As a result, populist and nationalistic parties have become more and more popular. The most recent evidence of this trend is the German elections of 2017. And this challenge is very serious for Europe.

Moreover, the distance between different groups inside the elites is growing too. Disagreements lead to the growing threat of Russia's friends' dominating (France, Italy).

I should stress that no one country is safe, especially Russia's neighbors, each of them has a soft spot. For Ukraine, it turned out to be Crimea and the Donbass. Moreover, such a soft spot can be created by long-term informational and soft power influence.

The aggressor's tactics and goals are changing, so that means the instruments used also change, but all of them are mutually supportive. For example, gas wars against Ukraine were held not only in the energy sphere, but also in the informational field. The same situation with aggression started in 2014. Energy, gas, history, international law, information, even elections – all became weapons. Some new battlefields have appeared since 2014 – the United Nations, elections in the USA, France and Germany.

The military challenge is maybe not the main challenge in the complex web of hybrid threats, but we cannot help but consider it.

- The Russian army is the second biggest in the world, and has recently reformed. We may laugh at the aircraft carrier Kapitan Kuznetsov, but Ukraine and Georgia

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[2] Demian Shevko, "Why the Conflict Between Russia and Ukraine Is a Hybrid Aggression against the West and Nothing Else", in *Multicultural Societies and their Threats,* ed. Nazarii Gutsul, Kristina Khrul (LIT Verlag Münster, 2017), 79-106.

have no carrier at all. We may differ in estimating "Garasimov's doctrine" and the concept of hybrid warfare itself, but it works.
- Russia's military budget in 2017 comprised 4,7% of GDP, about $62 billion or more, and militarization is still in process.
- Today Europeans are not ready to fight. Many people in Europe still believe Russia is not implicated in the war in the Donbass, many do not see Russia as a danger to their country. A March 2016 survey by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and its Polish partner, the Institute of Public Affairs (ISP), found that while a large minority of Germans polled (38 percent) perceived Russia to be a military threat, the majority (56 percent) did not. Opinions in Germany were almost the same in a poll conducted one year earlier, even though emotions were running high at that time in the midst of the Russia Ukraine conflict. Moreover, in case of danger for NATO allies 53% of French and 58% of German citizens voted against military assistance. The greatest danger the author sees is the loss of subjectivity. And this threat is currently important not only for Ukraine. No European political nation is monolithic. So, Germans in the evaluation of the potential danger of the Russian Federation turned out to be divided by an "east-west" line. Accordingly, in the east there are fewer people who see Russia as a potential military enemy. Language differences can be observed in the Baltic countries. Asked if they see Russia as a threat, only 7% of Russian-speaking Estonians and only 5% of Russian-speaking residents of Latvia are afraid of war with the Russian Federation.[3]
- The nuclear threat has become a very distinct reality since Russia wants to emplace nuclear weapons in Crimea.

Informational and cultural challenges

Key features of these types of challenges are:
- Propaganda of Russian culture, values;
- "Russian world" as a new identity and attractive image of Russia. Russia uses soft power to widen the space of every possible influence[4];
- Post-truth is a part of reality perception. Truth and reality are not as important as our emotions and feelings. And emotions and feelings are among the main targets in hybrid aggression.

Informational warfare combines two main types of methods – technical and humanitarian (soft power). Both types are widely used as main components of Russian hybrid aggression.

The informational component is perhaps most important in the structure of hybrid aggression. That is why the search for answers to this threat is most intense. At the end of June 2016, a Czech non-governmental organization named The European Values published

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[3] Gabriele Schöler. Russia – A Threat to European Security? A View from Germany, http://www.bfna.org/publication/newpolitik/russia-a-threat-to-european-security.

[4] Iulian Chifu, Oazu Nantoi (eds.). *The Pattern of the Informational War of the Russian Federation*, (București, 2016), p.30–39, 62–65.

a document entitled 'Full-Scale Democratic Response to Hostile Disinformation Operations. 50 Measures to Oust Kremlin Hostile Disinformation Influence out of Europe'. This document recognizes the tough new realities and proposes some recommendations, which could be the basis for a response to new challenges.[5]

Russia uses and combines numerous methods of creating a negative image of Ukraine. Russians try to use the persona of former Ukrainian President Victor Janukovich to put official Kiev under pressure and make its legitimacy questionable. Speculation on painful and controversial points in Ukrainian history become the norm. This instrument is not new, but effectively splits Ukrainian society. The pressure on Russia's partners in Europe to create coalitions against sanctions and to cut Ukraine's support is growing. Russia also claims that Ukraine is not a historically legitimate country, but a divided one. Although some positive steps have been made in the legislative regulation of the formation of Ukraine's international image, many unresolved issues remain such as a lack of program coordination of information activities of state authorities in creating a positive international image of Ukraine.

Russia uses public hysteria, fear and radicalization and at the same time these things become an instrument of aggression. For example, on January 16, 2016, Russian media and officials created public hysteria and a diplomatic fracas in Germany over the rape of a 13-year-old Russian immigrant by a Middle Eastern migrant. Russian-speaking migrants poured into the streets to protest the alleged attack. In the end, it turned out that the girl had run off to the apartment of a 19-year-old German friend. There had been no rape. But by then, the image of an out-of-control situation had already been created. Putin had furthered his objective of dividing Europe in order to, among other things, undermine solidarity on sanctions against Russia.

Books

In the Internet era books hold a key position in hybrid aggression. Books remain the bearers of ideas and the instruments of visual influence on the reader. Russia has been using books as an instrument of covert aggression for a long time.

One of the most widespread methods of modern Russian fiction literature is *popadanstvo,* or portal fantasy. In this genre, the hero is moved to unfamiliar time and/or space – the future, the past, the other world, where everything is possible. Even alternative historical events are possible, and no doubt, all these alternatives are in favor of Russia, the USSR, or the Russian empire. The plot seems to be a compensation for shock following the decline of the USSR and shows its will to return to the status of world power.

Such portal fantasy is popular among Russians and Russian-speaking readers. The reason is simple – it helps them to imagine themselves as heroes. Such books exploit the 'loser complex', an assurance of a hidden potential that cannot be realized because of external circumstances.

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[5] Jakub Janda, *Full-Scale Democratic Response to Hostile Disinformation Operations* (Prague, 2016), http://www.europeanvalues.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Full-Scale-Democratic-Response-to-Hostile-Disinformation-Operations-1.pdf.

Some books are flagrantly imperialistic, especially in their attitude to Ukraine. Among them are the books of Mikhail Juriyev, *The Third Empire: Russia as is Should Be* (2007), Maksim Kalashnikov and Sergey Buntovski, *Independent Ukraine, The Crash of the Project* (2009), Andrey Vadzhra, *Ukraine, That Never Existed* (2015). A full list would be enormous.

Refugees

Refugees are a major factor of insecurity. There are 2.9 million refugees in Turkey[6]. They move through the Balkans, and are primarily people running away from war.

The masses of displaced people create new social, economic, and psychological challenges. They may also be under informational and psychological influence. That is why they are also a factor in Russia's hybrid aggression.

The Russian Federation provokes conflicts and subsequent refugee outflows to Europe. They are an instrument of destabilization within the EU. Refugee outflows influence the political life of the countries that have adopted them. It is like playing with a tap: turn it on and make people move.

Inter-ethnic relations

The Russian Federation has intellectual potential and experience in working with the pain points of countries and peoples. It is about inter-ethnic relations in the region, for example, between the Turks and the Armenians, or conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia. The geopolitical ambitions of the Russian Federation to be the leader among all Slavs has long-standing roots in pan-Slavism, the idea of "liberating the Slavs" in many wars, from the Turks, for example.

Russia also manipulates the case of Kosovo. If Kosovo has the right to self-determination and this is recognized by many EU countries, why is it not the same for North Ossetia, Abkhazia or for the Crimea? Although I should also say that Ukraine does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state.

Influence on the internal politics of European countries

The attempted coup d'état in Montenegro is maybe the most impressive attempt by Russia to change the domestic situation in a European country.

The attempted coup d'état against Milo Djukanovic in October 2016 was a conspiracy of a mixed group of citizens of Serbia, Montenegro and Russia, and a moment of truth for Montenegro. And on 5 June 2017 it became a NATO member. But this does not mean that Russia will stop using its influence in the Balkans.

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[6] Emma Batha. "FACTBOX-World's refugee and displacement crisis hits record high", http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/idAFL8N1JD38C, accessed October 10, 2017.

The Russian motive and path are clear. Relations between Russia and Montenegro have gotten worse since April 2014, when the Balkan country joined the sanctions against the Russian Federation. Things became worse still after 2 December 2015 when Montenegro was invited to join NATO. That is why Russia was so interested in the victory of the opposition in the elections to the new parliament.

We also should talk about Moldova. Russia has a strong presence in the informational and political space of the country. We now have special term for it – dodonization. But the loyalty to the Kremlin authorities will not give any guarantee against Russia's hybrid aggression. For example, hybrid aggression is already a fact of Belarusian reality. Belarus is dominated by Russian media. Of course, if Russian TV made a negative series about President Lukashenka, the Belarusian authorities would block its broadcasting in the country. However, Russian propaganda has a major influence on Belarusians. The Kremlin immediately responds to any manifestation of independence by Minsk.

Gender challenge

The gender factor is also widely used in hybrid aggression. Women may become and often do become victims of violence, and combatants. Women work behind the lines as volunteers, nurses etc. Emancipation has led to a rise in female participation in peace negotiations. The hybrid aggression framework adds to the roles and is a tool for the aggressor.[7]

How do women become targets in hybrid aggression? Women are more vulnerable to certain types of messages from the combat zone. Accordingly, it is women who are the target of some information and psychological attacks whose goal is to sow doubt, disappointment and depression, to undermine the political situation. Let us stress again – hybrid warfare is a war for brains and souls. Specific female roles (mother, wife, daughter) and emotions connected to these roles, become targets of Russia's special operations. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology calculated the index of efficiency of Russian propaganda, which is higher for women (28 points) than for men (25 points).[8] One of the results of women-targeted Russian propaganda were 'mothers' protests' which was a series of protests of soldiers' mothers and wives, who were against mobilization or demanded to bring their men home.

Consciously or unconsciously, women, who quite possibly had sufficient ground to protest, became the goal of information attacks, which played on real-life fears and stereotypes. Scenes of expected protests were picked up by the Russian media. Packages were made with a view of having a domestic audience and for Europeans, as well as for the population on the occupied territories.

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[7] Nordmeyer K., *Old Wars, New Rules – The Impacts of Hybrid Warfare on Women,* http://www.ethikundmilitaer. de/en/full-issues/20152-hybrid-warfare/nordmeyer-old-wars-new-rules-the-impacts-of-hybrid-warfare-on-women.

[8] "*The Index of Efficiency of Russian Propaganda",* http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=510, accessed October 10, 2017.

The answer to this gender challenge may not be simple. While countering Russian propaganda it should be taken into consideration that women are more exposed to its influence. But the main way to stop using women as a tool of aggression is to maintain a narrative of gender equality and to oppose the patriarchy and intolerance of the Russian narrative.

European answers should be simple but effective and widely used. Understanding of the threat is growing, but not as quickly as it should be. What can be done to intensify this process?

Constant searching for ways to resist – countering propaganda and informational warfare is not a simple thing, but it is essential;

Working with the Russian-speaking diaspora should become a system;

Forming and spreading an alternative to the Kremlin's narrative. Fixing cases of disinformation and proving that Russia today has lied again will not help to persuade people. Simple words, systematically repeated, do more.

The main conclusion is that the world has become closer, especially the European world. There is no longer any country that is unaffected by what is happening in Ukraine. Therefore, Ukraine and its experience are important and will remain so for a long time yet.

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Fake History as a Tool of Russian Propaganda

Abstract: *The paper covers three aspects of Russian Fake History which became a strong tool of the Russian propaganda: 1. The history of the Second World War; 2. The history of the Georgian historical provinces of Abkhazia and Samachablo (so-called South Ossetia); 3. The history of Ukraine.*

Key words: *Russian propaganda, World War II, Poland, Ukraine, Georgia.*

The falsification of history has very long roots. The first attempts can be traced back to ancient times, when the first inscriptions appeared. At that time it was just hyperbolization of the deeds of the kings, who were considered as gods. Throughout time the methods have become more refined, the aims more complex and the outcomes more significant. The falsification of history became a trademark of the Soviet Union, where some of the sources were edited to satisfy the desires of its leaders. After the break-up of the Soviet Union the situation in Russia changed, but as can be seen today, it was just a temporary event. During Putin's years, Russia has started fighting against this falsification of history in her own original way by promoting its own version of history, sometimes distorted to such limits that it simply ceased being history at all. Following the present-day trend, it can be called "Fake History." One of the best examples of it is in the article by Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the second issue of the 2016 journal *"Russia in Global Affairs"*.[2]

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[2] Sergey Lavrov, Russia's Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective, *Russia in Global Affairs,* №2, April-June 2016, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-Foreign-Policy-in-a-Historical-Perspective-18067. (The Russian version – Сергей Лавров, Историческая перспектива внешней политики России, *Россия в глобальной политике*, №2, март-апрель 2016 – is available at http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Istoricheskaya-perspektiva-vneshnei-politiki-Rossii-18019.)

S. Lavrov tries to show Russian politics as one oriented towards the unity in Europe. He also blames all problems on the Western world. Here are several examples of Lavrov's statements: "*The system created in Vienna was destroyed again by attempts to push Russia to the European sidelines, an idea that possessed Paris during Napoleon III's reign. In a bid to throw together an anti-Russian alliance, the French monarch, like a hapless chess grandmaster, was ready to sacrifice all the other figures. What happened then? Russia lost the Crimean War of 1853-1856 but managed to overcome its consequences in a short while owing to the consistent and far-sighted policy pursued by Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov... It would be appropriate therefore to recall one more jubilee to be celebrated next year, that is, the centenary of the Russian Revolution. There is an urgent need to work out a balanced and unbiased assessment of those events, especially now that many people, particularly in the West, would like to use this occasion for new information attacks on Russia and portray the 1917 Revolution as some barbaric coup that allegedly messed up the entire history of Europe; or still worse, to equate the Soviet regime to Nazism and hold it partly responsible for starting the Second World War... I will not dwell on issues concerning Europe's slide into World War II. Obviously, anti-Russian aspirations of the European elites and their attempts to set Hitler's military machine against the Soviet Union played a fatal role in this process. And as many times before, the situation created by this appalling catastrophe had to be corrected with the participation of our country which played a key role in determining parameters of the European and world order... If we take an unbiased look at small European states, which previously were part of the Warsaw Pact and now are members of NATO and the EU, it will be obvious that they have not made any transition from subordination to freedom, as Western ideologists like to trumpet, but rather have changed their leader. Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently pointed this out quite aptly. Representatives of these countries also admit in private conversations that they cannot make any significant decision without the approval of Washington or Brussels...*".[3]

This article is one proof of how the Russian government is using Fake History as its tool. It is needless to say that the main reason for the Crimean War was the schemes of the Russian tsar Nicholas I, who wrongly thought that his attempts to take over the Ottoman territories would be supported by Great Britain and France. As a result, Nicholas I launched hostilities against the Ottoman Empire without having agreements with any of the European powers. The isolation and defeat in the war were inevitable and the Russian government had only itself to blame for them. It is also clear from S. Lavrov's wording that he still perceives the Bolshevik coup as a "revolution" and is not referring to the events of February-March of 1917. The desire to show the Bolsheviks in the best possible way, as well as a denial of responsibility "for starting the Second World War" proves that the present Russian government is in a real continuity with Lenin's and Stalin's ideas, which brought the demise of hundreds of millions of people, who had the misfortune to live under Communist rule. When talking about the beginning of the Second World War, S. Lavrov completely avoids the 23 August 1939 Soviet-German Pact, which made it possible for Adolf Hitler to launch his attack on Poland. Of course, he also "forgets" about the Soviet attack on Poland, which began on 17 September 1939, and the results of Soviet assistance

[3] Sergey Lavrov, Russia's Foreign Policy in a Historical Perspective, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Russias-Foreign-Policy-in-a-Historical-Perspective-18067.

to Germany during the first years of World War II. And finally the comparison between Soviet rule in the post-Soviet or Eastern and Central European states with their membership of the European Union and NATO has nothing in common with any good sense.

The Russian propaganda in terms of Fake History, as can be perceived from the above-mentioned excerpts, is multi-faceted and it would be difficult to cover all of its aspects in one article. Therefore, I will touch upon three points: 1. The history of the Second World War (the Great Patriotic war for Russians); 2. The history of the Georgian historical provinces of Abkhazia and Samachablo (so-called South Ossetia); and 3. The history of Ukraine, especially regarding the Crimean Peninsula and Eastern Ukraine.

The history of the Second World War was highly falsified during Soviet times. The most notable fact distortions were the denial of signing the Secret Protocols of the Soviet-German Pact of 23 August 1939 and the denial of Soviet guilt for the Katyn Massacre. In fact, the falsification of the history of the Second World War remains the most significant part of present-day Russian propaganda, mainly for internal use. The Russian government argues that there will be no diminution of the "Great Victory" achieved in the Great Patriotic war. On 19 May 2009 the then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev created the "Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests."[4] It is a strange coincidence, but in less than two weeks a great scandal started around the article of Colonel Sergey Kovalev, "Figments and Falsifications about the Evaluation of the Role of the USSR on the Eve and at the Beginning of the Second World War,"[5] which was on the official website of the Russian Ministry of Defence in the section named: "History: Against Fabrication and Falsification." Colonel Kovalev, who was at that time a candidate of historical sciences (the equivalent of a Ph.D. in Russia), stated that, *"Everyone who has studied the history of the Second World War impartially, knows that it began because of the refusal of Poland to satisfy the German claims. Nevertheless, it is less known what A. Hitler really wanted from Warsaw. Meanwhile, the German demands were quite moderate ones: incorporation of the Free City of Danzig into the Third Reich, authorization of building the exterritorial highway and railway, which would connect Eastern Prussia with the major part of Germany. It is difficult to call the first two demands unjustified. The Germans had the overwhelming majority of population in Danzig, which was torn away from Germany according to the Versailles Peace treaty, and they sincerely wanted the reunification with their historical homeland. The demand regarding the roads was also quite natural, especially since Germany had no intention to seize the lands of the so-called "Polish Corridor," which divided two parts of Germany. It should be mentioned that this is distinct from the*

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[4] "Dmitry Medvedev signed an Executive Order On the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests," http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/4121.

[5] The article was previously published in the official journal of the Russian Ministry of Defence, but for nearly one year nobody paid attention to it. (See: S. N. Kovalev, "Figments and Falsifications about the Evaluation of the Role of the USSR on the Eve and at the Beginning of the Second World War," *Voenno-Istoricheskij Zhurnal*, N°7 (July, 2008): 15-20 (in Russian), https://vz.ru/information/2009/6/4/294019.html (The article can also be accessed through the Internet archive at https://web.archive.org/web/20090529074925/http://www.mil.ru/files/Vimisli_o_roli_SSSR.rtf). It is impossible to figure out when it was posted on the Ministry of Defence website, but according to Russian historian Mark Solonin, who started a public campaign against the article, he came across it "somewhere in the spring" of 2009. (See: "Беру свои слова обратно," http://www.solonin.org/new_beru-svoi-slova-obratno).

Western borders as Germany never recognized the territorial changes in the East that were made by the Treaty of Versailles.

Therefore, when Germany had offered to settle the problems of Danzig and the "Polish Corridor" on 24 October 1938, it seemed that nothing forebode any difficulties. Nevertheless, the answer was a definite refusal, as well as on subsequent similar German proposals. Poland, seeking the status of a Great Power, did not want to become the junior partner of Germany. On 26 March 1939 Poland once and for all refused to satisfy the German demands."[6]

This piece of "Fake History" by Sergey Kovalev quickly became well-known. There followed protests from Polish officials and media.[7] As a result, the Ministry of Defence removed the article from its website.[8] It should be also mentioned that soon after there was a reorganization of the Ministry's website and the above-mentioned section "History: Against Fabrication and Falsification" also ceased to exist.[9] At the present time you can find only a subsection of books in the section Encyclopedia. It consists of the 12 volumes of the newly-published "History of the Great Patriotic War" and the proceedings of the conference "Crimea in the Russian History," which was held in Sevastopol in May 2014, shortly after the second annexation of Crimea.[10]

Meanwhile, the Presidential commission fighting the "falsification", instead of opening the Russian archives and finding new documents there, just gathered twice a year with no significant publications. At the same time, there appeared numerous publications that clearly fell under the jurisdiction of the Commission. One of them was the book of Elena Prudnikova and Ivan Chigirin, Katyn. The Lie that Became History Moscow: Olma Media Group, 2011.[11] The book aims to prove that both the Soviet and Russian commissions actually did not conduct a correct investigation. The authors stated that there is only one question to answer: "Who did it?" (Who conducted the Katyn Massacre?) According to Prudnikova and Chigirin, the answer is definitely "not NKVD."[12] These authors received no answer from the official historians or Commission, which actually had to "counter attempts to falsify history," maybe because it was not "to the detriment of Russia's interests."

However, the establishment of the Commission did not go overlooked by European officials. On 3 July 2009 the OSCE adopted a resolution, which condemned Stalinism and

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[6] As it was found later by Alexander Dukov, Sergey Kovalev actually plagiarized this fragment from the Book of Igor Pykhalov "The Great Slandered War" (Игорь Пыхалов, *Великая Оболганная война* (Москва: Яуза, Эксмо, 2005), 91–92) and even failed to mention it. (See: "Минобороны «почистило» свой сайт, сделавший Польшу виновницей Второй мировой войны," http://www.newsru.com/russia/04jun2009/polska.html).

[7] "МИД Польши потребовал объяснений от российского посла," http://www.dw.com/ru/мид-польши-потребовал-объяснений-от-российского-посла/a-4304897.

[8] The article was removed on June 4, 2009, after Polish protests. (МИД Польши потребовал объяснений от российского посла, http://www.dw.com/ru/мид-польши-потребовал-объяснений-от-российского-посла/a-4304897).

[9] Nevertheless, the lies found their way into official Russian propaganda. In September 2015 Sergey Andreev, the Russian Ambassador to Poland, claimed that, "the Soviet Union's 1939 invasion of Poland was an act of self-defense, not aggression." (See: "Russian Ambassador Says Poland Was Partly to Blame for World War II," SEPT. 26, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/world/europe/russian-ambassador-says-poland-was-partly-to-blame-for-world-war-ii.html).

[10] http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/books.htm.

[11] Е. Прудникова, О. Чигирин, *Катынь. Ложь ставшая историей* (Москва: ЗАО ОЛМА Медиа Групп, 2011).

[12] Е. Прудникова, О. Чигирин, *Катынь. Ложь ставшая* , 560. Later, in 2014, Elena Prudnikova officially blamed the Germans in the Katyn Massacre. See: Елена Прудникова, "Неудобная правда Катыни," *Expert Online, 2014,* http://expert.ru/2014/03/5/skuchnaya-pravda-katyini/.

equated it with the Nazi regime.[13] Nevertheless, the Commission was only abolished in 2012.[14] As for the Fake History of the Second World War, it continues to flourish in Russia. In 2013, the Russian historian Lydia Sokolova published the article "The Camp of the Polish Prisoners of War in Optina Pustyn"/Optina Pustyn is a monastery near Kozelsk/. Optina Almanach, 2013),[15] in which she stated that the European Court of Human Rights "recognized the official Katyn documents as falsified in April 2012."[16] This is a distortion of the Court ruling, which recognized the Katyn Massacre as a war crime, although refused to "rule on the merits of the Soviet investigation as it related to events that had taken place before Russia ratified the Human Rights Convention in 1998."[17] This is actually how Russian Fake History works.

While the history of the Second World War is mostly used internally, we have a different situation concerning present-day Russian interests. With regards to Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia, the main goal in producing Fake History is to prove that they historically were never part of Georgia. The most outrageous attempts were made in 2008, after the Russian-Georgian war, when the Russian politicians practically adopted the Ossetian version that "the united Ossetia joined Russia in 1774."[18] This lie was used during the recognition of "independence" of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia, although the fakeness of this statement was so evident that even Russian historians declined to promote it openly. Moreover, Dmitry Medoev, who has held several positions in the so-called South Ossetian government and was its "representative" in Russia, called it "at least, unfounded."[19] Meanwhile, the other prominent lie at that time, regarding "the Ossetian genocide, conducted by the Georgians" found its way into Vladimir Putin's rhetoric, who accused Georgians of conducting genocide against the Ossetians.[20] He said that it was already "the third time that Georgians have conducted Ossetian genocide." (He never mentioned which were the previous occasions, therefore it is impossible to define which

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[13] Resolution on Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century, in *Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Resolutions Adopted at the Eighteenth Annual Session*. Vilnius, 29 June to 3 July 2009, 48–49, http://www.oscepa.org/documents/all-documents/annual-sessions/2009-vilnius/declaration-6/261-2009-vilnius-declaration-eng/file.

[14] http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/34810.

[15] Лидия Соколова, "Лагерь польских военнопленных в Оптиной Пустыни," *«Оптинский альманах» Введенского ставропигиального мужского монастыря Оптина Пустынь* (2013), 63–69, http://r.efnez.ru/analitika/2013/06/10/lager_polskih_voennoplennyh_v_optinoj_pustyni/.

[16] Лидия Соколова, Лагерь польских военнопленных в Оптиной Пустыни, 69, http://r.efnez.ru/analitika/2013/06/10/lager_polskih_voennoplennyh_v_optinoj_pustyni/.

[17] "European court rules against Russia on 1940 Katyn massacre," https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-massacre-court/european-court-rules-against-russia-on-1940-katyn-massacre-idUSBRE83F0UB20120416. (For the complete text of the judgement see: "Case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia," http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-110513).

[18] Е. Р. Магкаева, "Южная Осетия в составе унитарной Российской империи (1774-1918 гг.)," http://osinform.org/1006-juzhnaja_osetija_v_sostave_unitarnoj_rossijskoj_imperii_1774-1918_gg.html.

[19] Дмитрий Медоев, "О вхождении Южной Осетии в состав России," https://regnum.ru/news/2118695.html.

[20] "Putin accuses Georgia of genocide," https://www.rt.com/news/putin-accuses-georgia-of-genocide/. It should be mentioned that Putin had already in 2006 been blaming the Georgians that they had conducted Ossetian genocide in the 1920s and 1980s. (See: "Путин рассказал о геноциде осетин," http://region15.ru/news/main/2006/10/10/22-23/). This proves that the Russian government at that time was already thinking about the aggression against Georgia and thinking about the pretext, which was used in 2008.

"two" occasions of "Ossetian genocide" he meant, because there are Ossetians, who can find "four" occasions of "genocide".)

While the historical affiliation of the so-called South Ossetia, which is actually part of Shida (Inner) Kartli, is not contested by any serious historian[21]. We have a different situation regarding Abkhazia. Several Russian historians try to prove that Abkhazia was part of Georgia between the 10th and 13th centuries. This is not unique. For the first time we saw the attempts of promoting its Fake History at the beginning of the 20th century,[22] when the Russian Imperial government tried to settle a Russian population on the territory of Abkhazia and reshape its administrative borders (the Sokhumi District was part of Kutaissi Gubernia at that time). Of course, the first promoters of the Fake History of Abkhazia are the Abkhaz "historians" themselves, namely Oleg Bgazhba and Stanislav Lakoba,[23] Aslan Avidzba,[24] MIkhail Gunba[25], etc., but they are supported by Russians too. These Russians mostly have serious ties with Abkhazia, like Anna Broydo,[26] who worked with Vladislav Ardzinba, or Spartak Zhidkov (Adighean by nationality),[27] although there are also historians who have no obvious ties with Abkhazia. The Western world usually does not pay enough attention to the significance in history of conflict resolution today. Meanwhile, all the conflicts share the same problem: the parties see their history differently. That is why Russia is promoting a Fake History regarding Abkhazia. It divides the Georgians and the Abkhaz more and more with time. The Abkhazians are forgetting their common history with the Georgians and they live in their virtual world, where it were the Abkhaz, who originally settled the lands of present-day Abkhazia.[28] They consider the kingdom of the "Abkhaz" to be an Abkhaz state in its modern meaning,[29] while all historian sources confirm that the "Abkhazian" kings were conducting state affairs in Georgian and even established the divine service in Georgian (it was conducted in Greek beforehand).[30] After the break-up of the unified Georgian kingdom, they considered the Abkhazian Principality as a separate unit, which had no relation with the other Georgian kingdoms or principalities, despite the fact that even Mikheil Sharvashidze, the last Principal of Abkhazia in the 19th century, used only the Georgian language in his correspondence with Russian authorities.[31] All this

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[21] Even Russian Wikipedia cites correctly that in 1802 there were no Ossetians living in Tskhinvali, Djava or Akhalgori (See: https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/История_Южной_Осетии).

[22] Л. Воронов, *Абхазия не Грузия* (Москва, 1907).

[23] О. Х. Бгажба, С. З. Лакоба, *История Абхазии. С древнейших времён до наших дней* (Сухуми, 2007).

[24] А. Ф. Авидзба, *Абхазия и Грузия: завтра была война* (Сухуми, 2012).

[25] М. М. Гунба, *II (XI-XIII .)* (Сухуми, 1999). This so-called "historian" stated that the "divine service in Abkhazia was conducted in Abazgian too" (See: М. М. Гунба, Абхазия во II тысячелетии нашей эры, 3). Of course, he never cited any source proving this absurd statement.

[26] Анна Бройдо, *Проявления этнопсихологических особенностей абхазов в ходе Отечественной войны народа Абхазии1992-1993 годов* (Москва, 2008), http://apsnyteka.org/1329-broydo_a_projavlenja_etnopsikhologicheskikh_osobennostey_abkhazov_v_khode_otechestvennoy_voyny_naroda_abkhazii_1992_1993_godov.html.

[27] С. К. Жидков, (Майкоп, 1996).

[28] Ю. Н. Воронов, *Абхазы – кто они* (Сухуми, 1991), 5. The historical sources locate their supposed ancestors in the region from the 1st c. A.D., while the Georgian tribes lived there from at least mid-2nd Millenia B.C. There are no known sources about the earlier times. (See: Зураб Папаскири, *Абхазия: история без фальсификации* (Тбилиси: Издательство Сухумского Государственного Университета, 2010), 17–20.

[29] М. М. Гунба, *Абхазия во II тысячелетии нашей* , 67.

[30] Зураб Папаскири, *Абхазия: история без фальсификации*, 26–51.

[31] Зураб Папаскири, *Абхазия: история без фальсификации,* 137-138.

fake history is considered essential by the Russians, because it strengthens the desire of the Abkhazians to separate from Georgia. Thus, Fake History is a powerful tool in Russian hands used within Georgia.

Beginning from 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Russia became very active in using Fake History against Ukraine. It is used widely and in several ways. According to Russian "historians": 1. Ukraine was never a country; 2. Crimea historically belongs to Russia; 3. Donbass and Luhansk were part of historical Novorossia; 4. There was no Holodomor; it was just a famine, which was not artificial and never had been designed against Ukrainians as a nation. There are numerous publications promoting these four points separately or together,[32] but I will pay attention to the most significant one in terms of its political influence. This is the Valdai Discussion Club report, which was prepared in 2014.[33] The Valdai Discussion Club is not just a gathering of experts for discussions; it is a powerful tool in Russian propaganda. It is sufficient to know that according to the official website of the organization, "Russian President Vladimir Putin has met with the participants of the Valdai Club's annual meetings every year since its founding."[34]

According to the Valdai Discussion Club report, *"Ukraine had never existed in its present borders before it became part of the Soviet Union. Its current borders are the result of Soviet state-building, which did not take into account the historical and cultural details of its territories... For example, Soviet authorities wanted "to balance out" the Ukrainian peasantry with the industrial workers from Novorossia, and to do so, they merged the territories of what is now eastern and central Ukraine. Or, conversely, they divided the territories of the Great Don Army in order to destroy the identification of Cossacks as an "anti-Soviet" class, and handed these lands over to Ukraine. The history behind the post-World War II annexation of Galicia (Halych), which had been outside Russia's historical project for several centuries, deserves separate study. The Transcarpathian Rus is a separate phenomenon... the sovereign Ukrainian state does not have its own authentic history. It's not just young; it's going through a period of historical infancy... In 1992, Ukraine received its independence not as a result of its own conscious and nationwide fight for independence, but as a result of a power struggle that took place primarily in Moscow, among the Soviet leaders... There has never been a long historical genesis of the Ukrainians as a political nation. A considerable portion of the population didn't want this independence at all. A single Ukrainian political nation has yet to take shape."[35]*

As it is clearly seen from these excerpts, the members of the Valdai Discussion Club deny the historical existence of Ukraine (if we look at the demographic maps of the beginning of 20th c., clearly this view is incorrect, since there were several regions, mainly populated by the Ukrainians, outside the Soviet Ukraine.) or of the Ukrainian nation. The report states that *"We are witnessing the formation of the two social identities on the basis of two unifying ideas – Western Ukrainian and Eastern Ukrainian. The latter is still making its first steps and it would*

[32] Alexander Bedritsky, Alexey Kochetkov, Stanislav Byshok, *Ukraine After Euromaidan: Democracy under Fire* (Moscow, 2015); Сигизмунд Миронин, *Сталинский порядок* (Москва: Алгоритм, 2007), 12–61; Е. Прудникова, О. Чигирин, *Мифология «голодомора»* (Москва: ЗАО «ОЛМА Медиа Групп», 2013).

[33] Valdai Discussion Club report, *The Crisis in Ukraine: Root Causes and Scenarios for the Future* (Moscow, September 2014).

[34] http://trendsinstitution.org/valdai-discussion-club/.

[35] Valdai Discussion Club report, *The Crisis in Ukraine: Root Causes and Scenarios for the Future*, 7–9.

be premature to speak about its progress. The number of challenges is enormous and the Ukrainian state does not provide any clear-cut ideological anchors."³⁶

The Valdai Discussion Club is actually one of the most significant players in Russian politics and Vladimir Putin uses its reports to promote his goals both inside and outside Russia. He continuously states that Crimea has historically belonged to Russia.³⁷ His latest statement that the French Queen Anna was Russian³⁸ is also evidence that the Russians promote Fake History to prove their historical rights on all Ukraine.³⁹ Therefore, Putin is clearly using Fake History as a tool of Russian propaganda.

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that Russian Fake History actually has some successes. Most Russians oppose any attempts to revise the official view of the Second World War. They sincerely believe that Crimea was always part of Russian territory and the estrangement of Ukraine was caused by the U.S. and Western plotting. They believe that the Russian government is defending the historical rights of the Abkhazians and Ossetians. At the same time many Western politicians recognize the historical right of Russia to Crimea, because they lack necessary information or simply seek Russian support.⁴⁰ As a result, Putin's regime is continuing the promotion of a Fake History, which proves to be a useful tool both in the internal and external arena.

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³⁶ Valdai Discussion Club report, *The Crisis in Ukraine: Root Causes and Scenarios for the Future*, 14.

³⁷ "Обращение Президента Российской Федерации," 18.04.2014, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. This is a very interesting understanding of history, since Russia had only effective control over Crimea since the 1770's and officially possessed it only after the first annexation of Crimea in 1783. Clearly, it does not mean that, "Crimea historically belonged to Russia."

³⁸ Danilo Elia, "How Putin annexed history of Ukraine," http://eastwest.eu (Thursday, 01 June 2017), http://eastwest.eu/en/opinions/riding-the-russian-rollercoaster/how-putin-annexed-history-of-ukraine.

³⁹ It should be mentioned that the French President Emmanuel Macron clearly proved that he knew history better than Vladimir Putin. On June 27, during his meeting with the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, Macron stated that, "Anna of Kyiv united Ukraine and France." (See: Ihor Vinokurov, "President Macron: Anna of Kyiv unites Ukraine and France," http://euromaidanpress.com/2017/06/27/president-macron-anna-of-kyiv-unites-ukraine-and-france/#arvlbdata).

40 Roman Goncharenko, "Controversial visit to Crimea by French politicians," 28.07.2016, http://www.dw.com/en/controversial-visit-to-crimea-by-french-politicians/a-19433406.

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Kremlin Propaganda and Disinformation in Georgia: tools, channels, narratives

Abstract: TThe aim of this paper is to present the Kremlin's propaganda and disinformation mechanism based on a case study of Georgia. The importance of information security has been present in Russian strategic documents since the very beginning of the Russian Federation, however the role of information as a weapon, not as a goal, was developed and publicly voiced much later. Although geopolitical goals in Georgia have remained the same, the switch to non-military means changed the targets, objectives and tools used to achieve them. This paper, following the research and media monitoring conducted between September 2016 and September 2017, analyses Kremlin channels, tools and narratives in the Georgian information sphere and evaluates its effectiveness.

Introduction

Georgia is an object of special interest for the Russian Federation for several reasons, mainly due to its strategic location. First of all, Georgia connects oil-rich Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea with Turkey and the Black Sea. The route through Georgia is also the shortest way from Russia to Armenia, which would shorten and ease the transport of military equipment to the Middle East. Further, the trade route through Georgia is one of the few routes connecting China with European markets simultaneously omitting Russia. Finally, Georgia is situated in the area called Russia's "soft underbelly", territory considered by Moscow as its natural sphere of influence, hence NATO's or the European Union's presence there is unwelcome. Yet Georgia is important to Russia for one more reason. Although the August war in 2008 was in general won by the Russian Federation, to Moscow's surprise

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international public opinion did not follow the Kremlin narration of the events' course. Russia lost the war on information and is unable to dispose of the occupant-aggressor image.

Even though the August war was not the only factor which contributed to the development of non-military means of pressure, certainly it has had a key influence in turning the Kremlin's attention to the soft power and information spheres – foreign policy tools less costly than economic sanctions or maintaining occupied territories. Such instruments are not new, obviously, but the ways of communication have changed greatly since Soviet times. Because of the long tradition of interference in a country's internal affairs via active measures, the Kremlin's propaganda is not simply a tool of foreign policy, as it is based mostly on black propaganda instruments[2]. As a complex toolkit, Kremlin information influence requires a wider approach than simple analysis of the messages content.

Role of information in Russian doctrines

Western understanding of soft power is usually associated with the attractiveness of institutions, political systems, culture, language, values and policies, as well as the obvious legality of undertaken actions.[3] The object of soft power should, by itself, *want* to share the same values and ideas, and find following the policy of the attractive country beneficial for its population and development. In order to achieve that goal the states usually use public diplomacy, quality media and culture. However, the Russian view on soft power stresses its substantially different aspects, namely as a tool of foreign policy against [sic!] another country, it should be complementary to the means of hard power – the army, economy and violence. It is important to distinguish these terms, as *soft power* in Russian sources refers to absolutely different phenomena than in the West. Its understanding of soft power is crucial in creating a comprehensive image of the Kremlin's perception of information, media, NGOs and their goals.

There are several Russian official and semi-official documents which deliver straight but fully-fledged concepts of information and the media as a weapon:

- 2000 National Security Concept;
- 2011 Convention of International Information Security;
- 2013 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation;
- 2013 Executive order of FR President (Sputnik);
- 2013 "Gierasimov's Doctrine";
- 2014 War Doctrine;

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[2] More on mechanisms and instruments of black propaganda, as well as on general mechanisms of the Kremlin information war, can be found in Jolanta Darczewska, *Dezinformacja – rosyjska broń strategiczna*, Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa, 4.07.2017, http://rcb.gov.pl/nowy-numer-biuletyn-rcb-2/; Игорь Н. Панарин, *СМИ, пропаганда и информационные войны*, Поколение, 2012, http://propagandahistory.ru/books/Igor-Panarin_SMI--propaganda-i-informatsionnye-voyny/ [access 12.02.2017]; . Garth S. Jowett, Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, SAGE Publications, Los Angeles-London-New Delhi-Singapore-Washington DC, 2012, pp. 20–30; Benjamin Nimmo, *Anatomy of an info-war: How Russia's propaganda machine works and how to counter it*, Central European Policy Institute, 15.05.2015, http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/anatomy-info-war-how-russias-propaganda-machine-works-and-how-counter-it [access 16.11.2016].

[3] J.S. Nye, *Przyszłość siły*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2012, p. 55.

- 2016 Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.

The documents listed above provide a vision of the global media environment being biased and hostile towards the Russian Federation. Information security as such was firstly mentioned in the 2000 National Security Concept (NSC), however, it emphasized the technical aspects of the informational environment:

> The striving of a number of countries to dominate the global information space and oust Russia from the external and internal information market poses a serious danger, as do the elaboration by a number of states of a concept of information wars that envisages the creation of means of dangerous influence on the information spheres of other countries of the world; disruption of the normal functioning of information and telecommunication systems and of storage reliability for information resources; and gaining of unsanctioned access to them.[4]

Highlighting the last part of the quoted paragraph, it seems that the access and acquisition of information was perceived as a goal, not as an instrument to achieve goals – even though the document already mentions the information wars (as a Western concept). The threat of growing dependence on the foreign information sphere is scarcely mentioned in the Foreign Policy Concept – FPC (2000[5], 2008[6]). It was only in 2013, already after the Russo-Georgian war and before the annexation of Crimea, when the issue of the information environment was put into the foreground by both the new FPC and the so-called Gerasimov Doctrine, published at the same time. The 2013 FPC describes soft power as

> ...a comprehensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil society potential, information, cultural and other methods and technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy", which, however, "sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlawful use of "soft power" and human rights concepts to exert political pressure on sovereign states, interfere in their internal affairs, destabilize their political situation, manipulate public opinion, including under the pretext of financing cultural and human rights projects abroad",[7]

while the Gerasimov doctrine basically unfolds a concept of weaponization of information and its potential in modern wars. Further, the Doctrine on Information Security from 2016 states that

> There is a trend among foreign media to publish an increasing number of materials containing biased assessments of State policy of the Russian Federation.[8]

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[4] *National Security Concept of the Russian Federation*, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10.01.2000, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/589768

[5] *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,* Federation of American Scientists, 28.06.2000, https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm.

[6] *The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation*, Official website of RF President, 12.01.2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116

[7] Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18.02.2013, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/122186.

[8] Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5.12.2016,http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents//asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2563163.

The Kremlin's perception of soft power and the mediasphere as a means of hostile influence and an attempt to interfere with another state's internal affairs, resulted in establishing a specific approach towards information. It was not new, though, as similar approaches were seen both in Soviet and Tsarist times. In the current approach, as the Russian doctrines state, the idea of information war comes from the West, hence Russia should develop defensive means so that it can protect its information space and reduce the hostile influence. Further, however, Moscow communicates the need to secure an adequate place in the global information circulation for Russian worldviews and an interpretation of ongoing events.

The need develop Russia's own means of "effective information influence" was firstly voiced in the 2008 FCP[9]. Still, the serious steps were taken in 2013, when President Putin decided to merge the *Voice of Russia* with the *Rossiya Segodnya* information agency, and established *Sputnik* in its place. *Sputnik's* mission is, according to its website, to "tell the untold" and deliver alternative news of the world dominated by the Western point of view[10]. Notwithstanding the creation of *Sputnik* and *RT* (formerly *Russia Today*, another media project targeting the foreign public), the information influence is also implemented by traditional means, i.e. by taken over local media, NGOs and politicians, which, together with propaganda and disinformation[11], are in fact part of active measures.

Geopolitical goals, objectives and targets

The main goal of interfering with Georgia's information environment in achieving foreign policy goals, can be identified as: restoring influence over the South Caucasus and reducing Washington's influence in order to gain more means of pressure in the energy sector over Europe; push the USA further from Russia's borders; and spread geopolitical ideologies (Holy Rus, Russkiy Mir etc.), while taking control over trade routes trespassing the South Caucasus.[12] In the case of Georgia, it can be fulfilled by achieving tailored objectives such as:

- forcing or convincing Georgia to obtain „neutral country status";
- inspiring fear and feelings of uncertainty, distrust towards state and foreign (Western) institutions;[13]
- provoking anti-liberal, anti-Western moods, distortion of European values;[14]
- questioning Georgia's geopolitical (or even civilization) choices, i.e. Euro-Atlantic integration;

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[9] Валерий Герасимов, *Ценность науки в предвидении,* Военно-промышленный курьер,ном. 8 (476), 27.02.2013, https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.

[10] *About us*, Sputnik International, https://sputniknews.com/docs/about/index.html.

[11] As it is not so relevant in this paper, the term disinformation is used both for purposeful false and harmful messages and *dezinformatsya,* which is the special technique attributed to Russian intelligence services.

[12] See Игорь Н. Панарин, *СМИ, пропаганда и информационные войны*, Поколение, 2012, http://propagandahistory.ru/books/Igor-Panarin_SMI--propaganda-i-informatsionnye-voyny.

[13] Levan Avalishvili, Giorgi Lomtadze, Alexander Kevkhishvili, *Kremlin's Information War: Why Georgia Should Develop State Policy on Countering Propaganda*, IDFI, Policy Paper, 22.08.2016, https://idfi.ge/en/informational-war-of-kremlin-against-georgia-the-necessity-of-having-state-policy-against-propaganda.

[14] Ibidem.

- spoiling regional cooperation and alliances;
- discouraging Western parties from supporting Georgia in order to isolate it; and
- neutralizing 2008 conflict effect.[15]

It is nigh impossible to convince Georgian society that the Russian Federation is a friendly state and that any concessions from Tbilisi will be returned in similar steps by Moscow. This is why specific objectives from Georgia are targeted more at influencing the society, in order to hinder it from striving towards the West and supporting NATO's presence. The objectives are accomplished by meeting short-term realistic small goals (here called targets). While analyzing the narratives distributed by propaganda channels, it becomes clear, that some of them are aiming at provoking ethnic tensions and instigating clashes between different social groups, some other messages are devoted either to implanting a negative image of the West (USA, NATO, UE and its member countries) in Georgia and vice-versa, or replacing Russia as the main threat with Turkey. Some political parties, especially populist ones, try to advocate Russian economic and political interests, often referring to the alleged threat to traditional, national values or supposed economic profits. The existence of such political actors indicates the target is also on one hand to establish pro-Russian political forces in Georgia, and on the other – to eliminate pro-Western forces from Georgian political life.

Propaganda dissemination: channels and narratives

While analyzing propaganda, it is necessary to draw explicit limits of the propagandist definition. The fundamental question is whether the criterion of awareness should be one of the factors in determining who is a propagandist. In other words, is the motivation of the propaganda or disinformation source important? At a glance it seems that the answer is yes. However, it is impossible to ascertain the motifs behind disseminating certain narratives and a subject's knowledge about their origins. It seems justified, at least for this paper, to define the propagandist as a person, organization or institution, which disseminates theses similar or identical to the narratives of the Kremlin information war, found in Russian geopolitical, historical, economic, cultural and religion ideologies, regardless of the propagandists' motivation.

Characteristics of Kremlin propaganda

With regards to narratives themselves, they may be universal, i.e. distributed in various countries, but also specifically tailored to chosen target groups. Propaganda may also use theses either created *ad hoc* or having an utilitarian character, circulating throughout history. Other distinctive features of Kremlin propaganda are:

- rapidness, continuation, and repetitiveness;
- lack of commitment to objective reality;

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[15] See also Alexander Rondeli, *Moscow's information campaign and Georgia,* GISS Expert Opinion, nr 29 2014, p. 4; Giorgi Targamadze, *Information warfare against Georgia*, GISS Expert Opinion, nr 32 2014, p. 4.

- lack of commitment to consistency;
- high-volume;[16]
- multisource;
- multichannel – the narratives are disseminated by various channels – traditional media, new media, NGOs, political parties, religious groups etc.; and
- multilayer – the narratives can be distributed on several levels, as well as be limited only to one level. The first layer is official Kremlin statements, the second – messages from institutions formally or officially not connected to Kremlin, but having strong ties with it (for instance, the Russian Orthodox Church), the third – local sources with hidden connections to the Kremlin and the fourth – inspired local media outlets repeating disinformation.

Propaganda narratives

In the case of Georgia, direct repetition of a positive image of Russia hardly would have any effect due to the prevailing negative attitude of Georgians towards Moscow and its image as an occupier. For instance, this lack of effectiveness of open pro-Russia propaganda was perfectly seen after Nino Burjanadze, leader of the Democratic Movement – United Georgia (DMUG) experienced an immense, long-range decrease in support after her meeting in Moscow with then-Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin in 2010. Burjanadze's visit to the Kremlin was not accepted by society, thus the DMUG lost a major part of its supporters. For that reason propagandists in Georgia are focused on geopolitical (integration with the UE and NATO), culture-historical (values, religion, conflicts with Turkey) and economic issues:

The above charts implies that the propagandists are operating on contradictions: on the one hand the West is presented in a negative light, with an emotional approach – the West will not defend Georgia, the West does not intend to accept Georgia into its structure at all, the West will destroy traditional values. In the case of Russia, though, the false dilemma technique is applied.[17] Having in the background an artificially created image of the demoralized West devoted to Satan[18], Russia is presented as a defender of traditional values, Christianity, as well as the only competent global leader or perfect market for export. In pro-Kremlin media, such as the aforementioned *Georgia and the World*, one of the most popular topics is usually Mikheil Saakashvili and the United National Movement, the party of the former president. The campaign against Saakashvili has lasted for a long time, even though he is no longer a crucial link on the Georgian or Ukrainian political scene.

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[16] Кристофер Пол, Мириам Мэтьюз, *Российская модель пропаганды «Пожарный шланг с потоками лжи» Почему это работает и каковы способы ей*, StopFake [RAND raport], http://www.stopfake.org/rossijskaya-model-propagandy-pozharnyj-shlang-s-potokami-lzhi/].

[17] False dilemma is a technique of manipulation, when the recipient is told that he or she has only two choices, while in reality usually there is a wide range of choices. See Aronson.

[18] Interesting studies of anti-Western narratives has been published by Media Development Foundation. See Tamar Kintsurashvili, *Anti-Western Propaganda*, Media Development Foundation from 2016 and 2017, Tbilisi.

Table 1

Chosen narratives of pro-Russian propagandist media in Georgia

Values	Politics	Economy
Europe/USA/West is threating Georgian national values and traditions	Integration with the EU or NATO equals losing Abkhazia and South Ossetia	Only the Russian market is profitable for Georgia
Western values are foreign to Georgians	Cooperation with the West means closer cooperation with Turkey, which is an enemy of Georgia even more than Russia, Turkey is threatening Georgian territorial integrity	Georgia would benefit from integration with Eurasian economic structures
West hates Orthodoxy, and Russia defends Orthodox values		Association Agreement [with the EU] will destroy the Georgian economy
West will impose homosexuality and homosexual marriage on Georgians	Georgia should be a neutral country	
Conflict in 2008 was exclusively Saakashvili's fault	Georgia is an American puppet	

Source: Author's research based on media monitoring Sep 2016–Sep 2017.

Channels of propaganda dissemination

Anti-Western, anti-liberal and anti-Turkish narratives are present in the rhetoric of the whole Georgian political spectrum: from pro-Russian parties, such as the DMUG or AP, through to some members of the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) to "nostalgic parties", i.e. parties referring to Georgia's soviet/communist past and praising Stalin. The first group – pro-Kremlin parties – aim at establishing solid political cooperation with Russia; hence parties visit Moscow and meet with the Russian counterparts of Nino Burjanadze, the AP's delegation and Zurab Noghaideli's party For Fair Georgia[19] agreement with United Russia. AP's former ally, Kakha Kukava from Free Georgia, is also a member of the Gorchakov Foundation Friends' Club. One other political group is a marginal Centrist party, which has promised in its policy Russian pensions[20] and Russian bases in Georgia (although there are military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Some GM members' visits[21] are of a political and business character, as the party itself represents a more pragmatic approach to the issue of relations with Russia. "Neo-Soviets" use the concept of "good old times", an idealized past with no territorial problems or unemployment.

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[19] For Fair Georgia is a marginal party with little importance, thus it is not included further.

[20] *ბედუკაძე – ხაჩიშვილის პარტიის რეკლამა რუსული პენსიის და ნიშნაზე*, Reg Tv on YouTube, 14.08.2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCvddj6EWTk.

[21] Author's own interview with Georgian expert T.K., 19.09.2017.

Another propaganda channel is the third sector – NGOs and think tanks. The most active are the Eurasia Institute and the Society of Erekle II. Currently these organizations are less visible, but their leaders act as experts on Georgian television (like Archil Chkoidze from the Society of Erekle II or Shota Apkhaidze, the director of the Caucasus Centre of Research on Islam and a former coworker of the Eurasia Institute) and they are leading an active campaign on i.a. the advantages of Eurasian integration, celebrating 9 May as a day of victory or learning the Russian language as well as imposing the responsibility for 2008 on then-president Mikheil Saakashvili and calling for neutrality[22] (it should be mentioned that Burjanadze has also called for Georgia's neutral status) [23]. Both institutions conducte projects financed by Russian government-organized non-governmental organizations[24] and were openly voicing Kremlin interests. Another type of propagandist NGO is an organization expressing concern about ethnic minorities' status. The Antifascist Coalition of Multinational Georgia and its satellite organizations are an example of an attempt to nestle the narrative about "Georgian fascists" who are abusing the rights of the Russian minority, which was quite successful in the case of Ukraine. The fake-Antifa briefings usually take place at the Georgian Sputnik's office.[25] It is noted that the first "antifascist" organization in 2006 the Antifascist Coalition of Georgia was established and headed by Irina Sarishvili (party Hope), after the arrest of 12 supporters of Igor Giorgadze (former KGB officer) on suspicion of a coup d'état.[26]

Finally, there is a separate category of religious organizations which are often not registered and usually do not conduct open activities. Orthodox organizations declare themselves as defending Christian and family values, sometimes at all costs; they also stand up against Catholicism and liberal values. These groups' rhetoric is often aggressive (especially towards homosexuals) and disinformative about Western customs. One example of such an Orthodox group is the People's Orthodox Movement.[27] There is a part of the Georgian clergy which takes an active part in events organized by aggressive Orthodox groups and socio-political life in general.

Emitting manipulative messages would not be possible without the media. As the basic source of information acquisition for Georgians is television, TV Obieqtivi, closely related to the AP, has become the main platform for propagandists. Further, propaganda is distributed through newspapers (such as *Alia, Asaval-Dasavali* and *Georgia and the World*) along with their electronic online versions and online portals (for instance MarshalPress, Isauri, Iverioni, Saqinpormi, YouTube television Patriot TV, Reportiori, Qartuli Azri, Tb24)

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[22] Nata Dzvelishvili, Tazo Kupreishvili, *Russian Influence on Georgian NGOs and Media*, Damoukidebloba.com /IDFI, Tbilisi 2015, https://idfi.ge/public/upload/russanimpactongeorgianmediadaNGO.pdf.

[23] ქეთი მაჭავარიანი, *ბურჯანაძემ პარლამენტში უბლოკო სტატუსის შესახებ საკონსტიტუციო ცვლილების მოთხოვნით განაცხადი შეიტანა*, Netgazeti, 12.08.2016, http://netgazeti.ge/news/134040/.

[24] Nata Dzvelishvili, Tazo Kupreishvili, *Russian Influence...*

[25] *Threats of Russian Hard and Soft Power*, ed. Lasha Tughushi, European Initiative Liberal Academy Tbilisi, Tbilisi 2016, http://www.ei-lat.ge/images/doc/policy%20document.pdf.

[26] *Грузии сторонники Гиоргадзе создали антифашистскую*, Кавказский узел, 18.09.2006, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/102497/.

[27] Nana Devdariani, one of the Movement's leaders, is also engaged in several other projects, in which members of other propagandist organizations are also participating, like the Scientific Association of Caucasologists. See also Nata Dzvelishvili, Tazo Kupreishvili, *Russian Influence on Georgian NGOs and Media*, Damoukidebloba.com /IDFI, Tbilisi 2015, https://idfi.ge/public/upload/russanimpactongeorgianmediadaNGO.pdf .

which may be later used as content for social media. In Facebook itself, the most popular propagandist profile is Politicano, which is strongly anti-American, anti-Western etc.

These outlets are also known for reposting disinformation content[28]. While the Russian press has little impact on Georgian society, Russian channels are popular among around 20 percent of the Georgian population. Moreover, around 53% of ethnic minorities' representatives watch news and political programs on foreign channels, predominantly Russian ones[29].

Is Kremlin propaganda effective in Georgia?

The answer to this question is much more complex than could be expected. To assess the effectiveness of Kremlin propaganda two factors were taken into consideration:
a)   Changes in public attitudes, measured by opinion polls and analysis of social reactions; and
b)   Support for political parties, which support pro-Russian narratives, measured by election results.

Public attitude changes

Based on the narratives, four target attitudes were chosen for this paper to present the effect of Kremlin propaganda.

a) EU – moderate change
According to the 2008 Caucasus Barometer opinion poll, 54% of respondents had a positive attitude towards the EU. High support lasted at the level of 42-45% until 2013. In 2015, only 27% of respondents declared trust towards the EU. Since 2012, the support for Georgia's membership in European structures has fallen dramatically – from 72% (2012) to 42% (2015); the number of undecided respondents has increased instead. On the other hand, according to NDI polls, the support for the EU stays at a stable level of 72%, whereas IRI polls show support on the level of 63% (85%, if counting answer "rather support"). However, the increase in voices against membership to the EU is the result of a declining number of undecided respondents. This leads to the conclusion that even though the joining the EU and trust toward it stays on a relatively high and stable level, hesitant people turn to a more reluctant option.

b) NATO and USA – significant change
As far as the positive attitude toward the United States it has rather not changed, however support for NATO has drastically decreased. During 2009–2013, according to the Caucasus Barometer the support for NATO varied from 58% to 70%, while in 2015 only 37%

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[28] See მითების დეტექტორი, Myth Detector official website, http://mythdetector.ge/ka.
[29] *Public Attitudes in Georgia Results of a April 2015 survey carried out for NDI by CRRC Georgia*, NDI, April 2015, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Georgia_April%202015%20Poll_Public%20Issues_ENG_VF_0.pdf.

of the survey's interviewees approved this idea. NDI and IRI researches also show a declining number of NATO's supporters, but not to such an extent as the Caucasus Barometer.

c) Russia – slight change

In IRI polls, it is only Russia (71%) that is perceived as a threat by Georgians. The second and third country's, i.e. USA and Turkey, were perceived as a threat by 6% of respondents each. On 27th March 2014 Elguja Khodeli, leader of one of the propagandist organizations, Earth is Our Home, stood in the center of Tbilisi with a Russian flag calling for the re-establishment of relations with Russia. His event gathered a small crowd, which actively protested against his claims and called him a traitor.[30] In the same year a situation happened with the Eurasia Institute, as its elevation was sprayed with accusations of treachery as well.[31]. Exposing pro-Russian sentiments or Russian symbols is still not well-seen in Georgia. However, although Nino Burjanadze met with widespread criticism after her visit to Moscow in 2010, the AP's delegation to Moscow did not have an impact on its political support.[32]

Values – significant change

Changes in values perception can be considered as a success of Kremlin propaganda and messages in accordance with it. The liberal or Western values have become associated mostly with imposing homosexuality and sexual deviations and as such – standing in contradiction with traditional Georgian values.[33]However, the attitude towards the essence of Western values, such as democracy, is still positive. This tendency – devaluation of Western ideas – is also visible in the new nationalistic movements, such as Georgian March, and in AP's rhetoric.

Support for political parties

The Alliance of Patriots gained 6 places in the 2016 parliamentary elections. Since 2003, it is the first party with pro-Russian rhetoric, which was able to overcome the 5% threshold. Even though in a November 2016 NDI public opinion poll the majority of respondents stated that the AP should not have been included in the parliament[34], the party's results should be considered as a Kremlin success. The Georgian Dream's position on Russia can be also be marked as ambiguous, especially from the economic aspect.

[30] დაპირისპირება რუსეთის მხარდამჭერებისა და მოწინააღმდე გეების აქციაზე [VIDEO], Netgazeti, 27.03.2014, http://netgazeti.ge/news/30479/.

[31] ორგანიზაციების ოფისებზე ანონიმურმა პირებმა წარწერები დატოვეს, Tabula, 13.08.2014, http://tbl.ge/g0b [access 27.01.2017]

[32] Author's interview with Georgian expert K. K., 19.09.2017

[33] A. Samkharadze, Russian Propaganda in Georgia and the EU's Measures, StopFake, 18.04.2016, http://www.stopfake.org/en/russian-propaganda-in-georgia-and-the-eu-s-measures/ [access 27.02.2017]

[34] Public attitudes in Georgia, NDI, November 2016, https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI_November%202016%20poll_political_ENG_vf.pdf [access 27.01.2017]

During the 2017 municipal elections AP maintained its level of political support with 6.53% of votes[35], although it was Georgian Dream that won all of the mayor posts.

Nevertheless, before summarizing those elements as a Kremlin propaganda success, a few other factors should be discussed which have had an impact on the attitudes towards issues enlisted above. Peculiarly, the circumstances of changes in opinion on the EU, USA and values are not limited only to information operations. It is not a propaganda effect being fostered by the Western policy towards Georgia, but rather the lack of a comprehensive USA or EU policy towards Georgia is fostered by the Kremlin, While the USA engage in Georgia, both by supporting the third sector and by conducting common military drills and exercises, the EU does not have a unanimous, coherent approach in its Eastern policy. It is a result mostly of different economic and geopolitical interests of EU member countries. An evident example of this is voting ona visa-free regime for Georgia, where some MEPs from Greece or Italy were voting against it.[36] As mentioned before, specialized propaganda also uses existing stereotypes or structural problems (like unemployment) and attributes them to the unwanted political parties, states or organizations in order to stir up the impression of responsibility lying on their side. Subsequently, the long-term effects of the Kremlin's information operations may be noticeable only in the more distant future. Hence, at this moment the effectiveness of Kremlin propaganda and disinformation in Georgia may be considered as moderate, albeit the deeper impact is yet to be seen.

Conclusions

The Kremlin perception of the third sector and the media as an internal threat from outside, and as a weapon, implies that it should not be considered as a public diplomacy or political marketing tool. Moscow started to pay more attention to this sphere after its conflict with Georgia, which was won by conventional weapons, but lost on the arena of international public opinion. It is also a reason why direct Russian propaganda is rarely successful. However, some of the Kremlin's information war theses have found a fertile ground in Georgia, which shows a specialist and thorough knowledge about Georgian society. The propaganda and disinformation directed to Georgian messages are disseminated mostly by Georgian media and politicians, while the ethnic minorities are affected through the Russian channels, however they are also under the influence of Armenian, Azerbaijani and Turkish media.

Moscow tries to prevent Georgia from deeper integration with the West by depicting it as immoral, homosexual, destructive and indifferent to Georgia's fate. Russia continues to try to replace its image of an occupant with Turkey and to discourage. This image is being delivered to the Georgian audience both by certain political parties and by the third sector: NGOs, Orthodox groups, some members of the Georgian Orthodox Church

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[35] See Preliminary results, CESKO, http://results.cec.gov.ge/eng/ [access 25.10.2017]. The final results were not available at the time of writing this paper.

[36] Protocol from the plenary session, 2.02.2017, European Parliament, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+PV+20170202+RES-RCV+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN, pp. 14-15 [access 2.02.2017].

and pro-Kremlin media. However, the Kremlin is not capable of providing Georgians with a positive image of Russia, except for the economic benefits, nor has it reached its target of restoring diplomatic ties with Georgia. The recent success of the AP reaching the 5% threshold in the 2016 parliamentary elections and a lack of a stronger reaction towards the AP's delegation to Moscow in July 2017, proves that this strategy is perhaps not very successful, but is much more rewarding than the previous attempts of installing openly pro-Kremlin forces in Georgia. Compared with the previous pro-Russian entities' activities, it is clear that after failing Eurasian and pro-Russian narratives more emphasis is put on nationalistic, traditional, conservative image and indirect propaganda.

IV

Foreign Policy and Geopolitics

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Studies in Poland's Foreign Policy: the case of Poland-Russia Relations[2]

Abstract: This article will analyse the academic literature on Poland's Foreign Policy by focusing on its used theoretical approaches. It will be done through the analysis of the example of Poland's relations with Russia, which it is believed depicts the broader tendencies in the academic literature on Poland's Foreign Policy. Three approaches will be identified – lack of a clear theoretical or methodological perspective, historical perspectives and constructivism. The paper concludes that overall Poland's relations with Russia are understudied, and this opens up opportunities to conduct new research on Poland's foreign policy and to bring new findings on the factors driving it.

Key words: international relations,

Introduction

Central Eastern Europe (CEE) has recently received considerable attention in the global media, for numerous reasons. On the one hand, countries in CEE face considerable security challenges: Russia's military actions against Ukraine and provocations in the Baltic and Black sea regions, an assertive Turkey, migration crisis, the deteriorating security situation in Moldova and the Caucasus. On the other hand, various developments within CEE countries have attracted the world's attention to the region: Hungary's authoritarian and defiant stance towards Western governments, a pro-Kremlin president in the Czech Republic, corruption scandals in Slovakia, Romania and Lithuania, the rise of populism, and more frequent anti-Western political forces in CEE countries.

However, there probably would not be such focus on the CEE had Poland not joined the aforementioned trends. Ever since the victory of the Law and Justice party (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS) in Poland's parliamentary and presidential elections in 2015, Warsaw has had strained relations with West European countries, especially Germany, and its neighbours, notably Ukraine. Moreover, Poland for the last two years has been at loggerheads with the European Commission due to its judiciary and media reforms, as well as Poland's refusal to let in refugees from the Middle East and Africa. More generally, in the West's political and media discourse Poland is accused of restricting freedom of speech, assaulting the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law, promoting nationalism and xenophobia. All in all these tendencies lead many to conclude, that Poland has turned away from the West and moved closer towards Russia.[3]

Of course, such claims deserve serious attention and thorough study. The best way to evaluate these kinds of allegations is by comparing how Poland's foreign policy towards Russia has changed after PiS entered office in 2015. But paradoxically, such a comparison is hard to realise. This article argues that the main reason for that is the low quality of international relations research on Polish-Russian relations in the 21st century. Apart from certain exceptions that use historical approaches and constructivism, the majority of works do not have a well-defined, either explicitly or implicitly, theoretical grounding and methodology. Hence, most of the research on Polish-Russian relations is descriptive, which at best may be qualified as a "policy-paper" type of analysis. Consequently, there is little knowledge of the main factors driving Poland's policy – for instance, not much can be said about the reasons behind Poland's attempts to normalise relations with Russia.[4]

In the next section the article will review the atheoretical literature on Polish-Russian relations. Afterwards, research based on historical approaches will be presented. Further, works using a constructivist framework have been analysed, which will be followed with some concluding remarks.

The atheoretical literature

Poland's relations with Russia have received considerable attention from analysts and academics. A substantial part of this literature has no clear theoretical background or methodology. This is especially so regarding research that tries to layout the chronology and development of Polish-Russian relations. For example, Marcin Kaczmarski and

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[3] Many columnists claim that the current Polish government's foreign policy is very useful for Russia, as it creates new divisions in the European Union. For instance: Remi Adekoya, "A Law and Justice victory in Poland could be good news for Putin," *The Guardian*, 2015-10-24, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/24/law-and-justice-poland-putin-russia; Sławomir Sierakowski, "Russiagate in Poland," *Project Syndicate*, 2017-09-14, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/poland-government-russia-ties-by-slawomir-sierakowski-2017-09; Adam Balcer, Piotr Buras, Grzegorz Gromadzki, Eugeniusz Smolar, "Change in Poland, but what change? Assumptions of Law and Justice party foreign policy," *Stefan Batory Foundation*, Warsaw, May 2016.

[4] Marcin Kaczmarski and Wojciech Konończuk, "Rosyjski dylemat w polityce zagranicznej Polski po 1999 roku," in *Polityka wschodnia Polski: Uwarunkowania, Koncepcje, Realizacja*, ed. Andrzej Gil and Tomasz Kapuśniak (Lublin-Warszawa: Instytut Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2009), 203–204; Joanna A. Gorska, *Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing Poland's Policy towards Russia, 1989–2009* (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010); Paweł Kowal, Paweł Ukielski, "Ćwierć wieku polskiej polityki zagranicznej (1989–2014)," *Horyzonty Polityki*, 11, no. 5 (2014): 31–50.

Wojciech Konończuk claim, that since 1989 Poland has consistently attempted to improve relations with Russia, but all attempts ended in failure due to huge disagreements in the spheres of economy, energy, security and history.[5] Joanna J. Mizgała claims, that bilateral Polish-Russian relations were downgraded to "inertial coexistence" after Poland entered the European Union (EU) and started to deal with Russia on that level.[6] These authors reach such conclusions without any reference to theory and do not explain where they gathered the data for their descriptive research. The same can be said about the research by Marek Menkiszak and Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski,[7] Miron Lakomy,[8] Cimek et al.[9], Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz,[10] Agata Włodkowska[11], Aleksiej Makarkin,[12] and Andrzej Grajewski[13]. Even the works of Roman Kuźniar,[14] a well-known specialist on Poland's foreign policy, can be accused of lacking a clear theoretical or methodological basis. He explains the state of Polish-Russian relations through the differing attitudes of Poland's ruling politicians towards Russia, but he does not explain what specific foreign policy decisions have lead to, or how these attitudes could through intervening variables, produce such decisions. Not an exception to this is Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski's newest book on Poland's eastern policy in 1989–2015, which explains the state of Polish-Russian relations through Warsaw's disagreement with Moscow regarding Poland's right to be a subject of international relations and Poland's eastern neighbours' geopolitical orientation.[15] Thus, at best, these works give a policy-paper-type account of Polish-Russian relations.

However, part of the academic literature does search for causality in Poland's relations with Russia. The majority of this research is focused solely on Poland's attempts to normalise relations with Russia between 2007–2013. Jurij Solozobov[16] and Miłosz Zieliński[17]

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[5] Marcin Kaczmarski and Wojciech Konończuk, "Rosyjski dylemat w polityce zagranicznej Polski," 203–204.

[6] Joanna J. Mizgała, "Cele polityki rosyjskiej wobec Polski," in *Polityka Zagraniczna Polski. Unia Europejska, Stany Zjednoczone, Sąsiedzi*, ed. Jacek Czaputowicz (Warszawa, 2008), 312.

[7] Marek Menkiszek and Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski, "Polska Polityka Wschodnia," in *Polityka zagraniczna RP 1989–2002*, ed. by Roman Kuźnia and Krzysztof Szczepanik (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Askon Sp, 2002), 237–242.

[8] Miron Lakomy, "Główne problemy w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich na początku XXI wieku," in *Stosunki Polski z sąsiadami w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku*, ed. Mieczysław Stolarczyk (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2011), 69–112.

[9] G. Cimek, M. Franz, K. Szydywar-Grabowska, *Współczesne Stosunki Polsko-Rosyjskie. Wybrane Problemy* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2012).

[10] Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, "Stosunki Polityczne między Polską a Rosją po 1990 r.," in *Białe Plamy – Czarne Plamy: Sprawy trudne w relacjach polsko-rosyjskich (1918–2008)*, ed. Adam Daniel Rotfeld and Anatolij W. Torkunow (Warszawa: PISM, 2010), 669–688.

[11] Agata Włodkowska, "Stosunki Polsko-Rosyjskie w kontekście członkostwa Polski w unii Europejskiej," in *Polska na Arenie Międzynarodowej – Współczesne Wyzwania*, ed. Jarosława J. Piątka and Renata Podgórzańska (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek), 167–180.

[12] Aleksiej Makarkin, "Polska i Rosja w XXI wieku: polityczny aspekt wzajemnych stosunków," in *Polska na Arenie Międzynarodowej – Współczesne Wyzwania*, ed. Jarosława J. Piątka and Renata Podgórzańska (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek), 181–189.

[13] Andrzej Grajewski, "Wyzwania polskiej polityki wschodniej," in *Polityka Zagraniczna Polski. Unia Europejska, Stany Zjednoczone, Sąsiedzi*, ed. Jacek Czaputowicz (Warszawa, 2008), 295–308.

[14] Roman Kuźniar, *Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczyspolitej* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2012).

[15] Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, *Polska polityka wschodnia 1989–2015. Wymiar narodowy i unijny* (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2016), 59–60.

[16] Iurii Solozobov, "An Answer to the "Polish Question"", *Russian Politics and Law* 48, no. 6 (2010): 57–58.

[17] Miłosz J. Zieliński, "Cross-Border Co-Operation Between The Kaliningrad Oblast And Poland In The Context Of Polish-Russian Relations in 2004–2011," *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review,* 28 (2012): 20.

emphasise the role of individuals – notably Donald Tusk and Radosław Sikorski. On the other hand, Stanisław Bieleń explains improved relations between Poland and Russia after 2007 by the desire of Poland's political elite and society to review their attitudes towards Russia.[18] Tomasz Grabowski and Grzegorz Makuch use a structural explanation. According to them, Poland decided to shift its position towards Russia, because without good relations with Russia it could not expect to have good relations with key players in the EU.[19] Nevertheless, this group of authors also may be accused of not subscribing to scientific standards: their research is hardly guided by any theory, they do not identify dependent and independent variables and the connections between them, they do not show how they collected empirical data for their research, nor do they come up with any hypothesis which they could check and with which they could substantiate their claims. It is often unclear where their claims stem from and seem more like reflections rather than well-designed international relations.

Apart from this, there exists literature that does present its theoretical assumptions, while explaining Poland's foreign policy, identifies dependent and independent variables and their interaction, but does not follow up these guidelines in the empirical part of the research. One of the best examples of such cases is Ryszard Zięba's recent book on Poland's foreign policy, which also touches upon Poland's relations with Russia.[20] At the beginning, the author presents internal objective and subjective, and external objective and subjective variables, which would help explain the reasons behind various Poland's foreign policy decisions. But the empirical part does not follow this theoretical framework and is of a descriptive nature. A similar situation may be found in Mieczysław Stolarczyk's research.[21]

Given the fact that the majority of authors analysing Polish-Russian relations are based in Polish universities, such a situation should not come as a surprise. As Jacek Czaputowicz and Kamil Ławniczak have shown, around 80% of Polish International Relations scholarly works do not explicitly show their theoretical and methodological approach and if they do, they are not followed up in the research's empirical part.[22] In another investigation Jacek Czaputowicz and Anna Wojciuk show, that 87% of scientific articles published in Poland's top international relations journals between 2007 and 2012 were atheoretical and of a descriptive nature.[23] Thus, the fact that a large portion of research on Polish-Russian relations has no theoretical background reflects the broader tendencies in the field of Polish International Relations.

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[18] Stanisław Bieleń, "The Possibility of Reconciliation in Polish-Russian Relations," *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, 27 (2012): 11–12.

[19] Tomasz Grabowski and Grzegorz Makuch, "Polityka Zagraniczna wobec Rosji," in *Głowne kierunki polityki zagranicznej rządu Donalda Tuska w latach 2007–2011*, ed. Paweł Musiałek (Kraków: eSPe, 2012), 251.

[20] Ryszard Zięba, *Polityka zagraniczna Polski w strefie euroatlantyckiej* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2013), 182–199.

[21] Mieczysław Stolarczyk, "Rola Rosji w polityce bezpieczeństwa Polski pod koniec pierwszej dekady XXI w.," in *Polska wobec wyzwań bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, ed. Klemens Budzowski (Kraków: Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego, 2010), 131–146.

[22] Jacek Czaputowicz and Kamil Ławniczak, "Polish international relations community and its distinguishing features according to the 2014 TRIP survey," paper presented at the Central European Political Science association annual conference „Security Architecture in CEE: Present Threats and Prospects for Cooperation", Vilnius, 2015 September 25-26.

[23] Jacek Czaputowicz and Anna Wojciuk, "IR scholarship in Poland: the state of the discipline 25 years after the transition to democracy," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 19 (2016), 463.

At best, this work may be termed what Jacek Czaputowicz and Anna Wojciuk call "common-sense realism."[24] This work focuses on identifying the studied state's national interest and showing how it was realised. However, there is no theoretical background behind such reflections, which would explain the reasons behind the observed trends. The commonality of such work with realism usually lies in the borrowing of some realist terms. It is for this reason that A. Wojciuk and J. Czaputowicz distinguish "common-sense realism" from the theory of realism in International Relations. This leads them to conclude that out of almost 1000 articles written in Poland's top International Relations journals between 2007 and 2012 only 13 could be classified as guided by realist theory.[25] Hence, there is plenty of work to be done in terms of analysing Polish-Russian relations from a realist perspective, as from most other theoretical viewpoints.

Historical approaches

This brings us to the second part of the literature on Poland's relations with Russia, which is comprised of authors using the perspective of historical sociology or historical approaches more generally. Its essence is to demonstrate how the present is determined by past processes and events. The methodology of these works is interpretive with a big focus on historical memory and its effects on international relations.

A lot of authors from this group explain the thaw in Poland's relations with Russia during 2007–2013 through the depoliticisation of historical issues. For instance, Wojciech Materski analyses the Katyn issue as a factor in Polish-Russian relations.[26] He starts his analysis from 1940, when the crime was committed and continues up until the present day, showing the whole dynamic of the Katyn case. But this is not a simple chronological depiction of events. Materski shows how pasts events – Gomułka's partial liberalisation, the activity of the Polish "Solidarity" movement, the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev, and the conclusions of Russia's prosecutor's office in 1994 – affected further actions of foreign policy decision-makers, their possible choices and mutual respect with their Russian counterparts. Richard J. Hunter presents a similar argument.[27] Meanwhile, Nikita Petrov through the same prism analyses the unpreparedness of Russia's political elite and society to acknowledge the Katyn crime, mostly driven by psychological complexes and the deep impact of soviet propaganda, which had heavily damaged Russian society's historical memory.[28] Artiom Malgin also argues that different Polish and Russian historical interpretations heavily

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[24] Anna Wojciuk and Jacek Czaputowicz, "Realizm w polskiej nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych," in *Teoria realizmu w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, ed. Haliżak and Czaputowicz (PTSM, 2014), 211.

[25] Ibid., 212.

[26] Wojciech Materski, "Katynė kaip Lenkijos ir Sovietų Sąjungos/Rusijos santykių veiksnys," in *Atminties kultūrų dialogai Ukrainos, Lietuvos, Baltarusijos (ULB) erdvėje*, ed. Alvydas Nikžentaitis and Michał Kopczyński (Vilnius: Lietuvos Istorijos Instituto leidykla, 2016), 297–311.

[27] Richard J. Hunter, "Katyn: Old Issues Threaten Polish-Russian Economic and Political Relations," *European Journal of Social Sciences* 17, no. 2 (2010): 288–297.

[28] Nikita Petrov, "'Katynės Byla' kaip Rusijos ir Lenkijos santykių indikatorius," in *Atminties kultūrų dialogai Ukrainos, Lietuvos, Baltarusijos (ULB) erdvėje*, ed. Alvydas Nikžentaitis and Michał Kopczyński (Vilnius: Lietuvos Istorijos Instituto leidykla, 2016), 312–319.

burdened bilateral relations, which created the ground for false myths and political identities, sometimes with messianic features. The pushing back of such questions into the background, a common group for difficult historical matters and a more moderate view towards history from both Poland and Russia has led to improved relations.[29] Irina A. Vasilenko also claims that the reason behind bad Polish-Russian relations was the stereotypes coming from history. The establishment of the commission for difficult historical matters and the centres of Polish-Russian dialogue in 2011 caused a thaw in relations.[30] Andrzej de Lazari holds a similar view.[31]

Paweł Ładykowski presents a completely different view, which can still be ascribed to the historical approaches camp. With the help of postcolonialist theory he argues that for Poland, Russia is at the same time a colonizer and colonized territory and these feelings drive Poland's policy toward Russia.[32]

Overall, the literature on Polish-Russian relations guided by historical approaches presents a more solid explanation about shifts in Polish-Russian relations and Poland's foreign policy towards Russia, locating its causes either in historical memory or history policies. Nevertheless, this group's research also has its drawbacks. Firstly, it is limited thematically. It cannot explain much that is beyond the realm of memory politics, for instance energy or military relations. Secondly, and more importantly, it does not show clearly enough how shifts in historical memory, or history policy, are later transformed into changes in foreign policy.

Constructivist views on Polish-Russian relations

This latter task is performed by constructivist theories, which form the third group of the literature on Poland's relations with Russia. Valentina Feklyunina claims that the improvement in relations between Poland and Russian in 2007–2013 have to be related with the beginning of the correction of historical narratives by both countries and their acceptance of historical mistakes,[33] which began with the transformation of their identities and consequently their foreign policies. Raymond Taras is part of the same group, who by analysing shifts in the discourse of Poland's public opinion and politicians says that in 2005–2007 Poland's identity was based on nationalist xenophobia, which in 2007 changed towards a European identity and it led to Poland's improved relations with Russia.[34] Similar

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[29] Артём Мальгин, "Россия и Польша: сквозь призму «Восточной Политики» Евросоюза," Восточная Европа Перспективы, No. 2 (2011): 11–12.

[30] Ирина А. Василенко, "Новый этап в российско-польских отношениях: трудный путь к диалогу и согласию," *Studia Politologiczne* 28 (2013): 22–27.

[31] Andrej De Lazari, "Polish-Russian Difficult Matters," *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, No.1 (2011): 72–73.

[32] Paweł Ładykowski, "Poland and Its Eastern Neighbours: A Postcolonial Case Study," *Baltic Journal of European Studies* 5, no. 1: 109–132.

[33] Valentina Feklyunina, "Russia's foreign policy towards Poland:Seeking reconciliation? A social constructivist analysis," *International Politics* 49, no. 4 (2012): 446.

[34] Raymond Taras, "Russia Resurgent, Russophobia in Decline? Polish Perceptions of Relations with the Russian Federation 2004–2012," *Europe-Asia Studies* 66, no. 5: 710–734.

ly, Patryk Wawrzyński's work reviews Poland's policy towards Russia in 2005–2010 through president Lech Kaczyński's identity and concept of history.[35]

Historian Andrzej Nowak uses a different constructivist approach. Though he does not present it explicitly, it can be read from his analysis that the main factor affecting Russia's foreign policy is its imperial identity, which is also an independent variable. A. Nowak substantiates his arguments with the popularity in Russia of geopolitical (pseudo)science, which scientifically proves Russia's destiny to dominate CEE, to which Poland belongs, and the constant references in Russia's politicians' speeches to geopolitics. From this follows the conclusion that Poland's foreign policy will always be affected by Russia's imperial identity and because of that Poland must search for ways to resist Russia's attempts to dominate it.[36]

Probably the most solid work on Poland's foreign policy towards Russia is Joanna A. Gorska's monography, which studies Poland's relations with Russia between 1989 and 2009.[37] She grounds her work on constructivism and realism. From these theories Gorska formulates such hypotheses:

- the more spread and specific the ideas on Russia in separate spheres, the bigger is their influence on Poland's foreign policy in a given sphere;
- the more positive the ideas about Russia in a given sphere, the bigger is Poland's willingness to cooperate;
- the bigger Poland's relative power and the less bipolar the international system, the bigger is Poland's opportunity to act and choose between cooperative and non-cooperative foreign policy types;
- the smaller the „security pressures" from Russia on Poland, the more the latter is inclined to cooperate. [38]

Gorska checks these hypotheses in the cases of soviet army withdrawal from Poland, Poland's entrance to NATO, Poland's energy policy towards Russia and the issue of Katyn. Gorska argues that Poland conducted a policy based on cooperation and a willingness to normalise relations with Russia. The main reason for this is Poland's increased power after the collapse of the Cold War's bipolar international system and the diminished threat from Russia towards Poland.[39] However, the author herself admits that far more research must be done to explain how these factors shaped the decisions made by Poland's foreign policy establishment.[40]

In general, the literature on Polish-Russian relations based on constructivism, has the best scientific basis and presents the most compelling arguments explaining Poland's policy towards Russia in the 21st century. In it worth mentioning is that the majority of these authors are based in Western universities. However, these constructivist depictions of Polish-Russian relations are far from perfect, as there are a lot of potentially important

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[35] Patryk Wawrzyński, "The Remembrance of the Katyń Massacre and the President Lech Kaczyński's concept of Polish-Russian Relations [2005–2010]," *Polish Political Science Yearbook* 41 (2012): 507–525.

[36] Andrzej Nowak, *Putin: Źródła Imperialnej Agresji* (Warszawa: Sic!, 2014), 61–71.

[37] Joanna A. Gorska, *Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing Poland's Policy towards Russia, 1989–2009.* Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2010.

[38] Ibid., 13–15.

[39] Ibid., 23–24.

[40] Ibid., 186.

themes that have not yet been discussed. One example could be the balance of power. For example, did the US-Russia reset initiative affect Poland's policy towards Russia? Such and similar questions still await their answers which could be presented by other theoretical approaches.

Conclusions

This article has analysed theoretically the literature on Polish-Russian relations in the 21st century. The literature can be grouped into three parts. The first one, which is also the biggest, is atheoretical, its works do not follow any theory or methodology. The two much smaller groups are works based on historical approaches and constructivism respectively. It is worth mentioning that the first group is comprised mostly of Polish scholars, whereas representatives from the latter two are based in Western universities. This fact illustrates the problems that the field of International Relations experiences with Poland.

Overall, several features of the literature on Poland's relations on Russia may be identified. Firstly, there is actually very little knowledge regarding the main factors driving Poland's foreign policy towards Russia. This problem is partially solved by the mentioned historical approaches and constructivism. However, these groups' research is limited thematically and does not cover all aspects of Poland's relations with Russia. Secondly, there is no clear understanding of what impacts Poland's foreign policy, i.e. why the Polish government makes certain decisions regarding Russia. This is most evidently demonstrated by the fact that there is no work which analyses Polish-Russian relations using Foreign Policy Analysis theories.

Hence, referring back to the discussion in the introduction about increased attention towards CEE, one finds oneself in a paradoxical situation. On one hand there is increased global demand for explanations of political processes in CEE and their foreign policies. On the other, there is a small supply of high-quality, scientifically grounded research on these matters. Most probably, such a situation arose because of CEE academic institutions lagging behind their Western counterparts and the latter's lack of interest in CEE. Notwithstanding the demand for knowledge about CEE and the unused opportunities to produce high quality scientific International Relations research, it brings hope not only for obtaining urgent answers, but that during this process CEE scientific institutions will become more acknowledged and recognisable within the global academic community.

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EU Public Diplomacy and the Eastern Partnership: Some Reflections on Goals, Determinants and Constraints

Abstract: The aim of this article is to show public diplomacy using the example of the European Union, which by its very nature is perceived as an actor with a natural potential to conduct public diplomacy. In a more detailed perspective, the analysis concerns EU public diplomacy towards the states of the Eastern Partnership, which is both an addressee of its objectives and a catalyst for its difficulties and constraints. The article consists of three parts. In the first part, the definitions' section of public diplomacy was briefly presented. In the second part, the aims and objectives of public diplomacy in the understanding of the European Union were presented. An important element of this section concerns the justification for why the European Union is perceived as an actor predestined to conduct public diplomacy. In the third part, the starting point for the analysis was the assumption that the EU's goal in public diplomacy is to define its image and its role in its international environment, which is conducive to the EU taking on many international efforts, including the establishment of the Eastern Partnership. At the same time, analysing EU public diplomacy through the prism of this initiative offers a research opportunity to look closely at the limitations of EU public diplomacy in general, which can be strategic in terms of assessing the EU's efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its objectives in international relations. .

Key words: European Union, public diplomacy, Eastern Partnership, goals, determinants, constraints.

Introduction

Jan Melissen claims that "the European Union has become a true laboratory for public diplomacy experimentation, constantly pressing the boundaries of what is acceptable

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diplomatic behaviour".[2] This observation is closely linked to the changes that are taking place in international relations and those which have generated new mechanisms and processes for solving international problems. Due to globalization interdependencies, the rapid development of technology, and the rise of public opinion's international awareness in the countries of the world, we see that new problems are becoming the subject of international relations, and new participants are transferring into actors in international politics. As a consequence, the contemporary international scene has been increasingly and densely populated by actors with different potentials and influence on various international issues. As Teresa Łoś-Nowak points out, "Their permanent presence in the international system seems to weaken the ability of the state to represent new social groups, non-territorial entities and other participants in international relations, of which they are emanations and whose interests they pursue. These new world policy actors, convinced of their natural need to represent social, economic, cultural and other forces, identified with their goals and philosophies of action, reach for methods different from those used in traditional diplomacy (...)".[3] These methods require new approaches to contemporary diplomacy, in which "issues are highly interdependent, requiring holistic solutions, international cooperation and, increasingly, collaboration between international civil societies".[4]

In the context of the emergence of new actors and new international problems, as well as their growing links with actors of traditional diplomacy, the research focus often refers to public diplomacy. As diagnosed by Mladen Andrlić, "the Westphalian system has moved towards supranational values and standards, while public diplomacy increasingly has taken over from traditional diplomacy. With all respect for the Vienna Conventions, which still provide the general legal framework for diplomatic and consular activities, the paradigm in diplomatic dealings has shifted from "government-to-government" dealings with the general public being involved to the dealings with specific niches of the public, with clearly defined and well-tuned target audiences."[5] Today, public diplomacy is used by a number of international actors, from the great powers like the US or China to small states such as Botswana and Uganda, as well as international organizations, NGOs, transnational corporations, regions, etc. The gradual but dynamic acceleration of public diplomacy is recognised in the literature as the phenomenon of 'globalisation of public diplomacy'.[6]

The aim of this article is to show how public diplomacy, using the example of the European Union, by its very nature is perceived as an actor with a natural potential to conduct public diplomacy. In a more detailed perspective, the analysis concerns the EU public diplomacy towards the states of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), which is both an addressee of its objectives and goals but also a catalyst for determinants of its difficulties

[2] Jan Melissen, *Beyond the New Public Diplomacy* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2011), 6.
[3] Teresa Łoś-Nowak, "Dyplomacja w ponowoczesności", in: *Nowe oblicza dyplomacji,* ed. Beata Surmacz (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2013), 49–50.
[4] Brian Hocking, Jan Melissen, Shaun Riordan, Paul Sharp, *Futures for Diplomacy. Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st century*, Report No. 1 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2012), 6.
[5] Mladen Andrlić, "Public Diplomacy in the CEI Area: Some Reflections", in: eds. Mladen Andrlić, Andrea Gustović-Ercegovac, *Diplomatic Academy Proceedings* (Zagreb, 2012), 14.
[6] Philip Fiske de Gouveia, "The future of Public Diplomacy", in: *The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy: A European Perspective: The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy*, ed. Javier Noya (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2006), 6.

and constraints. The article consists of three parts. In the first part, the definitions' section of public diplomacy is briefly presented. In the second part, the aims and objectives of public diplomacy in the understanding of the European Union are presented. An important element of this section concerns the justification for why the European Union is perceived as an actor predestined to conduct public diplomacy. In the third part, the starting point for the analysis is the assumption that the EU's goal in public diplomacy is to define its image and its role in its international environment, which is conducive to the EU taking on many international efforts, including the establishment of the Eastern Partnership. At the same time, analysing the EU public diplomacy through the prism of this initiative offers a research opportunity to look closely at the limitations of the EU public diplomacy in general, what can be strategic in terms of assessing of the EU's efficiency and effectiveness in achieving its objectives in international relations.

Public diplomacy: definitions, why and what for?

Philip Fiske de Gouveia sees public diplomacy as a term that "refers, in its simplest form, to the many and varied activities conducted by governments to engage and communicate with foreign publics. The purpose of this, ideally two-way, engagement is generally to influence attitudes towards that government's country so as to encourage tourism and inward investment, and to facilitate, for example, closer political ties and alliances".[7] Beata Ociepka explains public diplomacy as "Dialogic form of international political communication that facilitates the realization of the objectives of the state in the international environment by building mutually beneficial relationships with partners abroad".[8] Steffen Bay Rasmussen defines public diplomacy as "a modality of diplomacy that seeks indirect and structural influence internationally by affecting the political discourses within other states"[9]. When it comes to actors of this form of diplomacy, it is important to accentuate the fact that public diplomacy acknowledges and even invests in different, sometimes new, modes of behaviour not only in the case of traditional actors like governments but also non-governmental ones, like NGOs, national minorities, social leaders and social groups, private companies, universities etc. Therefore, public diplomacy is often divided into a 'government-to-people' model and a 'people-to-people' model, which is called new public diplomacy.[10]

Corresponding with the qualitative changes of current international relations, public diplomacy is "in a sense a metaphor for the democratization of diplomacy"[11], with functions and roles complementary to conventional diplomacy. Most of all, as Javier Noya diagnoses, public diplomacy " lays the ground, like a sapper" and "can act as a safety net,

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[7] Ibid., 5.

[8] Beata Ociepka, "Nowa dyplomacja publiczna – perspektywa teorii stosunków międzynarodowych i komunikowania politycznego", *Przegląd Strategiczny* 1(2012): 130.

[9] Steffen Bay Rasmussen, *Discourse analysis of EU Public Diplomacy: messages and practices* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2009), 1.

[10] See more: Jan Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice", in: *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2005), 10–16.

[11] Melissen, *Beyond the New Public Diplomacy*, 2.

a cushion that eases the blow".[12] In the first case, communication and information dissemination, mainly managed by governments and aimed at promoting, persuading, explaining or finally justifying their own interests and actions vis-à-vis other states, can help to build favourable ground in the public opinion of those countries to accept them. In the second case, the very character of public diplomacy, which involves the engagement of actors of various types and political and social affiliations, is referred to as extremely useful in times of crisis or conflict when formal diplomatic relations deteriorate or are broken. In particular, the 'people-to-people' public diplomacy mode can contribute to maintaining informal networks in diplomatic relations. However, as Noya reminds us of the following Ed Murrow quote, the journalist of 'Good night and good luck' fame, "public diplomacy must be an integral part of diplomacy as a whole, and it must be incorporated from the outset, from take-off, and not just on emergency landings in times of crisis".[13]

EU public diplomacy: goals, why and what for?

One of the introductory remarks compared the EU to a laboratory of public diplomacy. This is justified by the specific nature of the European Union, which results in the EU's potential to act on the different levels of modern diplomacy. In the literature, Beata Surmacz classifies and lists four categories of diplomatic actors who determine today's international arena. The first category is the professional representatives of states that act on the basis of a mandate and in accordance with the instructions of their governments. The second type is supranational actors who represent international organizations. The third type is a subregional diplomat who acts on behalf of the actors within the state, such as the regions or cities. Finally, the fourth type is transnational diplomats, which include transnational interest groups, business representatives, and civil society.[14]

At a glance, the European Union fits into the second category of supranational diplomatic actors, but with a deeper insight into the nature of European integration, we will see that it covers the areas and generates the mechanisms that open the diplomatic space for all of the types. The first two types are reflected in Jacek Czaputowicz's analysis, who asks "What is the European Union? Should it be seen as an international regime, an international organization, an agency acting on the part of the Member States, or a federation or a supranational institution gradually transforming itself into a European state? Perhaps the Union is all at once; various characters appear in different activities, in different institutions and at different times. In the European Union, there is a full spectrum of forms of action, ranging from pure intergovernmental policy, the balance of power and a model of international organization, e.g. in defense matters, to the model of supranationalism, e.g. in the common market".[15] The actions

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[12] Javier Noya, "The United States and Europe: Convergence or Divergence in Public Diplomacy", in: *The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy: A European Perspective: The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy*, ed. Javier Noya (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2006), 16.

[13] Ibid, 18.

[14] Beata Surmacz, "Kto jest dziś dyplomatą?", in: *Nowe oblicza dyplomacji,* ed. Beata Surmacz (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2013), 23.

[15] Jacek Czaputowicz, *Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych. Krytyka i systematyzacja* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2008), 354–355.

of the Member States and the actions of the EU institutions, sometimes in terms of coopera-tion, and sometimes in the form of rivalry, results in the first two types gaining full representa-tion within the European Union. In the case of the third type, subnational diplomats are also referred to as being representatives for the EU, not only because of their activities within the EU, but above all because of the fact that the integration project stimulated the develop-ment of such a form of diplomatic activity through European regional policy.[16] The fourth type of actors, transnational diplomats, can also be found in the European Union, since, for example, the European Commission engages transnational interest groups and civil society representatives into the process of drafting legislative proposals in EU decision-making.

Looking at the European Union as a framework for a broad spectrum of areas and international actors, it can be concluded that the European integration project creates a favourable environment for public diplomacy. In the definition of the European Commis-sion public diplomacy "seeks to promote EU interests by understanding, informing and influencing. It means clearly explaining the EU's goals, policies and activities and fostering understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens, groups, institutions and the media".[17] In a more unofficial manner, Emma Basker, who worked in the European Commission in the years 2004–2010 concludes that: "Thanks to globalization, information and images flash around the world in a matter of minutes, making world opinion as much of a foreign policy actor as any national government. Of course, that does not just affect the EU. But given that the EU's power is primarily soft rather than hard, we perhaps have even more at stake in ensuring world public opinion is on side. To prosper we must make sure we project a positive image of ourselves".[18] Thus, public diplomacy is justified as a tool ap-plicable to, and used by, the EU as it is often seen as the instrumentalisation of soft power. In this context, as emphasized by Jan Melissen, already "Cardinal Richelieu has observed that the reputation of a country is one of the most important sources of its power".[19]

Due to the specific nature of the European Union and its power and potential, as ex-pressed in terms such as 'co-operative public diplomacy superpower'[20], 'champion of multilateralism' or 'civilian power'[21], the literature prevails "a theoretical framework, which conceptualises EU public diplomacy as being not merely about influencing foreign per-ceptions of the EU, but about establishing an identity for the EU as an actor".[22] This ap-proach was also accentuated on the EU level as a consequence of introducing foreign policy reforms in the Treaty of Lisbon. Herman van Rompuy, the first President of the European Council under the Lisbon Treaty stated in 2010 that the primary consideration

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[16] See: Krzysztof Tomaszewski, "'Dyplomacja' regionów – nowy instrument promowania interesów wspólnot terytorialnych w Europie", *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, 6(34), 2006, 92.

[17] See: Simon Duke, "The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy", *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2013), 2.

[18] Emma Basker, „EU Public Diplomacy", in: *The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy: A European Perspective: The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy*, ed. Javier Noya (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2006), 31.

[19] Jan Melissen, "Public Diplomacy between Theory and Practice", in: *The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy: A European Perspective: The 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy*, ed. Javier Noya (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2006), 11.

[20] Fiske de Gouveia, *The future of Public Diplomacy*, 7.

[21] Philip Fiske de Gouveia, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy* (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2005), 3.

[22] Rasmussen, *Discourse analysis of EU Public Diplomacy*, 2.

for EU public diplomacy is "how to deal, as Europe, with the rest of the world".[23] Although there has been much debate, and following that even more disputes about the role/roles of the European Union in international affairs, the potential EU actorness is recognised by the literature in areas such as trade, development policy, humanitarian aid, promotion of democracy, human rights, and climate change.[24]

In its public diplomacy, the European Union bases itself on the power of its attractiveness. As Basker emphasizes, "The EU has a great deal of attractive power, our achievement in creating and sustaining peace within our boundaries is recognised and admired around the world. In fact, the Chinese Ambassador in Brussels described the creation and success of the European project as 'one of those events which happen in the world only every four or five hundred years'!".[25] Simon Duke puts it in less subtle way: "The international projection of the EU relies heavily upon the promotion of the 'domestic' Union as exemplar – 'you too could be like us'"[26]. Thus, the essence of EU public diplomacy, both in the sense of promoting its own image and of trying to define a proper international role / roles, is based on the belief that the EU governance model is a pattern for other actors to pursue and for them to implement foreign policy interests and to overcome conflicts consciously, taking into account the needs and expectations of the multilateral international environment. The main components of this model's success are its attractive elements, which make international cooperation and the individual development of the countries in the world upgrade to a higher level. These elements include: "*basic principles*, such as peace, democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights, the member states' right to equitable institutional representation and diversity; *conceptualized ideas* underpinning European policy regimes, such as sustainable development, social market economy, the single market, the area of freedom, security and justice or more recently in the neighbourhood policy; and *procedural and rule-based norms*, such as good governance and institution-building".[27]

In the context of such outlined objectives, it seems that the European Union's public diplomacy is most visible in the roles played by the European Union through its enlargements. [28] The history of the European Communities/European Union enlargements, taking into account the specificities of the acceding countries, is the success story of exporting the European integration model to European countries, which have adopted it with lesser or greater convergence. In particular, the Eastern enlargements have shown the potential of the European Union as a stimulating force to support and promote the progress of reform and systemic transformation of the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. With regard to these dependencies, the EU is even referred to as 'transformative power'.[29]

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[23] See: Duke, *The European External Action Service*, 11.

[24] Anna Michalski, "The EU as a Soft Power: the Force of Persuasion", in: *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen, (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 136; Rasmussen, *Discourse analysis of EU Public Diplomacy*, 2 and 16.

[25] Basker, *EU Public Diplomacy*, 31.

[26] Duke, *The European External Action Service*, 3.

[27] Michalski, *The EU as a Soft Power*, 126.

[28] Barbara Curyło, "EU Public Diplomacy: Analytical Discourse in the Context of Polylateral Diplomacy", in: *New Diplomacy in Open Europe*, eds. Barbara Curyło et al (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2014), 109.

[29] See more: Heather Grabbe, *The EU's Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006).

EU public diplomacy in the context of the Eastern Partnership: determinants and constraints

In his speech in Strasbourg in 2010, José Manuel Barroso, the first President of the European Commission under the Lisbon Treaty, stated that: "As the strategic partnerships of the 21st century emerge, Europe should seize the chance to define its future. I am impatient to see the Union play the role in global affairs that matches its economic weight. Our partners are watching and are expecting us to engage as Europe, not just as 27 individual countries. If we don't act together, Europe will not be a force in the world, and they will move on without us: without the European Union but also without its Member States".[30] Although the Eastern Partnership was set up in 2009, and therefore before this speech, its citation is justified as it reflects the motives and convictions underlying the establishment of the deeper forms of the EU's cooperation with Eastern European countries, especially after the successes of the Eastern enlargements.

The Eastern Partnership is a key component of the European Neighbour Policy. As it is described by Jacqueline Hale: "it has a bearing on both the EU's ability to exercise a power of attraction in its Eastern gravity zone, as well as indirectly impacting the development of a, at times, difficult strategic partnership with Russia. This policy is a mix of geopolitics, normative and technical approaches. On the one hand it creates a club of 'European neighbours' (...) having a vector to Brussels. On the other hand it attempts to extend the logic of regulatory approximation that underpinned the enlargement policy to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus and makes demands on these countries regarding human rights and governance standards as well as converging regulations".[31]

After several years, the conclusions and evaluations of the Eastern Partnership initiative's functioning are not satisfactory and one cannot disagree with Tetiana Poliak-Grujić, who diagnoses that, "despite its ambition to become an agent of change in its eastern neighbourhood, the EU has hardly managed to so. Since the launch of the Eastern Partnership Initiative numerous frameworks and mechanisms aimed at the integration of EaP countries with the EU have been created, but it has not gained any major political significance that would correspond to the European Union's ambitions and challenges on its eastern flank. The progress of reforms in the partner states has proved to be below expectations and exposed major shortcomings in the EU's foreign policy, and the instruments it has used to stimulate change".[32] It is therefore worthwhile to look at, at least, some of the key determinants of this state of matters, which illustrate and explain the low effectiveness of EU public diplomacy vis-à-vis the Eastern Partnership countries, both in the sense of promoting the EU's image and the exporting of the European model of governance.

First of all, it is important to begin by stressing the very important issue of modus operandi of cooperation between EU cooperation and its Eastern European partners. In the proposal entitled 'Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with

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[30] See: Duke, *The European External Action Service*, 11.

[31] Jacqueline Hale, "EU and the Eastern Partnership: staying the course", in: *Europe in the World: Can EU Foreign Policy make an impact*, ed. Adam Hug (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2013), 30.

[32] Tetiana Poliak-Grujić, "Implementing Eastern Partnership Initiative: Challenges and Obstacles", *Warsaw East European Review* vol. VI/2006: 93.

our Eastern and Southern Partners', presented in 2003 to the Council and the European Parliament, the European Commission defined the pathway for the development of these relations in such a way that the partnership approach to its neighbours was crystallized as contradistinctive to the EU's membership perspective.[33] This approach has also become the framework for cooperation and relations between the European Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. However, albeit extremely strategic for the shape and quality of the partnership, the European Union has not adapted the formulas of cooperation to this essential modification of replacing membership with the notion of partnership. This was confirmed, for example, by maintaining the principle of conditionality in the shape of the 'conditionality-for-membership' formula.[34] As a result, the cooperation between the EU and Eastern Partnership countries "employ the mechanisms of the EU enlargement policy, including the adoption of the EU's extensive *acquis* by the partners, in return for financial and technical support or other benefits such as trade preferences or access to EU programmes and agencies".[35]

And here lie the core constraints for EU public diplomacy. For some countries, the partnership, offered in place of the prospect of membership from the outset, was daunting and frustrating, especially since the EU was expecting the same adjustments as those from formal candidates. As Adam Hug underlines, "One of the fundamental fault-lines that still plagues the Eastern Partnership (and ENP) (...) is that the EU seeks to achieve similar goals (democratisation, economic development, integration and stability) to that achieved in Eastern Europe through the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, with a similar process of aligning partner laws and processes with EU norms but without the same political will, financial resources or the ultimate prize of EU membership".[36] On the other hand, in the case of other countries, this formula was unsatisfactory due to the lack of membership aspirations resulting from their internal conditions or hitherto existing international alliances. In their expectation, cooperation was meant to be based on facilitating economic relations rather than building foundations for membership, which was not even prospectively outlined. For this reason, as Poliak-Grujic concludes, "Being essentially inside-out, one-sided and Eurocentric, the external governance approach is unfit to contribute to authentic partnership in practice and, thus, to ensure policy legitimation and effectiveness".[37] As a consequence, Eastern Partnership countries feel more like targets of the EU's governance model than the real partners in a real partnership in which they have the opportunity to shape it.

The strategy of public diplomacy outlined in this way has been a classic mistake in art when it comes to the image and the credibility of the European Union as a partner. Under this premise, public diplomacy promotes tailor-made approaches that address the opportunities, needs and expectations of all parties of the relations and cooperation. With regard

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[33] Elena Korosteleva, *The European Union and Its Eastern Neighbours: Towards a More Ambitious Partnership?*, (London: Routledge, 2012), 11.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Rafał Sadowski, "Partnership in Times of Crisis. Challenges for the Eastern European Countries' Integration with Europe", *Point of View* 23(2013): 28.

[36] Adam Hug, "Challenges for the EU's Eastern Partnership", in: *Trouble in the Neighbourhood? The Future of the EU's Eastern Partnership,* ed. Adam Hug (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2015), 9.

[37] Poliak-Grujić, *Implementing Eastern Partnership,* 94.

to the countries of Eastern Europe the EU applied a 'one-size-fits-all' approach[38], which resulted in differentiated levels of frustration among the Eastern partners, due to different causes. Moreover, the European Union has put the states of the Eastern Partnership in a highly confusing position, because on the one hand it "made many efforts to exercise its skill as the continent's hegemonic 'normative entrepreneur'" but on the other hand it showed a considerable "lack of clarity, inconsistency and incoherence".[39]

This dissonance results from several reasons of constraining character. If you look closely at the construction of the Eastern Partnership initiative, it becomes visible that it "is built on 'systemic conflict' that is revealed by an increasingly apparent collision between the 'imperial paradigm' and 'pragmatic functionalism'".[40] What is more, each of these approaches contain further contradistinctions. If we look at the imperial paradigm, we will see the European Union's will to be present in its Eastern neighborhood, but on the other hand has ambivalent attitudes and declarations stemming from the complex nature of relations with Russia. Generally, The European Union has taken steps to "foster interdependence and practical cooperation with Russia as a means of promoting security, stability and perhaps even the incremental democratization of Russia".[41] Ultimately, the EU's conviction, which works well for the Member States, that interdependence excludes conflicts, has been questioned by Russian policy in the region. This is due, among others, to the nature of the interdependence between the EU and Russia which "has always been asymmetric and thus more prone to conflict than cooperation".[42] This dependency is an extremely important determinant of the progress of cooperation within the Eastern Partnership and explains many of its failures. As a result, we have a geopolitical rivalry, which is a great challenge for the Eastern Partnership countries. A notable example, naturally not mentioning the situation of Ukraine broadly analyzed in the literature and media, are the dilemmas of Armenia, which had approached the EU, but "was forced to choose integration with a Russian Project (Eurasian Economic Union), because the issue of Nagorny Karabakh appeared to be more important than in suggested programmes of the EU".[43]

In the case of pragmatic functionalism, the objectives of the European Union in the area of democratisation and stabilisation of the Eastern neighborhood are clear, but the methods of achieving these goals are ambivalent. There has already been talk of normative, adaptive requirements put forward by the EU without simultaneous membership guarantees. Nevertheless, there are also other determinants of such a state of matters that

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Vlad Vernygora, David Ramiro Troitiño, Sigrid Västra, "The Eastern Partnership Programme: Is Pragmatic Regional Functionalism Working for a Contemporary Political Empire?", in: *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy*, eds. Tanel Kerikmäe, Archil Chochia (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing 2016), 8.

[40] Tanel Kerikmäe, „Dimensions and Implications of Eastern Partnership Policy: Introduction", in: *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy*, eds. Tanel Kerikmäe, Archil Chochia (Switzerland: Springer International Publishing 2016), 2. See more: Vlad Vernygora, David Ramiro Troitiño, Sigrid Västra, *The Eastern Partnership Programme.*

[41] Kristi Raik, Sinikukka Saari, „Introduction: Mapping the geostrategic context of the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood", in: *Key Actors in the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood. Competing perspectives on geostrategic tensions,* eds. Kristi Raik, Sinikukka Saari (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs 2016), 16.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Poliak-Grujić, *Implementing*, 100.

are of general character that they concern not only the countries of Eastern Europe, but can also refer to the various problems in the EU public diplomacy.

As Janusz Józef Węc points out: "The Union's ineffectiveness in implementing the objectives of the European Neighborhood Policy also has results from a fundamental fact that its actions are based primarily on bureaucratic and administrative issues".[44] This is a truly problematic issue for the EaP countries because of the complexity of EU decision-making. In the area of cooperation with the Eastern neighborhood decision-making engages European External Action Service (EEAS), High Representative, the Directorates-General of the Commission and finally the Council. In this multi-actor environment, the EEAS's role is represented at all levels and it is sometimes likened to a conductor of many musicians (Member States and Eastern partner countries).[45] And here lies the core paradox of EU public diplomacy. Being a highly specific structure, with great potential for adapting to transitions in international relations and thus conducting public diplomacy, it encounters a number of obstacles. On the one hand, the European Union is enormously attractive on the grounds of culture, trade, prosperity, etc., but on the other hand, as Fiske dr Gouveia points out, "The European Union is too complex an organisation for many people. Although global elites may be aware of the difference between, for example, the European Council and the European Commission, perceptions of Europe third countries do not just confuse the status and actions of the different EU institutions, many people around the world have difficulty distinguishing in their own minds, for example between 'the West, Europe, the member states, and the European Union itself. Such confusion is not aided by European citizens' own common misunderstanding of the EU and EU institutions".[46] Thus, decision-making complexity can be detrimental to non-EU partners, who are often at a different level of institutional development, which results in the fact that the process is understandable to the experts of the European Union and is unreadable to its recipients, deriving from other traditions and experiences of political decision-making.

Another important determinant, resulting in complications in 'pragmatic functionalism', is the fact that the target of EU public diplomacy is both domestic European audiences, as well as audiences in the countries outside the EU.[47] However, the specific nature of the EU makes that public diplomacy targeted at one audience can be applied to the other as well and vice versa. When it comes to the EU domestic audiences, the European Union is in need of explaining and justifying not only the roles performed with respect to their countries, but also the roles performed globally. As Rasmussen concludes: "Although the population of the EU generally favours its existence, the EU does not enjoy the same kind of autonomic legitimacy as a state in the eyes of its citizens".[48] In case of audiences of third countries, public diplomacy refers to three groups of questions related to its international position: first: why the EU has an external policy; second: what is the EU external policy

[44] Janusz Józef Węc, „Reforma europejskiej polityki sąsiedztwa w okresie polskiej prezydencji w Unii Europejskiej, in: *Prezydencje środkowoeuropejskie i programy Partnerstwa Wschodniego*, eds. Wiesława Piątkowska-Stepaniak, Janusz Sawczuk (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego 2015), 25.

[45] See more: Hale, *EU and the Eastern Partnership*, 30–31.

[46] Fiske de Gouveia, *European Infopolitik*, 4.

[47] Michalski, *The EU as a Soft Power*, 125.

[48] Rasmussen, *Discourse analysis of EU Public Diplomacy*, 10

about and third, by what methods the EU operates in the international arena.[49] As a consequence, the EU public diplomacy has been termed 'intermestic' diplomacy because of "blending the international and domestic aspects of a certain policy or issue".[50]

This blending can be, however, problematic because in this manner the EU is operating within the scope of its Member States, their own interests and their own public diplomacies. Margot Wallström, Vice President of the European Commission (in the years 2004–2010) responsible for Institutional Relations and Communication Strategy, claimed decidedly that: "National governments like to claim credit for EU decisions that prove popular and to blame 'Brussels' for the unpopular ones. All too often they fail to explain to their citizens why and how these decisions are taken".[51] Thus, the role of individual Member States, their interests and their objectives in foreign policy and public diplomacy cannot be underestimated. The reason for this undecided attitude of the European Union towards the Eastern Partnership countries was and still is the cautious position of the leading Member States, including Germany.[52] Without going into detail in the particular interests of the Member States with respect to the Eastern European partners, it must be stated that, in the broadest sense, the international role/roles that the European Union undertakes through public diplomacy will always be determined by the needs and expectations of its Member States. Hence, one cannot disagree with the thesis that the significant functional weakness of the Eastern Partnership project, also in the sense of public diplomacy, is that it is largely a project of political elites, on the side of both the European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries. And what is crucial here is that these elites are more interested in stabilizing the region rather than in actual change.[53]

Conclusions

The EU public diplomacy is about promoting the European Union's image and defining the EU's role/roles in international relations based on creating grounds for political and the publics' understanding worldwide. Oriane Calligaro argues that, "promoting Europeanness is a process of negotiations in which entrepreneurs of Europeanness within the EU institutions involve noninstitutional actors and charge them to invent and communicate representations of Europe".[54] As a result the EU and its partners have to deal with 'the divergences between institutional and noninstitutional visions of Europeanness and its promotion'.[55] Zygmunt Bauman used to argue that the essence of Europeanness is

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[49] Ibid., 10–11.

[50] Duke, *The European External Action Service*, 3.

[51] Ibid., 5.

[52] Erhard Cziomer, "Wyzwania związane z realizacją polityki Unii Europejskiej wobec wschodnich sąsiadów w dobie kryzysu strefy euro ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem roli Niemiec w latach 2010–2012", in: *Prezydencje środkowoeuropejskie i programy Partnerstwa Wschodniego*, eds. Wiesława Piątkowska-Stepaniak, Janusz Sawczuk (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego 2015),77.

[53] Poliak-Grujić, *Implementing,* 99.

[54] Oriane Calligaro, *Negotiating Europe. EU Promotion of Europeanness since the 1950s*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2013), 4.

[55] Ibid., 5.

a constant contestation of Europeanness and permanent endeavours to define Europe in what he describes as solving the insoluble. [56]

Thus, as we see from the above, the diversity of actors and the diversity of their visions as well as the critical approach they embrace are embedded in the nature of European processes. Hence, they are the source of the difficulties of EU public diplomacy, which aims to create an image based on understanding the essence of Europe, but also the international roles that the EU wants to play and what are expected of it by the international community. In its relations with the Eastern Partnership countries, the European Union is also dealing with a diverse group of states that represent different approaches, different aspirations and different possibilities for international maneuver. It seems, however, that in its public diplomacy the EU has relied too much on their common feature, the fact that they all were former Soviet republics, and has attached too little attention to the significance of the differences between them. This has been a problematic issue since the launch of this initiative. As a result, the EU itself, in pursuit of promoting diversity in its own club, has adopted a relatively unilateral approach to Eastern European countries. As a consequence, according to Rafał Sadowski, in the opinion of the Eastern Partnership countries, the project of European integration is not their project.[57]

The reason for this is that the European Union building the Eastern Partnership and many other external policy initiatives falls into the conflict between imperial paradigm and pragmatic functionalism. On the one hand, the EU wants to play a role, but on the other hand it is restrained by the determinants such as a complex decision-making process or the counter interests of its Member States. These complex dependencies, which are in fact the everyday of the EU, are discouraging for third countries not having the experience of building and participating in such international cooperation.

Therefore, EU public diplomacy should descend from the top-down level, where the impulses go exclusively from the EU institutions or political leaders, but focus more on bottom-up activities in terms of people to people communication. Such actions do not produce results ad hoc, as in the case of rapid political actions, but in the long run they produce lasting results that are capable of building on a precipitous political climate. The criticism in relation to the Eastern Partnership concerns, among other things, the fact that it is a project of the elites, which makes it susceptible to political fluctuations and changes in the international arena. Hence, there is a need to broaden people-to-people diplomacy in the EU's public diplomacy, which will help the citizens of Eastern Europe to understand such a complex entity as the EU. As argued by Javier Noya, "Public diplomacy is attention to the public on a daily-basis, at a film screening, at an embassy, but also in academic exchange programmes or language classes at cultural institutes, which create networks for people who share an interest in another country. Public diplomacy acts in all levels of foreign policy, so that it is *macro*, but not less than *micro* and *meso*".[58] It is therefore necessary to continue building networks with political elites, but the EU also needs to invest more in creating networks with citizens. This is important for two reasons. First of all, their support for the European project will be an important determinant in the situation

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[56] See: Zygmunt Bauman, *Europe Unfinished Adventure* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2005).

[57] Sadowski, *Partnership in Times of Crisis*, 28.

[58] Noya, *The United States and Europe,* 18–19.

when the political elite in their country will change, with the political climate. Secondly, as it was indicated, EU public diplomacy is 'intermestic', so it means that it targets not only third-countries citizens, but also the citizens of its Member States who in turn determine the attitudes of their governments. So in relation to the Eastern Partnership it is therefore important to invest in the process of communication between people from different socio-political and economic cultures.

In recent years the EU seems to have taken these reflections and observations into consideration. Seeing its failures and being aware of the subjective, as well as objective, constraints of its public diplomacy, it has started to employ the mechanisms of people-to-people public diplomacy. Firstly, it has started to recognize the need for a differentiated approach to each state of the Eastern Partnership, taking into account their specific needs, conditions, problems and possibilities. [59] Secondly, what is visible in the analysis of the documents of the EU concerning the Eastern Partnership, the EU has gradually broadened the scope of its interests in expanding, promoting and investing in the social dimension of the initiative.[60] What is important here is the actions that involve citizens of the EU Member States and EaP countries in civil society projects. The idea is therefore to strengthen dialogue between these different societies rather than maintaining the EU's monologue, which encounters many constraints determined by often contradictory reasons.

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[59] See: Ionela Maria Ciolan, "Security in Central Eastern Europe: Eastern Partnership Looking Towards Riga Summit", *Europolity*, vol. 9, 1/2015: 36.
[60] See for example: *Eastern Partnership – 20 Deliverables for 2020. Focusing on key priorities and tangible results*, Joint Staff Working Documents (Brussels: European Commission, High Representative of The Union For Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2017).

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The Impact of the Iranian Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) on the Geopolitics of the South Caucasuss

Abstract: *This paper examines the evolution of Iran's foreign policy towards the three South Caucasian republics since the agreement of the Iran Nuclear Deal on 14 July 2015 between Iran, P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Union (EU) until today. This paper presents a number of key issues – energy, transportation and trade – related to Iran's policy towards Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Furthermore, it provides consideration of the effects of other international actors such as Russia, Turkey and Israel. The aim of this study is to show the complexity of bilateral relations between the states surrounding the South Caucasus and the impact of their multiple overlapping interests on the whole area.*

Key words: *Geopolitics, Iran's foreign policy, Iranian Nuclear Deal*

Introduction

The nuclear program of Iran is considered to be one of the most important security issues in the Middle East region over the past three decades. The regional and global actors in the Middle East and South-West Asia were tired of the ongoing Iranian impasse with no single regional country able to dominate the entire region. As a result of twelve years of intense negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, the international community welcomed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which was reached in Vienna between Iran, P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and the European Union (EU). On 16 January 2016, the international sanctions

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against Iran were lifted after it was found to be in compliance on the nuclear deal[2] and now Iran has been reintegrated into the global economy.

According to Shireen T. Hunter "This stalemate in the region (on the nuclear program of Iran), internationally offers the best opportunity to try reordering the region according to a new paradigm of avoiding maximalist goals and recognizing the principal security concerns of all countries in the region, of course including Israel."[3]

The lifting of sanctions has paved the way for Iran to rebuild its lost production, trade and investment capacity. Iran wants to seize the opportunity to take over European energy markets, which are trying to diversify away from Russia, by joining regional export pipeline projects. However, to have the economic engagement ability to engage international markets, Iran needs access to the South Caucasus or to Turkey which functions as a land bridge connecting the West and Iran[4].

The aim of this study is to analyse the geopolitic reordering after the Iran Nuclear Deal in the context of the three South Caucasus republics – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. To answer the question of "What is the impact of the Iran Nuclear Deal on the geopolitics of the South Caucasus?" this paper is divided into two parts. In the first part of this paper we have described what the positions of regional and extra-regional actors are towards the Iran Nuclear Deal. In this part, we will see how the geopolitical alignment of each of the states in the South Caucasus region, with extra-regional actors and the interactions of these extra-regional actors among each other, have determined their approaches towards the deal. We believe that these positions are important because they would also shape / are also shaping Iran's long-term relations with its South Caucasian neighbors after the deal. The second part of the paper explains what the possibilities and the limitations of Iranian economic engagement are to the South Caucasus countries in terms of energy, transportation, and economic cooperation projects in the post-sanctions era.

1) The Positions of Regional and Extra-Regional Actors Towards the Iran Nuclear Deal

- ### South Caucasus

Iran's northern neighbors have publicly welcomed the Iranian nuclear deal[5]. As could be expected, the countries of the South Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) were enthusiastic about the possible advantages of the reconciliation between Iran and the West especially in the economic area. With the nuclear agreement and the lifting of sanctions they would be allowed to trade and invest more with Iran. In terms of size these national economies, as potential markets, have little to offer Iran but the South Caucasus

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[2] US Department of State. "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action". https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/. [accessed April 21, 2017].

[3] Shireen T. Hunter, "The US-Iran Deal Could Lead to a More Stable Middle East and South-West Asia", *The Huffington Post,* March 12, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shireen-t-hunter/the-us-iran-deal-could-le_b_4379098.html. [accessed April 28, 2017].

[4] "After Sanctions, Iran's Growing Role in the Caucasus", *Stratfor Analysis,* February 1, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/after-sanctions-irans-growing-role-caucasus, [accessed June 13, 2017].

[5] Richard Weitz, "As Iran Deal Nears, U.S. Must Also Reassure Central Asia, Caucasus", *World Politics Review,* May 26, 2015, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15847/as-iran-deal-nears-u-s-must-also-reassure-central-asia-caucasus [accessed April 22, 2017].

functions as a land bridge connecting the West and Iran, so these countries have been trying to position themselves as transit countries for the flow of fossil fuels between Europe, Iran and South Asia[6]. Once completed, these projects between Iran and the South Caucasus countries would have a strong effect on the region's geopolitical order. More details on the energy transmission and transportation projects in the South Caucasus will be given below in the next part.

- **Russia**

Russia has always positioned itself as a friend of Iran and as a mediator in the nuclear deal negotiations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pointed out that without Russia the deal with Iran would not have happened[7]. Although, before signing the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), Russia knew that it would have a number of negative consequences for their country. Firstly, with the end of sanctions on Iran, this country will have significantly more opportunities to choose political and economic partners and Russia will lose its position of being Iran's privileged partner[8]. More importantly, in the long term, the deal will naturally have consequences for global energy markets as Iran eventually exports more oil. Competition with Iran in the gas sector may become an even more serious challenge for Russia[9]. When we consider the geopolitics of the South Caucasus, Iran's regional economic influence will begin to rebound at Moscow's expense. Despite these facts Russia cooperated on the Iran deal with other international actors. There are several reasons why Russia supported the deal. Firstly, Russia was sharing American interests in preventing Iranian nuclear weapons capability without the use of force[10]. Moscow was not interested in dealing with a nuclear Iran in its periphery. The second reason for Moscow's decision not to derail the Iranian nuclear agreement was the firmly expressed wishes from Beijing[11]. China really wanted the deal, aimed at expanding their energy business with Iran, and Putin was in no position to fight Xi in the current state of Russia-China relations. Having isolated itself from the West, Russia has effectively become reliant on China for financing and for markets[12]. That's clearly part of the reason why Russia didn't play more of a spoiler's role in the negotiations. The

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[6] Hamed Kazemzadeh, Yana Zabanova, Andrea Weiss, David Jijelava, "Iran and the South Caucasus after the Nuclear Deal", *Caucasus Analytical Digest,* No:92, (2017), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/publications/cad/details.html?id=/n/o/9/2/no_92_iran_and_the_south_caucasus_after_ , [accessed April 20, 2017].

[7] Pavel K. Baev, "The China factor in Russian support for the Iran deal", *The Brookings Institution*, July 21, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/07/21/the-china-factor-in-russian-support-for-the-iran-deal/) [accessed April 26, 2017].

[8] "Russia Warily Eyes a U.S.-Iran Deal", *Stratfor Analysis,* November 14, 2013, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia-warily-eyes-us-iran-deal, [accessed April 22, 2017].

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[10] Suzanne Maloney, "Three Reasons Why Russia Won't Wreck the Iran Nuclear Negotiations", *The Brookings Institution,* March 25, 2014, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2014/03/25/three-reasons-why-russia-wont-wreck-the-iran-nuclear-negotiations/, [Accessed April 26, 2017].

[11] Pavel K. Baev, "The China factor in Russian support for the Iran deal", *The Brookings Institution*, July 21, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/07/21/the-china-factor-in-russian-support-for-the-iran-deal/) [accessed April 26, 2017].

[12] Ibid.

third reason is that Russia sees the Shi'a Islamism of Iran as an ally against what it really fears: radical Sunni Islamist groups that have started to operate inside Russia itself (especially in the North Caucasus)[13]. Moreover Moscow and Tehran are also in agreement about the need to support Assad's Shi'a Regime in Syria. The fourth reason is the fact that Russians knew the deal would create a more favorable atmosphere for a possible normalization of Western-Russian relations, which have been steadily deteriorating after the Ukrainian crisis[14]. The fifth reason is the deal was offering Russia an additional argument to call on the United States to stop the NATO missile defense deployments in Central Europe (in Romania and especially in Poland), on the grounds that Iran will no longer pose a nuclear threat to Alliance countries[15]. When we put these considerations together, Russia's Iran policy on the Iran nuclear deal makes sense from Moscow's point of view.

It is necessary to underline that Iran has serious limitations. Iran's energy cooperation with the South Caucasus and its participation in regional transportation corridor projects have been assessed as potentially promising issues. But Iran is not in a position to easily finance large infrastructure projects and is looking for external funding[16]. Moreover, Russia and Iran will have to work together in order to block Western-led infrastructure projects, which they both largely oppose, and to avoid foreign military presence in the region, particularly in Georgia. At the same time the intensification of the Syrian civil war has increased Iran's dependence on Russian support. Considering these facts, for now, Russia and Iran's marriage of convenience remains intact.

- **Israel and the Arab Countries**

The nuclear deal with Iran was an unwanted outcome for Israel, Saudi Arabia and most of the Arab world. From these countries perspective the deal with Iran means two things: Iran will have the ability to improve its economic standing, and the capability to create a nuclear weapon – since the deal will only take effect for a relatively short period of time, 15 years, and will not destroy Iran's technical capabilities to maintain its nuclear program[17]. Both results would strengthen Iran and its allies in the Middle East at the expense of Saudi Arabia and Israel. This situation has led these countries to seek new alternatives following the signing of the nuclear deal. For example Saudi Arabia announced that they would work to develop their own nuclear program[18]. Israel also started to strengthen their strategic ties with Azerbaijan. As a key player in the South Caucasus region, Azerbaijan has strategic

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[13] "Why Did Russia Back the Iran Deal?" , *The American Interest*, Jul 27, 2015, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/07/27/why-did-russia-back-the-iran-deal/, [accessed April 26, 2017].

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[16] Hamed Kazemzadeh, Yana Zabanova, Andrea Weiss, David Jijelava, "Iran and the South Caucasus after the Nuclear Deal", *Caucasus Analytical Digest,* No:92, (2017), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/publications/cad/details.html?id=/n/o/9/2/no_92_iran_and_the_south_caucasus_after_ , [accessed April 20, 2017].

[17] "Why Saudi Arabia and Israel oppose Iran nuclear deal?", *Al Jazeera English*, April 14, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/saudi-arabia-israel-oppose-iran-nuclear-deal-150401061906177.html, [accessed April 27, 2017].

[18] Ibid.

value for Israel due to its geopolitical position and proximity to Iran. Further Azerbaijani–Iranian tensions played an important role in establishing this Azerbaijani–Israeli strategic partnership. These tensions have arisien from "unexpected" Armenia-Iran cooperation continuing since the collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, the theocracy, pragmaticly supported Armenia's war effort, in spite of its ideological rhetoric. Many political fears such as the rivalry between Iran and Turkey and its implications for Azerbaijan and the Azeri minority living in Northern Iran, which could mean instability for the Islamist regime, led to the pro-western/pan-turkist/kemalist Azerbaijan being seen as a threat by Iran. Therefore, from 1991 up until today, Iran has tried to undermine the independence of Azerbaijan through Armenia[19].

Despite this fact, due to the economic and social ties that post-sanctions Iran has with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, an escalation of conflict between the two could pose serious challenges for Iran. Because of this reason, Iran has presented itself as a mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict when fighting renewed in 2016[20]. It is interesting to note that despite its strong ties with Azerbaijan, Israel has kept silent on the conflict with Armenia out of wariness and concerns about raising the issue of occupation[21]. This silence can be explained through the similarity between Israel's position in the West Bank and the Armenian position in Nagorno-Karabakh. In this way the Israeli government has tried to avoid a comparison between these two conflict zones.

- **Turkey**

Turkey, Iran's historical rival in the region[22], reacted positively to the implementation of the nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers. The ending of Iranian sanctions is seen by Ankara as providing major trade opportunities. Although Turkey will be one of the benefactors economically in the post-sanctions era, we can observe an uneasiness of Turkey from the potential competition between Iran and Turkey for foreign capital in the long term. Despite the positive statements of the Turkish authorities regarding the deal, it is hard to say that politically Turkey would be delighted to see Iran emerging as a regional power and an international actor. When we look from the Iranian perspective, one of the most important priorities is to seize the opportunity to take over the European energy market. In line with this goal, exporting energy through Turkey would be more convenient for Iran and this energy cooperation may suit the interests of Turkey too. Turkey, is inviting Iran (Tabriz–Erzurum) and Russia (Blue Stream, Turkish Stream) to contribute to all projects

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[19] Alberto Priego, "Armenia-Iran relations and their implications for Nagorno-Karabakh", *Complutense University of Madrid*, June 19, 2007, https://www.ucm.es/data/cont/media/www/pag-72542/1comentario.pdf, [accessed April 27, 2017].

[20] Hamidreza Azizi, "Will Iran and Russia join forces on Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict?", *Al-Monitor,* April 14, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/iran-azerbaijan-armenia-nagorno-karabach-mediator.html#ixzz4fNJdVbNU, [accessed April 28, 2017].

[21] Ephraim Sneh, "Why Israel is staying silent on Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict?", Al-Monitor, April 15, 2016, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/04/israel-keeps-silent-ally-azerbaijan-conflict-armenia.html#ixzz4fNc5TAOR, [accessed April 28, 2017].

[22] Cengiz Çandar, "How Turkey really feels about the Iran deal?", Al-Monitor, July 20, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/07/turkey-iran-greece-european-union-geopolitical-parenthesis.html#ixzz4fqqnFVUG, [accessed April 28, 2017].

stemming from Turkey being a gas hub for the EU[23]. However, difficult relations between the countries on issues including how to end the Syrian civil war will ultimately make the Armenian route more viable[24]. On the other hand, to protect its influence in Armenia, Russia has been interfering in major infrastructure projects between Armenia and Iran. This situation also makes the alternative complicated for Tehran.

2) Post-Sanctions Era: the Possibilities and the Limits of Iranian Economic Engagement to the South Caucasus Region

Iran is the only bridge between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, this geographical and strategic position is an intermediary between these two energy reservoirs making it a viable choice as a transport route for the energy resources. However, to have the ability to transport energy to international markets, it first needs access to the South Caucasus which functions as a land bridge connecting the West and Iran[25]. In this chapter the issues that Iran assesses as potentially promising will be dealt with in more detail. In this context we will focus on the energy cooperation and regional transportation corridor projects between Iran and the three South Caucasus republics -Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. There is a number of key issues relating to Tehran's policy toward Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. These issues include limited and rather bilateral cooperation on the Caspian oil and natural gas transit; Iran's relationship with Armenia over energy, transportation, and economic cooperation; and Iran's predominantly economic relationship with Georgia[26].

Iran wants to seize the opportunity to take over European energy markets, which are trying to diversify away from Russia, by joining regional export pipeline projects such as the Southern Gas Corridor, TANAP, and the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline[27]. Along with that, Tehran opposes Western-sponsored economic projects such as the Nabucco pipeline[28]. As already mentioned Russia and Iran are direct rivals in the European energy market but Iran has the same approach as Russia of keeping away the U.S. and EU from the South Caucasus.

With the removal of sanctions, Armenia has had the potential to become a transit country for Iranian oil and natural gas destined for ports in Georgia. But emerging relations between Iran and Armenia on energy projects was the last thing Russia wants. In order to prevent this possibility in January 17, 2014, Russia's Gazprom became 100% shareholder

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[23] Hamed Kazemzadeh, Yana Zabanova, Andrea Weiss, David Jijelava, "Iran and the South Caucasus after the Nuclear Deal", *Caucasus Analytical Digest,* No:92, (2017), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/publications/cad/details.html?id=/n/0/9/2/no_92_iran_and_the_south_caucasus_after_ , [accessed April 20, 2017].

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[25] Ibid.

[26] Josef Kraus & Emil Souleimanov,"A Failed Comeback? Understanding Iranian Policies in the South Caucasus", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 18:5, 448–464, (2016), DOI: 10.1080/19448953.2016.1196024.

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[28] "After Sanctions, Iran's Growing Role in the Caucasus", *Stratfor Analysis,* February 1, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/after-sanctions-irans-growing-role-caucasus, [accessed April 29, 2017].

of ArmRusgasprom CJCS[29] – a company which is focused on natural gas supplies to the Armenian market. Thus, Russia has taken over all control of the existing natural gas supply routes to Armenia. It also means that currently Gasprom has control of the Iran–Armenia natural-gas export pipeline. Today, relations are turning around two main issues between Iran and Armenia: transportation and trade. The membership of Armenia in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) makes Armenia an important economic partner for Iran. For land-locked Armenia located between Turkey and Azerbaijan, the Eurasia Economic Union's (EEU) cooperation with Iran has also big importance[30].

In two areas, transportation and trade, we can observe competition between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well. Both Azerbaijan and Armenia have been promoting competing rail routes to provide alternative trade routes between Iran and Europe. The Southern Armenian Railway project, which connects Iran to Georgia's Black Sea ports via Armenia, was more attractive to Iran during the sanctions era but Azerbaijan's rail route proposal has gained momentum since the nuclear deal thanks to the availability of funding and Russia's interest. The establishment of a North-South Corridor between Azerbaijan and Iran was one of the most important topics of the Russia-Azerbaijan-Iran summit, which was held in Baku in August 2016[31]. After completing their portion of a planned freight railway route, on March 5, 2017, Azerbaijan and Iran signed an accord to link their rail systems to connect northern Europe to South Asia[32]. This cooperation on the North-South Transport corridor raises hope that the two countries have finally found a solution for successful neighborly relations. We have also seen that Iran's approach to Azerbaijan on energy transportation started to change in 2015. In May 2015, Iran's Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh expressed his country's eagerness to participate in Azerbaijan's oil and gas projects[33]. Azerbaijan (and Turkey) might prefer to have Iran contribute to the Southern Gas Corridor.

As we mentioned in the first chapter, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran has been trying to undermine the independence of Azerbaijan through Armenia but an escalation of instability in the region could pose serious challenges for Iran's new economic goals. So the realpolitik in the South Caucasus has led Iran to enhance relations with Azerbaijan. Iran also began to take steps towards becoming a mediator between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. For example, on 27 February 2017, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Bahram Ghasemi invited Armenia and Azerbaijan to restore peace and to settle disputes in the Nagorno-Karabakh region through negotiation and dialogue[34].

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[29] "ArmRusgasprom becomes Gazprom Armenia", *Armenpress*, January 17, 2014, https://armenpress.am/eng/news/746561/, [accessed April 29, 2017].

[30] "Armenia stresses boosting Iran-EEU cooperation", *Iran Daily*, April 16,2017, http://iran-daily.com/News/190959.html, [accessed April 29, 2017].

[31] Fariz Ismailzade, "The "North-South" transport corridor finally kicks off", *The CACI Analyst*, September 26, 2016https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13395-the-"north-south"-transport-corridor-finally-kicks-off.html [accessed April 29, 2017].

[32] "Iran and Azerbaijan to join railways as part of freight route", *The Reuters*, Mar 5, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-azerbaijan-railways-idUSKBN16C0MW?il=0, [accessed April 29, 2017].

[33] Sara Rajabova, "Iran eyeing participation in Azerbaijan's energy projects", *AzerNews*, May 7,2015, https://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/81709.html, [accessed April 29, 2017].

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In light of this information it could be said that the Iran Nuclear Deal cold have an important influence on the peacebuilding process in the region.

Georgia is the only South Caucasian state not bordering Iran. Actually, the two states made some efforts to foster cooperation in different spheres including energy, tourism and agriculture after the deal[35]. After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, Georgia become overwhelmingly dependent on Azerbaijan for its gas supply. Iran could be a good alternative as a new energy provider. Despite these possibilities, Iranian–Georgian relations have remained low profile because of Georgia's long-standing EU and NATO aspirations.

Conclusion

After a long diplomatic marathon, the Iran Nucler Deal (JCPOA) was announced by Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the European Union's policy chief Federica Mogherini on 14 July 2015. Thanks to this historic deal (or historic mistake according to some) nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were lifted in 2016. As expected, Iran started to use its new found status and resources to get more involved in South Caucasus relations. This article has sought to investigate how Iran's involvement has affected the region with an emphasis on the post-sanctions era. In this direction, the paper has explained the impact of the deal on the geopolitical alignment of each of the South Caucasus countries between each other and with extra-regional actors (such as Azerbaijan-Turkey-Israel or Armenia-Russia). Also, it has analyzed how the interactions of these extra-regional actors amongst each other have been shaped under the influence of this treaty.

Iran has had a long history of competing with Russia for control of territories and influence in the South Caucasus. There is a possibility that Iranian efforts to strengthen its positions in the region, transforming Russia-Iran relations, have made them more competitive than cooperative. However, this is most likely to happen only in the long term whereas today's emerging economic opportunities could lead to a more stable South Caucasus. Russia and Iran have converging interests to prevent the growing influence of the West (US/EU/NATO), to increase economic cooperation, and to utilize the region's transit capacities in launching new transport corridors. Thus, a reduction in the chances of a regional war is a welcoming development for Iran's neighbors in the South Caucasus. The mediation efforts of Russia and Iran on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be considered in this context.

It is difficult to determine the boundaries of regional interest relations in the South Caucasus. It seems like there are two main interest groups around Moscow-Tehran-Yerevan and Baku-Tel Aviv-Ankara-Tbilisi. However, the bilateral relations between the countries that form these two axes are not simply black and white. The sides of these two axes have reservations against each other, and along with the realpolitik of the region force them to create bilateral economic co-operations such as the Iran-Azerbaijan strategic

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[35] Hamed Kazemzadeh, Yana Zabanova, Andrea Weiss, David Jijelava, "Iran and the South Caucasus after the Nuclear Deal", *Caucasus Analytical Digest,* No:92, (2017), http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/publications/cad/details.html?id=/n/0/9/2/no_92_iran_and_the_south_caucasus_after_ , [accessed April 20, 2017].

collaboration on the construction of the North-South Transport corridor despite Azerbaijan's military ties with Iran's biggest enemy in the region, Israel.

In summary, Iran wants to get stronger in political and economical terms in the South Caucasus by using its geographical and strategic position as an intermediary between these two energy reservoirs (the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf). In this context, the priority issue for Iran is to be included in the energy cooperation and regional transportation corridor projects between Iran and the South Caucasus such as the Southern Gas Corridor, TANAP, the Trans-Caspian Gas pipeline and the North-South Transport Corridor. On the other hand, Iran has real limitations to realize these infrastructure projects, for instance the need of external funding and foreign investors reservations about the permanence of the deal.

It should not be forgotten that besides Europe, Iran has gas market alternatives such as China and India. Within the next few years, Iran's preference for the direction of exports will also determine Iran's long-term relations with its neighbors.

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EU foreign policy towards the Black Sea region – similarities and differences with the EU policies towards mediterranean

Abstract: *The European Union (EU) has been expanded and right now consists of 28 member states. The EU is widely considered as a "tour de force" on the path of the European Integration and as a cornerstone of European stability and prosperity.[2] However, the EU is currently facing a range of political and economic pressures. Those pressures make its ability to deal with a multitude of internal and external challenges harder. In the dawn of the new EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) in order those challenges and many others to be tackled an effective cooperation between EU member states is needed and as it illustrated in the EUGS's document it is more than crucial that the EU ensure that there are good relations with its neighbors. In this article, I am going to analyze the EU Foreign Policy towards the Mediterranean and Black Sea Region after the end of the Cold War. Last but not least I will examine if those policies are considered successful or not and what their differences and similarities are.*

Key words: *EU Foreign Policy, Black Sea Region, Mediterranean Region, Eastern Partnership, Black Sea Synergy, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean, EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy*

Introduction

The starting point of the development of the EU Foreign and Security Policy can be considered the Maastricht Treaty, which established a Common Foreign and Security Policy that constituted the second pillar of the new three-pillared European Union. The aim of the CFSP was to protect the common values, the fundamental interests and the independ-

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[2] Kristin Archik, *"The European Union: Current Challenges and Future Prospects"*, Congressional Research Service, February 27, 2017, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44249.pdf.

ence of the Union, strengthening its security and its member states in all ways, preserving peace, enhancing international security and promoting international cooperation.

Since its very beginning the EU was trying and still tries to develop its Foreign Policy and Security Strategy and to become a global security actor. Milestones of those efforts after the Maastricht treaty are the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997[3] and the Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998[4]. After the Saint-Malo Declaration, the EU became a security and defense actor of importance. Another important development was the European Security Strategy, which was adopted by the European Council in December 2003; it is a global strategy and provides the conceptual framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including what would later become the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in December 2009.

The European Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS) also mentions that the integration of acceding states increases the EU's security but also brings the European Union closer to troubled areas. It is highlighted in the ESS that the EU's task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders if the Mediterranean with whom it can enjoy close and cooperative relations.[5]

In 2016, the EU Global Strategy laid out the strategy for the CSDP, while the Lisbon Treaty clarifies the institutional aspects and strengthens the role of the European Parliament. The CSDP has recently undergone major strategic and operational changes and is continuing to evolve to meet security challenges and popular demand for increased EU responses.[6] The Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 also highlighted the need for cooperation with the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions.[7]

Having a wide picture of the European Union's evolution in shaping its Foreign and Security Policy, it would be easier to understand the initiatives the EU adopted in order to deal with its neighbors. In this article, I am going to focus on the EU's foreign policy towards Mediterranean and Black Sea regions.

The EU's involvement in the Black Sea region during the 1990s was limited to economic cooperation and technical assistance and there was in essence no EU policy towards this region. This occurred because for the Union during this period the Black Sea was "too far and too messy" and too close and very important for Russia and Turkey.

On the other hand, the EU's policies towards its Mediterranean neighbors predate these of its *Ostpolitik* because there were no integrationist dilemmas, and significant examples of this statement are Cyprus, Malta and Turkey. Moreover, the Mediterranean EU

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[3] "Treaty of Amsterdam: Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and Certain related Acts", Amsterdam, October 1997, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf .

[4] "Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France", EU Institute for Security Studies, February 2000, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf .

[5] "A Secure Europe in a Better World", European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 2003, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

[6] "Common Security and Defence Policy", Fact Sheets on the European Union, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_6.1.2.html.

[7] "Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe", A Global Strategy for the European's Union Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf .

member states committed to defining their relations with their southern neighbors. I will provide a short overview of the situation in the Black Sea and Mediterranean regions. In addition, I will present the EU Foreign Policy towards both regions and last but not least based on recent developments I will illustrate the differences and similarities of those regions and whether those policies can be considered successful or not.

Black Sea Region

From a historical perspective the Black Sea region is relatively young[8], and seems to have no geographical or cultural unity. There exist a variety of ecosystems such as plains, steppes, highlands or deserts in the Black Sea and a multiplicity of peoples, cultures and religions. Paradoxically, all those different cultures and territories merged under the same political umbrella by mainland powers.[9] This does not mean that those societies did not remain extremely distinct and difficult to homogenize. With the collapse of this 'political umbrella', the Black Sea countries and societies during the last 25 years have been through a long transition process in order to incorporate a market economy, parliamentary democracy and state building.[10] Notwithstanding the historical similarities, from a historical perspective the region is relatively young, participated in the new regionalism wave in the early 1990s and since then has been shaping a new sub-region on the eastern frontier of Europe.

Before the collapse of Soviet Union, these societies shared no common regional identity, and even if they shared the same 'political umbrella' they remained extremely distinct. Also, there were no transnational actors that could prepare the ground for regional cooperation and coordination. During the 1990s some of the most important political issues in the Black Sea region were protracted conflicts, and democratization. Countries that were for many years under the Soviet umbrella now had to redefine their foreign policy and their position on the international chessboard. Since 1991 these countries were no longer under the umbrella of the Warsaw Pact and sought access within another 'security umbrella'. And with the end of the Cold War new political issues emerged for the newly dependent states such as their political orientation, the "Westernization" of the region, participation in the Council of Europe (CoE), and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to defining their political orientation, these countries had to create their own military forces and to build their security concept. A combination of hard and soft power is important. NATO is responsible for their training and for assistance in managing security threats. Participation in the world economy and in the World Trade Organization (WTO), is beneficial for their involvement in world trade.

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[8] Sabine Fischer, 'European Foreign Policy and the Black Sea Region', European Union Institute for Security Studies, Seminar Reports, Paris, April 16, 2010, available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/The_Black_Sea_Region.pdf.

[9] Constantin Ardeleanu, 'Nations, Nation-States, Trade and Politics in the Black Sea', Euxeinos, 14/2014, available at http://www.gce.unisg.ch/~/media/internet/content/dateien/instituteundcenters/gce/euxeinos/euxeinos%2014_2014.pdf

[10] Panagiota Manoli, 'Black Sea Subregionalism', Ashgate 2012.

Another crucial political issue is state building, the creation of institutions and viable states. Georgia and Ukraine lost parts of their sovereign territories.[11] And territorial losses, civilian casualties, organized crime and high levels of corruption tend to imply a failed state.

A political issue that occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union is the impact of the creation of nation-states in the region. As characteristically told by Constantin Ardeleanu, 'With its pretended internationalist ideology, the Soviet Union tried to close Pandora's Box and keep inside the national evils that could have threatened the stability of the new empire'. With the collapse of the Soviet Union the national genie was released from 'Alladin's lamp' and the national map of the Black Sea was completely reshaped.[12] The creation of nation-states, the ways state institutions work, and the element of national identity caused ethnic conflicts in Georgia, Crimea and Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, the color revolutions after 2000 and the relations of Black Sea countries with Russia are included also in the political challenges of the region as well as bilateral relations with Turkey. Moreover, the Russian Federation and Azerbaijan present characteristics of oil rich countries with authoritarian tendencies. Increased energy wealth is accompanied by the emergence of authoritarian and corrupt political regimes. Another related issue is the politicization of energy relations between Russia and its neighbors including the EU.[13]

EU Foreign Policy towards Black Sea Region

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is no integrated policy towards the Black Sea countries. The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is an answer to the challenges the European Union faces from its eastern neighbors. ENP was created in 2004 to tackle the new challenges after the EU's latest enlargement when the European Union found itself without 'tools', and the aim was to develop an institutional framework towards its eastern neighbors. The ENP's tools include the Black Sea Synergy (BSS) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The Black Sea Synergy reflects mainly the German perception of political cooperation with the eastern neighbors while the Eastern Partnership mainly reflects the Polish perception.

Regarding the BSS, the European Commission did not intend to propose an independent strategy towards the Black Sea, given the fact that there was already a broader policy related to this area, including Turkey's pre-accession strategy, the European Neighborhood Policy and the Strategic Partnership with Russia. Further development and implementation of those policies on a bilateral level will continue to determine the strategic framework. What is required is a complementary initiative to the above policies which would turn attention to the regional level and enhance ongoing cooperation.

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[11] Vasili Rukhadze and Glen Duerr, 'Sovereignty issues in Caucasus: Contested Ethnic and National Identities in Chechnya, Abkhazia and South Ossetia', Nationalities Affairs New Series, 48/2016, available at https://ispan.waw.pl/journals/index.php/sn/article/download/sn.2016.003/1894.

[12] Constantin Ardeleanu, 'Nations, Nation-States, Trade and Politics in the Black Sea', Euxeinos, 14/2014, available at http://www.gce.unisg.ch/~/media/internet/content/dateien/instituteundcenters/gce/euxeinos/euxeinos%2014_2014.pdf.

[13] Manoli, Panagiota, *"Which are the Most Important Political Issues for the Countries in the Black Sea Region?",* Lecture for the course "Politics and Economy in the European South and the Black Sea", University of the Aegean, Rhodes, Greece, April 2014.

The main goal of the Black Sea Synergy was therefore the strengthening of cooperation within the Black Sea region as well as the cooperation between the whole region and the European Union. This initiative is characterized by transparency and seeks a permanent participation. The BSS is based on the common interests of the EU and the Black Sea countries and takes into consideration the results of consultations with all the Black Sea countries. Moreover, it promotes synergies and the development of the experiences of the existing regional initiatives which link the region with the EU. A significant example of such schemes of cooperation is the Danube Cooperation Process (DCP).

The Black Sea Synergy was intended to become a flexible framework that would ensure the wider cohesion and provide political guidance. In order to estimate the feasibility of providing community initiatives, a basic criterion was the active participation of the directly involved countries and regional bodies as well as a level of financing. The BSS focuses on those matters and sectors of cooperation, which reflect common priorities and where the presence and the support of the EU is already important. Those issues included democracy, respect for human rights, good governance, management of population movement, improvement of security, frozen conflicts, energy, transportation, the environment, maritime policies, research and educational networks, science and technology, employment, social affairs, communication between local authorities and the development of the region.

The Black Sea Synergy was never implemented. Just 20 months it was proposed, a Polish-Swedish initiative was presented for enhancing the EU presence in its eastern neighborhood. This policy was to go beyond the European Neighborhood Policy by deepening bilateral cooperation and creating a solid framework for multilateral cooperation. Following this proposal and after the dramatic events of the August 2008 Crisis, the European Council on September 1, 2008, reconfirmed that it wanted to adopt the 'Eastern Partnership' (EaP) starting in March 2009. As a result, the European Commission officially presented on December 8, 2008 the announcement establishing the 'Eastern Partnership'.

The Eastern Partnership managed to attract the attention of the EU in the Black Sea region as a cohesive, clear area of political interest. This succeeded and can be illustrated by the enhancement of the political profile/identity of the area, creating opportunities for a more tolerant approach of the EU in this area as a whole. Also, EaP brought for the first time together all the relevant stakeholders for shaping the future of this region, including politicians, national governments, international and regional organizations and people from the business sector. Another important achievement of the EaP is that it promoted the concept of regional cooperation and not only the cooperation between the EU and this region. EaP also enhanced the idea of problem-solving which required broader responsibilities on the regional level. A main characteristic of EaP was its humble aspirations in sectors of common interest, emphasizing environmental issues and transportation. This moderate approach made this initiative more realistic and created conditions for a 'spillover effect' in other sectors including energy and security. Moreover, the initiative strengthened the Europeanization process in the area by promising specific 'carrots' and specific assessment criteria.

Summing up, it can be said that the Black Sea Synergy had the potential to play a crucial role in the formation of good neighborhood relations and in the improvement of the climate in the region through the implementation of various programs of cross-border cooperation and initiatives.

Comparing the BSS with the EaP, the latter's potential contribution can be illustrated by the fact that it is more flexible than BSS because it includes (5+1) countries and thus it can be customized to the needs of each partner and its needs. They key concept of EaP is differentiation. More specifically, it is a policy based on a differentiated approach with each partner, and it is determined to support each individual country to move forward in its own way and pace. Differentiation provides flexibility and improves the performance as well as providing bilateral and multilateral measures for enhanced cooperation and it goes beyond ENP aiming to put at least some of its partners on the path of EU membership. This is the stronger motivation given to those countries. EaP also has a significant budget, beginning with 450 million euros in 2008, it was increased to 785 million on 2013 which is equal to a complementary fund of 350 million euro.

EaPe stablished stronger communication channels through high-level Summit Meetings, which represent also the beginning of socialization between the partners. In addition, EaP includes a more coherent group of countries that cannot be handled as a team and established Comprehensive Institution Building Programmes focusing on capacity development of partner countries, indentifying weak points and ways to overcome by providing training, technical assistance and equipment when necessary. The Eastern Partnership also pays attention to energy security issues and strengthens cooperation on environmental and climate issues. Another sector the EaP deals with is people-to-people contacts involving civil society and other relevant stakeholders. EaP has five high profile initiatives: a Comprehensive Border Management Program, Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Facilities, Regional Markets of Electric Power, Renewable Sources and Energy Efficiency, the Southern Energy Corridor, Prevention, Readiness and Confrontation of Natural and Man Made Disasters.

The strong point of the Eastern Partnership is its bilateral agreements that focus on the creation of a Neighborhood Economic Community, with provisions related to visa facilitation, the movement of people, capital and services. Also, though the bilateral agreements EaP aims to deepen political exchange and economic integration between the EU and Eastern European Partner Countries. There are also discussions about the Eastern Partnership working as a pre-accession document. Finally, the EaP is politically supported by some countries in the Council of Europe.

The Mediterranean Sea

The situation in the Mediterranean Region is characterized by crises and revolutionary changes that affect the Middle East and North Africa, Southern Europe and transatlantic stakes in these regions. The strategic environment in the Mediterranean is increasingly shaped by forces emanating from outside the region, and more specifically from the Levant and the Eurasian and African hinterlands, from the Black Sea, and from the Atlantic Basin north and south. As a result, these shifts in the strategic environment have progressively globalized Mediterranean security.[14]

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[14] Ian O. Lesser, ''The United States and the Future of Mediterranean Security: Reflections from GMF's Mediterranean Strategy Group'', *Policy Brief Mediterranean Policy Program,* April 2015, The German Marshall Fund of the United States.

It is evident that there are some transregional connections that make 'Mediterranean places and events at once more consequential for international security and less purely Mediterranean in character'. In particular, the circulation of foreign fighters from Europe and elsewhere to the battlefields of the Levant and back is an important challenge for European security. Some countries are affected directly, by foiled or successful attacks, other countries by being transit countries or departing bases for non-national fighters. This phenomenon is not new, although the sheer size and widespread origins have given the phenomenon a totally new dimension. The terrorist attacks and counterterrorism operations in France, Belgium and Denmark highlight the nature of the threat.[15]

The prospect of protracted conflict in Syria and Iraq and the potential of the spread of extremism like that of the so-called Islamic State group (ISIS) to other parts of Mediterranean, already evident in Libya, is likely to shape the Mediterranean security environment for some time to come. The fighting is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. This contest has become less political and more existential for its parties. The need for peace might be universal, although none of the belligerents can imagine surviving under the rule of their foes. State failure and dysfunctional rule could have an isolating effect on a region badly in need of economic and political development. At worst, it could produce spillovers of terrorism and political violence, even the collapse of ostensibly strong regimes such as the current order in Egypt.[16]

The instability and conflict in West Africa and Sahel cause insecurity in the Maghreb and Europe. For instance, after the French intervention in Mali, Tuareg rebels returned to fighting government troops, and islamists continued to pull off isolated attacks against French forces. Concerns are rising due to the fact that the problem seemed to have turned into a regional one, containing the consequences of chaos within that country for Algeria and the Western Mediterranean as a whole.[17]

In addition, the groups operating across the North and West Africa are now at the forefront of Western concerns about transnational, or more properly, 'transregional' risks in an arc stretching from Nigeria to Western Europe. More specifically, these groups including al–Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its various affiliates and offshoots concentrated in north-western Africa, Boko Haram in north-eastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad area, and Al Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya. Also present across the region are groups or factions aligned with the Islamic State (ISIS).[18]

Algeria's tremendous geographic extent and its insufficient border controls make that country a front line state as concerns the West African risks. The memory of Algeria's slide into violence in the 1990s, when the disintegration of the Islamic Salvation Front devel-

[15] Boutin B., Chanzal G., Dorsey J., Jegerings M., Paulussen C., Pohl J., Reed A., Zavagli S., ''The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union: Profiles, Threats & Policies'', International Centre for Counter -Terrorism- The Hague-Research Paper April 2016.

[16] Brian Michael Jenkins, ''How the Current Conflicts Are Shaping the Future of Syria and Iraq'', Policy Issue, available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE163/RAND_PE163.pdf.

[17] Adam Taylor, ''What Mali means to France'', The Washington Post, November 20, 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/11/20/what-mali-means-to-france.

[18] Conway Waddington, "The battle for the Sahel: Confronting Islamist terror groups throughout the region'', January 20, 2016, available at http://www.inonafrica.com/2016/01/20/the-battle-for-the-sahel-confronting-islamist-terror-groups-throughout-the-region.

oped into armed violence to overthrow the regime and establish an Islamic state. A long-standing and bloody war started between government security forces and armed Islamic groups resulting in thousands of deaths. The civil war in Algeria ended in 2005 with a referendum organized by the government and providing amnesty. These incidents cause neighbors, such as Morocco, Tunisia as well as Europe to case a wary eye on Algeria's stability and regional policies. The uncertain future of Algeria is one of the key open questions for Mediterranean security.[19]

Other challenges arise from the Atlantic approaches to the Mediterranean, where new trafficking routes are bringing drugs, arms, and money from Latin America to West Africa and onward through the Maghreb to Europe. Drawn to West Africa's penetrable borders and anaemic state and security institutions, new distribution routes have been created by drug traffickers, resulting in an inflow of cocaine into the region.[20]

Turkey and Morocco offer two very different examples of the wealth gap between north and south in the Mediterranean, which remains dramatic. Concurrent conflicts and turbulence from sub-Saharan Africa to Pakistan are generating waves of economic and political migrants, desperate to reach the relative prosperity of southern Europe.[21]

The range of this mobility is striking. Almost 2 million refugees have fled to or though Turkey since the start of the war in Syria, many more have crossed to Jordan and Lebanon. Over 1 million Christians have fled Iraq, and over a half million from Syria. The annual number of migrants registered as having been arrested and being deported in the EU is around 500,000. However, there are only estimates of the total number of irregular migrants who have reached European maritime borders. The number ranges from 4,000,000 to 8,000,000.[22] Tens of thousands of migrants have crossed the Mediterranean by sea in recent years, 6.000 just to Italy. Over 3.000 have died in the Mediterranean in 2014 alone, the vast majority of the estimated 4,000 migration deaths worldwide in the same period. The Mediterranean region is in the grips of a human security crisis, a crisis affecting the security and welfare of individuals, unprecedented since the end of World War II.

European Foreign Policy towards Mediterranean Region

Political relations between Europeans and the Third Mediterranean Countries (TMCs) are illustrated by bilateral political relations. The perception that Mediterranean Region is a confrontation space of the two super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, with no space for intervention from another actor belongs to the past.[23]

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[19] Paraskevi Kefala, lecture notes for the course ''International Relations in North Africa'', Rhodes 2011

[20] ''West Africa drug trade, new transit hub for cocaine trafficking fuels corruption'', United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/en/events/tenstories/08/westafrica.shtml.

[21] Ian O. Lesser, ''The United States and the Future of Mediterranean Security: Reflections from GMF's Mediterranean Strategy Group'', *Policy Brief Mediterranean Policy Program,* April 2015, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

[22] Clandestino Project, Final Report, November 23, 2009, available at http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_147171_en.pdf.

[23] Ioannis Seimenis and Konstantinos Seitis, 'Policies and Strategies of the European Union in the Mediterranean', at 'The Mediterranean at the Beginning of the 21st Century', Ziti Publications, Thessaloniki 2011

Going back to the very beginning of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the Mediterranean dimension of the European Community with two of its six member states being Mediterranean countries with historical ties and long-lasting problems with the rest of the countries in the Mediterranean space, forced the Community initially to focus on Southern Europe and more specifically on developing relations with countries located on the northern Mediterranean coasts: Greece, Spain, Portugal and secondly Cyprus, Malta and Turkey.

In 1990 the enlarged European Union tried to improve its relations with the TMCs especially because of the collapse of the USSR and the end of bipolarity. Those developments were the starting point of new balances in the international realm and also the crises in the Arab-Persian Gulf, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as long-lasting TMC security matters which now became threats and challenges for Europe. A resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism and the Arab peoples' shift to faith because of their disappointment towards the political systems of their countries and their weakness to resolve their problems increased the EU's problems.

The 1990 New Mediterranean Policy proposed increased funding towards eight TMCs (Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia) in order to promote economic reform and the highlight of this period is the Italian-Spanish proposal during the Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE) in Europe which took place in Mallorca on September 1990, for a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). In this framework and due to the European weakness in the implementation of an integrated Mediterranean policy, the "Western Mediterranean Forum" was created, commonly referred to as the 5+5 Dialogue[24], including 5 Euro-Mediterranean Countries and 5 countries from the newly born Arab Maghreb Union. The aim of this Forum is stability and development in the Mediterranean. After the creation of the Western Mediterranean Forum came the creation in 1994 of the Mediterranean Forum in Egypt; ten Mediterranean countries participated, attracting the attention of the EU countries for the Mediterranean and in the European Council in Essen in 1994. The Mediterranean represents a priority area of strategic importance for the European Union.[25]

A year later in 1995, 15 EU countries and their partners from the Southern Mediterranean countries started an ambitious program based on exchanges in political and cultural issues, encouraging development of trade. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) is based on 3 independent pillars: political, economic and social, meaning cultural and human. What I would like to point out is that cooperation based on those three pillars through the EMP was a new holistic approach to development going beyond the traditional approach of trade and aid.[26]

Cooperation in sectors such as the regional programs of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (energy, telecommunications and transportation etc.) can be achieved with funding through the MEDA (Mesures d'accompagnement financiers et techniques) program. MEDA works as the funding instrument of the EU-Mediterranean Partnership, under the

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[24] Economic Forum Western Mediterranean, available at http://westmediterraneanforum.org/about-the-55-dialogue.

[25] European Council, Meeting on 9 and 10 December 1994 in Essen, Presidency Conclusions, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/ess1_en.htm.

[26] Brigid Gavin, "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: An Experiment in the North-South-South Integration",

supervision of the European Investment Bank and as a continuation of aid towards TMCs which was in force before the establishment of the EMP.

Europe continued to consider the Mediterranean region of great importance and be-cause of this and the importance of the ties that were created with its countries, the range of the cultural and historical relations and the importance of the common challenges, the European Parliament in March 2008 approved the beginning of the Union of the Mediter-ranean. The Union of the Mediterranean was an attempt to reconsider EU policies towards Mediterranean, analyzing results and the contribution of the EMP in peace and stability in the region. The European Parliament invited the European Commission to present propos-als defining the parameters of the "Barcelona Process: Union of the Mediterranean".

The new program strengthens directly the EMP in at least three different ways: Firstly, through the improvement of political relations of the EU and partner-countries by the or-ganization of meetings of foreign ministers between Summit Meetings to examine the progress of the implementation of conclusions of the last Summit Meeting as well as preparations for the next Summit Meeting. Secondly, the establishment of the concept of co-ownership, which means the governance of the Union of the Mediterranean, based on equitable functioning and shared responsibility. The co-presidency ensures that countries from the North and South shores are on an equal footing, and can react promptly in crises which emerge in the region and which need consultation with the Euro-Mediterranean partners, all through a Joint Permanent Committee.

The "Barcelona Process: Union of the Mediterranean" as a multilevel platform of co-operation aims at increasing the possibility of regional integration and cohesion. Moreover, UfM works complementarily of the active bilateral relations of the EU with the Mediterra-nean countries. Those relations are still active under the auspices of the EU through various programs like the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) region. Also, UfM is complementary of the regional dimension of the enlargement policy of the EU. Finally this policy is linked and complements the Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

Regarding the funding of this program, EU member states have contributed effective-ly in the funding of the Mediterranean region though bilateral agreements. Although, the program includes financial planning and fund-raising, the funding sources are the private sector, bilateral cooperation with the EU member states, contributions from the Mediterra-nean partners, international financial institutions, regional banks and other bilateral sourc-es. Another source is the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility-FEMIP and investments through the ENP program and its funding instrument ENPI (European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument). Also, the MEDA program is a complementary funding and technical measure. MEDA is replacing various bilateral funding protocols that exist in the countries of the Mediterranean basin and is inspired by the PHARE and TACIS programs in aspects related to transparency and information.

Similarities

What similarities are shared by the Black Sea Synergy (BSS), the Eastern Partnership (EaP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), all created by the European Union and aiming to meet the demands of certain Member States with special interests and stakes

in the Eastern and Southern neighborhood?[27] As mentioned above, the Black Sea Synergy reflects mainly German perceptions of political cooperation with the eastern neighbors while the Eastern Partnership mainly reflects the Polish perception. Thus, while Germany has appeared to be more interested in Central and Eastern Europe, Spain, Italy, Greece and France have been instrumental in introducing Mediterranean-related issues into the EU agenda. This is illustrated by the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, the initial idea of the UfM having been launched by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.

Apart from EU member states aspirations towards their neighborhood, those regions share some common issues that are crucial for the EU agenda, such as energy, migration, the environment and maritime transport. For example, European dependency on Middle Eastern oil and Russian natural gas require the safe and uninterrupted supply of new sources through Black Sea and Mediterranean routes. Related to migration, in the Mediterranean basin illegal migration is reaching alarming levels and that is a threat to EU social stability. Recently, the Black Sea emerged as a new dangerous route for refugees trying to reach Europe, although due to the low percentage of incidents FRONTEX announced that it is too early to discuss a change in this trend.[28]

Also, a very important issue is the turbulence in both regions, with protracted conflicts taking place with direct impact on European security and stability. More specifically, in the Mediterranean Basin there are two major conflicts taking place right now, the battle against the Organization of the Islamic State (ISIL), in Syria, Iraq and Libya. In addition, the protracted Syrian civil war has led to one of the major political, humanitarian and moral crises in modern times with major spillover effects in Europe.[29] In the Black Sea region, the ethnic conflicts in Georgia, Crimea and Nagorno-Karabakh are still ongoing.

Conclusion-Current Developments

The Black Sea Synergy (BSS), Union of the Mediterranean (UfM) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) represent an important step forward of the EU foreign policy making marking the beginning of a new era. On the other hand, those policies reveal the different foreign policy priorities and interests of some of the EU member states. A significant example of this is the fact that BSS and EaP launched almost simultaneously, raising questions related to the coherency of EU policies towards the Black Sea region.

Weak civil society, heterogenic, weak and problematic states, lack of political support, funding and conflicting interests explains the reasons of the failure of the efficiency of the European Policy towards its Eastern and Southern Neighbors.

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[27] Triantaphyllou, Dimitrios, "Linking the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea", IEMed 2010, available at http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2010/aarticles/Triantaphyllou_Eastern_en.pdf.

[28] Gillet, Kit, "Smugglers make test runs with migrants across deadly Black Sea route", The Guardian, September 12, 2017, available at https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/sep/12/smugglers-make-test-runs-with-migrants-across-even-more-deadly-black-sea-route-romania.

[29] Pierini, Marc, "The EU and the Mediterranean Area: Dealing with Conflicts, Tensions and Resets", IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2017, July 19, 2017, available at http://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/07/19/eu-and-mediterranean-area-dealing-with-conflicts-tensions-and-resets-pub-71592.

Recently, a Fact Sheet provided a more results-oriented approach towards the Eastern Partnership has been applied with a continued focus on strengthening state and societal resilience. A new strategic work-plan combining both bilateral and regional cooperation aims to guide the work of the EU and the six Eastern Partnership countries between Summits, by focusing on twenty deliverables by 2020. Each deliverable is linked to implementation tools, with clear milestones to be reached by the time of the next Eastern Partnership Summit in November 2017, and targets to be achieved by 2020. In parallel, work has continued in the framework of the Black Sea Synergy.

Regarding its Southern partners, in the same Fact Sheet mentioned that a roadmap with concrete proposals to revise existing priorities of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and increasing synergies was endorsed by the UfM Ministers of Foreign Affairs on 23 January 2017 in Barcelona. Moreover, in December 2016, the EU and the League of Arab States confirmed at ministerial level a Joint Work Programme, which puts an emphasis on activities related to crisis management, civil society, human rights, diplomacy, electoral observation and increased participation of women in economic development. Last but not least, the EU's cooperation with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation has gained new impetus with the successful co-organisation of a High Level Event on Anti-Muslim Discrimination and Hatred in New York in January 2016.[30]

These announcements show that those initiatives did not stay on the shelves of the EU archives. But what is more than necessary is the European Union to move forward to its periphery having a harmonised and balanced approach and willingness to address those regions' concerns. It is not only important that the EU have a cohesive voice but also that the Eastern and Southern partners show a willingness to make reforms, to create a more active civil society and to establish a fertile ground for cooperation and discussion for topics which are crucial for both sides.

The results of the Black Sea Synergy (BSS), Eastern Partnership (EaP) and Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) do not exude optimism. But optimism is exuded by the fact that the European Union is better equipped compared to the past, and is seen as being more decisive in promoting stronger cooperation with its Eastern and Southern neighbours, especially after the implementation of the EU Global Strategy. This promising document shows that many developments are going to come in the near future. And that is a reason for optimism.

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[30] "Questions and Answers on the Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Review", European Commission-Fact Sheet, Brussels, May 18, 2017, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1381_en.htm.

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Turkey and East Central Europe: idealism, pragmatism, misperception or clash of interests?

Abstract: *Turkey is focused on Russia in its policy vis-à-vis the Black Sea region, Caucasus, Ukraine, Balkan countries as well as, at least to some extent, Central European countries, including Poland. This priority has its impact on Ankara's relationship with Eastern and Central European countries, which remain in the shadow of Turkish policy towards Russia. However that negative impact is not powerful enough to spoil Turkey's cooperation with Eastern and Central European countries. It certainly limits the scope of such partnerships or alliances. Turkey continues to cooperate with the region's countries, but often rejects their Euro-Atlanticism. In Turkish perception the EU's enlargement in Central Europe was unjust (as Turkey has been applying much longer for the EU's membership without any significant progress, whereas post-communist countries were accepted relatively quickly). NATO enlargement in the East in Turkey's view was always a 'risky adventure'. At the same time, from Ankara's point of view the Middle East is strategically more important than Turkish northern neighbourhood. Moreover, Turkey wants to be an equal interlocutor in dialogue with Russia, the U.S. and the EU, whereas it often conceives post-communist and post-Soviet countries merely as a zone of influence for the Kremlin and Washington or their battleground in Cold War 2.0.*

Key words: *East-Central Europe, Turkey, Poland, Visegrad region, Black Sea region, Middle East, United States, NATO, Russia, Cold War, threat assessment, stereotype, Eurasianism, Euro-Atlanticism,*

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Turkey is Russia-centric in its East European policies. This approach is a legacy of the Cold War, when the Communist bloc countries were regarded not as sovereign states, but merely the Soviet Union's "satellites". Even when they regained full independence after 1989, from Turkey's point of view, they constituted rather a kind of Russia's backyard and were generally little known to the Turkish public. Obviously the newly independent states established after the collapse of the Soviet Union were to an even greater extent than the post-communist states perceived in Turkey in the sphere of influence and special interests of Russia. These clichés were shared by Turks and with many in Western societies, as Turkey remained on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

In the 1990s, however, Turkey gradually increased its political and economic cooperation with post-Soviet and post-communist countries. Above all the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans were of special interest for Turkey since Turgut Özal's presidency.[2] In the case of the South Caucasus region, the reasons for cooperation were strong ethnic, historical and political ties with Azerbaijan as well as profitable energy cooperation after the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline in 2005.[3] Central Asia, dominated by Turkic nations, was also important from Ankara's point of view. The Central Asian republics were perceived as being able to follow the Turkish state model combining democracy, secularism and the free market with a Muslim background.[4] Another post-communist (but not post-Soviet) region in Turkey's zone of interest was the Balkans, and especially those countries with Muslim and/or Turkish minorities. In comparison to the above-mentioned regions, East Central Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova) was of rather marginal importance to post-Cold War Turkey's foreign policies.

Before answering the question of the nature of Turkish–East Central European relations, it is necessary to explain the geographical terminology used in this article. Especially the term "East Central Europe" as it may seem controversial to some political scientists as in recent years Central Europe and Eastern Europe are most often treated as two distinct regions. This approach has some merit as it indicates the political division of Europe after several waves of NATO and EU enlargement. Countries which became members of these organizations were labeled part of "Central Europe", whereas non-members – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – part of "Eastern Europe". However, from a purely geographical point of view this approach is obviously controversial as Romania and Bulgaria (in NATO since 2004 and in the EU since 2007) are rather part of South Eastern Europe, whereas the Baltic states (in NATO and EU since 2004) are located in the North of the continent. In the case of Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia their common historical background related to Eastern Orthodox Christianity may serve as an argument for categorization of these countries as "East European". However, Romania and Bulgaria, qualified as "Central European", also have an Orthodox Christian heritage. Moreover, the

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[2] Gülistan Gürbey, "Özal'ın Dış Politikası Anlayışı," in: *Özal'lı Yıllar. Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, eds. Ihsan Sezal, Ihsan Dağı (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 230–231.

[3] Konrad Zasztowt, "Stosunki Republiki Turcji z państwami Kaukazu Południowego," in: *Region Kaukazu w stosunkach międzynarodowych*, eds. Krzysztof Iwańczuk, Tomasz Kapuśniak, (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2008), 343–345, Konrad Zasztowt, "The Turkey-South Caucasus Relationship and Its Importance to the EU," in: *Turkey and Europe. Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Adam Szymański (Warsaw: Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2012).

[4] Bülent Aras, *The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 7.

lands of present Belarus and Ukraine since the Middle Ages have had a strong relationship with Roman Catholicism.[5] If indeed the political division between NATO and EU members and non-members should be regarded as a crucial distinction between Central and East Europe, then the European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia do not fit into this scheme.

From the point of view of the current analysis it is useful to underline common features of Turkey's approach to the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia), the Visegrad countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland), Romania, Bulgaria, and three of the EU's Eastern Partnership countries (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova)[6]. For that reason I will use the term "East Central Europe" to encompass all these countries. It is worth underlining that this concept is not new and has quite a long tradition of usage, especially in the historiography of the region.[7] As I will argue, the East Central European region does not play a significant role in Turkey's foreign policies and is still little known to the elites in Ankara. The latter often perceive the region through the geopolitical scheme of Russia and the United States and their struggle for spheres of influences in Europe. The same is partially true regarding the meaning of Turkey for the East Central European countries' elites. Turkish political realities are little known to them. Moreover, the Russian aspect of Turkey's foreign policy is probably its most important one from their point of view.[8]

Turkey's Forgotten Neighbors in East Central Europe vs. the Turkish "Soviet Myth"

Turkey has a long record of diplomatic relations with the countries of East Central Europe. Perhaps, the best example may be Polish/Lithuanian – Turkish relations, which began in 1414, when King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania Władysław Jagiełło sent his envoys to Ottoman sultan Mehmed Çelebi.[9] 2014 was a year of celebration for the 600 years anniversary organized by foreign ministries and other institutions in both countries, which included several conferences and cultural events.[10]

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[5] This relationship culminated with the Union of Brest in 1596, when the Ruthenian Orthodox Church in the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth decided to accept the authority of the Pope of Rome.

[6] I deliberately exclude here the South Caucasus members of the Eastern Partnership – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. These countries are Turkey's direct neighbors, which are not that unknown to the Turkish public and irrelevant for Turkish foreign policy. Nevertheless, in many aspects their situation is similar to East Central European countries. Similarly to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova they are regarded by Russia as so called "near abroad", an area of special Russian interests.

[7] See also: Jerzy Kłoczowski, *Młodsza Europa. Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w kręgu cywilizacji chrześcijańskiej średniowiecza*, (Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1998). Witold Sukiennicki, *East Central Europe during World War I: from foreign domination to national independence*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

[8] See e.g. article by Polish political scientists, advisor to Polish President Andrzej Duda and Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski, Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, "W czworokącie Turcja–Polska–UE–USA," *Gazeta Polska*, nr 38, 20. 09. 2017, https://www.gazetapolska.pl/14374-w-czworokacie-turcja-polska-ue-usa.

[9] *Orzeł i półksiężyc. 600 lat polskiej publicystyki poświęconej Turcji*, ed. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (Warszawa: Biblioteka Jedności Europejskiej, 2014), 9.

[10] For a résumé of cultural events commemorating the 600 years anniversary of Polish – Turkish relations c.f. *600 years of Polish –Turkish diplomatic relations. Final Report*, ed. Paulina Dominik (Warsaw: Adam Mickiewicz Institute, 2014).

After the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 19th century, Ottoman Turkey played an extraordinarily important role in the Polish émigré circles' political plans of dismantling the Russian Empire and restoring the Polish state. In the concept of Polish émigré leader prince Adam Czartoryski, the Poles had to unite all the enslaved peoples of the Russian Empire from Finland to the Caucasus. Czartoryski founded the Polish village of Adampol in the vicinity of Istanbul. There he settled political refugees from Poland and tried to form military units to fight together with the Ottoman army against Russia. From the Ottoman capital he sent numerous envoys to the lands of the Russian Empire in order to build a network of resistance against the tsars.[11]

Despite the long history of Polish–Turkish relations, knowledge about Poland in Turkey and about Turkey in Poland was very narrow in the communist period and is still rather limited.[12] Some other countries of East Central Europe are probably even lesser known in Turkey. This should be explained primarily not by geographical distance or cultural differences, but by the legacy of the Cold War, when Turkey was divided from communist bloc countries by the Iron Curtain.

Contrary to East Central European countries Turkish society does not have a negative experience with the communist system. This fact significantly shapes the Turkish elite's attitude toward Russia (understood as a former Mecca of the communists and successor of the Soviet Union). Many contemporary leftwing, but also some right wing conservative intellectuals (mostly with a Kemalist secular background), share a positive view of the heritage of the Soviet Union and its relations with the Republic of Turkey. To understand this it is important to examine its historical background. The Russian Bolsheviks played a significant role in the Turkish Independence War (*Türk Kurtuluş Savaşı*), when they helped Mustafa Kemal's government with financial aid and supplies of arms in 1921.[13] Although later the communist movement in Turkey was suppressed by the government and, after World War II, Turkey – threatened by the USSR – became a member of NATO, sympathies for Soviet and post-Soviet Russia remained in the intellectual milieus.

A good example illustrating the positive Turkish stereotype or myth of the Soviet Union may be the history and legacy of the most famous 20th century Turkish poet, Nazim Hikmet Ran. He was a diehard Communist in the period of Joseph Stalin's rule and a political emigrant, who after fleeing his homeland, spent the last years of his life in communist Poland and the Soviet Union. Nazim Hikmet remains a cultural icon in Turkey, not only for radical left-wing sympathizers, but also for the majority of well-educated Turks. Of course, it is necessary to underline that his fame is based on his outstanding literary skills. His political attitude is widely understood in Turkey not as sympathetic to the totalitarian Soviet regime, but rather for resistance to the repressive and authoritarian policies of the govern-

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[11] Jacek Borkowicz, "W poszukiwaniu gwarancji. Prometejski nurt polskiej myśli wschodniej," in: *Okręt Koszykowa*, ed. Jacek Borkowicz et al., (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2007), 49–50.

[12] For Polish stereotypes about Turkey during the Cold War period see e.g. a commentary to Polish writer Jerzy Putrament's relation from his journey to Istanbul in 1950's: "Doba w Stambule," in: *Orzeł i półksiężyc. 600 lat polskiej publicystyki poświęconej Turcji*, ed. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk (Warszawa: Biblioteka Jedności Europejskiej, 2014),, 349.

[13] Erich J. Zürcher, *Turcja. Od sułtanatu do współczesności* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2013), 153.

ment in Ankara.[14] Nevertheless, the figure of Nazim Hikmet reinforces sympathy for the Soviet legacy in Turkish society.

Turkey, the Soviets, and the U.S. during the Cold War

Of course, not only intellectuals, but also the political elite in Turkey at times sought a closer relationship with the USSR, especially during the period of tensions in Turkish-American relations in 1970s. However, in the conditions of the Cold War these attempts could have had only limited success, if any.

Long before the Cold War started, at the beginning of the Second World War in September 1939, the government in Ankara attempted to improve its relationship with Moscow by sending an official delegation headed by Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu to the Kremlin. The Turkish diplomats were, however, discouraged by the Soviet expansionist policies. On 17 September 1939 the Soviet army invaded Poland and the Turkish delegation met with Moscow's demands to change the Montreux Convention of 1936, which gave Turkey control over the Turkish Straits.[15]

The threat of the Soviet Union for Turkey became even more evident in June 1945. The Soviet government pushed not only for revision of the Montreux Convention, but also demanded the establishment of Soviet military bases in the Straits area and transfer of the Turkish territories of Kars, Ardahan and Artvin to the Soviet Caucasian republics of Georgia and Armenia. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov explained that according to the Turkish–Soviet Treaty of Kars (1921), the division of the lands of the Caucasus was "unjust" similarly as the Treaty of Riga between Bolshevik Russia and Poland signed in 1921. Molotov argued that it was time for new "just" treaties. In the case of Poland, the new, and after the war "just", treaty with the Soviets meant not only Soviet annexation of Poland's Eastern territories, but also the loss of sovereignty and Soviet hegemony. Obviously the Soviet demand was unacceptable for Turkey,[16] and pushed the Kemalist government in Ankara, which had managed to stay neutral through the whole period of the Second World War[17], to a final rapprochement with the United States and Turkey's accession into NATO in 1952.

Of course, Turkey's relations with the United States and other NATO allies had also its ups and downs. These usually affected the relations with the Soviet Union. One of the worst moments in the history of the U.S.-Turkey relationship was the Turkish invasion of Cyprus after a Greek coup d'état on the island in 1974. The U.S. reaction to the Turkish occupation of the Northern part of Cyprus was to apply an arms embargo on Turkey. The growing crisis in Turkish-American relations relating to Cyprus led to a warming in the Turkish-Soviet relationship. For instance, in 1973 Turkey allowed Soviet planes, with aid for the Arab countries fighting with Israel, to use the Turkish air base in Incirlik. At the same

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[14] More on Nazim Hikmet and his years spent in communist Poland and the Soviet Union see: Witold Szabłowski, *Zabójca z miasta moreli. Reportaże z Turcji* (Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne, 2010).

[15] Ali Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası. İlkeler, Aktörler ve Uygulamalar*, (Istanbul: Alfa, 2017), 87.

[16] Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Turcja*, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2000), 168–169.

[17] Turkey declared war to Nazi Germany only on 23 February of 1945, which was purely symbolic gesture in order to obtain better international position in the post-war situation.

time the Americans were not allowed to use the base.[18] The Cyprus factor continued to cast a shadow on Turkish-American relations until the 1980s. Then, a new government formed after a Turkish army-led coup d'état on 17 October 1980 decided to quickly repair its relationship with Washington. Shortly after the coup the head of the Turkish National Security Council, General Kenan Evren, met with NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Bernard Rogers. As an act of reconciliation with the allies in NATO, Turkey agreed to Greece's return to NATO's military command structure.[19]

To sum up, at the end of the Cold War, Turkey became even more integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. The pinnacle of good relations with the West was Özal's presidency. The U.S. appreciated his decision to support anti-Iraq forces in the Gulf War in 1991 by granting access for the American led coalition to the Incirlik airbase.[20] On the other hand, the years of tensions with NATO allies regarding the Cyprus issue, the U.S. support for an undemocratic military coup in 1980, leftist and Islamist criticism of Washington Middle East policies made many in Turkish society suspicious about American political goals or even openly anti-American.

Post-Cold War Turkey and East Central Europe: Allies or Competitors?

The USSR ceased to exist in December 1991, and Turkey started its attempts to open up to the post-Soviet and post-communist countries. This process, as mentioned before, was sometimes described as the "export" of the "Turkish model" combining an Islamic background with democracy and a free market to the newly independent countries transforming from the communist system.[21]

In 1987 the government in Ankara applied for full membership to the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union. However, Turkey became accepted as an official candidate for full EU membership only at the Helsinki summit of the European Council in 1999. Finally, the EU accession negotiations with Turkey started in 2005. At that time the political elite, as well as public opinion, in Turkey was becoming increasingly skeptical about the real chances to achieve EU membership due to the German and French veto to Turkey's accession.[22] The Turkish perception of the EU as a "Christian club" became reinforced with the relatively quick accession process of the predominantly Christian countries of East Central Europe and Cyprus in 2004.

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[18] Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, 176.

[19] Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, 189.

[20] Kołodziejczyk, *Turcja*, 249–250, Ramazan Gözen, "Turgut Özal ve Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı Örneğinde İdealler ve Gerçekler," in: *Özal'lı Yıllar. Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, eds. Ihsan Sezal, Ihsan Dağı (İstanbul: Beta, 2016), 255–265.

[21] Finally, despite high expectations, not only in Turkey, but generally in the West, the "Turkish model" was not implemented in any of the Caucasus or Central Asian post-Soviet states. The latter neither accepted the Iranian, "theocratic" or Islamic model, which many in the West feared might replace the Soviet system in the newly independent republics. See: Igor Torbakov, "Ankara's Post-Soviet Efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia: The Failure of "Turkic World" Model," 25.12.2002, www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/ eav122602.shtml.

[22] Lucia Najšlová, Adam Balcer, Rebecca Muray, Zsuzsanna Végh, "Should We Upgrade the V4-Turkey Dialogue," *EU Frontieres. Policy Paper*, no. 13 (June 2016): 7.

Another moment when East Central Europe entered Ankara's sphere of interests was the NATO enlargement process in the 2000s. Although Turkey did not oppose the 1999 and 2004 waves of the Alliance's enlargement, it became increasingly critical about the rising influence of the U.S. in the Black Sea basin. In 2006 Turkey was against the expansion of the NATO's "Active Endeavor" maritime operation from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea. The government in Ankara argued that Turkey's "Black Sea Harmony" operation was sufficient. The real motive behind Turkish disapproval of the "Active Endeavor's" extension to the Black Sea was Ankara's angst that the U.S. presence would irritate Russia.[23]

Even if Turkey was involved in assistance for the modernization of Georgia's army since the 1990s, it was reluctant to openly support Tbilisi's and Kyiv's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. When Russia protested against Georgia's and Ukraine's integration with NATO at the Alliance's summit in Bucharest in April 2008, Turkey found itself closer to Western European members (such as France and Germany), who "understood Russian concerns". Moreover, the "colorful" revolutions, the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and 2004 Orange Revolution were observed with suspicion in Turkey and often interpreted as a plot financed by American business magnate George Soros or the CIA.[24]

The End of Post-Cold War Peace: Turkey and East Central Europe Facing New Realties

The August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia turned out to be a challenging test for Turkey as well as the East Central European countries. The latter were not united in their attitude towards the conflict. The Visegrad countries – excluding Poland – were rather silent or sympathetic to the Russian position.[25] Poland and the Baltic states were the only European NATO members that decided to openly support Georgia. Turkey, however, launched a new peace initiative for the Caucasus, its so-called "Caucasian Platform of Stability and Cooperation", and tried to maneuver between the sides of the conflict without explanation of its own position.[26]

The main reason behind the weak Turkish reaction to Russia's aggression was Ankara's intent not to harm economic relations with Russia. Throughout the 2000s the Russian Federation remained one of Turkey's main economic partners. After construction of the Blue Stream pipeline linking the Russian and Turkish Black Sea coasts in 2005 as much as 60-70% of gas supplies were imported from Russia.[27] The Turkish economy profited from food

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[23] Rafał Sadowski, "The cold alliance. Turkish-US political relations after 2003," in: *Turkey after the start of negotiations with the European Union – foreign relations and the domestic situation. Part I*, ed. Adam Balcer, (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2007), 65.

[24] See e.g.: Sinan Oğan, *Turuncu Devrimler* (İstanbul: Birharf Yayınları, 2006), Fiona Hill, Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded?," 1 March 2006, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/turkey-and-russia-axis-of-the-excluded.

[25] Dariusz Kałan, Konrad Zasztowt, "Business and Democracy: V4 Policy on South Caucasus," *PISM Bulletin*, no. 136 (589), 13.12.2013, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=15892.

[26] Zasztowt, "The Turkey-South Caucasus Relationship," 189.

[27] Dimitar Bechev, *Rival Power: Russia's Influence in Southeast Europe*, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2017), 165.

exports to the Russian market, Turkish construction companies operating in Russia and Russian tourists coming to Turkish resorts.[28]

Turkey, however, was concerned by the Russian invasion of Georgia. Especially due to this it put at risk common energy projects with Azerbaijan, as all the strategically important oil and gas pipelines from this country crossed Georgian territory. Thus, despite the fact that there are numerous Abkhazian diasporas in Turkey, did not recognize Georgia's two separatist republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia after their recognition by Russia in August 2008.[29]

Another, serious security challenge posed by Russia to both Turkey and the East Central Europe region was Russian occupation of Ukraine's Crimea and instigation of the separatist rebellion in the Donbass in 2014. In Poland and the Baltic states Russian aggression against Ukraine was perceived as crossing the line. The conflict triggered serious debates in these countries about the further expansionist goals of the Kremlin. The Baltic states with relatively big Russian populations, Latvia and Estonia, started to prepare themselves for a possible hybrid war scenario including Moscow-instigated unrest by ethnic minorities.

When Ukraine's territorial integrity was breached by Russia, Turkey too could not stay completely passive. Similarly as in the case of the 2008 August War in Georgia, Ankara had to react, but did not want to push Russia too far. Thus Turkey restrained itself from joining the U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia after its annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. On the other hand, Ankara did not recognize the March 2014 referendum in Crimea organized by Russia in order to "legalize" the annexation. Turkey also became concerned due to the deteriorating situation of Crimean Tatars, the autochthonous Turkic population of Crimea.[30]

In 2015 two important international developments forced Turkey and East Central Europe to express their positions clearly. The first one was the height of the refugee crisis in summer 2015, and the second one was the beginning of Russian military intervention in Syria. In fact these two developments were interrelated: the refugee crisis was a result of the Syrian civil war and Russian military support for the Damascus regime led to a growth in the number of Syrians escaping from the conflict. Turkey became the country with the biggest number of Syrian refugees (according to UNHCR data: 3,285,000).[31]

In 2015, for many of those refugees, Turkey was only a transit country and their final destination were rich European countries, members of the EU. To stop the uncontrolled wave of refugees traveling through Greece and the Balkans to Central Europe, the EU (in fact mostly due to the initiative of German Chancellor Angela Merkel) decided to cooperate with Turkey. The March 2016 agreement between the EU and Turkey envisaged tighter control of the Aegean Sea border by the Turkish Coast Guard in order to stop the smuggling of people, a relocation mechanism of those migrants who had already come to Greece from Turkey, and EU financial aid for the Syrian refugees in Turkey. In the framework of the deal the EU promised Turkey a speed up of accession negotiations and to

[28] Bechev, *Rival Power*, 165.
[29] Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, 304–305.
[30] Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, 358.
[31] This is the number of registered refugees according to UNHCR data as of 2 November 2017: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224.

grant Turkish nationals visa-free access to the Schengen zone. The EU also agreed to re-settle up to 72,000 Syrian refugees directly from Turkey to the Union's member countries.

The latter element of the EU-Turkey agreement was criticized in the Visegrad countries, especially by the conservative governments in Hungary and Poland. They argued that an influx of Muslim immigrants to the EU countries could lead to a rise in terrorist attacks. The target of the criticism was, however, not Turkey, but rather the European Commission and German Chancellor Merkel.[32]

The anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic voices of some of the prominent politicians in Visegrad countries were equally strong and frequent as in the case of the West European political elites. Interestingly, however, despite this rhetoric, the same Visegrad politicians refrained from criticism of current policies of the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party government in Turkey. Moreover, some of the Visegrad leaders even tended to positively assess Turkish Prime Minister, and later President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his tough approach to the EU and Turkish anti-government protesters during the Gezi Park protests in summer 2013.[33]

There were other issues causing some tensions in Visegrad countries relations with Turkey. In the early 2000s Turkish diplomacy protested after the Polish and Slovakian parliaments passed the Armenian genocide resolutions.[34] In April 2016 the Syrian Kurds' military organization the People's Protection Units (YPG) officially opened an office in Prague. This caused a brief period of distrust between Turkey and the Czech Republic. From Ankara's point of view the YPG is a sister organization of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), recognized by both Turkey and the EU as a terrorist group. Regardless, the office was closed after seven months.[35] Before the closure of the YPG office in Prague, the Czech Foreign Ministry explained that it did not "recognize so called 'Syrian Kurdistan' as a subject of international law". The Czech authorities also underlined that the YPG office was registered as an NGO and the organization was not included in the EU's list of terrorist organizations.[36]

Turkey, the West and Russia after the 15 July 2016 Coup Attempt

Along with the issue of support for the YPG, the problem of the U.S. and EU countries' alleged tolerance, or sympathetic attitude towards, the Fethullah Gülen movement turned out to be the main bone of contention in Turkey's relations with its Western partners. Although the tensions had been growing since at least 2014, the peak of the crisis turned out to be the 15 July coup attempt in Turkey, which according to Turkish authorities was staged by pro-Gülenist officers. The coup was surprising for the Turkish public since the last case of the Turkish army's serious interference in civilian politics had happened in 1997.

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[32] "EU-Turkey migrant deal is 'necessary,' says Hungary's Orban," 2.05.2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/eu-turkey-migrant-deal-is-necessary-says-hungarys-orban--98619.

[33] Lucia Najšlová, Adam Balcer, Rebecca Muray, Zsuzsanna Végh, "Should We Upgrade the V4-Turkey Dialogue," 17–18.

[34] Lucia Najšlová, Adam Balcer, Rebecca Muray, Zsuzsanna Végh, "Should We Upgrade the V4-Turkey Dialogue," 16.

[35] "Kurdish YPG office in Prague shut down," 15.12.2016, http://aranews.net/2016/12/kurdish-ypg-office-prague-shut.

[36] Lucia Najšlová, Adam Balcer, Rebecca Muray, Zsuzsanna Végh, "Should We Upgrade the V4-Turkey Dialogue," 17.

Similarly, for Western observers, political analysts and political leaders, the 15 July events were unexpected and incomprehensible. On the other hand, the weak reaction of the U.S., and the main European leaders on the day after the coup was immediately interpreted by the government in Ankara as support for the plotters.[37] Later Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became annoyed due to the American authorities' refusal to extradite Islamist leader Gülen from his self-imposed exile in the U.S. state of Pennsylvania to Turkey.

On the other hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin was very quick to congratulate his Turkish colleague's victory over the Gülenist enemies. Investigative journalists started to analyze whether Russia was involved in the 15 July coup. Several facts raised doubts about the Russian role in these developments. On the day of the coup, just a few hours before it had started, Putin's propagandist and eulogist of Eurasianist ideology, Aleksander Dugin, visited Ankara and met with the capital's Mayor Melih Gökçek. The latter later stated publicly that he learned from Dugin about the CIA's involvement in the coup attempt.[38]

Most probably these statements were only a proof of how smart and skillful Russian propaganda was, rather than evidence that the Russians were fully aware of the coup plans or involved in the events of 15 July. Nevertheless, the Russian media managed to picture Russia as a true friend of Turkey and the U.S. and the West as traitors for plotting together with Gülen's organization against the democratically elected government in Ankara. Indeed some members of the Turkish ruling party started to repeat this Russian narrative. Dugin's anti-American rhetoric fitted into the narratives of both some Islamists, as well as secularist, politicians in Turkey. Undoubtedly, the coup attempt helped to strengthen rapprochement between Turkey and Russia, which started less than two months before the 15 July events.

 The Turkish-Russian thaw came just six months after a severe crisis between the two countries, which started after the shooting down by an F-16 of a Russian Su-24, which had violated Turkish airspace in November 2015. Two months before the NATO summit in Warsaw, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned that the Black Sea region is falling under Russian dominance and becoming "almost a Russian lake". He was quite alarming in his rhetoric addressing NATO partners ("If we don't act now, history will not forgive us").[39] However, in May 2016 Ahmet Davutoğlu resigned from his premiership, and Binali Yıldırım became the new prime minister. The latter, contrary to his predecessor, left all the initiative in foreign policy to President Erdoğan.[40] One of the first moves of the new government was to change Turkey's foreign policy priorities. The most important ones were halting the process of rapprochement with the EU (based on the EU–Turkey "migrant deal"), and a thaw in Turkish-Russian relations, boosted by the Gülen crisis between Turkey and the U.S. and EU.[41]

Turkish-Russian rapprochement happened despite serious arguments between Moscow and Ankara over the fate of Syria. President Erdoğan decided, however, to cooperate with Russia for several reasons. The main cause of this extremely rapid process of

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[37] Ian Lesser, "Turkey and the West after the Failed Coup: Beyond Suspicion?," *Insight Turkey* 18, no. 3 (Summer 2016): 45–46.

[38] See e.g. Hakan Aygün, *15 Temmuz Sırları* (İstanbul: Siyah Beyaz Yayınları, 2017), 352–354.

[39] "Russia's military ambitions make waves in the Black Sea," *Financial Times*, May 13, 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/1b9c24d8-1819-11e6-b197-a4af20d5575e.

[40] Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, 350.

[41] Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, 356.

restoration of relations between the two countries was pressure of the business lobby in Turkey, those who were the victims of a Russian-Turkish war of economic sanctions. Apart from important political figures in Turkey and Russia, also the President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarabayev played a crucial role in negotiations leading to a resolution of the crisis.[42] Moreover, mending fences with Putin enabled Erdoğan to start – with Russian silent approval – a military operation in Syria (*Euphrates Shield*). Turkey resigned from its previous demand for the resignation of Syrian leader Bashar al Assad, but managed to build its zone of influence in al Bab and disable Syrian Kurdish forces (YPG) from unifiying their territories along the Turkish border. In December 2016 Russia, Turkey and Iran issued a declaration in Moscow regarding common efforts to resolve the Syrian conflict. Turkey's involvement in this format meant the final resignation from regime change policy regarding Damascus and a further strengthening of its relationship with Russia.[43]

Looking at these developments in the Middle East from the East Central Europe perspective it is worth analyzing to what extent they influence the situation in the latter region. Poland was involved in the 2003 U.S. invasion of Saddam Husain's Iraq and many other East Central European countries participated in the post-invasion mission. Then, the rationale behind these governments' decision to send troops to the Middle East was to prove their loyalty to the U.S. as an ally in NATO. In the case of the Syrian conflict, the U.S. and other Western NATO countries did not decide to intervene on the ground.[44] Similarly, there was little incentive for East Central European countries to be involved politically or militarily in Syria. For Poland and the Baltic states such a motivation could have been support for Turkey, whose territory had come under threat due to the civil war in Syria. The common denominator for Turkey and Poland, the Baltic States, as well as Romania and Bulgaria, is their location on the Eastern flank of the Alliance. Nevertheless, the threats stemming from the militarization of Russia in the Baltic and Black Sea regions are different from the threats Turkey faces in its Middle Eastern environment. Moreover, at the moment it is Russia, not the NATO allies, who is helping Turkey to achieve its goals in the Syrian conflict.

On the other hand, Russia will rather not remain Turkey's reliable partner in the Middle East as the two countries are united only by a tactical alliance and their long-term goals in Syria are mutually contradictory. The changes in the security environment are fast and it is difficult to predict an outcome to the Syrian war and its impact on Turkish-Russian relations. What remains constant are the security challenges that NATO's Eastern flank countries are facing. Awareness of these risks should be the basis of closer Turkish and East Central European countries' viewpoints. Therefore, trying to understand and forecast the direction of Turkey's relationship with the region of East Central Europe, it is necessary to study their different perceptions, threat assessments and sometimes even stereotypes that influence their political decisions.

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[42] Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, 359.

[43] Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası*, 360.

[44] The operation *Inherent resolve* launched by the U.S. in 2014 against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria was confined mostly to air operations.

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V

Public Sphere in the Post-Soviet Space

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Modern authoritarian regimes: a contribution to the systematisation of the continuing debate

Abstract: *This paper deals with the conceptual framework of so-called 'modern authoritarianism', allegedly a form of government typical of non-democratic regimes at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The paper is based on the approach of Tyler Roylance, who divided the sources of legitimacy employed by modern authoritarian regimes into five spheres: the economy, the media, political competition, civil society and the rule of law. Following the arguments presented by various authors in their efforts to conceptualise different examples of modern authoritarianism, the paper aims to contrast this debate with the classical approaches to the research of non-democratic regimes.*

Key words: *Non-democracies, authoritarian regimes, modern authoritarian regimes, propaganda, corruption.*

Introduction to the debate about modern authoritarianism

In recent years there has been a noticeable shift in comparative political science, away from efforts to define what has been called 'hybrid regimes', which are conceived as being located somewhere on the boundary between democracies and non-democracies,[3]

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[3] Works in Czech on hybrid regimes include Holzer and Balík (2006), Drahokoupil (2014) and Bilek (2015).

towards a renewed interest in non-democratic regimes. Papers by leading theoreticians of hybrid regimes, including Wolfgang Merkel, Larry Diamond, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, have responded to the phenomenon of democratic recession (Merkel 2010; Diamond 2015), the revision of the prevailing paradigm of democratisation studies (Diamond, Fukuyama, Horowitz and Plattner 2014) and the increasing number of regimes that reject liberal values (Levitsky and Way 2015). It has been alleged that, from about 2005, there has been a re-consolidation of non-democracies, dampening hitherto optimistic predictions about the spread of democracy, which themselves were based on a generalisation of contemporary experience with the successful consolidation of democracy in some parts of the world (South, and, somewhat later, Central Europe). After the years 2008–2009, when both 'old' and 'new' democracies faced the global financial crisis and the associated uncertainties of their own political and democratic identity, modern authoritarian regimes no longer hesitated to display openly their non-democratic character. Non-democratic trends have become more prevalent in North Africa, especially since the so-called Arab Spring, into which substantial hopes of democratisation were placed. The other main region where modern authoritarianism is allegedly consolidating is the post-Soviet area (Walker 2016, 53). Faced with these trends, scholars have noted that the process of removing non-democratic regimes ends most often not in a transition to a consolidated democracy, but in the establishment of another type of non-democratic regime (or anarchy; cf. Svolik 2012).

Two questions emerge in connection with these developments. Are examples of 'modern authoritarianism' truly new, original models of non-democratic governance? And if so, in what respects are they original, and how do we define these modern types of non-democracy?

Even authors writing at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s (Huntington 1968) and the early 1980s (Perlmutter 1981) were sensitive towards the alleged differences between classic and modern forms of authoritarianism. However, with respect to our two questions, there is an issue that the current conceptual framework does not yet offer a generally accepted definition of a *modern authoritarian regime* (MAR). For instance, in the much-cited conception by Johannes Gerschewski, rather than a definition we find a list of three pillars – legitimation, repression and co-optation – of modern authoritarianism's stability (Gerschewski 2013, 14ff.).[4] Michael Ignatieff's (2014) lapidary statement, according to which this regime type is 'authoritarian in political form, capitalist in economics and nationalist in ideology', though apt, is not a definition either.

An interesting view, which is typical of the debate about modern authoritarianism, has been proposed by Ozan O. Varol, who argued that the earlier focus on typologies and definitions is no longer that relevant today, and that one would do well to focus on research in the more subtle aspects of MARs' functions in practice (Varol 2015, 1680). In particular, one should identify the instruments (they may be new) that these regimes use to obtain legitimacy domestically and internationally. For this reason the present paper takes as its starting point a short article, 'The Twilight of "Modern Authoritarianism"', by Freedom House

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[4] Further, Gerschewski distinguishes specific support (an authoritarianism's ability to provide society with benefits such as security or a certain standard of living) and diffuse support, which refers to the current characteristics of the regime, including its ideology, religious and nationalist proclamations, the leader's charisma and the presence of real or imaginary external threats (Gerschewski 2013, 20ff.).

researcher, Tyler Roylance (2014), which highlights five spheres or areas where MARs may seek to establish their legitimacy: the economy, the media, political competition, civil society and the rule of law. The differences emerging among the participants in the debate about MARs are not because they don't accept these areas as relevant; rather they are due to the relative emphasis placed by researchers on each area, i.e. which areas are considered crucial for the survival of an MAR. Thus, researchers often focus on one area only, which serves them to establish their own notion of an MAR.

By taking a broader view, this paper hopes to do the following. First, to describe various authors' approaches to these areas and thus to provide a comprehensive overview of the 'modern authoritarianism' concept. Second, to answer the following two questions. Viewed through the lens of classic notions of non-democratic regimes, in particular Juan J. Linz's (2000) notion of authoritarianism, what is and what is not innovative in the practice of modern authoritarianism? What do the prevailing preferences in the study of MARs imply for the general approaches towards describing and typologising political regimes?

Modern authoritarian regimes and the sphere of the economy

Historically, the overwhelming majority of authoritarian regimes were less open than democracies in terms of international trade. Linz's sub-types of authoritarianism covered various economic models, from those where the political elite does not interfere with the economy, to corporate models, to regimes where the political control over the economy is extensive (Linz 2000, 175ff.). In any case, a classic authoritarian system of governance, in line with a notion of a mentality that drew on traditional or semi-traditional sources of legitimacy, tended to view the economic sphere in paternalist terms, as an autochthonous environment that largely responded to domestic demand and deserved protection from foreign influence, not least because the domestic economy often was not competitive (Linz 2000, 144–145). And above all, economic liberalisation, if it were to happen, was often seen as a symptom, as a herald of upcoming political liberalisation (Brooker 2000, 167–173).

In this respect, most MARs do not shut themselves off economically from the outside world; rather they seek access to the world's markets, and often these regimes are important players internationally, with domestic markets open to foreign capital (Wu 2015, 790–791). Further, private property and entrepreneurship are not just allowed, but often encouraged in MARs, and seen as welcome instruments for consolidating the political community.

An analysis of modern authoritarianism can thus provide an interesting contribution to the classical dispute as to whether economic liberalisation and a free market bring democracy; the present state of knowledge about MARs supports the argument that a country's acceptance of free-market techniques does not imply democratisation. Modern authoritarian regimes use the free market as a source of income, social stability and greater legitimacy internationally; in sum, a free market may serve to stabilise non-democratic governance.

Wen-Chin Wu (2015) questioned the correlation between market openness and globalisation on the one hand, and democratisation on the other. His economic model

examined the circumstances under which MARs feel compelled to adopt a free market and evaluated the advantages this brings to them. He also paid attention to economic inequalities among MAR populations. Wu's hypothesis, tested on more than 80 non-democratic regimes between 1963 and 2003, is that, with growing income inequality in labour-abundant dictatorships, market openness also increases. The main dependent variable was the degree of market openness, with measures of inequality, labour productivity and international cooperation serving as independent variables.

Modern authoritarian regimes, Wu argues, lack legitimacy among the poorest strata of their populations. If the regimes do not work towards decreasing social inequality, they may well fear unrest. However, these regimes cannot adopt the classical approach to decreasing economic inequality – i.e. increased taxation of the rich – for by doing so they would risk losing the support of this class and, again, would risk their stability. Most MARs do not seek to resolve the issue of their poor by the 'classical' method of repression, but by an 'innovative' method of alleviating their living conditions. They do so by introducing free markets and by opening their markets to international trade, which is supposed to improve the living standards of the population, and hence also increase their support for the regime (Wu 2015, 790–792).

The argument that MAR economies are typically open is, however, called into question by other authors, who argue that these economies are less open than it might seem at first glance. MAR elites often seek to use their administrative and public power to capture the key sectors of the economy – typically the extraction of natural resources – that account for the bulk of their economic might (Nisnevich 2016, 8). In doing so they avoid classical methods (such as nationalisation), which might be seen as aggressive by domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors alike. Allegedly, more important is an ability to exert influence over the key players in the economy, which is facilitated by corrupt practices or the 'buying' of loyalty – including some share of political power being offered in return (Yakovlev, Sobolev and Kazun 2014, 188–190; Nisnevich 2016, 2–3). The expected effects of this include the lower probability of important economic actors' support for political opposition (Guriev and Treisman 2015).

The Moscow-based political scientist, Yulii A. Nisnevich, offers, in his 2016 study, a further elaboration of MAR corrupt practices. He distinguishes between coercion (i.e. use of physical, political or media force), corruption (i.e. the employment of financial and political-economic means) and political competition. Nisnevich uses quantitative data to measure corruption, especially those provided by Transparency International. The measures of these three criteria allow him to distinguish between democratic and authoritarian regimes. A democracy is defined by a high measure of competition, a low measure of coercion and a measure of corruption that is as small as possible. Authoritarianism is conversely defined as a regime with a low level of competition and high measures of coercion and corruption. Nisnevich then divides authoritarian regimes into two categories, depending on whether corruption or coercion is more prevalent, with the regime's 'substance' – whether it is a monarchy, a single-party state, etc. – serving as a subsidiary criterion.

Nisnevich describes the first category as authoritarian regimes. These use both corruption and coercion to various degrees and can be divided further into three sub-categories as follows:

- Authoritarian regimes with rudiments of communism, where the measures of corruption and coercion are about equal (China, Vietnam, Cuba, Laos, North Korea[5]);
- Modern dictatorships where coercion prevails over corruption (most of these are African countries such as Rwanda, Gabon and Algeria);
- Authoritarian monarchies, where coercion again prevails, but is of a different nature than in modern dictatorships (for example the Islamic monarchies: Qatar, Jordan, Oman, etc.).

Nisnevich's second category, and one that is of more interest for the present paper, is that of neo-authoritarian regimes (which is not divided into sub-categories). This is, allegedly, a new type of regime, one that has largely abandoned coercion and most typically uses corruption. Therefore it must be differentiated from the sub-category of authoritarianism with rudiments of communism, firstly because a neo-authoritarian regime is not a one-party state, but a personalised or corporative type of regime, and secondly because communist regimes such as China and Cuba often seek to fight corruption, though this might be considered window-dressing.

Modern authoritarian regimes allegedly do not use economic instruments only internally. It has been argued that they routinely exert pressure on foreign companies and seek to control them, as well as to create bureaucratic obstacles to these companies' access to their internal markets (without thereby completely dissuading them from investment or business in the country; Shevtsova 2015, 28). These countries also use economic instruments to influence regimes in other countries (Kotschwar 2014, 202–203; Cooley 2015, 58–60). By granting economic aid and trade advantages to allied regimes, it has been said that they buy the support of the elites of these countries, or even to keep such allied regimes alive. This has been seen as a remarkable instrument through which MARs may formulate their own vision of democracy, or 'fight against the West' (Walker 2016, 49–51).

Such practices have been illustrated by a number of examples, including Venezuela's *Petrocaribe* programme, which associates 18 Caribbean and Central American countries to which Venezuela sells its oil at below market price and thus 'buys' these countries' support (Corrales 2015, 46–47). China has been alleged as a classic example by using its economic capacities to buy support when investing abroad (Nathan 2015, 157–158; Plattner 2015, 8–9). Unlike Venezuela, China is thought to be interested not just in its immediate surroundings, but is allegedly seeking to invest and 'buy' legitimacy even in countries that are considered economically developed and, in terms of regime type, democratic; consider China's sponsorship of various (typically infrastructure building) projects in Central Europe and elsewhere (Chiriu 2016).

In sum, MARs use various economic instruments to broaden their legitimacy base. Whereas classic authoritarian regimes tended to be economically closed, today's MARs do not hesitate to open themselves to international trade. At the same time, they seek to be considered legitimate by various internal actors and employ internal instruments to this end, including corruption and measures that help decrease economic inequality in society. The question arises: to what extent are these economic instruments truly new? A free

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[5] The author notes that North Korea is a totalitarian regime, but nevertheless puts it in the category of authoritarian regime, adding that, together with Somalia, it is one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Nisnevich 2016, 14).

market was also present in many 'old' authoritarian regimes, and corruption was common in many of them. Thus, Nisnevich's concept cited above raises doubts, as it fails to prove an exclusive link between corruption and authoritarianism.[6] In terms of arguments that seek to define MARs via their economic policies, it seems more promising to focus on the external aspects of these policies, for instance, the strategy that seeks to source legitimacy internationally, using the state's economic capacity.

Modern authoritarian regimes and the sphere of the media

The media of non-democracies have allegedly undergone an important change. Classic authoritarian regimes were jealous of their information monopolies. Such monopolies are important not just for totalitarian regimes that are based on their supposedly unshakeable ideological constructions, but also for authoritarian regimes, whose foundations, relying on mentality, can be similarly fragile. They too are sensitive to contacts with *the other, the foreign.* Naturally, the instruments used by classic authoritarian regimes to protect what they considered as *their own* corresponded to the more extensive and efficient options that were available several decades ago.

MARs, by contrast, seem able to adapt to the fundamental changes which we have witnessed in the media in recent years. Above all, MARs allow independent media to operate in their territories; however, this independence has its limits, as the regimes often seek to control the media by buying ownership shares. The alleged reason for allowing 'independent' media in is that in a monopoly system the state media is unable to offer a sufficient range of entertainment programmes.

The trend of media openness is thought also to be connected with the rise of the new media, especially the internet. Most MARs do not prevent their citizens from connecting to the internet. However, these liberal tendencies are balanced by the regimes' awareness of the risks involved in any lack of control over flows of information. For that reason, MARs have started to implement instruments allowing not just the regulation, but also the propagandist use, of new media (Brady 2015, 56–58; Deibert 2015, 68–71; Pomerantsev 2015, 40-48; Guriev and Treisman 2015, 4).

Many authors consider the ability to influence the media as a paramount task for MARs. In classic authoritarian regimes, the consumption of foreign media was typically banned, and the regime's own media dominated the information channels. With the development of the new media, control over access to information from abroad has become problematic. Modern authoritarian regimes respond to this by innovating their propaganda toolkits. In the past, propaganda was primarily linked with totalitarian regimes, which used it to spread their ideologies and to educate the 'new man'. However, propaganda complemented rather than supplanted violence, especially when these regimes were at their zenith. Propaganda is considered a key instrument of MARs, serving to convince the public that the ruling elites are competent, while Western media are mendacious (Deibert 2015, 68–71; Pomerantsev 2015, 40).

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[6] There are authoritarian regimes in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Singapore, but they do not have serious corruption issues.

The role of propaganda as a crucial instrument for MAR survival has been emphasised by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (2015) in their concept of *new authoritarianism.* They open their argument by noting that non-democracies have turned away from large-scale violence and embraced a strategy that creates the positive public image of a competent dictator. The authors see this as the most important condition for the survival of any non-democratic regime. Their model is conceived as a game with three players, or social segments. The first is the dictator (an individual or a ruling group), the second is the elites (social, economic etc.) who know the truth as to whether the dictator is competent or not, but, on their own, are unable or unwilling to overthrow the dictator as long as they lack the support of the third player – the masses, or the general public. As long as the dictator provides security and economic growth, and seems competent, the masses are content and will not rise against him. However, the model is not concerned solely with the relationship between the dictator and the masses. Will the masses rise or not? Here the position of the elites is important, even decisive. The elites know the truth about the dictator. As long as the masses trust in the dictator's competence, they will themselves not rise against him; they would need the leadership of the elites to do this. Thus, the dictator needs to keep the elites loyal, and he has two strategies at his disposal to achieve this: repression and cooperation. Guriev and Treisman argue that dictators in MARs largely choose cooperation as repression would increase the regime's cost unnecessarily. Thus, the *new authoritarianism* model assumes that the dictator survives thanks to two skills: the ability to convince the masses that he is competent (this purpose is primarily served by propaganda) and the ability to keep the elites loyal.

Propaganda on its own would be insufficient, however, and in MARs it is complemented by a classic instrument of authoritarianism: censorship. Min Jiang (2010) has focused on the phenomenon of censorship serving to consolidate an MAR. Her notion of *authoritarian informationalism* is based on her analysis of China's regime, its relationship with information and its creation of a comprehensive self-image. According to Jiang, MAR legitimacy rests on sustainable economic growth, nationalism, ideology (though vague), culture and a specific notion of democracy. Through censorship the regime hides various disagreeable pieces of information from the population, including those concerned with corruption, political trials, social inequality etc. A legitimacy thus supported allows the regime to deploy censorship to such an extent that most of the population see no alternative; they do not question the regime, and even approve of its measures (internet regulation, for example). Thanks to this, MARs do not need to approach the media from a position of full distrust; rather, they prefer to publish their own information, with the intention of improving social stability, fostering nationalist feelings, etc. Naturally, this does not imply the absence of such traditional phenomena as the threat of possible sanctions, which compels authors to self-censorship, or structural obstacles applied on an *ad hoc* basis, such as withdrawing licences from defiant publishers and editors, and their subjection to special taxes, fines etc.

Many authors argue that the internet has become the main battlefield for both propaganda and censorship. By allowing internet access, MARs demonstrate their openness; it also serves as a practical instrument for improving popular living standards and facilitating trade and research (Jiang 2010, 82). On the one hand, populations are given greater access to information; yet, on the other, this information is filtered and inconvenient

content is blocked (Pomerantsev 2015, 41-43),[7] largely with reference to laws that are flexible enough to allow censorship or the persecution of unwanted authors (Vatanka 2015, 65–67). Social media are also affected: if they are not regulated by the regime, they might be used to organise opposition movements or protests. In authoritarian regimes, Western social networks are often blocked and replaced by national social networks, or their use is made downright illegal (Jiang 2010, 85–86; Milani 2015, 58–59; Vatanka 2015, 65–66).

Like the economy, the media have not just a domestic, but also an international dimension. MARs seek to propagate their worldview and understanding of events (Brady 2015, 51–54; Pomerantsev 2015, 44–46). They cannot use their censorship abroad, and hence focus on propaganda. However, a too obvious link between a TV station, say, and an MAR would damage the channel's credibility. Thus foreign media outlets of MARs seek to pose as independent, claiming that the media of Western liberal democracies are themselves not 'objective' anyway (Brady 2015, 51–54; Pomerantsev 2015, 45; Vatanka 2015, 67–69). The most important media channel is television. Seeking to counterbalance the influence of such media as the BBC (Vatanka 2015, 67), MAR television stations broadcast in multiple languages, and these language versions show where the regimes seek to enlarge their spheres of influence (see Table 1).

Table 1: MAR television stations and their language versions

Country	TV station name	Language versions
Russia	Russia Today (RT)	Russian, English, Arabic, German, Spanish
China	China Central Television (CCTV)	Chinese, English, French, Arabic, Russian, Japanese, Portuguese (planned)
Venezuela	The New Television Station of the South (teleSUR)	Spanish, English, Portuguese
Iran	Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting	Persian, English, Arabic

Sources: Vatanka (2015, 67–69); Pomerantsev (2015); Brady (2015, 51–58); Corrales (2015, 48–50); websites: irib.in; cctv.cn, rt.com, teleSURtv.net.

Beyond television, radio and newspapers, the internet is of particular importance to MARs, as it can be used to address a wider circle of recipients. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes can employ individuals who show support for the regime on social networks, discussion forums and blogs, agitating and arguing in favour of their particular regime, while proclaiming their own independence. These individuals also attack the mainstream media and their own blogs etc. and serve as alternative sources of information for many readers (Pomerantsev 2015, 42–43).

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[7] In terms of censoring foreign websites, the 'The Great Firewall of China' seems to be the most effective, and the technology is popular with other MARs; it was bought by Iran, for instance (Vatanka 2015, 65).

Foreign MAR propaganda on the internet has been studied by Ron Deibert (2015), who created the notion of *cyberspace authoritarianism*. Deibert identified three developmental phases, or generations, of cyberspace authoritarianism. In the first, non-democracies mainly used defensive technological instruments to limit freedom of information, such as censorship and blocking access to foreign servers. In the second, they no longer relied on these imperfect technological devices and came up with laws limiting publication and exerted pressure on private corporations to make them compliant with the regime's needs. However, these were still defensive measures. A breakthrough came with the third phase, where offensive measures were deployed, including threats, espionage and defamation. These instruments serve to undermine the reputations of individuals and institutions that the regime finds troublesome. Other offensive instruments include cyber-attacks on foreign corporations and recruiting 'electronic armies' that defend the regime on the internet, a practice used by virtually all modern MARs, according to Deibert (see Table 2).

Table 2: MAR cybernetic armies

Country	Designation of cybernetic army
Venezuela	Communicational guerrillas
Egypt	Cyber army
Russia	Pro-Putin bloggers of Russia
Kenya	Director of digital media
China	Fifty-centers

Source: Deibert (2015, 69)

To sum up the argument: MARs may open themselves to the world and information technology, but in doing so they aim to strengthen their legitimacy. The issues that this opening creates for them in terms of controlling information are resolved by developing tools of censorship. Over time, MARs have realised that they do not have to be merely defensive, but can also mount an offensive of self-promotion on modern digital media. In doing so they have dusted off propaganda – an instrument formerly typical of totalitarian regimes – and turned it into a crucial source of legitimacy both at home and abroad.

Modern authoritarian regimes and the sphere of political competition

As far as political competition is concerned, the notion of a MAR obviously draws on the discussion about hybrid regimes and such concepts as competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2002) and electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2013). Their authors sought to respond to the phenomenon of emergent (often post-transition) regimes where the ruling elite repeatedly proved its ability to confirm its privileged position in a situation

of a semi-open (and not closed) model of political pluralism. To put it simply: these regimes held competitive elections, but their practices of exercising power were described as non-democratic. How does the MAR concept respond to this?

Modern authoritarian regimes are thought to use elections as one of the instruments to ensure their survival (Seki 2014, 2–6), or to reinforce their position. Most MARs recognise a multi-party system or a quasi-multi-party system, allowing, in theory, the replacement of the elite (Donno 2013, 703–705). However, the elections they hold do not meet the Western standards of fairness. Some political parties are banned, undesirable candidates are prosecuted, journalists are persecuted, voters are intimidated and results are falsified (Schedler 2013, 1). Whereas in the hybrid-regime concept, the elections were of paramount importance, in the MAR concept they are but one topic among many. The framing of elections is different, too: when a MAR holds elections, they are not merely a gimmick, a fig leaf, or an effect of pressure exerted from abroad; they can also be a positive step taken by the regime, an appreciation on the part of the regime of the advantages that the holding of elections may bring (Donno 2013, 703–704).

The first important factor that is thought to have influenced the introduction of elections in MARs is the information-providing role of elections. Classic authoritarian regimes faced the following issue. Relying on a collective mentality, the regimes did not know whether this mentality was undergoing a change, nor to what extent the regime remained acceptable to the majority. Elections in MARs help resolve this issue by showing any potential change in society's position towards the ruling elite. This information can then be used by the regime to adjust its policy so that it is more in line with the needs of the electorate (Seki 2014, 3–4). Certainly, MARs seek to avoid changing their government, and they continue to persecute the opposition. It is important, however, that the repression does not go beyond an acceptable threshold. Should this threshold be crossed, the opposition might opt not to contest elections. In this understanding, elections are a kind of referendum on the population's satisfaction with the authoritarian elite (Lust, 4; Seki 2014, 3–4). The more stable the support obtained by a MAR in an election, the more certain the regime can be in the steps it takes, the more confident the signal it sends out concerning its own stability, and the easier it is then to demotivate the opposition and passive segments of the population (Seki 2014, 3). Contrary to the classic view of the relationship between elections and authoritarianism, then, elections can actually make authoritarian governance easier.

Alongside elections, MARs may also develop a multi-party system. In classic non-democracies, the opposition were unable to seek political power. Opposition parties in MARs, though variously curtailed, do contest elections (Seki 2014, 4–5). Elections are thought to help MARs to deal with the threat of an 'accumulation' of opposition. The electoral results provide information about the relative strength of the opposition actors, and this allows the regime to invite some to participate in power, thus avoiding potential solidarity among the opposition (Donno 2013, 705–706; Seki 2014, 4–5). Thus, elections become a pragmatic instrument serving to divide the opposition or to identify new, emergent elites, which the elite in power might need to co-opt.

Another way of how a multi-party system can be used to break up opposition is to create artificial opposition parties, which are actually dependent on the regime and act as formal, but not real, opposition (Walker 2016, 56). Such parties attract votes that would

otherwise go to genuine opposition groups. This approach can also serve to defuse tensions in terms of personnel. One might, for instance, take advantage of certain ruling elite members' popularity with voters and place them in a new party, thus weakening their actual influence over the regime without thereby explicitly discrediting them (Seki 2014, 4; Lust, 6–7).[8] Elections can even serve to retire or replace existing authoritarian elites. If, in an election, the population shows their dissatisfaction with the regime in no uncertain terms, the dictator might come to the conclusion that it is in his interest to retire and hand over power to someone else. In this way, the dictator avoids the risk of unrest, or, in the extreme case, a civil war – a war that, even if it were waged with victory, might not produce a new legitimacy (Seki 2014, 3–6; Lust, 11). Thus elections are thought to partially replace violence as a means of removing a dictator from power. In the words of Andreas Schedler, 'Before trying to conquer power through bullets, cost-sensitive challengers should assault it through ballots.' (Schedler 2013, 35).

In sum: MARs are thought to use elections as a source of internal and external legitimacy, to weaken the opposition and also as an 'emergency exit' should they find themselves in serious trouble. Still, for the elites the introduction of elections brings risks as well as advantages. By allowing opposition candidates to stand, they might unwittingly allow the opposition to become too strong and resistant to the regime's repression, thus weakening the regime or even undermining it completely. However, opposition usually emerges out of civil society, which is why MARs focus on it as one of the main sources of potential trouble.

Modern authoritarian regimes and the sphere of civil society

Similarly to what we have seen with respect to electoral and party-political pluralism, MARs also allow non-governmental organisations to exist, though they seek to control them lest they cause too many problems to the regime. Most risky are organisations concerned with politics or human rights, especially those originating from abroad. These are then exposed to the greatest control and persecution (Rutzen 2015, 31–33). In their place, MARs might seek to create their own structures – non-profit organisations, various social movements, etc. – which are then paraded as proof of the regime's pluralism and openness (Walker 2016, 56–58). This creates a fundamental dilemma for non-state civil society actors: either they will not engage with political issues – or they will, but then fall under the regime's control.

In MARs, non-governmental organisations tend to be regulated through legislation; for instance, they may be prohibited from receiving funding from abroad. Douglas Rutzen divides arguments put forward by MARs for the necessity of regulation into four categories: (1) protection of state sovereignty, (2) transparency in funding, (3) promotion of effectiveness in the civil-society sector and (4) national security (Rutzen 2015, 31–33). As outlined

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[8] The papers surveyed here unfortunately fail to respond to either the classic 1970s works about the various types of opposition in non-democracies (written by Isabel De Madariaga, Frederick Charles Barghoorn, Leonard Schapiro and others) or the more recent works on opposition in non-democracies, including those that have focused on Vladimir Putin's Russia (Gelman 2005; Marsh 2009; Bennets 2016).

above, MARs seek to use the civil-society sphere for their own benefit and as a source of legitimacy. To this end they may create pseudo-non-governmental organisations, which have been described as GONGOs[9] (government-organised non-governmental organisations; Walker 2016, 56; Cooley 2015, 53–56). Though seemingly autonomous to some degree (Teets 2013, 19), in reality GONGOs are dependent on the regime, starting with their funding. Their main purpose is to provide a democratic facade, since the presence of a civil society is understood to be one of the characteristics of a liberal democracy (Rutzen 2015, 35–36). MARs even send GONGO representatives internationally to engage with NGOs, to undermine a liberal conception of democracy and human rights, and to defend their own regimes. In order to carry out their propaganda abroad, MARs create organisations to act in civil society in foreign countries. These seek to attract attention by offering alternative sources of information, a 'different' worldview, language teaching, etc. (Walker 2016, 56–58). Beyond GONGOs, a group of environmental, social, health and cultural NGOs is thought to exist in MARs, and these are thought to operate almost as fully-fledged, Western-style NGOs. Given this situation, Jessica C. Teets (2013) has critically tested the argument that there is a relationship between autonomous civil society and democratisation. According to Teets, a flourishing civil society is not necessarily accompanied by democratisation; rather a MAR can take advantage of this civil society. Her notion of *consultative authoritarianism*[10] is based on data confirming that there are options for cooperation between a limited, though present, civil society and a non-democratic regime. The elites in MARs, Teets argues, become aware that citizens themselves – and not the state above them – understand their own needs best. Hence MARs allow civil-society organisations to operate on a limited scale. Particularly those organisations that have an environmental, cultural or educational focus, and typically operate on a local scale, may propose solutions to problems or even participate in policy-making, but they serve only as consultants to the regime. The MARs then direct their repressive policies solely against those actors who they consider as aiming to disrupt political stability, and are judged able to do so.

Thus, in MARs, civil society is thought to be more autonomous than it was in earlier authoritarian regimes, but not as free as it is in a liberal democracy. The regime provides space especially to those organisations that do not focus on political issues. But even those organisations that are permitted are subject to legislative pressures.

Modern authoritarian regimes and the legal sphere

As already outlined, in the twenty-first century MARs avoid extensive repression, violence and terror, i.e. phenomena that were typical of the various non-democracies of

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[9] In China these organisations are often created by the Communist Party, and are sometimes called PONGOs (party-organised non-governmental organisations; Walker 2016, 56).

[10] The author has devised her concept on the basis of China and the Shining Stone organisation, which dealt with the issues of migrants in Beijing and their inclusion in society. Created as non-governmental, the organisation proposed solutions to issues, organised educational and cultural events, etc. This has led to its official acceptance as a partner to the Communist Party for these issues, and it was awarded state funding. Thus, by pragmatically approaching a local civil society actor, the regime gains access to new solutions, and reinforces its own legitimacy. See Teets (2013, 26–30).

the preceding century, and were even thought by some authors to constitute the crucial defining characteristics of non-democratic rule (for an overview of these arguments see Brooker 2000: 7–35). Most activities undertaken by MARs, by contrast, are carried out in a legal spirit, and acts of repression are based on legislation that permits them. This is thought to be a consequence of MARs' abandoning of mass repression and of a collective definition of their internal enemies. Rather, MARs embrace more selective approaches towards defining enemies. Nevertheless, importantly, the legislation in question remains vague so that it can be put to use to serve the concrete needs of the regime (Roylance 2014; Applebaum 2015, 26-27).

As Moustafa (2014) noted, in MARs the judicial branch typically enjoys substantial autonomy in interpreting law. In classic authoritarianism, by contrast, the judicial branch was subject to strong external control. As Peter Solomon (2007) argued in his now decade-old article, MARs are supposedly not afraid to share power, thus making governance easier for themselves. According to Solomon, there are four basic models of the relationship between a non-democratic regime and its judiciary. The first comprises that approach where the courts of law are wholly dependent on the state, as in the Soviet Union. The second model, the so-called 'Spanish solution', was constructed on the basis of the realities of Franco's regime in Spain: though the judges are formally independent of the regime, in practice their powers are almost negligible. The third model provides for the relative autonomy of the judiciary, whose powers are not negligible, and can really affect the functioning of the regime (e.g. post-1864 Russia). The fourth model of how the judiciary may operate in non-democracies has been described by Solomon as 'final', the most up-to-date and corresponding to the notion of MARs. In this model the judiciary is formally almost fully independent of state power. However, it is controlled through informal relations and instruments that influence the judges so that they do not oppose the regime (e.g. Putin's Russia). Given how vaguely the laws are worded, judges are advised to interpret them in a way that benefits the regime, and this can lead to the banning of opposition parties and organisations, the prosecution of journalists, politicians and activists whom the regime finds troublesome, etc. (Solomon 2007: 124–126).

What induces MARs to introduce judiciaries that are at least formally independent? That is an important question. One possible answer, according to Moustafa (2014, 283–286), is that these regimes can use the separation of power to shed their responsibility in front of the public. Given that the courts are formally free in their interpretation of laws, they have to accept public responsibility for the rulings they issue. The MAR power-elites can then emerge out of particular cases with clean hands.

Thus, MARs are thought to introduce, and make use of, the rule of law to maintain their legitimacy. The wording of their laws may be an issue, however. In liberal democracies, such laws would be seen as contravening the constitution, as they often infringe the liberal understanding of universal human rights, or international conventions on human rights. And yet, MARs consider the source of their political power to be constitutionally grounded (Moustafa 2014, 282–287). The problem, then, is in the evidently different view (as compared to liberal democracies) as to what constitutes law and the essence of human rights. The answer that is typical of MARs, and crucial for the very notion of an MAR, is that these regimes are not liberal, and that they emphasise their specific historical, cultural or confessional characteristics (Cooley 2015, 50–53).

Conclusion

This paper has sought to present the essential or typical arguments that are heard in the current debates about so-called modern authoritarian regimes (referred to in this paper as MARs). These debates follow up on intense study of the so-called hybrid regimes, a topic that has dominated the study of democratisation processes over the past 20 years or so,[11] and naturally also upon the classic conceptions of non-democratic regimes.

A central theme in these debates is to identify the instruments that MARs use as sources of their legitimacy. This paper adopts the division of these into five spheres – the economy, the media, political competition, civil society and the rule of law – as proposed by Tyler Roylance. Even though various authors emphasise different techniques as used by MARs, it seems to us that they all have one common denominator: each of these regimes has its own, distinctive conception of the legitimacy of its rule.

Modern authoritarian regimes do not hesitate to call themselves *democracies*, albeit they typically add a qualifier. Thus, in China, there is supposedly a *socialist democracy*, based on one-party rule [sic] and an autochthonous emphasis – peculiar to the Chinese civilisation – on its own understanding of human rights and governance (Jiang 2010, 76–81; Nathan 2015, 156–167). In Russia, there is allegedly a *directed democracy* based on the notion that society must be led towards higher goals, defined by an exclusive mentality and the interest of the Russian *mir* (Pomerantsev 2015, 42; Cannady and Kubicek 2014, 7). The Iranian regime describes itself as an *Islamic democracy* – as Islam in itself is supposedly not inconsistent with democracy – yet this is not a democracy as rule by the people, but rule for the 'good' of the people, in harmony with God's will (Milani 2015, 52–55).

That a non-democratic regime uses the term 'democracy' to describe itself is not a surprising historical innovation. The problem is rather linked with the fact that the definition of democracy changes as time goes by; that the minimalist understanding as proposed by Josef A. Schumpeter (Schumpeter 1976) is now largely thought to be insufficient to express the realities of democracy in the early twenty-first century, and that the notion currently preferred is *liberal democracy*, an unbreakable compound, where the primary source of legitimacy for democratic governance and the fundamental criterion serving to distinguish democracies from non-democracies is the former's respect for a *liberal*, universal notion of human rights.

In this sense, the strategy adopted by many MARs is as follows: to co-opt the notion of democracy, but at the same time to attack its current foundations that are based on the liberal narrative of human rights, and instead to focus on such values as security, traditional values and diversity of civilisations (Cooley 2015, 51), while using their 'soft powers' to defend an illiberal view of the world (2016, 49–50). In doing so MARs seek to accommodate the pressures exerted by the international community, which sees democracy as the only acceptable system of government (Roylance 2014; Cooley 2015, 49).[12] Yet, in the same breath, the MAR elites pose the question: Well, then – why should only democracy be liberal? Turning away from the question of whether MARs are non-democratic, and

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[11] After all, in 2013, 30 per cent of the world's countries belonged to this category, according to Freedom House.

[12] Whether it is uncritically lauded, or, more realistically, described as the best of the bad models of governance that are available.

towards the question: *What is the essence of democracy?* – that is a remarkable strategy employed by these MARs.

Thus, the contemporary debate about modern authoritarianism is unable to evade old questions of comparative politics: (1) What are the defining features that, with the greatest possible reliability, separate democratic and non-democratic regimes?[13] (2) What does the field of non-democracies look like on the 'inside'?

As far as the second question is concerned, one may note from the conceptual framework of modern authoritarianism as presented in this paper how much energy is currently expended in comparative politics on reflecting on those non-democracies that tend to appeal to traditional mentalities and to use particular – traditional and utilitarian – sources of legitimacy and procedures for obtaining legitimacy. Together with the attention given to the model of the Islamic state,[14] this is clearly a priority for researchers in comparative politics.

Beyond changes currently occurring in non-democracies, the transformations taking place in democracies cannot be ignored. In Western polities we observe increasingly dramatic disagreements as to the definition of their two fundamental concepts – democracy and liberalism – and this is reflected in the deepening cleavages among various political actors and, more practically, in disputes over what constitutes the catalogue of rights and freedoms.[15] Not only in the so-called new, but also in the old, democracies we witness renewed interest in traditional, local political identities, that to many socio-political segments of these political communities seem under threat from the allegedly voluntarist behaviour of their political elites who denationalise themselves. Not just *tradition*, but *progress* too can provide a widely applicable framework of legitimacy that can be used for a non-democratic exercise of power. The classic theory of non-democracy responded to this with the notions of authoritarianism, sultanism and totalitarianism (Linz 2000) and there is no reason why this colourful spectrum of techniques for obtaining legitimacy should not be reflected upon by contemporary comparative politics.

These facts bring the question (1) above – concerned with the defining features of democracies and non-democracies – back to the centre of attention. The contemporary debate about MARs might renew a 'Sartorian' focus on a substantive division of political regimes into democracies and non-democracies, a division that relied on the criterion of political pluralism.[16] However, the description of modern authoritarian regimes presented in this paper suggests that the prevailing tendency among analysts is to emphasise the nature, extent and measure of implementation of a catalogue of human rights by various political regimes – a criterion that was first highlighted in the discussion of the so-called hybrid regimes.

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[13] The discussion about hybrid regimes has created another question that is relevant to this in terms of methodology and content: Is there another, specific regime type between democracies and non-democracies?

[14] By the way, this is a model that sees itself in universalist terms, seeks to export its ideology, is oriented on mobilising its populace, is monist and features an ideology *par excellence* – in other words it fulfils all the key defining criteria of a totalitarian regime.

[15] For the situation in Central Europe, see Dufek and Holzer (2016).

[16] This can be expressed in Juan J. Linz's terms of pluralism vs. limited pluralism, or monism (Linz 2000, 159–161).

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Power-Sharing as a Peace-Building Solution for Ukraine

Abstract: *The institutional arrangement in Ukraine is a game with zero-sum: a strong president (winner) takes all. In the case of the ongoing conflict in the East of Ukraine and the consequences of such a conflict, it forces us to look for a solution to overcome the existing problem, especially, where each part of Ukraine can feel its impact on the political process (or decision-making). When comparing the power-sharing situation in Ukraine (like a president from one political party, and a prime minister from the opposite, or from another patron-client network, or a coalition consisting of opposite parties) it has been found that democracy is much more likely to occur in these situations, and Ukraine which is in the process of democratic trans-formation can come closer to other European countries. Therefore these findings open the door to thinking about not just how to reform the existing majoritarian model of democracy, which produces a winner-takes-all outcome, but to look for a model which would share something between each substantial segment of society, and would give a better chance for Ukraine to be a democratic country and a real part of the European community. Such a model could become the power-sharing model suggested by Arend Lijphart, which presupposes systems with inter-est accommodation and power sharing among significant segments of society.*[1]

Introduction

On the way to establishing democratic institutions, scholars and politicians are faced with difficulties in their effective functioning. Unsuccessful attempts to introduce demo-cratic institutions in the twentieth century have shown us that most of the political systems

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of Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa have simultaneously come across almost all problems of nation-building. Compare this to the old nation-state of Western Europe, which developed slowly, to many political systems that became independent as a result of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian or Ottoman empires, the colonial systems of Great Britain, France, Spain and Portugal, and were forced to solve the problems of nation-culture identity, political participation and economic inequality at the same time. The rapid "speed-up" of the events left them little time or did not make it possible to achieve even temporary institutional solutions of some problems before having to solve the next problems. This is the fundamental difference between the old Western systems and the younger ones that arose as a result of the collapse of Great Empires. "Belated" nations are not only delayed with the achievement of independence – they are left little time to create their own independent institutions before facing the devastating pressures from the outside and inside. Old European nations have developed in a multi-center international environment, in the absence of any particular model of development, with very weak transport links and without any rapid mass mobilization technologies. Belated nations continue to have examples of successful development, strong and polarized external centers of economic and ideological influence, and developing means of communication and methods of mass mobilization[2].

Nation state vs. state-nation

In order to explain the establishment of democracy in some countries, let us turn to such concepts as "nation-state" and "state-nation". If there is only one significant group in the country that considers itself as a nation, has a common sense of history and religion, one language throughout the country, then building a nation-state and a democracy can strengthen one another. At the same time, if competitive elections take place under the conditions of a multinational state, the building of a nation-state and an established democracy leads to conflict situations. This is because only one nation would prevail in the state-building, while other nations would be unrecognized, and sometimes even marginalized[3]. The model of the nation-state involves one identity, which is shared by all its members and is single for both members of the nation and for the citizens of the state. In order to achieve this goal, the state creates a homogenization and assimilative policy in the field of education, culture, and language. In ordinary electoral politics, autonomous parties are non-coalitional, and separatist parties are either illegal or marginalized. The structure of the state is mainly a unitary or mono-national federation (France, Sweden, Japan, Portugal are examples)[4]. The policy of the state-nation, on the other hand, supports a political-institutional approach that protects diversity, but at the same time produces complementary socio-cultural identities. The policy of the "state-nation" recognizes the

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[2] Стейн Роккан, "Измерение процессов формирования государства и создания нации: возможная парадигма для исследования вариаций в пределах Европы", *Ойкумена. Альманах сравнительных исследований политических институтов, социально-экономических систем и цивилизаций*, no. 3 (2005): 192-193

[3] Alfred Stepan, Juan Linz, Yogendra Yadav, "The Rise of "State-Nations"", *Journal of democracy* 21, no. 3 (2010): 51

[4] Alfred Stepan, "Ukraine: Improbable Democratic "Nation-State" But Possible Democratic "State-Nation"?" *Post-Soviet Affairs* 21, no.4 (2005): 281

legitimate public and even political expression of existing socio-cultural divisions, as well as creates mechanisms for the accommodation of competing and conflicting requirements without imposing any one of them. The policy of "state-nation" involves the creation of affiliation ("we-feeling") to the national political community while creating institutional guarantees for respecting and protecting politically important socio-cultural differences. In democratic societies, an institutional guarantee of the introduction of a "state-nation" policy will take the form of federalism, and more often asymmetric federalism, with the possible combination of it with consociational practices[5]. (Examples of state-nation are Spain, Belgium, Canada, and India).

Thus, the state-nation provides a completely different concept of governance. At the same time, it is necessary to determine the historical context of the formation of national states. One of them is the concept of Stein Rokkan, who considers the construction of national states depending on certain configurations of geopolitical factors. He introduces the notion of the "belt of cities", explaining why in certain territories there were no nation-states in the modern form.

Rokkan's "belt of cities" as an explanation for power-sharing

Rokkan created a formula for the correlation between a geographical/topological location in Europe and the success of the formation of a nation and a state. Based on two dimensions – the strength of cities and the power of Catholicism – Rokkan outlined a "conceptual map" of Western Europe. Introducing the notion of the "belt of cities", Rokkan pointed out two aspects; they are the balance of forces and the stability of the territorial location. In a brief historical review, he described how the belt of cities was formed as a result of the special purpose of cities that were a connection between trade routes of South and North (Western) Europe. "Belt of cities" was the core and the "engine" of Western Europe, which defined its territorial division and structure. States/empires arose outside of the "belt of cities", while this "belt" insulated itself from the power of these states/empires[6]. The first nation-states in Europe formed in the territories of dynastic centers which were adjoined to the "belt of cities". According to Rokkan, dynastic centers that were not able to penetrate the "belt of cities", subordinated lands, which were located between this "belt" and their main city-centers. Their efforts of state-centralization prevented the growth of other cities and their acquisition of the dynamic autonomy that distinguished the city from the "belt". In addition, the dynastic centers isolated their cities from the influences of the "belt"[7]. Rokkan concluded that the states formed on the "belt of cities" are states of a classical consociational type.

A different concept of form of government is needed for states formed on the territory of the "belt of cities" (according to Rokkan) or for the state-nation (by Stepan), but also for "the organization of the whole political space", where the political system would be based not on competition and conflict (that is built in to majoritarian democracy), but on

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[5] Stepan, Linz, Yadav, "The Rise of "State-Nations", 52–53.
[6] Стейн Ларсен, "Моделирование Европы в логике Роксана", *Полис*, no. 1 (1995): 42.
[7] Ларсен, "Моделирование Европы ", 45.

consensus. Thus, the term "consociation" involves the idea of management based on agreement and cooperation. Even in the seventeenth century, the German scientist Johannes Althusius put forward the theory of consociation and subsidiarity as an alternative to the concept of an absolutist state and absolute sovereignty. The theory of Althusius arose in contrast to the Bodin ideas on the organization of the state of that time. The Bodin work "The Six Books of the Republic" was a classic explanation for the existence of a unitary monarchical state: the power of the state should be absolute, centralized and indivisible. In contrast, Althusius focused on the creation of a decentralized federal state[8]. He established the most general rules for the decision-making process, which is what "affects everyone should be agreed with everyone". This means that any particular community may have the power of veto and self-regulatory autonomy on issues that are part of the community's vital problems, while it is possible to use majority voting in general issues that are concerned to all[9]. The key category of Althusius' political theory is "consociation", which suggests that general issues cannot be adopted by the majority, but when accepted by everyone the decision-making process must prevail on the basis of the agreement[10].

Models of democracy for divided society

A divided society is a society in which the organization of politics in most cases occurs in accordance with ethnicity, and two or more segments of society compete with each other for power in the center of the political system[11].

There is a fundamental debate between the advocates of communal views (in which consensus is the best option) and those who advocate a more integrated direction. In this context, there is a debate between those who suggest electoral systems should strengthen the positions of ethnic parties and promote ethnic distribution and those who want to create incentives for parties or candidates which promote interethnic formation or minimize the importance of ethnicity as a basis for the distribution of public resources.

Arend Lijphart has borrowed the term "consociational" from the works of Althusius for his explanation of stability in polarized states; he mentioned it in his work "The Politics of Accommodation" (1968) for the first time, but this term has not become widespread. In its original form, the theory of consociational democracy was developed in the article "Consociational Democracy" (published in "World Politics" in 1969). In subsequent works, the main concept of Lijphart changed a bit, but since 1990 the concept has remained constant.

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[8] Éva Bóka, "The Idea of Subsidiarity in the European Federalist Thought", *Grotius: The Journal of the Institute of International Relations of the Corvinus University of Budapest* (2005), http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/ECICWF/boka_eva_idea_subidiarity.pdf.

[9] Thomas Hueglin, "Bottom-up Federalism: The Early Modern Contribution to Local Governance in a Globalizing World", *Paper for the Workshop Local Governance in a Global Era – In Search of Concrete Visions for a Multi-Level Governance*, (December 7-8, 2001), http://lex.juris.hokudai.ac.jp/global-g/paper/4-09.pdf.

[10] Томас Хьюеглин, "Федерализм, субсидиарность и европейская традиция", *Казанский* , no. 4 (2002), http://www.kazanfed.ru/publications/kazanfederalist/n4/stat5.

[11] Bernard Grofman, Robert Stockwell, "Institutional design in plural societies: Mitigating ethnic conflict and fostering stable democracy", in *Economic welfare, international business and global institutional change*, ed. Ram Mudambi, Pietro Navarra, Giuseppe Sobbrio (Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, 2002), 102.

Consociational democracy can be described as a system of accommodation and compromises between elites, in which plural societies are able to achieve political stability. Lijphart defines the consociational democracy through its four distinctive features, the first, and the most important, of which is a grand coalition of political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society. It can take several forms, for example, the cabinet of a grand coalition in the parliamentary system, a "big" council or a committee with important advisory functions, or a grand coalition with other key officials in the presidential system. Three other important elements of the consociational democracy are 1) a mutual veto, 2) proportionality, and 3) a high degree of autonomy for each segment. Thus, the most important feature of consociational democracy is that the political leaders of all the significant political segments of the plural society cooperate in the government of country within the framework of a "grand coalition". The style of government in the consociational model is based on the building of a coalition of interests[12]. Of course, for this purpose, representatives of political forces need to be in the government simultaneously and do not participate in dangerous temporary rotary coalitions, whose composition is constantly changing[13].

Participation in a "grand coalition" provides an important political guarantee of security for political segments that constitute a relative minority, but the guarantee is not absolutely reliable. Decisions must be made by the "grand coalition"; they are achieved by voting, and although their presence in the coalition gives minorities the opportunity to vigorously defend their position in the face of other coalition partners, nevertheless the majority may blackball such decisions. If decisions are taken in this way through the violation of vital interests of the minority segment, then such a defeat would be considered unacceptable, and cooperation between elites of these segments would be threatened. The style of government in the consociational model is based on building a coalition of interests. Since in plural societies the stakes in a political game often rise very high, it is undesirable to have politics of a zero-sum game: therefore, a "grand coalition" is more suitable for them, rather than a "government-versus-opposition". In developed "normal" democratic constitutions, this dilemma is solved by establishing a simple majority for the ordinary agenda and special absolute majority for making important decisions (for example, amendments to the constitution)[14].

Donald Horowitz is the most famous critic of consociationalism. He emphasizes that consociational mechanisms just reinforce the ethnic or religious cleavages, and elites do not have incentives to cooperate[15] . Horowitz pays attention to the theme of coalitions before and after the elections; unlike Lijphart, for whom the main goal is to reach a compromise between groups after the election, Horowitz points out the necessity of coalition building before elections that would involve the electorate from different groups and thus promote a compromise on an ethnic basis[16]. He puts forward arguments in favor of an

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[12] Аренд Лейпхарт, *Демократия в многосоставных обществах: сравнительное исследование*, trans. A. Salmin, G. Kamenskaia (Moscow: Aspect Press, 1997), 86.

[13] Лейпхарт, *Демократия в многосоставных* , 89.

[14] Аренд Лейпхарт, "Со-общественная демократия", *Полис* , no. 3 (1992): 86–87.

[15] Grofman and Stockwell, "Institutional design in plural societies", 108.

[16] Donald Horowitz, "Constitutional design: proposals versus processes", in *The architecture of democracy: constitutional design, conflict management and democracy*, ed. Andrew Reynolds (Oxford University Press, 2002), 23.

approach of integration that helps to resolve ethnic conflicts by overcoming the ethnic difference between groups[17]. Horowitz determines that the best way to reduce the destructive characteristics of a society with socio-political divisions is not to encourage the formation of ethnic parties, but rather to use an electoral system that will encourage cooperation and accommodation among competing groups[18].

Power-sharing vs. majoritarian democracy in Ukraine

Nowadays Ukraine faces a lot of the institutional problems. There have been a lot of attempts to reform the Ukrainian political system, but all of them were unsuccessful. These institutional arrangements are based on a majoritarian democracy. And in the case of Ukraine shows the failure of this model in terms of a political system. This is because Ukraine is a plural society.

The reformation of the political system in Ukraine was based on a majoritarian democracy. This model of democracy means a government-versus-opposition pattern. These majority rules work well in relatively homogeneous societies. That is why this principle does not work in the Ukrainian political system.

Kuzio is against the zero-sum game politics across post-Soviet countries; he argues that for post-Soviet countries it is impossible to apply „non-liberal" politics to the creation of a single nation. This creates the interethnic tension that impedes national integration[19]. He says that the great degree of diversity makes for a more difficult transition to democracy.

Ukraine is a plural society, which is why application of a classical model of democracy (which is characterized by the nation-state) is impossible[20]. Stepan has formulated a general theoretical principle that the aggressive policy of nation-state if more than one mobilized national group exists is dangerous for social stability and prospective for democratic development[21].

The division inside society influences the reforms' failure and Matsiyevsky argues that the main factor is the deep elite's fragmentation. The main political actors have given their preferences to a "zero-sum game" instead of compromise and cooperation, and this game ended mutual losing[22].

The changing of consolidation democracy's model is a way to overcome the crisis of the political system. The divided elites inhibit the reforms that cause social instability. At the same time, we could not demand consolidating elites on a totalitarian basis. Therefore, stable democratic development can only take place if there is a voluntary consolidation and coordination of positions and goals.

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[17] Grofman and Stockwell, "Institutional design in plural societies", 109.

[18] Benjamin Reilly, "Electoral systems for divided societies", *Journal of Democracy* 13, no2 (2002): 157.

[19] Taras Kuzio, "Western Multicultural Theory and Practice and its Applicability to the Post-Soviet States", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 13, no. 2 (2005): 235.

[20] Stepan, "Ukraine: Improbable Democratic "Nation-State" But Possible Democratic "State-Nation"?", 297.

[21] Алексей Миллер, "Нация-государство или государство-нация?", *Россия в глобальной политике*, no. 5, (Сентябрь-Октябрь 2008), http://www.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/34/10434.html.

[22] Юрий Мациевский, "Смена, транзит или цикл: динамика политического режима в Украине в 2004–2010 гг.", *Полис,* no.5 (2010): 25.

Implementation of power-sharing into the Ukrainian political system

The key point that determines the effectiveness, or ineffectiveness, of the consociational model is the "extra-constitutional" factors associated with the functioning of the political system in a whole. In Ukrainian practice, there is a balance of socio-political segments that leads to a blockage of the political process. Under these conditions, it is necessary to find out solutions to the problems related to the search for a new configuration of institutional design. One of the options might be using some principles of Lijphart's consociational democracy; the principle of "grand coalition" could partially "unload" the "narrow" places of the political system in Ukraine.

The most important feature of a "grand coalition" is not its specific institutional composition, but leaders of the largest political segments take part in the government of a plural society. Moderation of positions and readiness to compromise are the necessary conditions for the formation of a "grand coalition". In this sense, the prospect of being in government is a powerful incentive for compromise, because in this case the risk of being deceived by other parties or their own unwarranted optimism about their readiness for reconciliation is minimized. These political parties would get an important guarantee of political security when they have power and do not trust each other[23]. A "grand coalition" could be formed by a broad representation in the executive through the following constitutional requirements: the government is formed by the equal representation of two ethnopolitical groups (Belgium); to give the right to be represented in the government to all parties that have to overcome a 5% threshold (South Africa, 1994-1999); equal representation of the two main parties in the cabinet and rotation between the two parties of the presidential post (Colombia, 1958-1964); or the presidential post is permanently "reserved" for one group, and the post of prime minister is for another (Lebanon)[24]. Thus, it is possible to create an effective majority, where all significant socio-political groups will be represented due to this mechanism.

The grand coalition is a comprehensive concept that describes any collective governing by the elites' segments. There are different forms of democratic consociational executive; they are absolute, coinciding and weak.

The absolute consociational executive is represented by leaders of all significant ethnic segments. In coinciding consociationalism, each significant ethnic segment is represented in the executive, and this executive has the support of at least the majority of each segment. In weak consociationalism, each significant segment has elected political leaders in the executive, but at least one of the segments has support of a plural majority among voters.

The democratic constitution does not require a full, inclusive, grand coalition in the executive. But this grand coalition should have a significant distribution of power between segments, each of which is represented in the government with the support of at least a plural majority within each segment. Consociations can exist without the inclusion of all

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[23] Лейпхарт, "Со-общественная демократия", 89.

[24] Аренд Лейпхарт, "Конституционный дизайн для расколотых обществ", *ОЙКУМЕНА: Альманах сравнительных исследований политических институтов, социально-экономических систем и цивилизаций*, no. 6 (2009): 168

segments being placed into the government. This situation can arise when there are many small ethnic minorities that are not particularly significant[25].

The prospect of consociational democracy is not that the democratic regime is a parliamentary or a presidential one. It consists of the existence of power-sharing by all groups over the functions of the executive and the agenda of the legislature[26]. The executive, where there is a significant inter-segment representation, is a necessary component of a democratic consociation.

The 2004 reform was accepted because no one group had a majority. Hale argues that Ukraine got the democratic progress not because Yuschenko won the presidency at the end of 2004 but because he did not win. That election created a stalemate in the country, which they managed to get out of only when Yuschenko agreed to make presidential power weaker, through constitutional reform, in exchange for which Yanukovych would refuse the presidency and would consent to a third round[27]. In the new system, a parliament appoints a prime minister. A head of a cabinet has got broad power that could be used as a counterweight to the current presidential power in political conflicts. Such a separation of power deprives the president of becoming a major force that determines the direction of collective elites' action because elites that would be dissatisfied with a president may shift to a parliament and a prime minister[28].

Some scholars (like Lijphart) point out that a parliamentary system is needed to build a model of power-sharing, but due to the comparative method of research, it has been possible to determine that some semi-presidential countries, under certain conditions, could combine formal and informal institutions to act as a parliamentary system. Other researchers point out that the premier-president system could function as a parliamentary one[29]:

Table 1.
Functioning of systems in relation to whom the government is accountable

Government Accountability to	Parliamentary	Premier-president	President-Parliament	Presidential
Parliament	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
President	No	No	Yes	Yes

In general, premier-presidentialism could be considered as the most optimal choice of institutional design; it brings to democracy both legitimacy and effective governance. Such republics keep the benefits of presidentialism: direct elections of a president as a leader of government to help ensure legitimacy, while institutional dispersal of power

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[25] Brendan O'Leary, "Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments", in *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies,* ed. Sidney Noel (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 12-14.

[26] O'Leary, "Debating Consociational Politics", 17.

[27] See more: Henry Hale, "Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia", *World Politics* 63, no. 4 (2011).

[28] Генри Хейл, "Президентский режим, революция и демократия", http://www.nmnby.org/pub/0805/31a.html.

[29] William Clark, Matt Golder, *Principles of comparative politics* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2013).

can make governance more open to access and help to limit authoritarian tendencies. People's support for a strong national figure can indeed integrate a divided society, but if a strong president is accepted by only one party (usually the majority of ethnic and/or societal/regional groups in a multi-ethnic society[30]), then also, semi-presidentialism can be the most important factor for further split and instability. That is why a model of power-sharing is required, the main purpose of which is accommodation and compromise.

Political reform, the transition from a president-parliament system to a premier-president system, introduced a new institution into Ukraine: the government's political accountability before parliament. The presidency in premier-president systems gives a president some power to nominate the prime minister, and sometimes ministers, but only a parliamentry majority can dismiss the cabinet[31]. But one of the political system's problems in Ukraine, e.g. dual accountability of the Cabinet of Ministers to both the President and Parliament, remains.

Scholars argue that a plural society needs some kind of power-sharing between its significant segments. The key idea of any power-sharing structure is that two or more ethnonational groups have to govern together and take decisions under consensus. No single group can decide important matters without the consent of the other. On the basis of informal or formal rules, all groups have access to political power and other resources.

According to Lijphart a "grand coalition" can take different institutional forms. In the context of the Ukrainian political system, such an arrangement could be implemented into the Cabinet of Ministers. So, the presence of the second largest party's principle is one of the required elements of reforming the political system. It avoids the winner-takes-all system and introduces power-sharing into the government. The political practice of divided cabinets in Ukraine has shown a positive tendency for promoting democracy. The most divided cabinets were between 2006–2010. They were formed by opposing parties in parliament (Party of Regions and Our Ukraine) or by political forces in conflict (BUT and NU-NS). Therefore, the consensus among the main political actors provides democratization. Also, such power-sharing does not allow for the building of a single pyramid (according to Hale).

Conclusions

To conclude, democratization takes place only where there are institutional changes, and an effective system of checks and balances, which could destroy patronage presidentialism and the "winner-takes-all" system. The proposed changes would reduce the strength of patron-client networks in the political system through various instruments: the institutional separation of the president's and prime minister's powers, and the establishment of mechanisms for compromises and cooperation.

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[30] Lidija Basta Fleiner, "Governmental Systems in Multicultural Societies", International Research and Consulting Centre Institute of Federalism, Fribourg, (April 22, 2005), http://www.thomasfleiner.ch/files/documents/governmentalsystems_tipsheet_209.01_final.pdf.

[31] Метью Шугарт, Скотт Мэйноуринг, "Хуан Линц, президенциализм и демократия: критическая переоценка", *ОЙКУМЕНА: Альманах сравнительных исследований политических институтов, социально-экономических систем и цивилизаций*, no. 1 (2003): 80.

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The emancipation policy during the Soviet period in Azerbaijan

*Abstract: The work focuses on the political history of the emancipation of women in So-
viet Azerbaijan during the 1920s and 1930s. The author's intention is to describe the forms and
methods utilised by the communist regime to enforce the engagement of women in the socio-
political, and economic life of the country.*

At the turn of the 19th and 20th century the issue of a women's role in society became
one of the crucial components of ideology of the modernization and democratization of
Azerbaijani society. Many Azerbaijani intellectuals stood at the forefront of those ideas
engaging directly in educational and charitable activities towards women. This was an im-
portant stage in the process of raising awareness of analphabetism, early marriage and
abuse of women's civil rights.

These efforts resulted in the enfranchisement of women and enfranchizing them with
voting rights in 1918 during the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic period. However, taking
into account the level of conservatism among the Muslim society, in which women's rights
were highly limited, the newly introduced law brought little – if any – breakthrough. The
real cultural revolution came along after 1920, during the Soviet era.

The Azerbaijani intelligentsia tried to solve women issues with a gradual, step-by-step
approach. The co-founder of the first Azerbajiani republic Mehemmed Emin Resulzade
considered women's issues as a statesman. In 1913 he wrote: "Nations are formed by fami-
lies. Nations which are formed by faulty families, are themselves faulty."[2] He argued that
societies formed by unequal marriages could not compete with nations which are created
by partnership marriages where both the husband and wife have equal rights[3]. Resulzade

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[2] Shirmammad Huseynov, ed. *Məhəmməd Əmin Rəsulzadə. Əsərləri, II cild, 1909-1914*, (Baku: Shirvannashr, 2001), 207.

[3] Huseynov, *Məhəmməd Əmin Rəsulzadə. Əsərləri*, 247.

proved that women have to know their rights in order to function properly within a family and banning them from that pushes the whole society into backwardness and analphabetism.

Broadly understood, the "women's issue" was one of the most frequent topics of the satirical magazine *Molla Nasreddin*[4]. *The magazine's editor Jalil Mammadguluzade published articles covering tragic situations of young Muslim women, early marriage problems, and a lack of women's freedom within a family environment and beyond. Molla Nasreddin's* caricatures had a much bigger impact on the readers than intellectual divagations published by other newspapers. One of those satirical illustrations presented how young boys perceived women. The image showed a young boy with his father walking down a street in Istanbul, stopping by and looking at a grated window. There is a woman looking down from behind the grate. The subtitle under the illustration says:

-Look, papa, these cages are bigger than mine. There must be large animals in there.

– Shh, my son, this is a house of free Turkish [Ottoman – SK] women".[5]

As shown above, *Molla Nasreddin* diagnosed the problem correctly – a lack of educated men, superstition and the backwardness of the society. This is why Jalil Mammadguluzade and other prominent intellectuals promoted the education of fathers and sons as a way of solving this problem.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, intended to settle the women's issue in their own, revolutionary way. After coming to power in Muslim-inhabited regions, the Bolsheviks planned to encourage women to fight for their rights, by rising up against tradition, religion and their alleged usurpers, their fathers, husbands and brothers.

The Communists made the women's emancipation issue the main slogan of their anti-system crusade. They regarded the battle for women's rights from the perspective of the class struggle. German sovietologist Jorg Baberovsky points out three main goals of this policy: criminalisation of traditional Muslim family rules, provoking gender conflicts and dropping the *chador* (the so-called "unveiling").[6] I fully agree with Baberovsky's critical opinion on the methods of this policy. However, I think the main goal of this move was to engage women in the ranks of proletariat, making them subjects of the country's economic environment. Just to make a remark, women made up half of the country's population and so the Bolsheviks could not allow such a big portion of society to be excluded from the revolution. This is why one of the major tasks of the new authorities was finding a way to include women in the country's social, economic and political life. Moreover, the Communists assumed that having been oppressed by men, women would easily identify themselves with the revolution and it would be of their vital interest to support its pace. The Communist Party thought of solving this issue in line with its doctrine – it needed women in its ranks, who would be faithful to the new ideology. Thus all other aspects of

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[4] Shahla Kazimova, "Progressive Thoughts in "Molla Nasreddin" Magazine (Initial Period – 1906-1907)." in *Oriental studies and arts: contributions dedicated to Professor Tadeusz Majda on His 85th birthday,* ed. Agata Bareja-Starzyńska et al. (Warsaw: Wyadwnictwo Akademickie Dialog, 2015), 146-147.

[5] Christoph Keller, ed. *Slavs and Tatars prezents: Molla Nasreddin: the magazine that would've, could've, should've, (*Zürich: JRP/Ringer, 2011), 63.

[6] Jörg Baberowski**,** *Vrag est' vezde. Stalinizm na Kavkaze* (Moscow: Rossiyskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya, 2010), 608.

the emancipation policy were only supplementary – criminalisation of family rules, inciting gender conflicts and suppressing the veil as the "symbol of enslavement".

In order to achieve this, the authorities had to make a grand effort, both organizationally and educationally. From November 1920, they started to establish women-only units (zhenotdely) aside the Central Committee, the Baku Committee as well as regional and local committees of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. During this initial period, the zhenotdely were lead by women of foreign nationalities.[7]

The first women's club was founded in the apartment of Jeyran Bayramova, a women's rights activist, in June 1920. There was also a library and a tailor cooperative (a so-called *artel*) formed by 10 women.[8] Apart from teaching craftsmanship, the club's organizers carried out their propaganda and indoctrinated their members. Bayramova writes in her memoires that at the beginning women were afraid to come to the club's meetings and those who were not, were later bullied and intimidated by their husbands who threatened them with divorce. Secretly, they brought their own sewing machines and continued to learn their craft.[9] Along with that, the club members took part in a literacy course. After finishing their classes they were assigned to fight analphabetism in the villages. In 1924-1930, the courses were attended by 8,280 women altogether.

As the club developed its activities, authorities granted it the confiscated mansion of one of Baku's tycoons. The organization prepared future activists to their mission of spreading revolutionary ideas among Muslim women and propagated their social and professional activities, including tearing off their *chadors*, as a symbol of submission. In early 1926, there were already 42 clubs in Azerbaijan. Clearly, they were more effective than the Communist Party's women sections. Firstly, despite being supported by the state, they were in fact bottom-up initiatives. Secondly, the clubs were organized by women who belonged to the same social circles as the course participants, but were "converted" to the new ideology. They were the living examples of the self-determination that could change their own fates. Lastly, the clubs, apart from their ideological role, were also active in the field of education, trade schooling, workshops and cooperatives. In 1927, more than 4,000 Azerbaijani women worked in the industry, comprising around 4.5% of the total labour force.[10]

In January 1923, for the first time in the Soviet Union the Committee for amending women's work and life standards (KUTB – *Komitet po uluchsheniyu truda i bita jenshin*) was formed alongside the Central Executive Committee in Azerbaijan. The committee was headed by Koylu gizi Gulara, who worked as a reporter in the first women's magazine in Azerbaijan – *Sharg gadini[11]* (The Azerbaijani Woman), of which she later became the editor.

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[7] Latifa Aliyeva, "Polojenie jenshin v Severnom Azerbayjanie: 1900-1922 gg." (Summary of Dissertation, Baku State University, 2016), 41.

[8] In 1922 the club was given the name of Azerbaijani revolutionary Ali Bayramov. It lasted until 1937. Its founder was Jeyran Abramova, who, after her husband was sentenced to death, was forcibly sent to Kazakhstan as a "wife of the people's enemy".

[9] [8] Muradova, *Vovlechenie zhenshchin Azerbeyjanskoi SSR v organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti:20-30 gody XX veka (* Baku: Nurlan, 2007), 52.

[10] Muradova, *Vovlechenie zhenshchin Azerbeyjanskoi SSR v organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti*, 57.

[11] The magazine was founded in 1932. The name (The Eastern Woman) was symbolic, as it was the first such publication among the Muslim societies of the Soviet Union at that time. In 1938 it was renamed *Azarbayjan gadini* (The Azerbaijani Woman).

Following this example, such committees were also formed in other Soviet republics. One of the main tasks of these organizations was to prepare women for the industrial work environment, including putting them into cooperatives and *kolkhozes*. In order to attract the women and pull them out of their homes, the committees offered several perks like free dining, laundry presses, nurseries and other things. In 1928 during the Moscow summit, a decision was made to centralize all the committees into one organization – the KUTB, backed by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union.[12] In Azerbaijan, the committees' main activities included legal support for women and monitoring the enforcement of Soviet legislation concerning family issues. Another task was including women into local political units, National Councils, as well as organizing educational courses for them. Under the influence and pressure of KUTB activists, many women were elected to local councils and very often led them. In case of rejection, both men and women suffered repressions. However, very often it turned out that when KUTB activists left a village, locally "elected" female heads of the councils silently resigned from their posts either voluntarily or under the pressure of local men. Among the most conservative societies of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the KUTB enforced radical actions including the *anti-chador* (anti-veil) campaign. The action was so aggressive and severe that local people named it *hujum* or invasion, siege.

The campaign against *paranja* (full-body clothing) in Central Asia was brutally enforced from 1927. On March 8th, a public burning of *paranjas* was organized in Tashkent, Samarkanda and Kokand.[13] One of the most spectacular *hujums* was carried out in Samarkanda, on the Registan square right next to the Islamic school Ulug Beg Madrasah. The site was purposely chosen because during the Medieval Period the square witnessed public executions. Women gathered around the square, threw their paranjas on the ground and burned them. The campaign resulted in riots and protests, as well as a terror campaign against women in many areas, where they decided to join the action and throw away their full-body clothing.

In Azerbaijan, the anti-*chador* campaign began in autumn 1928. In order to execute it, the Central Executive Committee created a special anti-*chador* commission headed by the Committee's chief Samad Aghamali-oglu. In 1929 the authorities decreed a resolution forbidding the wearing of *chadors* and traditional men's headwear *papaq* in public.[14] Entrance to schools, theaters and public offices was not granted to veiled women. Also, not following this rule could be punished with up to three months of community service or a 300-ruble fine and the confiscation of the chador. However, the campaign effect was far from what the authorities had initially assumed. The majority of women simply stopped going out, preferring to stay at home rather than show theselves in public without *chadors*. The authorities tried to promote the image of a "liberated woman", demanding from local communists to be examples by going out with their wives showing their hair. Moreover, public officers were asked to abolish covering women's hair among their families and to show themselves in public places with their hair exposed. Not obeying

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[12] In 1932 the KUTBs were dissolved and replaced with women's sections in the Soviets.

[13] Marianne Kamp, *The New Woman in Uzbekistan: Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism,* (Seattle & London: University of Washington Press, 2006), 166.

[14] Muradova, *Vovlechenie zhenshchin Azerbeyjanskoi SSR v organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti*, 61–62.

this rule resulted in an imminent loss of a job. Women in factories were instructed to fully uncover their hair, too.

Around March 8, on the occassion of the International Women's Day, public unveiling events were held in Baku. Women were gathered in city squares and were asked to take their *chadors* away and make an oath not to wear them again. However, throwing the *chador* off was not enough, it had to be either burned, torn apart or stomped on. In the villages, women were accompanied by local activists who insisted on women doing this in front of their husbands. Baberovski points out that Azerbajiani women, who wore headscarfs (*yashmaq*) instead of *chadors,* were also forced to take them off. Such actions were not imposed on Russian or Ukrainian women.[15] In some regions the communists forcibly educated "the women unaware of their rights". Russian and Armenian *komsomoltsy* grabbed women on the streets pulling off their *chadors* and throwing them down. Nationality was a factor here, as Muslim communists, especially in smaller settlements, refused to take part in such actions. In patriarchal communities the men's honor was dependent on how women behaved and were taken care of. Muslim communists knew that by unveiling their own wives and daugthers they would lose respect and esteem within their communities. Therefore, in order to try to save their reputation, they often left towns when the activists were coming.

Blinded by their own propaganda the communists did not realize that they were culturally abusing women, tearing off not only their cloaks but also their dignity. Disregarding social status, a woman in a Muslim society, while cloaked, was secure from molestation. In many poorer towns and villages they hid not only their bodies but also their poverty. Meanwhile, seen publicly without *chadors* they were treated like prostitutes, risked molestation and abuse, and sometimes even being raped.[16] Not fully recognizing the hidden sense of this obsession, local men were suspicious of the communist activists, fearing that they might tear off women's clothes to abuse them right away. Therefore, fearing for the safety of their wives and daugthers they tried to save them by hiding them or sending them away to their distant relatives. This is why it often happened that when the activits came to town, they saw only men and children around. In one of the villages, women were gathered in a local mosque while men kept guard, not letting the activists nearby.[17]

Women themselves were those who suffered the most in this battle against their headwear. Once they showed themselves without *chadors* in public, they were often persecuted, beaten up, raped or murdered. The anti-*chador* activists gladly reported the statistics of burned pieces of clothing, while nobody kept records of the victims of those actions. In smaller towns, the crimes and the wrongdoers were not reported, women did not confess to being raped and murders were officially recognized as accidents or death from sickness. Even in Baku's industrial districts women were being harassed. In March 1929, in an attempt to remedy this situation, the government decreed that special checkpoints be formed next to the entrances of factories and clubs. Earlier, in January 1929,

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[15] Baberowski**,** *Vrag est' vezde,* 619.

[16] Marianne Kamp, "Women – initiated unveilling, State-led campaigns in Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan," in *Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World: Gender, modernism and the politics of dress*, ed. Stephanie Cronin (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 220.

[17] Baberowski**,** *Vrag est' vezde,* 626.

there was a special purpose bureau formed within the prosecutor's office, devoted to this kind of crime. Specially introduced laws saw up to three years of imprisonment for men persecuting or abusing women over their way of dressing; the same punishment could be faced by people campaigning against the unveiling. In order to discourage such behaviour, right before the mass unveiling actions on March 8, the judges of the Supreme Court visited villages and organized demonstrational processes during which people were being sentenced to the death penalty for their crimes against women. Such fake processes angered local populations and resulted in riots, so the judges and prosecutors had to be accompanied by GPU secret service agents. However, local Azerbaijani KUTB activists demanded to qualify crimes against women as of counter-revolutionary character and asked for capital punishment sentences. In May 1929, the Central All-Soviet KUTB in Moscow discussed the issue of mass murders of women in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. The motion of the Azerbaijani delegates was backed and pushed forward to the Central Executive Committee with a recommendation to make necessary amendments to the Criminal Code. In early 1930, during the next wave of anti-*chador* campaigning, the level of agression against women was even higher. The central authorities introduced the severe amendments to the Criminal Code,[18] but it was only a symbolic move, as earlier solutions also made it possible to adequately punish such crimes.

Regarding making Islamic law comply to state rules in the sphere of family affairs, several attempts were also made by the tsarist regime. For example, in 1872 the authorities decreed the age of maturity to be 13 for women and 15 for men.[19] However, the law was practically ineffective among Muslim communities. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, quickly passed legislation regulating marriage and family affairs. Article 79 of the first Constitution of the Azerbaijani SSR (May 1921) mentioned gender equality in all social and political spheres, in economy, as well as in education. Because, as I have mentioned already, the women rights issue was a priority to Bolsheviks, and certain regulations had already been introduced in 1920. The National Justice Committee made a decree on July 21, 1920, banning polygamy, introducing the age of maturity for women at 16, enacting a civil registry office and forbidding the abduction of future wives, a custom popular in the whole Caucasus. In June 1927, Azerbaijani authorities annulled the tradition of Islamic marriage (*kebin*) and *mehr* ("a promise", usually material goods, given by the husband to his newlywed). The law was retroactive and voided all religious marriages, forcing people to register their relationship in civil registry offices (*Zapis' Aktov Grazhdanskogo Sostoiania*-ZAGS). However, these acts were only a formality, as local traditions and Sharia law customs prevailed and were still binding among the Muslim community. By the end of December 1928, the authorities had imposed even stricter rules concerning family affairs. It introduced heavy fines and imprisonment for the Muslim clergy, who did not obey the prohibition. In case a man decided to marry a second wife or carry out a *siga* (so-called "temporary marriage"), he risked up to five years of imprisonment. Marrying anyone underage was prohibited and resulted in up to three years of imprisonment. Also, men who would not let their divorced wives marry again, could face up to three years behind the bars.

[18] Baberowski, *Vrag est' vezde,* 630–631.
[19] Muradova, *Vovlechenie zhenshchin Azerbeyjanskoi SSR v organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti*, 24.

In spite of having such instruments at their disposal, the authorities failed to fully enforce the new legislation. In many local regions official civil marriage was not regarded valid, people still carried out *kebins*. Rural communities stayed away from the courts, women did not report the crimes against them fearing for their reputation.

The cultural revolution of the 1920s had proven to be a failure. It brought more harm than good to Azerbaijani women. Its main sin was introducing gender conflict and using the women rights issue in an ideological war. It is enough to give an example of absurdly organized local meetings in villages, where women were earlier told to stand up and report "enemies of the people" and to demand liberation "from men's oppression". Based on their reports, the authorities made lists of people who objected to the revolution. A similar paradigm was Pavlik Morozov, an anecdotal boy who reported the *kulaks* (peasants with privately-owned households) and did not hesitate to report his own parents. Just like Pavlik Morozov who was later shown as a child role model, women were also intended to act like protagonists of the cultural change, battling ideological enemies, collectivisation and the elimination of private property. The emancipation campaign did not end well for its executors either, as Josef Stalin himself intervened. On July 1, the Politbureau dismissed the whole executive committee in Baku. The anti-*chador* campaign was critisized as being introduced without taking into consideration local cultural and economic circumstances – aside from *chadors*, also folk musical instruments were supposed to be banned. The central authorities in Moscow pointed out that the campaign was carried out ineffectively and it made people distrustful towards the ideas of the Revolution. It has to be pointed out that during the first years of sovietization, national communists led by Nariman Narimanov (the head of the Council of National Commissioners of the ASSR in April 1920-April 1922) openly disapproved of the methods of the anti-*chador* campaign and harassment of local people.[20] Instead of being eliminated, the *chadors* became symbols of local identity.

Only after launching full-scale propaganda in literature, cinematography, theater and television (films: "Sevil" (1929), "Almaz" (1936), opera "Nargiz" (1932), sculptures and monuments of strong, liberated workwomen, a statue of a liberated woman in Baku (1960),) were the communists able to really influence the emancipation of women. The cinema, regarded by communists as the main tool of propaganda, played the biggest role. Even the most distant villages were accessible for mobile cinemas. During the post-Stalinist era, the authorities resigned from the brutal enforcement of cultural change and instead used soft power methods. The propaganda pictured a successful, educated woman with uncovered hair and contrasted it with an illiterate peasant woman with a *chador*. This method was used to stigmatize the traditional, conservative communities. There was no place for *chador* in Soviet Azerbaijan. Only a headscarf (*kalaghay*) was allowed and it was associated with traditional, foklore clothing. Local communities came to terms with the cultural revolution's failure. The mosques were being closed but a blind eye was turned to religious practices at home.

Moreover, while analysing the issue of Azerbaijani women it is important to remember, that the process of emancipation was started much earlier, even before the communist revolution. The difference was that at that time it was not a method of revolutionary terror,

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[20]   Nariman Narimanov, „K istorii nashej revolutsii v okrainakh", in: *Nariman Narimanov. Pisma i nekotorie dokumenty po karabakhskomu voprosu,* ed. Ramiz Mekhtiyev (Baku: Nurlan, 2002), 52–54.

but of education and in participation with socially active, educated women. Also, women emancipation of the pre-revolution era did not assume using the women's rights issue in an ideological battle, but rather saw it as part of the general social modernization process.

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Value Orientations and Social Status Aspirations of Frontier Teenagers in Eastern and Central Europe

Abstract: This research deals with a comparative sociological analysis of values and social-status aspirations of adolescents who live at the border areas in Central and Eastern Europe in Ukraine, Poland and Hungary. The key issues of the article are based on a comparative survey of teenage youth of Ivavo-Frankivsk's graduates (n=774) on the one hand and Ukrainian citizens on the other hand. Additionally, a comparative study of social-status aspirations of adolescents from Ukraine – Kharkiv (n=428), Drohobych (n=392)), Poland (Zielona Gora (n=336); Rzeszow (n=294)) and Hungary (Nyiregyhaza (n=359) -- based on the international study «Youth on the border of Central and Eastern Europe» is analysed. The paper investigates the trend of European-oriented identity of teenagers' values. It shows that there are more common characteristics of value orientations than differences among Ukrainian, Polish and Hungarian teenagers. It concludes that it is conditioned by the characteristics of their youthful age, including modern educational influence on their consciousness and communicational experience determined by the fact of living at "the borderland of cultures and peoples". The prospects for further study of the subject are also discussed.[1]

Key words: borderland, value orientations, adolescents, frontier, Eastern and Central Europe,

Introduction

It is well-established that the process of Eastern and Central Europe frontier scientific investigation began at the end of the 20th century as a result of fundamental transformations in the geopolitical structure of the region, as determined by the destruction of the former USSR. Both the process of European integration and the collapse of the former USSR resulted in the creation of new independent states, as well as the formation of

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a modern borderland region, which has given a particular importance to the scientific reflection and conceptualization of the concepts of the border and the border area in terms of new geopolitical circumstances. A number of factors have determined the social and academic significance of scientific investigation of the Eastern and Central Europe frontier area. From the epistemological point of view, a significant need for a theoretical rethink of the borderland concept might be seen when taking into consideration the issue of globalization on the one side, and the steadily increasing informational potential of modern society on the other. Both the mentioned above factors have resulted in the destruction of the epistemological potential of the borderland concept as well as in its interpretation crisis, which has substantially contributed to its theoretical and methodological dysfunction in terms of its modern implementation. From the ontological point of view, a particular importance of academic investigation and practical implementation of special strategies of frontier area development could be emphasized so as to promote social stability of the region as well as to prevent some potential conflicts.

Theoretical and Methodological Approaches to the Sociological Analysis of Borderlands

It is quite possible to state with certainty that until this day and age the concept of the frontier has been positioned as a well-established term, the connotation of which in scientific literature was quite understandable and adequately argued. However, in terms of modern circumstances, it is quite possible to assume that the territorial independence of the state, outlined by the borders, and due to globalization, is transformed into a «flexible pragmatism form»[2] and the notion of «the border as an instrument by which the state protects its own national interests, and hence national identity»[3] all visibly loses both epistemological and ontological relevance and, as a consequence, theoretical and methodological legitimacy. Borders in the modern world have ceased to be seen as barriers that have transformed the border into contact zones, where the interaction of cultures and the birth of socio-cultural innovations is actively taking place»[4] The global nature of modern socio-economic processes contributes to the fact that the characteristics of the border are less and less determined by the territory of its localization[5] In view of this, the current state of development of societies in the perspective of a global vision is appropriate to consider by the concept "post-territorial world"[6].

Taking into account the issues mentioned above, we are defining the object of our research as frontier teenagers in Eastern and Central Europe as a particular social group, considering that first of all they are mainly not represented in sociological surveys as long as they principally involve respondents over 18 years of age. Secondly, it is quite possible to say that frontier teenagers tend to communicate across borders thanks to modern

[2] Филиппова О. А., «Концепт Пограничья в контексте политик идентичности.» В, под. ред. .В. Кравченко, А.А. Мусиездова, О. А. Филиповой (Вільнюс: ЕГУ, 2012), 117.
[3] Филиппова, «Концепт Пограничья в контексте политик идентичности», 117.
[4] Валлерстайн И., Конец знакомого : социология XXI века, пер. В.И. Иноземцева (М.: Логос, 2004), 70.
[5] Филиппова, «Концепт Пограничья в контексте политик идентичности», 115.
[6] Maier, *Once Within Borders Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500*.

technological innovations, so that our key hypothetical statement is that a significant number of similarities among adolescences who are living in the Eastern and Central Europe frontier region can be seen, especially in two main spaces of their life: educational and territorial identity. In formulating this hypothesis we proceeded from the supposition that the level of similarity among frontier teenagers in Eastern and Central Europe might be substantially higher than the level of similarity between teenagers in a particular country on the one hand and its citizens on the other hand.

Thirdly, in our belief that value orientations and socio-status expectations of this socio-demographic stratum are crucial in terms of forecasting future trends in the development of border areas, since youth structurally form the most active and innovative stratum of society, for example, the revolutionary events in Ukraine during the period of independence (The «Revolution of Granite», the action «Ukraine without Kuchma», «Orange Revolution», «Revolution of Dignity») were initiated by the young people themselves and only later were they supported by the majority of Ukrainian citizens.

In the long run, it can be assumed that it is the young people, especially the well-educated young people, who in a short-term perspective will implement their own value orientations and social-status expectations in real life practices. Consequently, studying the value orientations of youth literally opens a window of opportunity to understanding their future social actions and to a certain degree it allows us to deduce some trends of their future social activity – therefore, the value orientations and social status aspirations of frontier teenagers in Eastern and Central Europe is the subject of our study.

The aim of this publication is to reveal the features of similarity and difference based on a comparative sociological analysis of values and social-status aspirations of adolescents who live in the border areas of Central and Eastern Europe.

To realize this goal, first of all we need to bring to light the theoretical and methodological foundations of our study. We are going to begin with the concept of the borderland, which in our opinion requires a scientific rethinking and validation in line with current social-cultural realities.

Regarding the scientific discourse of the border phenomenon, we came to the conclusion that the conceptualization of the border notion takes place within the framework of three main approaches: firstly, the border is regarded as the main tool of a certain political order[7,] secondly, it is revealed as an artificial hindrance to social solidarity[8,] thirdly, as a phenomenon which is difficult to define in terms of territorial location, having recently become less physically visible on the one side and more complex and transparent on the other side[9]. Additionally, it is well-established that until this day and age the territorial interpretation of the border and the borderland has dominated. For instance, a significant number of the Association for Borderlands Studies (ABS) publications have been devoted to the territorial aspects of the problem[10].

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[7] For instance: McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500-1800;*Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History.*

[8] For example: Кушнир П.И., "Этническая территория и этнографические границы" В *Труды Института этнографии АН СССР* (Москва, 1951), 3–128.

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[9] Филиппова О. А., «Концепт Пограничья в контексте политик идентичности.» В *Представления о Пограничье и практики их использования*, под. ред. .В. Кравченко, А.А. Мусиездова, О. А. Филиповой (Вільнюс: ЕГУ, 2012), 117.

[10] Google, "Association for Borderlands Studies".

Apparently, the greatest number of recent studies on this topic has been devoted to the problem of the semantic transformation of the border notion from physical localization to value-semantic interpretation and axiological demarcation[11], which in our opinion proves the epistemological and scientific potential of this approach. "The border is not only a territorial concept, it is a social space filled with diversity, the basic parameters of which are its integrity and social interaction", – notes K. Haushofer[12], adding that "... everywhere, where we would like to carefully conduct the border, we see no lines, but only zones, a zone of independent life, full of struggle"[13].

Among Ukrainian researchers, the analysis of the concepts of the border and the boundary in the given methodological perspective can be found in a significant number of publications[14]. This particular approach is also the theoretical and methodological basis of our investigation.

Realizing the purpose of our research, we turned to a number of studies. In particular, by studying the EU situation where the boundary functions have become less clear and, in some cases, the physical boundaries have disappeared, although the state territories are continuing to function. A team of authors (J. DeBardeleben, N. Newol, et al.) proposed to expand the semantic framework of the border concept, introducing the scientific use of two new notions: "hard border" and "soft border"[15]. In a quite similar way, a leading re-

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[11] Валлерстайн, *Конец знакомого мира: социология XXI века.*
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[12] Хаусхофер, "Границы в их географическом и политическом значении", 247.

[13] Хаусхофер, "Границы в их географическом и политическом значении", 245.

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[15] DeBardeleben, J. "Introduction". In *Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe,* edited by. J. DeBardeleben (Ashgate, 2005), 1–23.

searcher at the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF, Germany) analysed the notion of the borderland. Exploring the structural conflicts and contradictions caused by the abolition of border control between EU member states, A. Müller pays special attention to the institutional transformation of its external border from clearly defined borders between individual countries, towards "moving border zones"[16]. Similarly, the Ukrainian scientist O. Filippova proposed distinguishing two semantic vectors of the notion: firstly, the ethno-cultural diversity of the region ("the inner frontier"); secondly, the governmental dimension of the notion ("the external frontier")[17], emphasizing that the physical boundaries of the internal and external frontiers do not always coincide with the mental map of the region in the minds of its inhabitants.

Empirical Data Analysis

The empirical basis of our study consists of three groups of materials. Firstly, there is the monitoring sociological research project "Value orientations of school graduates of Ivano-Frankivsk" conducted by the Educational and Scientific Center of Sociological Research of the Precarpathian region of SHEI "Vasyl Stefanyk Precarpathian National University" in 2015. For several years, under the supervision of the author of that publication, measurements of value orientations of Ivano-Frankivsk's school graduates were carried out. Some of the results of the survey were carried out with the support of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta in 2015. The survey questionnaire was correlated with the research project tools "Ukrainian society" of the Sociology Institute of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. The percentage of the target group achievement accounts for 68,7%. Data were collected from 774 respondents attending 28 Ivano-Frankivsk's schools with the method of personal interview. The sample is representative of the school graduates of Ivano-Frankivsk. The statistical sampling error (with a probability of 0.95) does not exceed 1,98%.

Secondly, we investigated the Ukrainian national monitoring survey "Ukrainian society"[18] (2015), which had been implemented by the Sociology Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine since 1992. The sample and monitoring questionnaire has been standardized since 1992, which results in the possibility of identifying the Ukrainian social change dynamic. Data were collected from 1800 respondents (developers of the sample model – N. Panina, M. Churilov). The sample represents the adult population of Ukraine (18 years and over) by sex, age, education, type of settlement and region.

Thirdly, we consulted the international comparative sociological survey data "Youth on the Border of Central and Eastern Europe" (2015) located at the archive of the Department of Sociology of the Sociological Faculty of VN Karazin Kharkiv National University and conducted with the participation of the publication's author. In order to illustrate the axiologi-

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[16] Müller, *Governing Mobility beyond the State: Centre, Periphery and the EU's External Borders, 35–50*

[17] Филиппова О. А., «Концепт Пограничья в контексте политик идентичности.» В *Представления о Пограничье и практики их использования*, под. ред. .В. Кравченко, А.А. Мусиездова, О. А. Филиповой (Вільнюс: ЕГУ, 2012), 117.

[18] All the data in this article came from: Інститут соціології НАН України, «*Таблиці моніторингового опитування «Українське суспільство» 2015 р*», i-soc.com.ua/files/u/US-2015.doc

cal situation of Ukrainian teenagers from a comparative prospective of Central and Eastern Europe, five cases were selected: Kharkiv (Ukraine, n = 428); Drohobych (Ukraine, n = 392); Rzeszow (Poland, n = 294); Zelena Gora, n = 336) and Nyiregyhaza (Hungary, n = 359).

Comparative Analysis I: Teenage youth of Ivavo-Frankivsk and Ukrainian Citizens

Regarding the sociological investigation outcomes of adolescent youth graduates from Ivano-Frankivsk in comparison with the data of the Ukrainian monitoring survey, it can be seen that the younger generation of Ukrainians are fundamentally different from the country's other residents. In particular, comparing the answers of Ivano-Frankivsk's graduates and the citizens of Ukraine in general to the question "What feelings do you have when you think about your future?" it might be asserted that Ivano-Frankivsk's graduates tend to perceive their future more positively, according to the number of indicators, then Ukrainian citizens as a whole (Diagram 1).

Diagram 1
"What feelings do you have when you think about your future?" (%)

For instance, Ivano-Frankivsk's teenagers demonstrated a significantly higher level of curiosity in their own future (47, 7 %), much more optimistic in their own perceived future (47, 3%), and they are less prone to fear and confused feelings.

It is quite interesting that Ukrainians significantly tend to connect their own future life with the future of their country, which is convincingly shown in this graph (Diagram 2).

Diagram 2

"What do you think? On whom does your personal existence mainly depend on"? "Ukrainian society" (2015) and "Value orientations of school graduates of Ivano-Frankivsk" (2015); (%)

The social responsibility indicator (the distribution of answers to the question "What do you think? On whom does your personal existence mainly depend on"?) is by far the most relevant, once Ivano-Frankivsk's teenagers are compared with Ukrainian citizens as a whole (Diagram 2). Approximately two thirds of Ivano-Frankivsk's youth are convinced that the way their lives are formed mainly depends on them (completely or almost completely), while the proportion of such respondents in Ukraine drops to a little over one fifth (22,8%). Additionally, the majority of Ukrainians tend to consider that their life mainly depends on external circumstances.

The indicator for the future temporal visibility of Ivano-Frankivsk's teenagers is quite significant as well. Approximately one out of ten of Ivano-Frankivsk's teenagers plans his or her life for more than 10 years; roughly one fifth of the respondents plan their life for 2–5 years; 11% of adolescents plan their life path for one year or less.

The average level of life satisfaction of Ivano-Frankivsk's youth accounts for 7,4 points out of a ten-point scale of assessments. However, the average level of trust is only 4,1 out of ten, which correlates with the Ukrainian data in general, nevertheless leaving a lot of questions for reflection.

It is more noticeable that quite a large number of the graduates of Ivano-Frankivsk have expressed a high level of social expectation determined by their future higher education. For instance, to the question: "What do you plan to do after school?" 87,7% of respondents answered that they are going to obtain a higher education.

Regarding political ideological preferences, it can be seen that Ivano-Frankivsk's teenagers expressed the greatest support for the ideology of nationalism (13,7%), while the level of public support for this ideology by Ukrainian citizens in general accounted for 3,8%.

According to the monitoring of the Sociology Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, during the independence period in Ukraine, the number of individuals identifying themselves as Soviet citizens (in other words, the number of people considering themselves citizens of a no longer existing state) is quite significant. In particular, the answer distribution to the question "Will you please tell me, citizen of which country you personally consider themselves first of all? » is quite interesting in both cases (Diagram 3). Regarding Ukrainian inhabitants' preferences, the Ukrainian identity was chosen by the most significant number of respondents (57,5%). Then, the number of respondents who consider themselves as USSR citizens took second place (3,9%). And finally, the number of those who consider themselves as European citizens accounted for 1,3%. It is noteworthy that the ranking between these identities have remained in exactly the same order during all the years of measurements. European identity and Soviet identity have not changed places in year.

Diagram 3
"Will you please tell me, a citizen of which country would you personally consider yourself first of all?"; "Ukrainian society" (1992–2015)[19]; (%)


[19] All the data in this diagram came from: Інститут соціології НАН України, «*Таблиці моніторингового опитування «Українське суспільство» 2015* », i-soc.com.ua/files/u/US-2015.doc as well as from collective monograph Ворона, В. ред., 2013, *1992–2013. Стан та динаміка змін. Соціологічний моніторинг*, Київ: Інститут соціології НАН України

Regarding Ukrainian inhabitants' preferences, a Ukrainian identity was supported by the most significant number of respondents (57,5). Then, the number of respondents who consider themselves as USSR citizens took second place (3, 9). And finally, the number of those who consider themselves as European citizens accounted for 1,3%. It is noteworthy that the ranking between these identities have remained in exactly the same order during all the years of measurements. European identity and Soviet identity have not changed places in years.

However, in the case of Ivano-Frankivsk teenager's preferences according to the same question, it could be seen that European identity (27,7%) substantially overweighs Soviet identity (3%) (Diagram 4).

Diagram 4
"Will you please tell me, a citizen of which country would you personally consider yourself first of all?"; "Ukrainian society" (2015) and "Value orientations of school graduates of Ivano-Frankivsk" (2015); (%)


Comparative Analysis II: The Cases of Teenage Youth in Ukraine, Poland and Hungary

Next, we are going to analyze how the value orientations and socio-status expectations of the adolescent youth living on the border of Eastern and Central Europe, according to the above-mentioned international comparative study, are positioned. From the archive of the Department of Sociology, several indicators were chosen, namely, the distribution of the sense of belonging as well as the belonging to certain communities, will be analysed. Additionally, we will consider the significance of people running their

own businesses in terms of the entrepreneurial initiative indicator such as to deduct some outcomes connected with social activity and social initiative issues.

The significance of higher education is equally important for representatives of all the five analyzed cases, but it is especially important for Ukrainian youth. And in this context, the indicators for Kharkiv youth tend to be more similar to the indicators of Hungarian youth than to the representatives of Rzeszow and Zelena Gora.

Diagram 5
Youth on the Border of Central and Eastern Europe (2015):
Significance of Higher Education (%)

Analyzing the communities' connections, it might be seen that school graduates from Kharkiv demonstrate a much stronger national identity than expected (Diagram 6). Furthermore, according to this indicator there are a lot of similarities among Drohobych's youth with teenagers from Rzeszow and Zelena Gora.

Regarding the territorial identity of Central and Eastern Europe teenagers, a wide range of differences could be mentioned. For example, the territorial identity figures of teenage youth from Ukraine are to some extent higher in comparison with their counterparts from Hungary and Poland (Diagram 8). It is a little bit surprising that in both Ukrainian cases the territorial identity of teenagers is equally similar even though Kharkiv is located in the country's eastern part while Drohobych is situated in its western territory. A similar situation with regional identity data can also be seen.

Next, it is with great pleasure to emphasize that the significance of family values was equally high for teenagers in all analyzed cases (Diagram 7)

Diagram 6
Youth on the Border of Central and Eastern Europe (2015):
**Country's Citizens (%)**

Diagram 7
Youth on the Border of Central and Eastern Europe (2015):
**Significance of Family Value (%)**

Diagram 8
**Youth on the Border of Central and Eastern Europe (2015):**
**Territorial Identity (%)**

A similar situation with the regional identity data can also be seen (Diagram 9)..

Diagram 9
Youth on the Border of Central and Eastern Europe (2015):
Regional Identity (%)

The distribution of answers to the question "To what extent do you feel yourself as Europeans?» reveals the declarative identity of respondents: in Kharkiv, approximately one third of adolescents do not feel European, by contrast the number of such respondents in Drohobych is much smaller (16%). However, teenagers in western Drohobych even feel a little more European than the Polish Rzeszow's teen, which is quite surprising (Diagram 10).

Diagram 10
Youth on the Border of Central and Eastern Europe (2015):
European Identity (%)

Table 1
Youth on the Border of Central and Eastern Europe (2015):
The Significance of own Business Running (%)

Taking into account the subject of our research, the significance of running one's own business, in terms of the entrepreneurial initiative indicator, has been analyzed as well (Table 1).

	Kharkiv (Ukraine)	Drohobych (Ukraine)	Zielona Gora (Poland)	Rzeszow (Poland)	Nyiregyhaza (Hungary)
difficult to answer	2,4	8,0	19,9	21,3	4,8
It does not matter at all	4,3	2,8	5,4	5,2	9,0
Rather, it does not matter	18,2	24,2	29,5	32,6	35,5
Rather, it's important	41,2	43,3	29,5	31,3	36,9
Very important	33,9	21,6	15,7	9,6	13,8

As can be seen, in line with the collected data, the Ukrainian youth from Kharkiv and Drohobych are to some extent more active in terms of the entrepreneurial initiative than their Polish and Hungarian counterparts are altogether. Additionally, it is a little bit surprising that the entrepreneurial initiative indicator in Kharkiv is much higher than in Drohobych. By studying the motives for running their own business, from the perception of adolescents in the border region, we understand that ensuring a normal life for themselves and their families is equally important for representatives of all cities apart from Drohobych where young people have mentioned future independence as their main motivational factor for running their own business.

Conclusions

1. A comparative analysis of the value orientations of Ivano-Frankivsk's teenagers and Ukrainians in general suggests that the youth of Ivano-Frankivsk are fundamentally different in line with a number of indicators (for instance, future perception, ability to assume responsibility, European orientation, etc.). In contrast, comparing the value preferences of adolescent youth in Kharkiv, Drohobych, Rzeszow, Zielona Gora and Nyiregyhaza allows us to establish a high correlation among indicators of communication with their communities, European orientation, entrepreneurial initiative and its motives, etc. So that it can be proved that there are more common characteristics of value orientations among Ukrainian, Polish and Hungarian teenagers than differences. It was concluded that it is conditioned by the characteristics of their age, including modern educational influence on their consciousness and communicational experience determined by the fact of living in "the borderland of cultures and peoples".

2. Thanks to the processes of globalization on the one side and accelerated growth of informational potential on the other side, a new geopolitical phenomenon known as the "post-territorial world" has appeared which has resulted in the necessity of frontier concept scientific rethinking and its modern theoretical-methodological validation.

3. Taking into account the process of semantic transformation of the frontier concept, it could be an epistemologically reasonable solution to interpret it according to the value-semantic demarcation frame of social space, as long as the territorial approach (acceptable rather for industrial societies) is continually losing its theoretical and methodological significance in terms of explaining the instruments of social structure as a whole and the criterion of Central and Eastern Europe frontier teenage communities structuration in particular.

4. The functional transformation of the borderland, its social and cultural diffusions and interactions, is caused by the emergence of new communication opportunities, substantially contribute to the fact that adolescent communities are structured primarily on the basis of a value criterion rather than a territorial one.

5. Apparently, this paper does not represent a complete draft of the problem outlined in the publication. Apart from our analysis, there remain a number of such important issues for determining the attributive parameters of the boundary in the conditions of the «post-tertiary world», the peculiarities of the perception of the boundary phenomenon at the individual and collective levels, the problem of the empirical verification of this theoretical

concept, etc. An analysis of these and many other issues related to the borderline phenomenon will be the subject of future publications on the selected issue.

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